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ASCETIC IDEOLOGY AND THE SATIRIC MODE IN PIERS PLOWMAN 
Martin Leigh Harrison, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2010 
 William Langland’s Piers Plowman is a richly imaginative work keenly 
interested in human nature and the society of its day. Precisely because of those 
concerns, readers of this major fourteenth-century visionary poem have long 
investigated both its status as a satire and the character of the religious thought on 
which it draws. A detailed examination of how the work’s ascetic outlook shaped its 
satire has not been performed, however. This is surprising, because satire also 
centrally concerns itself with identifying flaws in the character and conduct of both 
individuals and groups. Moreover, ascetic thought greatly influenced the interpretation 
and writing of satire well into the central medieval period. This study explores how 
Langland’s poem, although late-medieval and vernacular, makes thorough use of that 
long-standing connection. 
 Part I (chapters 1 and 2) identifies Piers Plowman’s loose participation in a 
formal “genre” of medieval satiric poetry: one characterized by ambiguity and, 
throughout the Middle Ages, by hybridity. Chapters 3 through 5 (part II) move beyond 
discussions of genre (an historically contingent set of formal characteristics) to the 
work’s use of the satiric mode (a particular descriptive stance). Scholars have 
recognized the influence of ascetic “contempt of the world” (contemptus mundi) in the 
poem—but this principle needs to be examined in conjunction with fellow “walls” in 
the so-called “cloister of the soul.” These influence the poem’s narratorial self-
criticism, social criticism, and views on judging others. Part III (chapters 6 and 7) 
considers Langland’s prophetic ideal, suggests an audience that could have 
appreciated it, and traces a posterity that increasingly did not. 
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PREFACE 
MORBIDITY VERSUS “CONTEMPT” 
 In a journal entry for New Year’s Eve of 1872, concluded on New Year’s Day 
of 1873, the famous antiquarian Sir Frederic Madden (Feb. 6, 1801—March 8, 1873) 
was seized by disquiet thoughts: 
  
Tuesday 31st. Very bad night. Cough incessant and stomach very 
uncomfortable. Peste veil [sic] de l’homme! [...] I kept in bed all the day, and 
made myself as warm as possible. Read a little by lamplight. And so the 
miserable year is brought to an end. I cannot say Thank God for it! My bitter 
enemy is still alive, and well; and consequently Planchette, which in 1869 
predicted his death in 1872, is found to be a lie, a deception, and a sham.  
  
And now, having fully determined to bring to a conclusion this long series of 
Journals, filling 43 vols I commenced 1 Jan. 1819 and continued 
uninterruptedly day by day to the present 31 Dec. 1872, I shall cease to record 
my daily life. Indeed I am too ill to do so, and have no strength or energy left. I 
feel I am only a short distance from the grave, and my poor dear wife is dying 
visibly, slowly but surely. When I cast a rapid glance over all I have done and 
suffered during the last 54 years, I feel that I have been a very ill-used man, 
both by Fate (or Providence) and by people in office. And of the hundreds I 
have laid under obligation, scarcely one ever showed any gratitude. But I 
cannot dwell on such minor miseries. 
 
There is (of course) a large proportion of matter merely personal in these 
Journals, and much that is trivial, but also there is a large mass of valuable 
information on Paleographical, Antiquarian, and Literary subjects. Had my 
children manifested the slightest interest in these volumes, I might probably 
have bequeathed them to their care, but as this is not the case it is my wish that 
these Journals, from 1819 to 1872 inclusive, together with other books and 
Papers should be placed together in a box properly secured, and after my death 
offered to the Bodleian Library, on the condition that the Box shall not be 
opened till the 1st January, 1920—at which time no offence can be given by 
remarks made (often in extreme bitterness of spirit) on [sic] any individual. If 
the curators of the Bodleian Library should refuse to accept the bequest, under such 
conditions, then I direct the same offer to be made to the Chatham [sic] 
Library, Manchester, and if another refusal is given, then I leave the volumes 
to my Executor or Executors, to destroy or keep as he or they may think 
proper.  
 
And these are the last words I shall ever write in the volume before me.  
 
                                                                         F. Madden 
                                                                         1st January, 1873.1  
                                                 
1 The original diaries are available on microfilm as The Diaries of Sir Frederic Madden, MSS Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, Engl. Hist. c. 140-182 (London: World Microfilms Productions in association with 
the Bodleian Library, 1973). 
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 No doubt the weather (“black and gloomy” on Sunday the 29th, continuing 
colder) contributed something to Madden’s bad feelings, as did both his and his wife’s 
unfortunate ill health—but Madden also, clearly, had more than the present weighing 
on his mind. His life, seen in retrospect, disappointed him bitterly; though entries 
stretching back half a century testify to a mind profoundly gifted for the study of 
ancient languages and the leisure to pursue that study, resulting in pioneering editions 
of Middle English texts—and knighthood at age 32—these had failed to leave him 
content. Although he declares a desire not to “dwell on such minor miseries” as had 
afflicted him over the years, he also seems unable to keep from doing so. 
  Perhaps not surprisingly, neither Madden’s last entries nor his earliest have 
been published. The only ones to appear so far in print comprise a slim volume of 
“extracts” focused expressly on the scholar’s years at the University of Cambridge, 
edited by T. D. Rogers, even though a quick look at the earliest and latest entries will 
show that for Madden scholarship was not confined to one life stage.2 Rogers’ choice, 
however, indicates a probable desire to preserve the dignity of Madden’s private life, 
and to take at his word that his entries could provide much non-personal material still 
valid for a university’s institutional history and others’ scholarly use. Robert and 
Gretchen Ackerman provided more personal information about Madden in a book 
published one year before Rogers’, but this “biographical sketch and bibliography” 
preserves discretion with a necessarily cursory essay.3 
 We can likely ascribe much of Madden’s dissatisfaction to depression, but it is 
poignantly ironic that he should have felt this way. At a time when the ranks of Middle 
English editors were filled with sometimes-dilettantish amateurs, Madden 
                                                 
2 See T.D. Rogers, ed., Sir Frederic Madden at Cambridge: extracts from Madden’s diaries 1831, 1838, 
1841-2, 1846, 1859 and 1863 (Cambridge: Cambridge Bibliographical Society, 1980).  
3 Robert W. Ackerman and Gretchen Ackerman, edd., Sir Frederic Madden: a Biographical Sketch and 
Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1979).  
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distinguished himself for exceptionally deep learning, editorial consistency, and rigor. 
His knowledge of literary and intellectual culture, however, appears not to have 
matched his facility with languages and texts: the span from the twelfth to the 
fourteenth century on which Madden devoted much of his scholarly attention was rich 
with reflections, as it happens, on how to age peacefully to arrive at a contented end.  
  Madden might not have taken to heart the profusion of later-medieval texts 
about the art of aging, so often written as elegy, because of the literary and intellectual 
culture surrounding him. In a way alien to and discredited by scholarship in the latter 
twentieth century, the proverb-laden lyrics and elegies that make up so much of the 
early Middle English poetic corpus were interpreted as not literally about death so 
much as about the Conquest—reflections of wounded national pride felt over a 
century later, attesting to the disarray of the English spirit and the dissolution of its 
tongue.4 Madden himself seemed content to focus a focus on editorial and 
paleographical matters.  
 Nationalism set aside, these elegies appear (at least through our own lenses) as 
evidence for another reforming spirit: not lamentations concerning political conquest 
(as Madden’s compatriots might have claimed), but miniature guidebooks on living 
wisely.5 By depicting figures’ overreliance on youth and care for transitory glories, or 
their dying unprepared, such poems could promote the opposite ideal. Proverbs and 
messages spoken by well-regarded figures from the distant past, including King Alfred 
                                                 
4 The idea that the English language had suffered in this way would be initiated by E. A. Freeman in the 
fifth volume of his History of the Norman Conquest: its Causes and its Results (6 vols [Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1873-1879]) published three years later, though Freeman and some compatriots seem 
to have been influenced by a German philosopher named Max Müller (1823-1900). Freeman’s most 
extended meditation on the matter—really a jeremiad—may be found under the subheading “Evil result 
of the Conquest on language” in the 90-page 25th chapter of volume five, esp. pp. 547-48. 
5 See for example the accessus on the elegies of Maximianus, a medieval school text, which I translate 
from R. B. C. Huygens, ed., Accessūs ad Auctores: édition critique (Brussels: Latomus, 1954), a 25: “In 
this book he excoriates old age for its wretchedness and praises the delights of youth. […] The 
usefulness of the book is to understand the desires of the fool, avoidance of old age. It can be 
categorized under ethics, because its subject is behavior.” 
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and Bede, could provide inspiration as well.6 The curious figure of Tremulous Hand, 
an evidently disabled monk contemporary to Laʒamon (whose Brut Madden edited in 
1847), appears to have copied Anglo-Saxon texts at Worcester Cathedral with such 
lessons in mind.7 Debates between body and soul, reflections on the joys of heaven 
vis-à-vis the confining grave: these promote not bitter depression over vanished 
happiness but, instead,  “contempt of the world”  (contemptus mundi)—a term often 
misunderstood as signifying active hatred but more properly referring to a withdrawal 
of concern for worldly things. This sense survives in the legal phrase “contempt of 
court.”8 
 The interest in learning to live well, largely in order to die well, naturally 
extended past the literary and into actual life. As Robert Bartlett has shown, Norman 
and Angevin-era England saw a rise in the popularity of cloistered religious life both 
cenobitic (communal life behind the walls of a monastery) and eremitic (as a hermit, 
alone). In the process of anchoritic immuration, a solitary hermit—often female—
would be sealed within the walls of her “cell” attached to a church in a ceremony 
closely borrowing on the mass for the dead. While such practices may seem morbid or 
depressing, it is important to acknowledge the somewhat paradoxical freedom this sort 
of religious life afforded—perhaps especially for women; by succeeding with her goal 
of becoming an anchoress despite heavy family opposition, for example, Christina of 
                                                 
6 A sampling of such texts nearly contemporary with Madden, if not in the best edition, may be found in 
Richard Morris’s Old English Miscellany: containing a bestiary, Kentish sermons, proverbs of Alfred, 
religious poems of the thirteenth century from manuscripts in the British Museum, Bodleian Library, 
Jesus College Library, etc., EETS o.s. 49 (London: N. Trübner for the Early English Text Society, 
1872; repr. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1997).  
7 On this enigmatic figure and the probably congenital reason for his namesake tremor, see Christine 
Franzen, The Tremulous Hand of Worcester: a Study of Old English in the Thirteenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991).   
8 Simo Knuuttila’s Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) does not explicitly observe but nonetheless makes clear in its discussions that “contempt” in the 
sense of hatred is very different from medieval religious  “contempt.” I am grateful to Alan Perreiah for 
first referring me to Knuuttila’s book and for providing me with a copy of his forthcoming review.  
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Markyate was able to avoid entrapment in a marriage she did not want. After the 
Norman Conquest, religious enclosure also helped women from high-status English 
families maintain their former prestige.9  
 The apparent popularity of literal enclaustration accompanied an interest in 
figurative enclaustration: the cloister without walls. Not all could conduct the rest of 
their lives in an abbey or cathedral, let alone sealed within the walls of a parish 
church, and high-medieval religious thought increasingly recognized external habitus 
for its role in shaping interior disposition.10 The phenomenon of the Order of Friars 
Minor, initiated by Francis of Assisi c. 1209, is well known for its role in encouraging 
religious life of marked austerity outside of the literal cloister.11 About half a century 
before that, the idea was explored more theoretically in writing by Hugo de Folieto, a 
canon regular, in a treatise “on the cloister of the soul.”12 In his treatise, Hugh 
contrasts the various “abuses” attendant upon literal cloistered life with the interior 
virtues an internalized cloister might help to promote. Although Hugh likely intended 
his treatise originally for those like himself in religious orders, its influence extended 
much more broadly. By the close of the Middle Ages in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, as Christiana Whitehead has shown, it even inspired literature intended for 
the laity.13  
 
                                                 
9 For much of this paragraph I have drawn on Bartlett’s England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 
1075-1225 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), at chapter 8 (“The Institutional Church”), pp. 377-
441.  See also C. H. Talbot, ed. & trans., The Life of Christina of Markyate, a Twelfth-Century Recluse 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).  
10 See for example Jeroen W. J. Laemers, “Claustrum Animæ: the Community as Example for Interior 
Reform,” in Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century, edd. I. P. Bejczy and Richard Newhauser 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 119-29. Other works on medieval individuality are cited in the chapters 
below. 
11 David Knowles contrasts the organizational development of the religious orders from Late Antiquity 
to the early modern period in From Pachomius to Ignatius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
12 De claustro animæ, PL 176, coll. 1017-1181. 
13 See “Making a Cloister of the Soul in Medieval Religious Treatises,” MÆ  67 (1998), 1-29. 
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 The development of a “cloister of the soul” arose from the conflict between 
real and ideal inherent in Christian ascetic thought, a conflict present in classical 
Stoicism as well. One might expect continual disappointment, unhappiness, and 
“extreme bitterness of spirit” (such as suffered by Madden) to follow from ascetic 
critiques of actual experience in light of a higher and perhaps unachievable ideal. True 
to its Stoic roots’ ideal of apatheia, however, instead criticized reality as a means of 
promoting detachment from it—or in order to surpass it.14 To consider death and the 
grave, for the medieval ascetic, was to prioritize the eternal. This being the case, it 
may not be surprising that satire was also prevalent in the literature of the Latin West 
during the later medieval period. Such satire also professes dissatisfaction with what 
actually occurs in light of an ideal situation that doesn’t occur. It, too, accordingly 
moves in the direction of ever-greater schematization and abstraction–highlighting, 
even exaggerating flaws in order more solidly to critique them. It is always difficult to 
make convincing assessments of a writer’s ‘tone,’ since tone depends on a reader or 
hearer´s subjective affective response. It therefore lies out of our reach to refer to 
medieval satire’s decreased humor thanks to ascetic thought. Yet we can say that, 
under the influence of asceticism, medieval satires broadened in their “affective 
intent”: the range of emotional reactions they bid to summon up. 
 In the introduction below, I describe the extent to which medieval ascetic 
ideology influenced medieval satire. Their discourses were similar, after all, and not 
merely in the ways I have already indicated. Both were also, for example, deeply 
concerned with the proper occasion for silence and the authority of speech. The 
Greeks used the term parrhesia and the Romans either libertas or licentia for the 
boldness that Stoics and later Christians were to use in their satire, a boldness which 
                                                 
14 See the reference to Barbara Rosenwein (Emotional Communities), Jean Daniélou (Platonisme et 
Théologie Mystique), Thomas D. Hill (“The Unchanging Hero”), and François Vandenbroucke 
(Moines: Pourquoi?) in the introduction below. 
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came from the speaker’s authoritative position outside of, beyond, and above the 
individuals and social systems he criticized.15  This authority, at least in the later 
medieval Latin West, gave the words of ascetic satirists an affinity with both 
sermonizers and prophets—not least because medieval writers often seemed more 
earnest in satire, and more serious, than their classical forebears had been.16 This is not 
to say that all medieval satire was ascetic; certainly the comic verses of the “Goliards” 
prove otherwise. In fact, comic satire often criticized self-styled ascetics for 
hypocritical excess. All the same, the correlation between asceticism and satire was 
robust in the Middle Ages. It suggests that all ascetic discourse is also satiric in some 
way, to the extent that it promotes reform by drawing attention to human weakness.17   
 Written satire works verbally much in the same way that visual caricatures 
work pictorially, both relying on schematization, so it is perhaps not surprising that 
satire’s theoretical relationship with asceticism might be understood pictorially as 
well. This is true today, as satiric covers for the New Yorker magazine show. But 
instruction of a schematizing and thereby satiric sort could be conveyed through 
medieval visual art as well, as Paul R. Hyams has for instance shown.18 A 1624 
portrait by Alonso Cano (1601-1667) of Francis Borgia (1510-1572)—the only 
                                                 
15 See my references in the introduction to Braund, “Libertas or Licentia?”  
16 Seneca, in his Apocolocyntosis (see e.g. the edition listed in the bibliography) makes bold statements 
about his authority for recounting events “as he saw them”—but he does so with obvious humorous 
intent. Even Seneca’s De Ira has been suspected of being merely parodic: see William E. Wycislo, 
Seneca’s Epistolary Responsum: the De Ira as Parody (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2001). In the introduction,  
with reference to Thomas Habinek’s article on Roman satire as “Aristocratic Play,” I provide further 
discussion of classical satire’s humorous aspect. 
17 In L’Ascèse Bénédictine au Moyen Âge (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1927), Ursmer Berlière defines 
asceticism in a way that does not contradict with my view: “L’ascèse est cet ensemble de moyens par 
lesquels, avec l’aide de la grâce de Dieu, on travaille à se purifier des vices et des imperfections, à se 
dépouiller de l’homme naturel pour revêtir l’homme nouveau selon le Christ, à acquérir les vertus qui 
sont la conséquence et l’expression extérieure de cette transformation intérieure, afin d’arriver par la 
pratique de la charité à l’union avec Dieu.” (1) 
18 See “What did Henry III of England Think in Bed (and in French) about Kingship and Anger?” in 
Anger’s Past: the Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages, ed. Barbara Rosenwein (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 92-124. 
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member of that notorious family to be named a saint—illustrates the affinities 
particularly well.  
 An imposing work depicting its subject nearly in life size (at 73¼ by 47¼ 
inches), the painting presents a black-clad Borgia, his hair closely cropped into a 
tonsure, standing alone in the middle of a dark and half-ruined setting. He bears a 
crowned skull in his left hand. While a bright sun shines through the sooty clouds 
behind him, he holds up his right hand in a gesture of warding off. The object of this 
gesture, a large red cardinal’s hat, lies rumpled at his feet.  A standard reading of the 
scene, reproduced in the “Sacred Made Real” exhibition catalogue for the National 
Gallery of Art, observes that the painting represents scenes from the saint’s life. The 
crowned skull represents Empress Isabella of Portugal, the interpretation holds, 
because the sight of her decaying body allegedly impelled him to live ascetically.19 
The cardinal’s hat, which Borgia rejects while contemplating the skull, refers to a 
prestigious position that Borgia actually refused. 
 
                                                 
19 A common trope in medieval religious writing contrasts the earthly beauty of potentates with their 
future corpses’ (or romantic partners’ corpses’) putridity and decay, so this episode in Borgia’s life—
even if true—has ample literary precedent.  The online notes to the exhibition (and a free brochure) 
acknowledge this in so far as they call the crowned skull merely “a symbol of worldly vanity.”  
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Alonso Cano, San Francisco de Borja (Saint Francis Borgia), c. 1624: oil on canvas, 
189 x 123 cm., Museo de Bellas Artes de Sevilla, Spain; on display at the National 
Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. for “The Sacred Made Real: Spanish Painting and 
Sculpture, 1600-1700” (Feb. 28 to May 31, 2010). Public-domain image obtained 
online. 
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 There is certainly nothing invalid with this historicizing interpretation, given 
that it reflects episodes held true of its subject’s life, though certain tropes of ascetic 
piety deserve recognition as tropes.20 In any case, the painting’s outsized focus on just 
a few spare elements, whether historical or conventional, helps to convey that piety in 
terms closely analogous to written “ascetic satire.” Its lavish attention on Borgia the 
individual presents him as a model for society. He is illuminated by the sun (bearing 
the “I.H.S.” monogram associated with Christ) shining at his back; the darkness of the 
landscape around him shows that a similar brightness has failed to illuminate the rest 
of the world, wrapped in its own brown and threatening clouds.  The cardinal’s hat, 
flattened, indicates the base emptiness—vanitas—of its associated position. The 
crowned skull registers the impartiality of death.  
 Even as they convey a critical, “satiric” view of the powers of this world, the 
spare elements of Cano’s portrait suggest a means for overcoming the problematic 
issues they highlight; the painting’s ascetic program suggests the sermonic mode as 
well. The way to stand, it indicates, is to study the vanity of dead kings (or empresses 
like Isabella, as the case may be). One might then learn to reject honors similar to 
those represented by the cardinal’s hat. By taking on the tonsure one might take on a 
more lasting nobility, symbolized here by a halo; black clothes, consonant with the 
dominant colors of the landscape, find their foil in the halo and brighter sunlight.  
 The portrait’s suggestion of a high status for Francis Borgia, a certain nobility 
entirely alien to the vain and mortal world he ignores, underpins the prophetic aspect 
of its message–a stark one: that heaven-clouding worldly honors not only cannot 
                                                 
20 The curators at the National Gallery present Cano’s painting of Borgia with a life-sized sculpture of 
the saint, made in the same year (1624), by Juan Martínez Montañés (1568–1649) and Francisco 
Pacheco (1564–1644). A companion statue of Ignatius of Loyola depicts that figure with tears 
streaming down his cheeks—a fact that goes without remark in the exhibition catalogue, though this 
characteristic likely refers to the role of weeping in the saint’s “spiritual exercises.”  On these see for 
example Jean-Joseph Navatel, “La Dévotion Sensible, les Larmes, et les Exercices de Saint Ignace,” 
Collection de la Bibliothèque des Exercices de Saint Ignace 64 (1920), pp. 3-19. 
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prevent death, they might actually lead to it. In order to mitigate the decidedly bad 
politics of such a message, the painting imbues its prophet—Francis Borgia—with an 
authority greater than the ones that he warns. His source of authority is the “sun,” 
which shines behind him and illumines him in the scene. He stands at a level above the 
monarch’s skull; the cardinal’s hat is quite literally at his feet. He is outside of, and so 
able to speak frankly to, worldly powers.  
 Taken as a whole, Alonso Cano’s portrait of Francis Borgia illustrates not only 
the affinity satire increasingly enjoyed with sermons and with prophecy in the 
medieval period but also, just as much, the constructive role medieval (and slightly 
later) thinkers ascribed to asceticism. The painting draws heavily on tropes associated 
with medieval “contempt of the world” while clearly finding such asceticism salutary. 
It offers an invitation—one that Madden refused—to look past fortune’s uncertainty 
and life’s “minor miseries.” If Madden’s bitterness, depression, and morbidity were 
destructive, medieval asceticism was literally edifying: contempt of self, contempt of 
the world, love of one’s neighbor, and the defense of Truth were understood in fact to 
be the very walls that made up the “cloister of the soul.”21 How these ideals influenced 
one late medieval poet’s satire, written in the vernacular for clergy and laity alike, will 
be the subject of this dissertation. 
                                                 
21 Peter Damian at one point uses “Veritatis defensio” where other writers use “amor Dei.” I do not 
wish to claim that Langland was indebted to that particular text when mentioning “Veritatis defensio,” 
however.  I use it simply because it keys in nicely to the concern with Truth (Veritas) in Langland’s 
poem and also—with its verb, “defense”—indicates how for a medieval Christian writer the love of 
God could have found expression through satiric judgment. 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
TWO TYPES OF AMBIGUITY: 
INGENUITY, AUTHORITY, AND THE DANGERS OF CRITICAL SPEECH 
 In a work expressly devoted to the topic of justice, book Five of Edmund 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene, the (just) knight Arthegall encounters a disturbing display 
of punishment on his way to the court of Queen Mercilla (who symbolizes mercy):22   
 
ix. 
Thereas they entred at the Scriene, they saw 
some one, whose tongue was for his trespasse vyle 
nayled to a post, adiudged so by law: 
for that therewith he falsely did reuyle, 
and foule blaspheme that Queene for23 forged guyle, 
both with bold speaches, which he blazed had, 
and with lewd poems, which he did compyle: 
for the bold title of a Poet bad 
he on himselfe had ta’en, and rayling rymes had sprad. 
 
Thus there he stood, whylest high ouer his head, 
there written was the purport of his sin, 
in cyphers strange, that few could rightly read 
BON FONT: but bon, that once had written bin, 
was raced out, and Mal was now put in. 
So now Malfont was plainely to be read; 
eyther for th’euill, which he did therein, 
or that he likened was to a welhead 
of euill words, and wicked sclaunders by him shed.24 
 
The most striking aspect of the scene, apart from the vicious creativity it ascribes to 
the hand of mercy, is that the object of punishment shares Spenser’s occupation: he is 
a poet, and a satiric one at that.25 The passage might even sympathize with the 
condemned poet a little. It draws attention by reference to the word “Bon,” now in 
                                                 
22 Quoted from The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, edd. J. C. Smith and Ernest de Sélincourt, 1-
vol. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924).   
23 i.e. through, according to Alfred B. Gough, “Who Was Spenser’s Bon Font?” MLR 12.2 (1917), pp. 
140-45.  
24 Gough points out that these last two lines offer two alternate interpretations of BonMALFont’s name: 
“they do evil” or “fount of evil.” 
25 Some might question whether the spreader of “rayling rymes” (hardly subtle) can be called a 
satirist—a valid concern to have. I certainly beg the question by giving both Spenser and this poet the 
same label, but I do so here because both types of writer (satirist and composer of “rayling rymes”) risk 
punishment for writing that others have the power to deem intemperate criticism (Spenser elsewhere 
shows himself to have been acutely conscious of these risks, as in the Letter to Raleigh).  For more on 
Spenser as a satiric poet, see the concluding chapter, below. 
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“cyphers strange, that few could rightly read,” to the fact that BonMALFont had once 
enjoyed regard and favor for his verse—but that the queen who has punished him has 
made this hard to see. (“Bon” is hard to read “rightly,” whereas “Mal” is “plainely to 
be read.”) The passage also describes nearly the same grisly fate as Cicero, another 
writer who found himself on the wrong side of the law.26 
 But how much sympathy for BonMALFont does Spenser’s vignette really show? 
To decide requires considering Spenser’s source for the character (the Ulpian Fulwell 
whose name inspired the passage’s last two lines) and some consideration that 
Spenser—though he brings up the figure to indicate the dangers of satire—is satirizing 
him. Ulpian doubtless did not get his tongue “nayled to a post” for libeling Queen 
Elizabeth, though BonMALFont has. The severity of this poetic punishment suggests the 
enormity of his poetry’s offense, remindering readers that words do matter and can 
bear weighty consequences. On the one hand, then, the passage’s sympathy lies with 
the wronged Mercilla and (thereby) with the real-life queen. On the other hand, 
Spenser’s picture here does not necessarily show that he condones Fulwell’s real-life 
punishment, whatever that might have been.27 Its portrayal as excessive (similar to 
Cicero’s, although meted out by “Mercy”) suggests the view that punishment other 
than censorship is excessive. In that view, Spenser reminds the reader that words don’t 
matter—at least, not enough to merit outrage. Spenser thus manages to make Fulwell 
emblematic and exemplary in a way that warns poets against spreading “rayling 
rymes,” even as its apparent eager agreement with a bad poet’s fate at the hands of a 
                                                 
26As I have discussed in the context of another episode in the Faerie Queene, involving the character of 
Florimell and the magical girdle she wears, the word “adiudged” in Spenser can refer to decisions 
simultaneously authoritative and flawed. Perhaps those connotations apply here. I do not intend to 
embark on a digression concerning the death of Cicero here. I do not know what Spenser thought about 
it, either, but I do feel justified in assuming that Spenser—like so many of his contemporaries—held the 
orator in high regard. 
27 Noting that Fulwell simply disappears from the record, some years after the publication of his works, 
Gough suggests that Spenser’s depiction was motivated by ill will. In any case ,we cannot imagine 
BonMALFont’s ate being visited upon even the most obnoxious Elizabethan poets. 
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blameless queen exaggerates that into a monstrosity. The very act of renaming 
BonMALFont for his “blasphemy” attributes a godlike power to the queen, one which 
should encourage detractors to temper their criticism and encourage her to stay her 
hand. The portrait might promote some ethically reformist end for either party, taken 
in context. Here, however, it simply raises questions—does not suggest a specific 
course of action—regarding those  parties’ behavior. Its topicality attracts notice but 
almost immediately cedes attention to larger (non-topical) issues, in a way that 
BonMALFont himself probably did not do.  
 In sum, Spenser outweighs his degree of mute sympathy with a grim 
understanding that writing satiric poetry requires caution. The image of BonMALFont 
before the court of Mercilla serves as a reminder for Spenser of how quickly a poet’s 
fortune can turn, how dependent writers of social criticism can be upon the political 
and cultural climate in which they write. Since Mercilla’s court possesses the authority 
of a divine rather than a human institution, the poet being punished has been charged 
beyond defamation or libel. We read that the sign over his head proclaims “the purport 
of his sin,” namely that he “did foul blaspheme” the crown. And with this, Spenser 
shows, the role of poet might not be enough by itself to ensure a poet’s preservation: 
sometimes, even for a satirist, holding one’s tongue is better than the chance of losing 
it.  
 Spenser was by no means the first poet to understand the risks inherent in 
using literature to criticize others. Satiric poetry, which provides an important 
laboratory or testing-ground for the limits of free speech, is inherently confrontational 
by virtue of being critical. Satire is always problematic speech: it does few favors to 
its (often influential) targets, yet it draws attention to itself; it is “free speech” to the 
extent that someone has been able to create it, but it still groans at being left unheard. 
The poet’s subordinate social position almost assures that he will end up criticizing 
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someone greater than himself in influence and prestige. Therefore, just as it behooves 
a would-be satirist to be critical, it also behooves such a poet to take care regarding 
what and whom to criticize. He needs to judge, but to avoid punitive reprisal—to treat 
general situations relevant to individuals and groups (identities, conflicts, and 
relationships) rather than specific topical circumstances. He must use terms that his 
satire’s addressees can understand, a demand which might invite topicality, and he 
might draw inspiratiom from events happening in real life—but he must prevent 
primary attention from lingering on real-life specifics. He mustn’t exhaustively assess 
objectively presented details, and he must also avoid the appearance of doing so.  
 As such, it will usually be unclear whether the satirist has presented a topically 
relevant situation expressive of wider truths or a generally relevant situation 
immediately applicable. The former type of satire will be safer because, even though it 
presents an immediate situation, it defuses its critique suggesting that matters have 
always stood that way. The latter type of satire is not unsafe, though, because the trick 
of presenting general situations that comment on specific ones requres characters and 
settings far removed (outside their general qualities and relationships) from what they 
comment on.28 I call the satirist’s vital limiting uncertainty “ambiguity.” The satirist 
maintains this ambiguity through caricature: a representational style whose emphases 
and suppressions deny his claim to objectivity, leaving his take on specific facts 
unknown.  
 Ambiguity negotiates a tension between the pressures for “speech” and 
“silence” that lies at the heart of satire—a tension to which a memorable phrase from 
Walter Map’s Dissuasio Valerii ad Rufinum gives voice: “loqui prohibeor, et tacere 
non possum.”29 One can imagine that this conflict lies at the heart of any critical 
                                                 
28 George Orwell’s Animal Farm comes to mind. 
29 See the text in Ralph Hanna and Traugott Lawler, edd., Jankyn’s Book of Wikked Wyves, vol. 1 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), pp. 121-48.  
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utterance, for that matter, no matter how lacking in verbal artistry, but explorations of 
this tension elsewhere have been increasingly hard to find. Despite the grandiose 
claims of Burckhardt that modernity helped to foster the development of “the 
individual” (that problematic term), the story of the past century and more has actually 
been the development of the group.30 But as a result, with today’s critical voices 
emboldened by the assurance of coverage on the Internet or by other media, we rarely 
encounter the image of a comparatively weak individual employing his wits against 
powerful controlling interests. The group of signatures on a petition—the army 
arrayed under the banner of a talking point—has become the typical vehicle for 
written complaint, with the unfortunate result that (outside the courts) the boundaries 
between speech and silence are not thoroughly explored, and certain issues central to 
what it means to speak freely are ever less frequently entertained.31  
 Satire deserves attention then, partly because it presents an individual relying 
on his own abilities to point an ungrateful finger at powerful interests—an individual 
who has every reason to turn to the toolbox of rhetoric and poetry. With these tools he 
can emphasize the quality of his mind, entertain, soften certain blows that might fall 
on his closest benefactors and by anticipating deflect other reprisals that otherwise 
might rain down on him.  Satire is especially interesting as critical speech because it 
models for us (when reality will not provide) a picture of the risks, defenses, and 
rewards an individual must face, set up, and hope to gain when challenging powerfully 
entrenched corruptions in his world, upon which he might at the same time depend. 
                                                 
30 On Jacob Burckhardt’s claims for the birth of the individual after the Middle Ages see The 
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 
vol. I, part ii (“The Development of the Individual”), chapters 1-2, pp. 143-150.   
31 À propos of free speech and the courts, a recent ruling by the United States Supreme Court in favor of 
a group called “Citizens United” has renewed discussion in this area. See Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
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 Satire represents issues central to any debate concerning speech, but it is also 
decidedly literary. Even its central dynamic of crafty individual against a powerful 
status quo has often been a kind of fiction. In the works of the classical satirists, the 
“personæ” which bear the poets’ names have been shown—recently by Catherine C. 
Keane, among others—to be elaborate constructions.32 Moreover, as Thomas Habinek 
has indicated, the satirists’ cozy relationship to what we might call the Roman “power 
elite” implicates them as jaded partakers in the injustices of their social system rather 
than clear-eyed outsiders outright.33 In other words, satirists often write critically only 
when they know they can. Yet despite such artifice, if not because of it, the classical 
satirists place the problem of their poems’ problematic speech at the forefront, in 
effect raising our awareness of the high stakes involved. They might do this so as to 
appear even braver and more forthright, to appear driven on by a compulsion to “call it 
like it is,” like Juvenal in the first line of his poems: “Semper ego auditor tantum? 
nunquamne reponam?”34 Regardless of motivation, however, satirists’ choice to 
portray themselves as voices crying out in a wilderness of fraud and abuse means that 
they absolutely must consider possible limits to and defenses for their speech.35  
                                                 
32 On classical satiric personæ, a rich field, see Catherine C. Keane’s discussions of how narrators 
present and construct themselves in Classical and Modern Literature 22.2 (2002), pp. 1-5 (introduction 
to the issue) and pp. 215-31 (“The Critical Contexts of Satiric Discourse”). See also Keane’s “Satiric 
Memories: Autobiography and the Construction of Genre,” The Classical Journal 97.3 (2002), pp. 215-
31. I am grateful to Keane for mailing me offprints of these pieces and for her interest in this project. 
Susanna Morton Braund discusses the divergent and developing narratorial personæ of Horace, Persius, 
and Juvenal in the introduction to Juvenal and Persius (London: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 
11-24.   
33 Habinek covers the poets’ at-least avowed lack of serious reformist purpose in “Satire as Aristocratic 
Play,” in The Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire, ed. Kirk Freudenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 177-91; Juvenal explores his place in the social hierarchy (not the lowest) 
in his fifth satire, set at a dinner party. 
34 Juvenal 1, line 1 (Braund, Juvenal and Persius, p. 130-131, translates: “Shall I always be stuck in the 
audience? never retaliate[...]?”). 
35 I discuss the threat of censorship in late fourteenth-century England in the next chapter, but this was a 
perennial problem. As Braund notes, Persius’ literary executor Cornutus took care to “[replace] line 121 
in Satire 1, allegedly ‘King Midas has donkey’s ears,’ with ‘Is there anyone who does not have 
donkey’s ears?’ to avoid the risk of insulting Nero” (Juvenal and Persius, lines 14-15).  
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 Americans would identify “freedom of speech” as the core principle facing 
satirists such as I’ve just described, and without a doubt satire presents itself  most 
luxuriously—to Americans—as the expression of that ideal. The words to the First 
Amendment in the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, which declare that 
“Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” 
need to be read in the context of the main Preamble’s assertion that the document 
exists “in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” Freedom of speech comes 
across as a foundational ideal for Americans, especially when exercised against the 
government who insures it—a circumstance that introduces complexities if not 
tensions since, even in America, some types of expression are not allowed.  
 Not surprisingly, Americans’ most ardent critical examinations and defenses of 
satire, to say nothing of their own employments of it, often feature criticism of the 
State: consider Jon Stewart’s Daily Show, the Colbert Report, The Onion, and several 
novels by Christopher Buckley, or—as Susanna Morton Braund does—lyrics to the 
song “White America” by the rapper Eminem.36 While this political focus may seem 
inevitable, however, the opposition between private truthsayer and powerful élite fails 
to suggest another way in which satiric speech was viewed as problematic in the 
ancient world, quite apart from its potential to call attention to the failings of the 
powerful: it can also criticize fellow human beings, even outside the corridors of 
power, risking outrage almost by design and without clear motive (patriotic or 
otherwise). Satire is therefore, in fact, problematic speech even when the State is not 
involved. 
                                                 
36 See Braund, “Libertas or Licentia? Freedom and Criticism in Roman Satire,” in Free Speech in 
Classical Antiquity, edd. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Mark Rosen, Mnemosyne 254 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 
pp. 409-28. I quote from Braund’s analysis of the Eminem song in a note, below. 
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 The word the Greeks used to describe the speech exercised by satirists—still of 
critical interest, as the focus of Michel Foucault’s famous last lectures to the Collège 
de France—was parrhesia: a word that denoted frank, bold, and even coarse critical 
statements about others.37 To the Romans, the term translated in two ways: as libertas, 
(“liberty” or “freedom”) always to be compared to and distinguished from licentia, 
(offensive “license”). As Susannah Morton Braund has argued, satirists constantly 
need to negotiate the line between “liberty” and “license” in their speech, or in other 
words to prove to their potential detractors that they speak virtuously rather than out of 
vice. Braund’s reading of a few lines from Eminem’s “White America” nicely lays out 
the artist’s negotiation of this tension between “speaking the often unpalatable truth 
about society” (liberty) and “exploiting [the] platform to give offense” (license), 
which “dynamic tension [...] the satirists exploit by reviving the threat of licentia in 
order to assert their exercise of libertas.”38 This quite essential tension sets the stage 
for ambiguity. 
 After consciously exploiting the tension between bracingly salutary truth-
telling and needlessly offensive attack, satirists need to avoid the punitive retribution 
of “censorship or censure,” which Braund defines as “legal coercion and social 
coercion.”39  Braund makes the interesting claim that, for this reason, the classical 
Roman satirists Horace, Persius, and Juvenal developed–in “programmatic” poems 
commenting on their own reasons for writing satire—the following pattern or 
sequence of statements: 
 
 
                                                 
37 I shall return briefly to the topic of parrhesia in later chapters. For Foucault’s lectures see Fearless 
Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2001). J. C. Mulhern,  “ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ in 
Aristotle,” in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, pp. 312-39 at p. 333 n. 28 et passim, notes some 
problems with Foucault’s view.  
38 Braund, “Libertas or Licentia?” p. 410.  
39 Braund, “Libertas or Licentia?” p. 409. 
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1. The satirist makes a challenging statement, in bombastic or defiant 
terms, of his mission in writing satire 
2. [An] interlocutor warns him of the risks of satire 
3. The satirist appeals to the precedent of Lucilius[, the first Roman   
satirist whose works survive in fragments] 
4. The interlocutor renews his warning in different terms 
5. The satirist evades the issue.40 
 
As Braund observes, Horace’s “evasion” involves humor.41 Juvenal and Persius, while 
not exactly employing humor, also manage to “evade” the issue of satire’s risks by 
suggesting facetiously how harmless their verse will be (Juvenal pledges only to speak 
of the dead, while Persius promises to confine his criticism to a veritable hole in the 
ground—his little book).42 Such evasions continue, as Braund takes care to show, even 
in the bold and Constitutionally protected realm inhabited by Eminem. In crying out 
imprecations against political heavyweights with “the free-est of speech this [D]ivided 
[S]tates of [E]mbarrassment will allow [him] to have,” as Braund notes, Eminem 
“does not tell us” how to interpret his statement. “[T]o destabilize everything further,” 
she adds, “he finishes the track with the spoken flourish: ‘I’m just kiddin America, 
you know I love you.’”43  
 Horace’s evasion in Satires 2.1 particularly highlights the seriousness of the 
risks the satirists seemed to face, as well as their sometimes monumental frivolity in 
facing the same, and all the more because the exchange in which this evasion takes 
place serves as a nice interpretive gloss to Spenser’s depiction of the poet BonMALfont 
with which this chapter opened: told that “bad (sc. evil) poems” (mala carmina) will 
undoubtedly lead to a criminal trial, Horace saucily asks what will happen if he writes 
“good poems” (bona carmina), whereupon his interlocutor admits that all charges 
                                                 
40 Braund sees this pattern hold for Horace Bk. 2 sat. 1, Persius 1, and Juvenal 1 (“Libertas or 
Licentia?” p. 419).  
41 Specifically, it uses a pun I will discuss in a moment. 
42 Juvenal 1, lines 170-171; Persius 1, lines 100-123. See the discussion in Braund, “Libertas or 
Licentia?” pp. 420-21. 
43 Braund, “Libertas or Licentia?” p. 412. Such “destabiliz[ation],” and the many ways writers could 
achieve it in the Middle Ages—which I have called “ambiguity”—is the main topic of this chapter.   
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would be dropped in laughter.44 As Spenser’s scene more soberly points out, though, 
no soi disant “good poet” need feel quite so carefree as Horace seems to, here; it’s not 
really up to the poet to say whether his poems are good or bad, full of vice or replete 
with virtue, in the eyes of those who “adjudge” him. That BonMALFont had “on himself 
[taken]” the “bold title of a Poet bad” might not have been entirely his own doing, in 
other words. The performative evaluation of his superiors could have compelled him 
to bear that title along with the rest of his punishment.45 
 Perhaps the classical satirists’ best defense lay not in their purported avoidance 
of vice or embrace of virtue, their exercise of liberty too easily confused with license, 
but their frequently pervasive (indeed sometimes utter) lack of consistent moral 
conviction. Braund approvingly quotes the conclusion to an unpublished paper by 
Ralph Rosen, which supports this point about what she calls “the slipperiness of 
satirists”: 
 
Few satirists—from the Greek iambographers to Howard Stern[—]ever 
display a consistent moral position, despite the complex rhetoric of 
self-righteousness that defines the genre, and most flirt with 
didacticism only to undermine it with their own brand of improbitas.46 
 
The way the classical satirists and later writers as well authorize their critical speech 
and deflect criticism from it often involves postures that tacitly self-dismantle, often 
through an unsustainable exaggeration of flaws and inflated judgmental claims: 
caricature.  
 As the “artifice” responsible for creating ambiguity, caricature helps the satirist 
maintain the limits of his speech.47 It thus needs to be seen as a defining characteristic. 
                                                 
44 Braund, “Libertas or Licentia?” p. 419. 
45 Fortunately, as I shall at length suggest, William Langland provided Spenser a different model for 
writing satire than the poems of Ulpian Fulwell (the real-life individual on whom, as Gough noted, 
BonMALfont was based). 
46 Braund, “Libertas or Licentia?” p. 424 n. 24 
47 cf. Braund, “Libertas or Licentia?”: “[L]ike Eminem’s lyrics, satire continually concerns itself with 
limits. Most obviously, satire polices the boundaries of acceptable behavior by criticizing those who 
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And since it is frequently comic, it also tends to make people laugh. The Roman 
satirists understood this: despite their poems’ frequent displays of crudity, harshness, 
and rage, there can be no doubt that their works were considered funny as well. When 
Persius depicts a typical patron begging him for an uncharitable depiction, for 
example, we can see the aspect of Roman satire characterized by Thomas Habinek as 
“aristocratic play.”48 Early literary theorists on satire also recognized the satiric 
embrace of humor. Isidore of Seville compared it to comic drama; before him, in the 
fourth century, the grammarian Diomedes wrote of satire as writing in which “things 
laughable and shameful are said” (ridiculæ res pudendæque dicuntur). In general, 
according to a definition I discuss below, the style of satire was understood to range 
widely “on a scale from severity to humour.”49 It will not surprise modern readers to 
hear that humor was common—as Horace asks, what’s the harm in laughing while 
telling the truth?50—but medieval authors often took another view. This “other view” 
provides the “harm” about which Horace asked, and it makes understanding the 
historical and theoretical place for satiric humor very important to trace.   
 Our difficulty in ascertaining a satire’s true ratio of “ridicule” to art, insult to 
entertainment, passion to hyperbole, which stems from the fact that satiric ends and 
means are often inextricably entwined, exemplifies the uncertainty scholars face when 
attempting to classify literary works. Definitions of satire both antique and medieval 
commonly describe such writing in terms of fullness, hybridity, variety, and polysemy. 
                                                                                                                                            
exceed those boundaries. But satire itself all too easily oversteps the mark in its criticisms. And it 
knows it does this.” (412-413) 
48 Habinek, “Aristocratic Play,” cited above. 
49 See Paul Scott Miller, “The Mediæval Literary Theory of Satire and its Relevance to the Works of 
Gower, Langland, and Chaucer,” Ph.D. diss., Queen’s University Belfast, 1982, p. 47 and circa. I refer 
here to Miller’s definition for satire: “that type of ethical verse, ranging in tone between bitter 
indignation, mocking irony, and witty humour, which in forthright, unadorned terms censures and 
corrects vices in society and advocates virtues, eschewing slander of individuals but sparing no guilty 
party, not even the poet himself” (171).  
50 “Ridentem dicere verum, quid vetat?” (Bk. 1, sat. 1, line 24) 
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Satires are said to jump from matter to matter like a dancer (saltatrix), wild like a satyr 
(satyra); to offer a heaping dinnerplate of targets as well as critiques (lanx satura); to 
say several things at once like a complex law (lex satura). Marked by intense irony, 
referentiality, and hybridity, satires require caution, even downright suspicion, to 
interpret.51 As Wyatt Mason has observed of contemporary satires, “they revel in, and 
trade on, knowingness.”52  
 If anything can be called “straightforward” about the satiric mode, as Mason 
indicates, that would be its general technique, which takes common critical 
observations and transforms them into literally remarkable ones. “Yes, as it happens,” 
Mason goes on to note,  
 
Parker, Bierce, and Twain are making timeless points: love, often 
unlovely; conversation, frequently dull; war, not exalting. No one, 
though, would needlepoint these revelations onto pillows—they’re old 
news. In the hands of an adept satirist, however, the ‘old news’ satire 
brings becomes a special report.53  
 
Like newspaper caricaturists, whose weird drawings the brain has been found to 
recognize more readily than their originals, satirists like to depict people and situations 
in highly unrealistic, schematic, compressed portraits that, strongly emphasizing their 
subjects’ differences from us, decrease our sympathy for them—more or less. As 
Braund has noted, satire is notoriously hard to characterize or define; she approvingly 
takes as a starting point a certain Feinberg’s definition, though, that satire is “the 
                                                 
51 For the history of these etymologies see Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory” and Charles A. Knight, 
The Literature of Satire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). They draw on Diomedes—
with Miller noting that the “satyr” etymology is not exactly typical but does appear on occasion. 
52 Wyatt Mason, “My Satirical Self” (New York Times Magazine, September 17th, 2006): “All these 
various entertainments—human emanations on the Web, on television, at the movies and between 
hardcovers (whatever their differences in ambition, conception and achievement)—are attuned to the 
ridiculous in modern life. They are all, in other words, satirical: they revel in, and trade on, 
knowingness.” I thank George Saunders for providing me with this reference. 
53 Id. (op. cit., n. pag.) 
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playfully critical distortion of the familiar.”54 This distortion makes us feel relieved 
and self-satisfied (in a word, proud) that we aren’t subject to the same problems, vices, 
and other faults as they are.55 
 Satire amounts not just to criticism, then, though invariably it is critical. Nor is 
humor necessary, as we shall see, though satire can inspire laughter. This study will 
focus not on satire as a genre, then, since in both the medieval period and today the 
satiric stance is not reserved to one set genre of verbal or visual art. Even the pervasive 
assumption that satires appear in verse seems the result of general observation rather 
than deep thought about the inherent poetics of satire as a genre: satire may appear in 
verse, but rather only in the way that we expect textbooks to be written in prose.56  I 
will instead consider satire in terms of what various scholars have simply called the 
satiric “mode.”57 Mason’s remark that satire “trade[s] on knowingness,” moreover, 
suggests an affinity with Feinberg’s definition—the “playfully creative distortion of 
the familiar.” As I have suggested, though of course it stands to reason, this “creative 
distortion” affects the brain in much the same way as a visual caricature does. I 
therefore have called this aspect of satire simply “caricature.”  
 This understanding of the satiric mode helps to explain why the Roman 
satirists brought up serious issues regarding the limits and propriety of “free speech,” 
only to avoid would-be censure through deflection. The poets want to avoid 
retribution, certainly—but their defenses also indicate the natural limits of satiric 
                                                 
54 Juvenal and Persius, p. 1. On the pictorial phenomenon see Gillian Rhodes, Superportraits: 
Caricatures and Recognition, Psychology Press, 1997. On the connection between similarity and 
sympathy one might see “Names that Match Form a Bond on the Internet,” New York Times (April 12, 
2008). Jeannine Horowitz and Sophia Menache write in L’Humour en Chaire, p. 114, of the lowering of 
sympathy that laughter furthers, which they see as potentially helpful (however mean) for the correction 
or reformation of character: see below.  
55 I intend “pride” here as akin less to medieval superbia than to the modern U.S. English sense of the 
word (as in the phrase “pride in a job well done”). 
56 See Vivien Law, “Why Write a Verse Grammar?” Journal of Medieval Latin 9 (1999), pp. 46-76. 
57 This term, associated with Northrop Frye, is used in a different way. 
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critique, which goes only so far and intends to go only so far. In exchange for the 
license to schematize a range of possible targets—himself, others, and he wider social 
world—the satirist foregoes the opportunity to claim objectively accurate description 
(what to the visual arts is known as “photo-” or “optical” realism). Satire knows it can 
never substitute for policy (e.g. public policy) and has no standing to provide it.  
 As Spenser’s anecdote of BonMALFont indicates, the line between being “good” 
(or at least tolerated) and “bad” (causing enough outrage to trigger severe retribution) 
can be a fine one. The infamous recent controversy regarding a Danish cartoonist’s 
allegedly satirical depictions of the prophet Muhammad also argues this point. 
Moreover, even though satire provides a simplified, distorted and so theoretically not 
actionable depiction of its targets, it often delivers truly barbed critique. Jonathan 
Swift’s “Modest Proposal,” for instance—although not a genuine public policy 
suggestion—nonetheless draws attention to the plight of the Irish whom that 
“proposal” concerns. A definition of the satiric mode, therefore, must acknowledge its 
ambiguously self-limiting selectivity in even the most incisive satiric critiques. I will 
call it a descriptive stance that identifies and focuses on the flaws of individuals or 
groups to suggest its targets’ departure from some ideal or normative state while 
ambiguously deferring the power to effect reform,58 foregrounding its reliance on 
impressionistic assessment through the use of caricaturing bias.59  
                                                 
58 Here my definition refers to satire unaffected by the satiric mode, though I shall soon introduce 
ascetic thought as a complicating factor. To allude to the old stew-etymology behind “satire,” ascetic 
and satiric criticism differ the way a cook's experience of a dish differs from a diner's. Ascetic thought 
criticizes particular situations as a way of pushing across a wider thesis about what specifically is wrong 
with humanity, which implies a belief that something specific can be done to repair it. The “pure” 
satirist focuses on a given situation as just another example of the complications to which humanity is 
prone.  
59 As my use of the term “caricature” so far has shown, I mean something different from what Norton-
Smith must mean when he claims that “there is hardly an instance of identifiable caricatura in 
Langland’s satiric presentation[...].” For Norton-Smith does later refer to Piers Plowman’s use of what I 
call caricature: “If the object viewed by the poet appears ‘distorted,’” he writes, “[Langland] usually 
manages to convey the impression that it is the vice which has already caused the distortion, not the 
medium of poetic rendering.” (William Langland, p. 49) Alvin B. Kernan has also written in seeming 
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 I have suggested in the preface that this mode can also influence visual art, 
where one target of the critique in Cano’s portrait is represented by a flattened hat on 
the ground. Even so, Cano’s portrait is not a perfect analogue to satire as I have just 
defined it. The scene’s “satirist,” Borgia, has been invested with far more authority 
than any of the other satirists here mentioned ever accord to their personæ.60 The satire 
also seems much more tightly related to the discursive modes of preachers and of 
prophets. Nothing prevents this connection or a claim to such authority (we shall see 
medieval poets making it all the time), since observing a flaw often leads inexorably to 
stating how to correct it and then noting the consequences of action or inaction. 
Nevertheless, as my definition for the satiric mode indicates, “pure” satire typically 
declines to offer solutions to the general problems it observes. What solutions it 
suggests, and what consequences it imagines to follow, often respond only to the very 
specific situation depicted in a given satire and appeal to a social morality that 
prioritizes one's standing in others’ (human) eyes. A “selfless” morality not as closely 
                                                                                                                                            
contradiction of my claim, observing that “the major tendency in western satire has been toward the 
creation of an illusion of objectivity, and therefore of implied truthfulness,” but he refers mainly to the 
decline of narratorial personæ in favor of increasingly omniscient third-person narration (128). More 
problematic for my and other medievalists’ views is his observation just preceding, that “authors of 
satire consistently make an effort to persuade their readers that their works, no matter how bizarre or 
grotesque, are plain, straightforward literal descriptions of the world as it really is if men would only 
see it in their ‘steel glass.’ To buttress these claims,” he continues, “satirists regularly disclaim being 
poets and present themselves as simple truth-tellers; they call attention to the plain, everyday language 
they use; and they make elaborate, though ludicrous, attempts at specificity and verisimilitude, naming 
streets, drawing maps, providing graphs.” (128) But Kernan argues as much because he accepts it as a 
“requirement”  that “aggression is allowable only if the charges leveled at the target are true” (127)—
and his use of the word “ludicrous” in the account of how they establish this “tone of veracity” points, 
again, to the ambiguity from caricature that his reading would deny. (128) See “Aggression and Satire: 
Art Considered as a Form of Biological Aggression,” in Literary Theory and Structure: Essays in 
Honor of William K. Wimsatt, edd. Frank Brady, John Palmer, and Martin Price (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973), pp. 115-29. 
60 This comparison raises the question of narratorial personæ in the painting: is Borgia somehow Cano’s 
persona here?  
  16   
tied to material concerns need not be rejected by satire—but satirists do doubt its 
presence, let alone its efficacy, again and again.61 
 The sermonic and prophetic messages that I identified in the Borgia portrait, 
however, depend on the existence and efficacy of this more general “selfless 
morality.” They are figurative, like satire, yes—but nothing in the portrait’s sermonic 
“discourse” forswears the hope of guiding specific behavior, or that its prophecy will 
not provide an earnest and honest report. The close relationship of the sermonic and 
prophetic modes to the portrait’s satire suggests that the satiric mode is somehow 
altered here instead, shot through with or animated by a system of thought that would 
combine it with sermon and with prophecy. This “system,” namely ascetic ideology, 
explains the portrait’s tightly trimodal pronouncements—as well as a further mystery.  
For while the pronouncements I cite are immensely authoritative, they are also neither 
rash nor impatient. On the contrary, Borgia hardly seems to look at the cardinal’s hat 
that he refuses. He ignores it, staring instead at the skull that he holds, reminded of 
what happens even to those who accept crowns.  
 One might say that Cano paints Borgia looking inward, attempting to change 
himself as a model for the world. Yet satire (as I’ve defined it) looks outward; it 
intends to describe its targets, not to change them. Even Juvenal suggests no plan to 
transform the emotional variety his poetry concerns; and I contend that all “pure” 
satire forbids itself truly reformist aspiration.62 That reformist aspiration appears 
                                                 
61 Swift's “Modest Proposal: nicely models this sense of morality. After enumerating all of the various 
economic and civil benefits to be won by his idea, the speaker suggests reforms tied to a selfless (even 
religious) morality only to deny them. And why? Because he feels certain they will not work: 
“Therefore I repeat,” he writes, “let no man talk to me of these and the like expedients, ‘till he hath at 
least some glympse of hope, that there will ever be some hearty and sincere attempt to put them into 
practice.” (emphasis mine) 
62 See Juvenal 1, ll. 85-87: “[Q]uidquid agunt homines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas, / gaudia, discursus, 
nostri farrago libelli est. / Et quando uberior vitiorum copia? [...]” Braund, Juvenal and Persius, 
translates: “All human activity—prayers, fears, anger, pleasure, joys, hustle and bustle—this is the 
mishmash of my little book. And when was the supply of vices richer?” (138-39)  
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centrally, however, not only in Cano’s painting but also in one of the most heavily 
social-critical poems from the Middle Ages: Piers Plowman, by the writer known as 
William Langland. How and why does ascetic ideology influence its use of the satiric 
mode? 
 
Critical History and the Question of Definitions 
 
 The question of whether or not Piers Plowman is a satire at all, let alone to 
what extent, is important—in part because it has met with a variety of answers. 
Critical consensus has moved from a strongly unqualified (if unexamined) “yes” to an 
only slightly qualified “no” between the fourteenth century and the twenty-first, with 
judgments hinging upon what definition of satire we might choose to apply. The 
poem’s early modern critics seem not to have had a carefully theorized definition for 
satire in mind and, content with the idea of poetic social criticism identifying satire, 
could well call Piers Plowman such a poem. (Not incidentally, they seem not to have 
considered humor a characteristic of the genre, though, a fact of more than incidental 
importance; that Langland rebuked “wittyly,” in Crowley’s formulation, seems merely 
a further reason to praise the satire in the poem.)  
 By the early twentieth century, the poem was “a” satire only marginally at best. 
Tucker recognized its visio as wholly sufficient for understanding satire in the poem; 
as a result he only briefly, and even then not helpfully, categorized the rest.63 This 
omission signals evidence that it did not fit into the literary history that Tucker 
                                                 
63 See Samuel Marion Tucker, Verse Satire in England before the Renaissance (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1908): “The second part of The Vision—Do wel, Do Bet, and Do Best—is rather a 
tedious piece of work, the good qualities of which all appear in The Vision itself. For our present 
purpose it may safely be disregarded.” (79, n. 105) As Middleton notes in the Alford Companion, 
Tucker and his contemporaries conceived of satire as “a potent and destructive attack on the social 
fabric.” This is not completely out of keeping with Crowley and Puttenham’s views. 
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attempted to draw, and, on the evidence, it did not: references to the vita are 
uncommon in early reception of Piers Plowman and the early criticism on it. Decades 
later, John Peter’s Complaint and Satire in Medieval England would still express 
uneasiness about according the title of satirist to Langland, whose unsubtly moralized 
types were inconsistent with both classical and Chaucerian personification: despite a 
modified quotation of the line “cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator,” Juvenal 10.22, 
Peter maintains that “[Langland] obviously made no effort in Piers Plowman to 
approximate his own style of writing to Roman precedent.”64 As Middleton notes, 
literary critics subsequently rejected the idea of “complaint” as a way to describe 
Piers. Complaint or planctus in the Middle Ages meant for the reader to sympathize 
with the narrator, not to be informed of flaws.65 These reactions attest to the problem 
of accounting for medieval satire purely on the basis of classical and early modern 
models, from whose shared practices it diverged.  
 Literary criticism ultimately came to reference what John A. Yunck and Jan M. 
Ziolkowski simply have called the satiric “mode,” instead of a fixed poetic genre.66 
                                                 
64 Complaint, p. 108. The line becomes Piers Plowman B.14.307, “Cantabit paupertas coram latrone 
viator.” 
65 Middleton, Companion, citing Miller at pp. 9-10: “According to [medieval] teachings, the purpose of 
complaint was to excite pity for the speaker, not to effect reform in the reader, a fundamental objective 
of medieval satire.” The extent to which medieval satire might or might not have held readerly reform 
to be a “fundamental objective” is my subject in the larger study, of course, but I quote Middleton here 
simply to register the definition of “complaint” she uses. This genre, planctus, should be contrasted to 
the quasi-legalesque literature of “clamour” treated by Wendy Scase’s recent book, Literature and 
Complaint in England, 1272-1553 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). As Ralph Hanna has 
observed in his review of Literature and Complaint (in RES n.s. 59.238 [2008], pp. 137-38), the 
literature that Scase discusses has very little to do with planctus as medieval Latin poets understood it. I 
would claim, nevertheless, that the book’s willingness to move beyond much older ideas of complaint 
as bootless lament, and into an examination of how such writing attempted to engage with society and 
to provide a voice protected from censure, is strong and interesting indeed. It improves on the too-
simple dichotomy proposed by Thomas J. Elliott in “Middle English Complaints against the Times: to 
Contemn the World or to Reform it?” (Annuale Medievale 14 [1973], pp. 22-34), notably, and I hope 
that its sense of such texts’ active rhetoricality (especially through appropriations of and allusions to 
official discourse) will find an echo here. 
66 See John A. Yunck, Chapter 5: “Satire,” in the Alford Companion, pp. 135-54, especially at p. 135: 
“Admittedly, medieval satire tended to shade into comedy and grotesquerie in one direction or 
sermonizing and lament—‘complaint’—in the other. In the vernaculars it usually functioned as a 
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Even this, however, has not seemed to fit entirely with Piers Plowman. S. T. (not to be 
confused with Charles) Knight argued that critics should consider more of Piers as 
satire than they had been accustomed to anyway, despite these divergences. “Piers 
Plowman is in totality a satire,” he claimed, “but Langland has extended the nature of 
satire and has set a new standard.”67 Knight, for whom Langland’s sometimes cosmic 
sweep of vision makes his work satirical, as well as Piers’ concern with speaking 
against cynical moral standards and other bad behavior, called this a “mode” as well. 
Yet his essay explicitly denies that this mode can concern matters other than “human 
affairs within their own terms,”  pairing satire to a fuzzier “theological mode”  in 
which Langland also wrote.68 Knight acknowledged the poem’s innovations with 
satire, that is, but also refrained from calling some of that “satiric.”  
 John Norton-Smith perceptively suggested that Langland’s technique as a 
satirist is similar to Henry of Huntingdon’s in the latter’s Satira Communis, “where 
the victims belong to all the estates of the realm and the display of vices is large and 
generalized.”69 As John A. Alford made clear, however, Norton-Smith’s general 
avoidance of engaging Piers Plowman scholarship harmed the reception of his 
points.70 Ultimately it was to be a student of Norton-Smith’s, Paul Scott Miller, who 
would exert the widest influence yet on critics’ understanding of satire in the poem. 
                                                                                                                                            
literary mode rather than a genre, a stance that writers in any genre—epic, romance, lyric sermon—
could assume, when it suited their purposes. We may describe it, warily, as disparagement or censure 
viewed as a verbal art, sometimes using complex fictions, sometimes simple invective, usually with the 
professed purpose of reform.” The “professed” is key. See also Jan M. Ziolkowski in Dictionary of the 
Middle Ages, vol. 14 (“Supplement”), ed. William Chester Jordan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
2004), s.v. “Satire,” pp. 554-57; and Thomas Bestul, Satire and Allegory in Wynnere and Wastoure 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974), p. 47. 
67 See S. T. Knight, “Satire in Piers Plowman,” in Piers Plowman: Critical Approaches, ed. S. S. 
Hussey (London: Methuen, 1969), pp. 279-309 (quoted at p. 308). 
68 Knight, “Satire in Piers Plowman,” p. 279. 
69 See John Norton-Smith, William Langland (Leiden: Brill, 1983), p. 48. Norton-Smith does not say 
further why, exactly, Langland’s satire reminds him of Henry’s poem. I suspect, given his reference to  
“generalized” vices,  that he had Henry’s last two lines in mind: “præmoneo, monuitque Deus, vel sero 
redite, / ne subito vobis æternum dicat, ‘Abite.’” 
70 See Alford’s review in Speculum 61.1 (1986), pp. 192-195. 
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Drawing on the evidence of medieval satires soi disants as well as the powerful 
postclassical tradition of medieval literary theory—accessūs and commentaries on 
noted authors produced for curricular use—Miller’s dissertation took on the task of 
uncovering the medieval sense of satire. Before what he saw as a broad but necessarily 
shallow concluding conspectus  of Langland, Chaucer, and Gower, he presents the 
following definition:71  
 
that type of mediæval ethical verse, ranging in tone between bitter 
indignation, mocking irony, and witty humour, which in forthright, 
unadorned terms censures and corrects vices in society and advocates 
virtues, eschewing slander of individuals but sparing no guilty party, 
not even the poet himself.72  
 
This is certainly a well-supported and carefully constructed definition of what 
medieval writers would generally have agreed applied to their own satires, and it 
allows Miller to consider Piers Plowman in terms of those views.73 Its many offerings 
need to be compared with my definition of satire’s “mode.”  
 As the title of his study suggests, Miller’s definition  presents satire in terms of 
its formal characteristics as understood from classical precedent. It suggests that satire 
during the Middle Ages should be viewed as a distinct genre marked as verse, for 
                                                 
71 For a defense of the shallowness of the overview, see Miller’s preface to “Mediæval Literary 
Theory”: “It would require a lifetime’s work to classify and describe every example of satire (by 
medieval definition) which was written between 1050 and 1500. Similarly, as Jill Mann’s work on 
Chaucer and John Yunck’s study of Langland have shown, it is possible to devote a whole book to the 
influence of the satirical tradtion on one small part of a work by one of the great fourteenth-century 
English poets. I therefore consider my study of the medieval satirical tradition and its effect on the 
works of Gower, Langland, and Chaucer to be a general survey of an area requiring extensive further 
investigation.” (vi) 
72 The definition appears in Miller’s glossary in multiple places, such as p. 171, and p. 208.  
73 For more how the Middle Ages encountered the classical satirists, see Vincent Gillespie, chapter 6: 
“[The Study of Classical Authors] from the Twelfth Century to c. 1450,” in The Cambridge History of 
Literary Criticism, vol. 2 (“The Middle Ages”), edd. Alastair Minnis and Ian Johnson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 145-235. See also Suzanne Reynolds, Medieval Reading: 
Grammar, Rhetoric, and the Classical Text (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), as well as 
the bibliographical items on the place of satire and asceticism in medieval education, cited below. 
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instance, just as Roman satire had been.74 The definition also notes that satire plainly 
and directly makes its critiques, using “forthright, unadorned terms”: the evidence 
Miller draws on for this element speaks to the Roman satirists’ “low style” of diction75 
as well as to the medieval scholarly position that these poets were not to be interpreted 
allegorically.76   
 Miller’s stipulation that satiric verse be “forthright and unadorned” deserves 
special attention, I think, for highlighting a conflict between medieval satire in theory 
and in practice. Although the words “forthright” and “unadorned” do lend the opposite 
impression, Miller points out that medieval satirists “frequently had recourse” to such 
techniques as “irony; parody; the use of puns, etymologies, and acrostics; and the 
appropriation of Scripture, maxims, proverbs, and epigrams,” inter alia.77 He notes 
that such techniques are optional, which partially explains their absence from his 
definition, whereas we have just seen his commentary evidence for a plain style’s 
being essential.78 That evidence from the commentary tradition partially explains the 
plain style’s inclusion in his definition—but not entirely, in the face of so much 
contrary evidence. Fortunately, Miller himself explains his assumption in favor of 
“forthright and unadorned,” indicating that, to him, these various ways in which 
satirists presented their criticism was a secondary element. Miller referred to these 
methods of presentation as (optional) “disclaimers” on the satire’s (essential) 
                                                 
74 See Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” pp. 110-111. Miller likely did not further specify such 
poetry’s formal features for the reason that these varied a great deal.  
75 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 167. 
76 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 165. Miller probably does not insist upon the latter here for 
the obvious reason that a poet cannot (apart from suggestions and warnings) control how his words will 
be interpreted. 
77 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 234.  
78 Note for instance satire’s description in the commentaries as “naked” (nuda): as Miller quotes on p. 
165 of “Mediæval Literary Theory” (from the Oxford, Bodleian Library MS. Auct. F. 6. 9. accessus to 
Juvenal) “Satira est nuda, quemadmodum [satyri] sunt nudi, <scilicet> quia nude, & aperte, & clare, & 
<sine> ambagibus, & circuicionibus, & sine integumento romanorum uicia reprehendit.” On the other 
hand, as I have just pointed out, medieval satire can often be marked by a great deal more 
circumspection in practice than Roman satire was or seems to have been.  
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“voicing”: simply a way of escaping the threat of punitive coercion for the authorial 
message they conveyed.  
 Miller’s claim about the disclaimers in satiric voicing, disassociating clever 
medium and frank message, enabled Miller to reconcile medieval intepretations of the 
Roman satirists with a lush profusion of very different later satires.79 It moreover helps 
to explain Miller’s claim that satire had a range of tones “between bitter indignation, 
mocking irony, and witty humour.” This list—including the non-tone of irony instead 
of *“ironic mocking”—oncemore pits theory against practice, resolving their dispute 
by relegating what appears in practice to a range of only secondary effects. It declares 
that “voicing” is essential when it comes to the matter of tone, as both theory and 
practice attest: there must be some authorial voice! At the same time, though, the 
definition must allow for a great variation in examples. And since irony seems 
fundamental—but does not appear in every commentator’s works or every written 
satire—Miller places irony in this tonal range as more than a modifier (like “witty” or 
“bitter” ) but also only one of several options.  
 A similar dynamic manifests itself when Miller’s definition notes that satire 
“censures and corrects vices in society and advocates virtues.” As Miller firmly 
pronounces elsewhere, satires as he understands them are not sermons since they 
confine their focus purely to the realm of the here and now (what we might call the 
realm of “civil” or “social” morality).80 But non-medieval satires do not always 
“correct” vices, and medieval satires’ vices and virtues are not always purely civil 
ones. As for what accounts for the innovation, Miller provides a clue with his last 
                                                 
79 His insistence that satire is verse might indicate a deference to the medieval commentary tradition 
over satire in practice, which (again) stands to reason given his study’s aims.  
80 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 235. Miller’s assertion here aligns well with S. T. Knight’s 
view already quoted above. I would agree when speaking of pure, transhistorical satire, and do so when 
providing my own definition, but I consider medieval satire at least sometimes—as in Piers—a 
different case.  
  23   
major definitional block: one which also harmonizes between classical satire in 
medieval theory and medieval satire in hard-to-classify practice. This final block’s 
major claim that satire “eschew[s] slander of individuals” barely requires defense, in 
so far as not to eschew slander or libel (as Miller himself observes) marks the 
difference between satire and invective.81 Satire’s “sparing no guilty party” also 
reflects a universally recognized tendency of satirists to make comprehensive analyses 
of their targets’ flaws. Miller’s real contribution regarding medieval satire, then, lies in 
the last few words of the definition: “not even the poet himself.” As I will discuss 
below in chapter 3, narratorial self-criticism is nothing new to medieval satire. Even 
the Roman satirists criticized themselves. Some medieval satirists, however, make an 
elaborate point of marking their narrators’ complicity in the vices they criticize. And 
this innovation is significant. 
 As with its correction of social vices and espousal of virtues, which indicates 
closeness to the modes of sermon and of prophecy, medieval satire’s narratorial self-
criticism can be understood in light of the intellectual and religious communities in 
which medieval commentaries on the Roman satirists would circulate. Even if we 
choose to see medieval satire’s often close affinity with these other modes the way 
Miller might, as an appropriation meant to supply “disclaimers” on satiric “authorial 
voice” in order to protect it—we are nonetheless left with a range of such disclaimers, 
a range expanded from what the Roman satirists’ works themselves provide. We then 
have every reason to search for their impetus in the history of religious thought. And 
yet Miller’s use of the term irony casts doubt on the idea that “disclaimer” is a quality 
subordinate to “voicing,” when it comes to satire: both are equally necessary, as the 
two are intertwined.82  
                                                 
81 Miller says as much regarding invective in “Mediæval Literary Theory,” loc. cit. 
82 Miller’s example of “direct authorial assertion,” i.e. without disclaimer, does not use irony but 
accomplishes the same deflection we might expect irony or humor to produce. It disavows harmful 
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This necessity of disclaimer, finally, makes sense as a reflection of ambiguity—the 
focus of this chapter. Medieval satire’s greater “range” of non-comic and self-
implicating “tones” speaks to a dissatisfaction with the easiest and most effective 
means of producing satiric ambiguity: one frequently and persistently associated with 
laughter.83 No definition can narrate the history we need to understand this 
development, though Miller’s at least points toward it.  
 Miller’s definition of satire has been gratefully cited and employed over the 
past three decades. Anne Middleton cites his study approvingly, in “The Critical 
Heritage”;84 Wendy Scase offers his definition word for word in an encylopedia 
entry;85 Vincent Gillespie, drawing from Miller’s dissertation as a whole, quotes 
Miller’s similar definition of the satirist (as informed by medieval scholia);86 and 
Ralph Hanna, Tony Hunt, R. G. Keightley, Alastair Minnis, and Nigel F. Palmer as a 
body pronounce Miller’s definition to represent “the critical consensus” regarding 
medieval satire.87 Yet despite so many scholars’ profit from Miller’s definition, and 
more importantly from the study of commentaries and accessūs that lies behind it, no 
true “critical consensus”  on the satire in Piers Plowman has been reached.  
                                                                                                                                            
“intent” and, as a preacher or prophet might, aligns that “intent” with the will of “God þat is oure 
gouuernour.” See “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 219.  
83 See John of Garland’s brief description of satire in the Morale scolarium, which Miller helpfully cites 
on p. 193 of “Mediæval Literary Theory”: “Hęc est lex satirę: vitiis ridere, salire, / mores excire, quę 
feda latent aperire” (“This is the law of satire: to laugh at vices, to leap, / to incite good behavior, to 
reveal vile things that are hidden”). “To laugh” [ridere] reveals itself here as shorthand for the 
ambiguity with which satire expresses its critiques and the sense of incongruity such ambiguity elicits. 
(In so stating I acknowledge a debt to Hermann Hesse’s Steppenwolf, which presents laughter as a 
pressure-releasing escape from the world’s various unfairnesses and contradictions.) 
84 Middleton, “The Critical Heritage,” pp. 9-10: “[T]he medieval theory and practice of satire [was] 
founded upon a consensus of the early glossators of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, and transmitted in the 
teaching of these auctores in medieval schools. [...] (Miller).”  
85 Encyclopedia of Medieval Literature, edd. Robert Thomas Lambdin and Laura Cooner Lambdin 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 665-66, s.v. “Satire.” 
86 Gillespie, “Twelfth Century to c. 1450,” pp. 223-25. 
87 Ralph Hanna, Tony Hunt, R. G. Keightley, Alastair Minnis, and Nigel F. Palmer, chapter 14: “Latin 
Commentary Tradition and Vernacular Literature,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, 
vol. 2 (“The Middle Ages”), pp. 363-421 at p. 405. 
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 In the absence of true “critical consensus” (about satire in Piers, at least) the 
“state of the question” has best been suggested, and advanced, by Anne Middleton’s 
1997 essay titled “Acts of Vagrancy.”88 Middleton focuses there on the C.5 
“autobiographical” passage, which she claims could have been Langland’s last 
completed revision to Piers, in which Will defends himself from the charge of idleness 
and vagrancy by appeal to clerical privilege and his poetic métier. In the course of 
making that self-defense, Will directly appropriates the narratorial persona for 
medieval “Goliardic” satire, which using the label of “gyrovague satire” Middleton 
defines by appeal (“especially”) to 
 
its technique of castigating the vices and sociopolitical perversions of 
clergy and court through the voice and rhetorical posture of one deeply 
implicated in them—and hence a voice that in effect positions both 
itself and its audience rhetorically within the slippery and treacherous 
moral and semantic universe it represents.89 
 
Such poetry indulged heavily in comic effects, both in its frequent recourse to a type 
of parody—of Scripture, of liturgy—and to what Jill Mann has identified as 
intriguingly inverse descriptions whose libelous nature did not endear Goliardic 
writings, at least officially, to the ecclesiastical hierarchy.90   
 Middleton suggests that Will’s C.5 self-defense “mim[es]” a “satiric tirade [...] 
[with] the classic topics, and in the classic voice and rhetorical mode, of goliardic art,” 
in which “the speaker of such satire discloses his implication in the pleasures, 
temptations, and intrigues [...] of the world against which he rails.”91 It is a “reminder 
that [satire] everywhere pervades [Piers Plowman], albeit to [...] unpredictable and 
                                                 
88 See Middleton’s “Acts of Vagrancy: the C-Version ‘Autobiography’ and the Statute of 1388,” in 
Steven Justice and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, edd., Written Work: Langland, Labor, and Authorship 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), pp. 208-317. 
89 Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy,” pp. 256-57.  
90 I discuss the Goliards further in chapter 3, below.   
91 Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy,” p. 257.  
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indeterminate effects.”92 Specifically, Langland’s unstable fusion in Will of  (comic) 
Goliardic persona and (non-comic) “apostolic” aspiration has been  “invoked in a 
more sustained and detailed fashion [...] than in any previous version of the poem,” 
she writes.93 It manages to “concentrate and force into systemic articulation and 
judgment the implications of Will’s intermittent and scattered self-characterization 
throughout earlier forms of [Piers Plowman].”94 Middleton explains satire’s “more 
volatile” nature here in terms of a Latin satiric tradition whose evasions of censure are 
often comic, cross-pollinated here with a vernacular tradition of what she calls “evil-
times complaint.”95 She leaves the reasons for this cross-pollination unclear, even so, 
especially in so far as the “evil times complaint” she refers to also existed in Latin. 
“Acts of Vagrancy” nevertheless accounts better than any other modern scholarly 
assessment for the diffusion of satiric mode throughout all of Langland’s poem, which 
Middleton notes owes much to sermonic and prophetic stances as well. Certainly the 
poem seems possessed of a real but self-undercutting power of judgment throughout, 
one which not only implicates the narrator but compels him not to deflect, and instead 
to endure, a program of introspection: one that even risks despair. 
 The systematic view of human behavior that motivates even Langland’s 
comedy will be clearer if we understand that satire’s affinity with sermons and with 
prophecy is not only theoretical but also historical. Medieval satire owes its very 
existence to ascetic communities and was interpreted within the framework of ascetic 
thought.  
 
 
                                                 
92 Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy,” p. 257.  
93 Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy,” p. 264.  
94 Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy,” pp. 264-65. 
95 Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy,” pp. 257, 258. Middleton’s definition of “complaint” here is not the 
same to which she would hold John Peter.  
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Quid Rides? Satiric Laughter and Ascetic Thought 
 
 Even though laughter has a long tradition of presenting itself as a natural 
response to satiric writing, as much as pride, some medieval satirists were not 
regularly concerned with cultivating amusement. The complete satirical works of 
Horace, Persius, and Juvenal were cherished in the Middle Ages not for humor but 
instead for criticizing pagan society–evoking not laughter but fear and shame, as 
Juvenal imagined of Lucilius at the end of his first satire:  
 
ense velut stricto quotiens Lucilius ardens 
infremuit, rubet auditor cui frigida mens est 
criminibus, tacita sudant præcordia culpa. 
inde ira et lacrimæ. tecum prius ergo voluta 
hæc animo ante tubus[...]. 
 
But whenever Lucilius blazes and roars as with drawn sword, the 
hearer whose mind is chilled with crime goes red and his heartstrings 
sweat with silent guilt. Then come rage and tears. So turn all this over 
in your mind before the trumpets sound[.]96 
 
Employed by medieval Christians for edification rather than “aristocratic play,” the 
classical satirists’ humorous aspect was, of necessity, even further downplayed.97 This 
in turn only served to heighten the Stoicism inherent in classical satirists.98 It thus 
made of their writing a vehicle for the related and yet more intense ideology of 
                                                 
96 Juvenal 1, lines 165-69, ed. & trans Braund, Juvenal and Persius, pp. 144-45. 
97 An anonymous commentator on Juvenal writing in the twelfth century wrote, according to Miller’s 
“Mediæval Literary Theory,” that “Satire is naked [...] because it censures the vices of the Romans 
nakedly, and openly, and clearly, and without circumlocution and periphrasis, and without an 
integumentum” (27). On the strength of such an understanding we can see how medieval satirists might 
not have known or cared to be “hilarious.” Thus when John D. Peter dismissed much non-Chaucerian 
medieval satire as “complaint” in his Complaint and Satire in Early English Literature (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1956), he ignored not only the existence and integrity of the medieval genre of 
planctus, which more properly deserves the label, but the principal requirement of the medieval satiric 
mode: that, like the provision-laden laws, stuffed sausages, lavish feasts and half-humans from which 
the word “satira” was said to derive, it should criticize its targets with a mixture of the possible forms, 
quotations, stereotypes, conventions and topoi that lay at its disposal. 
98 For more on Roman satirists’ actual debt to Stoicism, as opposed to what medieval readers thought, 
see chapter 3: “The Satirists” in Marcia L. Colish’s Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages 
(Leiden: Brill, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 159-224. 
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“contempt of the world” (and related concepts) whose relationship to satire I will 
focus on. Made influential thanks in part to Peter Damian and other champions of 
monastic reform (as Robert Bultot has shown in the most thorough investigation of 
this topic) contempt of the world appears throughout the writings of religious and 
educational communities during the high medieval period—especially of monks, who 
both read and wrote a lot of satire.99  
 It’s important to recognize that there was actually very little place for humor in 
the Benedictine worldview, at least in theory. No fewer than two of the so-called 
“instruments of good works” in the Rule of Saint Benedict specifically discourage 
laughter: monks are “not to speak vain words or such as move to laughter,” the Rule 
states and “not to love much or violent laughter.”100 Degrees ten and eleven of the 
twelve “degrees of humility” follow in the same vein: “the tenth degree of humility,” 
we read, “is that [a monk] be not ready and prompt to laughter, for it is written, The 
fool [raises] up his voice in laughter; the eleventh degree of humility is that a monk, 
when he speaks, do so gently and without laughter, humbly and seriously, in few and 
sensible words, and without clamor [...].”101 Instead, as Conrad Leyser suggests, 
                                                 
99 On religious contemptus mundi, subject of chapter 4 below, see, for the most in-depth discussions, the 
selective list of Robert Bultot’s scholarly work provided in the bibliography.  Bultot provides 
bibliographies of his own as well. In “Anthropologie et Spiritualité: à propos du contemptus mundi dans 
l’école de Saint-Victor,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 51 (1967), pp. 3-38, he 
provides a bibliography for his dispute over contempt of the world with Francesco Lazzari and other 
scholars. Perhaps the most current bibliography of his entire output might be found in  “Aux Sources du 
Divorce entre l’Église et le Monde Moderne: la Doctrine de Mépris du Monde,” in Rêves de Chrétienté, 
Réalités du Monde: Imaginations Catholiques, edd. Laurence van Ypersele and Anne-Dolorès Marcelis 
(Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2001), pp. 17-58. 
100 “Verba vana aut risui apta non loqui; risum multum aut excussum non amare.” (Quotations from the 
Rule come from Justin McCann, ed. & trans., The Rule of Saint Benedict in Latin and English. 
[Westminster: Newman Press, 1952]). 
101 “Decimus humilitatis gradus est, si non sit facilis ac promptus in risu, quia scriptum est: Stultus in 
risu exaltat vocem suam. Undecimus humilitatis gradus est, si cum loquitur monachus, leniter et sine 
risu, humiliter cum gravitate, vel pauca verba et rationabilia loquatur, et non sit clamosus in voce; sicut 
scriptum est: Sapiens verbis innotescit paucis” (McCann, 46). While that last proverb has been 
attributed specifically to the so-called “Sentences of Sextus,” which many medieval monks might not 
have recognized, the sentiment behind it appears commonly in other medieval proverbs, maxims, and 
sententia. Delatte’s Commentaire sur la Règle de S. Benoît attempts to make the restriction against 
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silence for Benedict as for other early monastic legislators served as “a figurative 
cloister keeping the ears and mouth inviolate to all speech save God’s.”102 In his 
discussion of whether or not monks might be allowed to preach or conduct pastoral 
care, Rupert of Deutz begins by noting that “the monk is dead to the world,” and that 
“the outstanding [precipuus] doctor of the church Jerome has said that ‘the monk has 
no business of teaching, merely mourning,’” non docentis, sed lugentis.103 Gerhard 
Schmitz recounts the story of a monk asking one of his brethren, What am I supposed 
to do,” Quid facio?, to which the other monk responded, Flere semper debemus, “We 
always ought to be weeping.”104 
 These pronouncements against laughter in favor of a life of more than usual 
dolor make clear contemptus mundi’s debt to Stoicism, at least as taken up by the 
Desert Fathers and later ascetic communities in the church, for whom laughter could 
                                                                                                                                            
laughter more palatable for twentieth-century monks, apparently: “N. B. Père ajoute: ‘Ne point dire de 
paroles vaines ou qui portent à rire.’ Il ne songe point à proscrire la joie surnaturelle ni cet enjouement 
qui est parfois indice et instrument de perfection [cf. S. Basil, Reg. fus., XVII], mais seulement la gaieté 
grossière, la verve lachée et bruyante, le rire épais et secoué.” (87) To my knowledge, however, nothing 
in the Rule demands so narrow an interpretation. See also cap. 4: “[...] verba vana aut risui apta non 
loqui, risum multum aut excussum non amare, lectiones sanctas libenter audire [...] [e]cce, hæc sunt 
instrumenta artis spiritalis”; cap. 6: “Scurrilitates vero vel verba otiosa et risum moventia, æterna 
clausura in omnibus locis damnamus, et ad talia eloquia discipulum aperire os non permittimus” (my 
emphases). Basil defines “talia eloquia” as “[g]eneraliter omnis sermo qui non proficit ad aliquam 
gratiam fidei Christi,” however (Reg. contr. XL, in Delatte p. 111 n.3). For more examples see Jacques 
Le Goff, “Le Rire dans les Règles Monastiques du Haut Moyen Âge,” in Haut Moyen Âge: Culture, 
Education, et Société: études offerts à Pierre Riché  (Nanterre: Éditions Publidix and La Garenne-
Colombes: Éditions Européenes Erasme, 1990), pp. 92-103; and I. M. Resnick, “Risus Monasticus: 
Laughter and Medieval Monastic Culture,” Révue Bénédictine 97, 1987, pp. 90-100. Resnick is 
particularly valuable for citing a blanket prohibition against laughter in the Concordia regularum by 
Benedict of Aniane.  
102 See Leyser’s Authority and Asceticism from Augustine to Gregory the Great (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000), p. 120.  
103 “[...] monachus mortuus sit seculo et cum precipuus doctor ecclesie ieronymus dicat “Monachus non 
habet officium docentis, sed lugentis.” Quoted from Joseph Anton Endres, Honorius Augustodunensis: 
Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geistigen Lebens im 12. Jahrhundert (Münich: Jos. Kösel’schen, 1906).  
104 “...quod rident homines, plorandum est: der ‘Unwert’ des Lachens im monastich geprägten 
Vorstellungen der Spätantike und des frühen Mittelalters,” in Stadtverfassung, Verfassungsstaat, 
Pressepolitik: Festschrift für Eberhard Naujoks zum 65. Geburtstag, edd. Quarthal and Setzler 
(Sigmarigen: Thorbecke, 1980), pp. 3-15 at p. 5. 
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indicate an excess of levity.105 In order to achieve the perfect equanimity necessarily 
for the blessed life, or apatheia, a subject would have to repress such emotional 
extremes.106 Saints like Martin of Tours were accordingly honored for their 
impassivity: “No one ever saw him angry, agitated, mourning, laughing,” Sulpicius 
Severus would write. “He was always one and the same, a hint of celestial joy 
showing forth on his face, seeming beyond the nature of man.”107 Alcuin, in a famous 
letter to Higbald of Lindisfarne, would counsel that “the voices of readers ought to be 
heard in [monastic] dwelling places” (the practice of mealtime lectio) “not the noise of 
[monks’] laughter in the streets.”108 Centuries later, Alan of Lille’s discussion of 
spiritual grieving in the Summa de Arte Prædicatoria picks up the same message, 
                                                 
105 Barbara Rosenwein notes religious communities’ debt to Stoicism in Emotional Communities in the 
Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), but it is interesting that at least in the 
twelfth century Stoicism and contempt of the world were recognized to have very different characters, 
as witness John of Salisbury’s poems against Stoicism (and for contempt of the world) in the 
Entheticus. I give a full citation below in chapter 4.  
106 The literature on (like the influence of) Stoicism from the early Middle Ages forward is enormous. 
See for instance Thomas D. Hill, “The Unchanging Hero: a Stoic Maxim in The Wanderer and Its 
Contexts,” Studies in Philology 101. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 233-49. But for one good discussion of the 
appropriation of Stoic apatheia by Christians in Late Antiquity, see Jean Daniélou, Platonisme et 
Théologie Mystique: essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de Saint Grègoire de Nysse (1934), pp. 99-110. 
François Vandenbroucke, in Moines: Pourquoi? théologie critique du monachisme (Gembloux: 
Duculot, 1967), avers eloquently regarding this mixed heritage of Christianity and Platonism that “[i]l 
est très difficile d’établir avec certitude l’origine d’un thème doctrinal précis, et surtout le chemin qu’il 
prend au cours de siècles où les témoignages sont relativement rares, comme c’est le cas du moyen âge, 
et où les idées offrent le spectacle d’un enchevêtrement simultané et quasi inextricable de thèmes 
nombreux, voisins ou contradictroires.” (58) See also Henry Chadwick, “The Ascetic Ideal in the 
History of the Church,” in Monks, Hermits, and the Ascetic Tradition, ed. W. J. Sheils (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1985), pp. 1-23; and Alexander Murray, chapter 4: 
“Philosophy,” in Suicide in the Middle Ages, vol. 2: The Curse on Self-Murder (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 122-51. 
107“Nemo umquam illum vidit iratum, nemo commotum, nemo mærentem, nemo ridentem: 
unusidemque fuit semper, cælestem quodammodo lætitiam vultu præferens extra naturam hominis 
videbatur.” Quoted in Schmitz, “...quod rident homines,” p. 6 n. 16. 
108 Alcuin, Ep. 124 (797), line 25: “Voces legentium audire in domibus tuis, non ridentium turbam in 
plateis.” Bullough’s translation, quoted on page 92 of the Norton Critical Edition of Beowulf, reads 
“The voices of readers should be heard in your dwellings, not the laughing rabble in the courtyards.” 
We can see that the notion that laughter might be useful for counteracting tristitia or tædium or despair, 
yet it appears little to have been thus contemplated by monastic legislators, who nevertheless had to 
contend with the dissemination of entertaining stories and songs by monks who presumably did want to 
draw a distinction between types of laughter. As potentially hard to maintain as such a distinction could 
be (in theory), it would prove (in practice) impossible to ignore. 
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citing authorities from the Bible to Gregory the Great on the inadvisability of laughter 
and the benefit, even necessity, of grief.109 Contempt of the world went much further 
than Stoicism in this respect, restricting an emotional expression long deemed a 
defining characteristic of humanity in favor of penitential tears.110 
  An apparent hypocrisy—which monks tried to resolve—follows from 
comparing actual literary practice with the pronouncements I’ve just mentioned.111 
The same directions used to promote humility among monks—such as the eleventh 
“degree of humility,” with its requirement that a monk speak “without laughter” (sine 
risu), “humbly and seriously” (humiliter cum gravitate) and without clamor (non [...] 
clamosus in voce)—should have discouraged harsh criticism. The Rule’s “instruments 
of good works” also proscribe and even forbid (damnamus) jests (scurrilitates), idle 
words (verba otiosa), intentionally humorous sentiments (risum moventia), and all 
other such speech (talia eloquia) “with an eternal ban in all places” (æterna clausura 
in omnibus locis).  
 Comedy, especially when mixed with criticism as in classical satire, seems 
distinctly unwelcome in this context. And yet satires were written all the same. The 
                                                 
109 PL 210, coll. 136C-D: “His auctoritatibus et rationibus potest aliquis invitare ad spiritualem luctum: 
‘Beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur (Matth. V).’ Et alibi: ‘Væ vobis qui ridetis nunc, quia 
lugebitis et flebitis (Luc. VI).’ Jacobus ait: ‘Miseri estote et lugete, et plorate: risus vester in luctum 
convertatur, et gaudium in mærorem (Jac. IV).’ Salomon ait: ‘Melius est ire ad domum luctus, quam ad 
domum convivii (Eccle. VII).’ Gregorius: ‘Præsentia gaudia sequuntur perpetua lamenta. Nemo potest 
hic gaudere cum sæculo, et illic regnare cum Deo.’” 
110 On tears, see especially Piroska Nagy, Le Don des Larmes: un instrument spirituel en quête 
d’institution (Paris: Albin Michel, 2000); on the humanity of laughter (as recognized even in the Middle 
Ages), see Jan Ziolkowski’s “Humour of Logic and the Logic of Humour,” Journal of Medieval Latin 3 
(1993), p. 5 nn. 17-18.  
111 As John D. Peter recounts out in Complaint and Satire, Jerome famously wrote a letter in which he 
declined to “name names” since he did not intend to write satire—which, as it had been understood 
classically, could be destructive and demeaning, and of which he had in another situation been accused. 
For more information see David S. Wiesen, St. Jerome as a Satirist: a Study in Christian Latin Thought 
and Letters (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964). For the influence of Jerome’s ascetic outlook on 
his polemical writing see also Elizabeth A. Clark, “Dissuading from Marriage: Jerome and the 
Asceticization of Satire,” in Satiric Advice on Women and Marriage: from Plautus to Chaucer, ed. 
Warren S. Smith (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), pp. 154-81. 
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importance of group cohesion, and the often explicit plans to shore up community 
pride, combined with a writer’s desire to give a vehicle to his learning and rhetorical 
skill, seem to have meant that under the rubric of “contempt of the world” could be 
admitted very harsh criticism of other humans indeed—at least, so long as their ways 
were sufficiently degenerate or even secular. We can see a prime example in the De 
Contemptu Mundi of Bernard of Morlaix (or Cluny), a Cluniac monk during the 
abbacy of Peter the Venerable. Subtitled earlier in the last century by the editor H. C. 
Hoskier as a “bitter satirical poem of 3000 lines” on the evils of the age, the poem 
explicitly identifies itself with satire about halfway through.112 As Ronald Pepin has 
pointed out, Bernard’s poem is a poetic tour-de-force, a sustained exercise carried over 
three long sections of verses in tripartiti dactylici caudati, “a hexameter line with both 
internal and tailed rhyme, a form”—Pepin informs us—”[that] very few of Bernard’s 
contemporaries attempted.”113 The poet also seems to have been indebted to classical 
satire. Pepin observes that it “[salutes] Horace, Persius, Juvenal, [and] even Lucilius, 
by name.” It shows familiarity with Vergil and a hodgepodge of biblical books as 
well.114  
 Given its monastic context, Bernard’s poem quite understandably steers clear 
of humor even when most vociferously taking up satire, opting for much different 
feelings with its affective intent: alertness, outrage, shame, repentance, and fear.  
“Evils abide but justice lies low, and thus a wide way is open to satire,” Bernard 
writes. “Much that follows is indecent [sc. for me to mention], yet my concern is to 
                                                 
112 De Contemptv Mvndi: a Bitter Satirical Poem of 3000 Lines upon the Morals of the XIIth Century 
(London: Quaritch, 1929).  
113 Ronald Pepin, Scorn for the World: Bernard of Cluny’s De contemptu mundi, Medieval Texts and 
Studies 8 (East Lansing: Colleagues Press, 1991), p. xiii.  
114 Pepin, Scorn, xii.  
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prevent wicked deeds and to encourage virtuous deeds. [...] Here I follow satire.”115 
The jeremiad that follows happens to bleed into prophecy—but, as it does so, the 
poem reminds us of the very porous boundaries between sermonic, satiric, and 
prophetic discourses.  
 We can see a similar focus on rejection of the world and tearful repentence in 
Johannes de Hauvilla’s also very grand and learned Architrenius, or “Archweeper,” 
whose protagonist battles with human weakness and, in so doing, incessantly bewails 
his inability to live as perfectly as he intends.  “Traversing the world with wandering 
steps,” as the prose prologue has it in Wetherbee’s translation, “he encounters [...]  all 
those forms of worldly prostitution which seize a man with their many-stranded rope 
and make him long to know the unlawful embrace of temporal things. [...] Therefore, 
read on,” it continues. “If you are curious about the author, suffice it to say that his 
name is John.”116 With this final reference to the name of the poet, about whom 
apparently we need only know that he shares a name with John the Baptist and the 
author of Revelation apparently, the prologue alerts us to the work’s monitory and 
even prophetic role. In this poem though, even more than in Bernard’s, the wisdom 
dispensed often comes from the classical world. The Architrenius ends with long 
speeches by the likes of Persius, Diogenes, Socrates, Cicero, Pythagoras, and others, 
for instance. It concludes with the marriage of the poem’s hero to Moderation, that 
classical virtue, herself.  
 However striking such learning and poetic virtuosity, few contemporaries of 
either Bernard or Johannes would have found it strange to see Roman poets’ works 
                                                 
115 Pepin, Scorn, Bk. 2, ll. 123-25, on pp. 82-83: “Stant mala, jus latet, hinc satiræ patet area lata. / 
Parce, modestia, multa sequentia sunt inhonesta, / cura tamen mea facta vetat rea, suadet honesta. / Da 
veniam precor; hic satiram sequor [...].” 
116 Winthrop Wetherbee trans., Johannes de Hauvilla: Architrenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 3. Wetherbee’s translation draws on the edition by Paul Gerhard Schmidt: Johannes de 
Hauvilla: Architrenius: mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen (Münich: Wilhelm Fink, 1974).  
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(least of all their satires) re-tuned to comment on the vanity of the world. In fact, 
classical poets and writers were routinely cited by high-medieval poems to illustrate 
the vanity of temporalia and the necessity of introspection. Their poems were used in 
schools as important, authoritative, texts. Alan of Lille suggests the first line of 
Persius’ first satire, despite what he recognizes as the author’s “comic” style, as a 
proper quotation for preachers to use who wish to inspire a sense of the vanity of 
human ingenuity.117 Juvenal’s tenth satire was in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
used widely to illustrate contempt of the world as well.118 These and others also appear 
quoted in the Vagantenstrophe ‘cum auctoritate’ as used by Walter of Châtillon, 
sometimes to illustrate the same ascetic ideal.119 At least nine lines of Horace appear 
to do so in the Moralium dogma philosophorum, and John of Salisbury’s Entheticus de 
dogmate philosophorum devotes original verses to the philosophical project of 
                                                 
117 Summa Magistri Alani Doctoris Universalis de Arte Prædicatoria, PL 210, cols. 144D-115A: “Si 
Prædicator vult invitare auditores ad mundi contemptum, in medium hanc afferat auctoritatem: Vanitas 
vanitatum, et omnia vanitas, etc. (Eccle. I.) Quæ enim auctoritas ita insinuat mundanarum rerum 
vanitatem, et hominum vilitatem, omnia esse lubrica, et nulla stabilia, sicut auctoritas ista? Juxta hanc 
auctoritatem, debet distinguere triplicem mundi vanitatem. Est enim vanitas mutabilitatis, vanitas 
curiositatis, et vanitas falsitatis. Vanitas mutabilitatis est, secundum quam naturaliter omnia mutabilitati 
subjacent; de qua Apostolus: Omnis creatura vanitati subjecta est (Rom. VIII). Vanitas curiositatis est, 
secundum quam homo expendit omnem curam suam in mundanis. Unde: Dominus dissipat cogitationes 
hominum quoniam vanæ sunt (Psal. XCIII; I Cor. III). De qua Persius comicus ait: O curas hominum, o 
quantum in rebus inane!” (Braund, Juvenal and Persius, surmises that this line in Persius is a quotation 
from Lucilius, and of course Alan would not have known this, but the fact of the quotation illustrates 
the intense referentiality of satire even among its Roman originators.)] 
118 Pepin, “Juvenal X: a Paradigm for Medieval Contemptus mundi Poems,” Latomus 49 (1990), pp. 
473-478.  
119 See “Tanto viro locuturi” by Walter (Strecker’s editions & Levine’s translation provided in 
bibliography) to see original verses on this subject as well. In using classical poets to support the 
author’s more contemporary ascetic pronouncements, Walter’s poems have the form but not the 
character of regular Goliardic verse. On this form see Winthrop Wetherbee’s discussion s.v. “Goliardic 
Verse/Vagantenstrophe” in the New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993) as well as Paul Gerhard Schmidt, “The Quotation in Goliardic Poetry: 
the Feast of Fools and the Goliardic Strophe cum auctoritate,” in Latin poetry and the Classical 
Tradition: Essays in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, edd. Peter Godman and Oswyn Murray 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 39-55; Winthrop Wetherbee, “Goliardic Verse,” in The New 
Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, edd. Alex Preminger, T. V. F. Brogan, et al. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), n. pag. (online access). Charles Witke discusses the poetics of the 
Vagantenstrophe in chapter 9: “Walter of Châtillon: Apologies for Stability,” in Latin Satire: the 
Structure of Persuasion (Leiden: Brill, 1970), pp. 233-66.  
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cultivating proper contempt for worldly things, though not all of these can be called 
satires.120 Other examples could be multiplied.121  
 Ascetic thought was influential on satirists outside the monastery, too, fairly 
early on. Robert Bultot observes that Henry of Huntingdon both exemplifies and 
alludes to the academic currency of such sentiments in his own letter De contemptu 
mundi (appended to his History of the English People) when recalling how in earlier 
years, dazzled by life at the household of Robert Bloet, he completely ignored the 
advice of those who taught the contempt of the world in schools.122  That dire-
sounding curriculum fits well with a definition for philosophy offered by Hugh of St. 
Victor in his Didascalicon, namely that “Philosophy [...] is a meditat[ion] upon death, 
a pursuit of especial fitness for Christians, who, spurning the solicitations of this 
world, live subject to discipline in a manner resembling the life of their future 
home.”123 Stephen Jaeger has observed that this reappropriation of classical thought 
                                                 
120 On this work see Rodney Thomson, “What is the Entheticus?” repr. in The World of John of 
Salisbury, ed. Michael Wilks, Studies in Church History Subsidia 3 (London: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 
287-301. For an example, see poem 47 in Jan van Laarhoven, ed. and trans., John of Salisbury’s 
Entheticus Maior and Minor, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters XVII, vol. 1 
(Leiden: Brill, 1987), part II, section “J.” Laarhoven writes of the Entheticus that “[it] is indeed a 
storehouse of warnings, admonitions, and exhortations, in the forms of satire, didactical exposés, and 
polemic diatribes. If all the genres are present, they serve but one purpose: to teach one how to be wise” 
(24). 
121 R. Bultot, “La Chartula et l’Enseignement de Mépris du Monde dans les Écoles et les Universités 
Médiévales,” in Studi Medievali, ser. 3, 8.2 (1967), pp. 787-834 at p. 821.  And for more examples, see 
also R. Bultot, “Les Philosophes du Paganisme, Docteurs et Exemples de ‘Contemptus Mundi’ pour la 
Morale Médiévale,” Studia Gratiana XIX (“Mélanges G. Fransen”), pp. 103-22. For the monastic 
educational milieu, see C. Stephen Jaeger, “Cathedral Schools and Humanist Learning, 950-1150,” repr. 
in Scholars and Courtiers: Intellectuals and Society in the Medieval West, Variorum Collected Studies 
Series CS 753 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), item I, pp. 568-616; see also Elizabeth J. Gardner, chapter 
5: “The English Nobility and Monastic Education, c. 1100-1500,” in The Cloister and the World: 
Essays in Medieval History in Honour of Barbara Harvey, edd. John Blair and Brian Golding (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 80-94.  
122 Quoted from Bultot, “Chartula,” p. 788: “Cum igitur omnes, et ipsi etiam qui de mundi contemptu 
legebant in scholis, ei obsequerentur, et ipse, quasi pater et deus omnium æstimatus, mundum valde 
diligeret et amplexaretur, si quis tunc mihi hæc pulcherrima quæ omnes admirabantur contemnenda 
diceret, quo vulto, quo animo ferrem! Insaniorum Oreste, importuniorem Thersite judicassem!” 
(Bultot’s emphasis) 
123 See Jerome Taylor, ed. and trans., Didascalicon: a Medieval Guide to the Arts (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961), p. 62. Earlier, Hugh describes philosophy, with notably theistic spin, as “the 
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and letters was deeply indebted to, and darkly tinctured by, the readings and the 
requirements of its high-medieval religious context.124 This is not to say that such 
introspection was unknown to the classical satirists themselves, of course: it appears 
for instance in Persius, albeit in a complicatedly ironic and dialogic fashion.125 Yet in 
Henry of Huntingdon’s first surviving book of epigrams, by contrast, such contempt of 
self appears regularly, and deeply, in earnest.126  
 Henry also wrote love poems and could boast of a sense of wit: a fact that 
reminds us that conditions for literary production were much freer outside the 
cloister—even for a typically grave archdeacon.127 For that matter, even monks appear 
sometimes to have infused their satires with humor: the Benedictine monk Nigel of 
Longchamps’ intensely comical Speculum Stultorum, a “mirror for fools” makes for 
perhaps the best example, recounting the travels and mishaps of Burnellus the Ass in 
search of a longer tail.128 Nigel’s surprising introduction, though, rather wrenchingly 
                                                                                                                                            
love of that wisdom which, wanting in nothing, is a living Mind and the sole primordial Idea or Pattern 
of things.” (61)  
124 On disciplina and the educational-formative aims of the school of St. Victor, see C. Stephen Jaeger, 
“Humanism and Ethics at the School of St. Victor in the Early Twelfth Century,” Scholars and 
Courtiers: Intellectuals and Society in the Medieval West, Variorum Collected Studies Series, CS 753 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), item III, pp. 51-79. The twin definitions of philosophy by Alcuin, quoted 
by Jaeger, “Humanism and Ethics,” p. 60, seem comparable to Hugh’s: “Philosophia est naturarum 
inquisitio, rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio. [...] Est quoque philosophia honestas vitæ, 
studium bene vivendi, meditatio mortis, contemptus sæculi. [...]” (emphasis mine) 
125 Persius 3, e.g., trans. Braund, Juvenal and Persius.  
126 e.g. Henry’s “In Seipsum,” quoted here from the introduction to Wright’s Anglo-Latin Satirical 
Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century (London: Longman & Co., 1872): “Sunt, vates 
Henrice, tibi versus bene culti, / et bene culta domus, et bene cultus ager. / Et bene sunt thalami, bene 
sunt pomeria culta, / hortus centimodis cultibus ecce nitet. / O jam culta tibi bene sunt, sed tu male 
cultus; / se quicunque caret, dic mihi, dic quid habet?” Wright opines on the same page that “[t]he style 
and character of Henry’s epigrams show an attentive and not unsuccessful study of the classical 
models.” (p. xix, emphasis mine) Greenway provides a translation of this and other poems in her edition 
of Henry’s Historia Anglorum, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
127 See Greenway, pp. cxii-iii at “Lost Poetry.” There is some speculation, Greenway notes, that Henry 
might have destroyed some of the lighter works in his old age. For Henry’s boasting about his wit, see 
the introduction to the eleventh book of the Historia: “Abiecta ergo leuitate seriisque complexis, quem 
ridiculosum stupueras religiosum stupescas [Levity, then, has been cast aside and sobriety embraced: 
you wondered at my wit, now wonder at my piety]” (pp. 778-79). 
128 The Ysengrimus would  be another example of humorous satire, what Mozley and Raymo call 
“burlesque” as opposed to “invective” satire. It might also be monastic, although such a conclusion is 
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spins all the poem’s humor back to the stern didacticism we’ve just seen, explaining 
that Burnellus represents the monk or any man of religion not content to remain in his 
cloister where he belongs.129 A dedicatory letter to William of Longchamps explains, 
further, that though the “text and title [of the book] appear laughable [ridiculosus],” it 
is intended for instruction.130  
 Should we ignore Nigel’s comments on his own work, treating them as 
obvious excuses, or accept them as a plausible rationale? If we choose the latter, we 
can find ample precedent for Nigel’s shaming, didactic use of humor in the exempla of 
medieval preachers, who understood what Jeannine Horowitz and Sophia Menache 
have called the corrosive aspect of corrective laughter [...]. This humor is very far 
from drollery,” they write. “Instead, it [...] aims to scare one away from a vice by 
making other people laugh in a complicity from which the guilty party is excluded 
[...].”131 In Nigel’s somewhat more charitable words, it’s easier to heal some illnesses 
                                                                                                                                            
much less easy to come arrive at with security: see John H. Mozley and Robert R. Raymo, edd. 
Speculum stultorum (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960). Jill Mann points out several 
strange aspects of that poem in the opening to her essay, “‘Luditur Illusor’: the Cartoon World of the 
Ysengrimus,” Neophilologus 61.4 (1977), pp. 495-509. In general, for Mann, “[t]he Ysengrimus is one 
of the most difficult texts of the Latin [M]iddle [A]ges. This is not only due to its length and the 
intricacy of its language, but also to the reader’s difficulty in defining either its subject matter or the 
author’s standpoint in relation to it” (495).  In deference to these difficulties, I do not treat that poem at 
any length here. 
129 See Wright, Satirical Poets, p. xxi. and p. 4: “Introducitur autem asinus, animal scilicet stolidum, 
volens caudam aliam et ampliorem quam natura contulerat contra naturam sibi inseri [...]. Asinus iste 
monachus est, aut vir quilibet religiosus in claustro positus, qui, tanquam asinus ad onera portanda 
Domini servitio est mancipatus, qui non contentus conditione sua [...] amplius affectat [...].”  
130 J. H. Mozley, trans A Mirror for Fools: the Book of Burnel the Ass (South Bend: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1963), p. xvi. Jan Ziolkowski argues on p. 25 in his “Humour of Logic,” cited above, that 
“Nigel’s decision to name the donkey dunce of [his] poem after the Burnel of philosophical jargon [...] 
tells us that the donkey will be not just any donkey, but an individual representative of a species, an 
individual who will make an ass of himself in an individual fashion, but who will simultaneously 
exemplify the failings of an entire group.” This being so strengthens the case that Nigel’s prologue was 
not simply tacked on as a justificatory afterthought. 
131 Jeannine Horowitz and Sophia Menache, L’Humour en Chaire: le rire dans l’Église médiévale 
(1994), pp. 163, 165, my translation. On page 114, Horowitz and Menache write, similarly, that “[l]a 
correction des mœurs par le rire exclut naturellement les sentiments de pitié, de sympathie, 
d’identification, momentanément ‘anesthésies,’ afin que le rire au dépens d’un individu puisse 
s’exercer. Cet aspect, passablement cruel, du rire, ‘attentatoire à la dignité,’ pour reprendre l’expression 
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with ointment than with a cautery iron.132 Even that use goes against the very explicit 
constraints in the Benedictine Rule, however, which as earlier noted “condemn[ed] 
[such words] everywhere with a perpetual ban.”  
 Even high-medieval monastic satire could be “funny,” then, but it often 
entertained without the intention of amusing, clinging to an expressed intent (at least) 
to edify. The more ascetic satirists downplayed the role and importance of laughter 
because their literary antecedents seemed to do so, and equally as much because 
laughter was officially valued little in the “emotional communities” in which such 
satire spread. Still, this suppression of humor was not easy: as my early and brief 
allusion to satire as literary caricature aimed to show, the distorting and sympathy-
reducing emphasis on difference provided by satiric description should almost always 
go hand in hand with humor, much as with identity affirming pride in the face of the 
satirically emphasized “Other.”  
 To accomplish the feat of avoiding laughter, high medieval ascetic satirists had 
to draw heavily on two closely related discourses, those of preachers and of prophets.  
And when they did allow their caricatures to be funny, it is not surprising that 
medieval poets took a very different view of textual authority, a phenomenon specially 
clear in the verses of the so-called Goliardic poets whose influence Anne Middleton 
detected (albeit with modifications) in Piers Plowman. This type of Latin satire, 
whose origins Rodney Thomson found in the dissatisfaction and impotence of 
university students, would become in that sense the forerunners of satire today.133   
                                                                                                                                            
d’Eric Blondel [Le risible et le dérisoire, Paris, 1988, p. 57], s’avère pour la prédication une arme aussi 
efficace que les traditionelles armes de la peur.” 
132 Wright, Satirical Poets, p. 10: “Multa enim genera morborum sunt quæ utilius unguentum quam 
cauterium ad medelam admittunt.” 
133 See Thomson, “The Origins of Latin Satire in Twelfth-Century Europe,” Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 
13 (1978), pp. 73-83. Perhaps Nigel’s comedy best represents the influence of secular poetry on the 
future course of satire, then—the same sort being cultivated at just the universities the Speculum 
Stultorum pokes fun at, which I haven’t discussed here (but see the note above). 
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Ambiguity and Constraint  
 
 This chapter has so far suggested that all satire is—must be—ambiguous, 
because of the satiric mode’s very definition: “a descriptive stance that identifies and 
focuses on the flaws of individuals or groups to suggest its targets’ departure from 
some ideal or normative state while ambiguously deferring the power to effect reform, 
foregrounding its reliance on impressionistic assessment through the use of 
caricaturing bias.” Because satire needed to criticize without confusing itself with 
other types of criticism, it early on found indispensable the appropriation of comedy 
(the use of which would limit the force of a satirist’s critiques and protect them from 
the charge of untoward “license”). Bénédicte Delignon, ascribing this appropriation of 
comedy to Horace, notes that such poetry is characterized by ambiguity—on a variety 
of fronts:  
 
[a]mbiguïté des sources, ambiguïté des lectures possibles, ambiguïté du 
propos moral et du propos politique [...]: les terrains de l’ambiguïté 
sont multiples, au point qu’il nous paraîtra possible de parler d’une 
‘poétique de l’ambiguïté,’ poétique au cœur de laquelle se trouve 
précisément le genre comique, caractérisé lui aussi par certaines formes 
d’ambiguïté.134  
 
The influence of an ascetic Christian ideology helps to explain the decreased and 
clearly more careful recourse to comedy by such satirists in the Middle Ages, despite 
their continued need for satiric ambiguity.  
 
                                                 
134 Bénédicte Delignon, Les Satires d’Horace et la Comédie Gréco-Latine: une poétique de l’ambiguïté, 
Bibliothèque d’Études Classiques 49, gen. ed. J. Dangel and P.-M. Martin (Louvain: Éditions Peeters, 
2006), p. 23. Alvin B. Kernan, in “Aggression and Satire,” speaks to the subject of ambiguity when he 
writes that, “[t]o be true satire, verbal aggression must, we seem to believe, be artfully managed, witty, 
indirect [...] [to] requir[e] [a] high degree of stylization in the attack” (118). Yet he also notes that satire 
“persistent[ly] refus[es] to be bled off into tragedy’s compassionate awareness of the inevitability of 
error and suffering, or comedy’s joyous sense that life always finally outwits folly” (loc. cit.). Whatever 
one might think about Kernan’s definitions of tragedy and comedy, his location of satire outside these 
realms points agreeably to satire’s intertwining of nonetheless distinct modes. 
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 Even in the late fourteenth century, whether comedic in their assertions of 
artifice or not, poets certainly had every reason to lean on their ambiguity. The fate 
that Horace’s interlocutor predicted for mala carmina, which Spenser would later so 
incisively depict via BonMALFont, sets a warning to satirists of every place and time—
and, concerning late fourteenth-century England particularly, the early years of Piers 
Plowman’s circulation saw the development of what James Simpson would 
memorably label “constraints on satire.”135  We might understand the “constraints on 
satire” more precisely as constraints on the types of critical speech and writing that 
satire could resemble, and from which, in fact, it can sometimes be very difficult to 
distinguish it.  
 As evidence for the power of such constraint on Piers, Simpson first observes 
its reticent “unwillingness to conclude, to drive home a point”—especially in the 
opening passūs. The narrator declares for instance that he “kan and kan nought of 
court speke moore,” which Simpson’s article has pointed out plays on two senses of 
“ken” in Middle English: the narrator might be able to tell us more about the court, but 
it is not licit for him to do so.136 Similarly, as Simpson notes, the conclusion to the 
fable of rats belling the cat ends with a refusal to interpret: “What thise metels 
bymeneth […] divine ye, for I dar not!”137 Conscience’s parable about Saul and “mede 
measureless” fails to put two and two together, likewise, because “so is this world 
went with hem that han power,” it would be foolish for him to do so.138  
 As these examples make clear, some of Langland’s ambiguity stems not 
merely from an admiration for debate but from a sense of the real political danger 
                                                 
135 See James Simpson, “The Constraints of Satire in Piers Plowman and Mum and the Sothsegger,” p. 
13. I am indebted to Simpson’s essay for much of what follows. 
136 Simpson, p. 13, on B.prol.111.  
137 Simpson, p. 13, on B.prol.209-210. “Here [...] the narratorial reticence is the result of fear (or so it is 
declared, at any rate): he does not dare to speak.” 
138 Simpson, p. 13, on B.3.280-83. 
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faced by satirists against the court at the time of his writing the B-text. Statutes 
promulgated during the reign of Richard II in 1378, taking up and making more 
explicit material from just over a century earlier during the reign of Edward I, forbade 
(and punished with imprisonment) the circulation of “false lies” and news against the 
king and his council and other officers.139 That said, Langland seems to have enjoyed 
skirting the edges of these prohibitions more than he actually feared them—as the 
fable of the rats belling the cat shows best. For while the story clearly points out the 
danger inherent in irking the “great [man] of the Realm” himself, its scriptural Latin 
tag (Ve terre vbi puer Rex est!) moves in for the kill. That Latin pouncingly suggests, 
                                                 
139 Simpson, p. 13. As mentioned by Simpson see for example Anno 2 Ric. II, Stat. 1, cap. V (1378)—
which reads as follows: “Item de controvours de faux novels & countours des horribles et fauxes 
mensonges des prelatz ducs countes barons & autres nobles  & grantz de roialme & auxint del 
chaunceller tresorer clerk de prive seal seneschal del hostel nostre seignur le Roi justices del un bank & 
del autre & dautres grantz officers du roialme des choses qe par les ditz prelats seignurs nobles & 
officers avantdits par ont debats & descordes purroient sourdre parentre les dits seignurs ou parentre les 
seignurs & communes qe Dieu ne veulle & dont grant peril & meschief purroit avenir a tout le roialme 
& legerement subversion & destruction del roialme avantdit si duremede ny fuisse mys est defendus 
estroitement & sur grief peine pur eschuser les damages & perils avandis qe desore nul soit si hardi de 
controver dire ou counter ascune faux novelle mensonge ou autre tiel fauxe choses des prelats seignurs 
& les autres desusdits dont descord ou esclaundre aucune puisse fourdre deins mesme le roialme et qi le 
frat eit & encourge la paine atresoit ent ordenes par estatut de Westm’ primer qe voet qil soit pres & 
emprisones jeqes a tant qil eit troves celluy dont la parole serra moeves.” See Danby Pickering, ed., The 
Statutes at Large, from the Fifteenth Year of King Edward III to the Thirteenth Year of King Henry IV 
inclusive, vol. 2 (15 Edw. 3 to 13 Hen. 4) (Cambridge: Joseph Bentham, 1762), p. 222. [Pickering’s 
translation: Item, of devisors of false news and of horrible and false lyes, of prelates, dukes, earls, 
barons, and other nobles and great men of the realm, and also of the chancellor, treasurer, clerk of the 
privy seal, steward of the King’s house, justices of the one bench or of the other, and of other great 
officers of the realm, of things which by the said prelates, lords, nobles, and officers aforesaid, were 
never spoken, done, nor thought, in great slander of the said prelates, lords, nobles, and officers, 
whereby debates and discords might arise betwixt the said lords, or between the lords and the commons 
(which God forbid) and whereof great peril and mischief might come to all the realm, and quick 
subversion and destruction of the said realm, if due remedy be not provided: it is straitly defended upon 
grievous pain, for to eschew the said damages and perils, that from hence forth none by so hardy to 
devise, speak, or to tell any false news, lyes, or other such false things, of prelates, lords, and of other 
aforesaid, whereof discord or any slander might rise within the same realm; and he that doth the same 
shall incur and have the pain another time ordained thereof by the statute of Westminster the first, which 
will, that he be taken and imprisoned till he have found him of whom the word was moved.] Simpson 
further indicates that “[t]he statute is repeated, though reinforced, in 1388, where it is [ordained] that the 
reporter of false speech against the great men of the realm be imprisoned and punished by the advice of 
the King’s Council when he cannot find the first mover of the news.”  To this I would add Anno 5 Ric. 
II, stat. 2, cap. V (1382), though it is a non-statute—“the commons never assenting thereto”—on certain 
dangerous “preachers.”  
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for a literate audience different from the listening “men that ben murye” addressed by 
the tale, exactly the sort of criticism that could be made—and thus, poetically at least, 
bells the “kitoun” after all.140  
 Importantly, though, these constraints on satire reflected in the B-text were not 
only political; some were religious and involved the proscription of theological 
“errors.” Simpson divides this into “two unequal categorizes […] [viz.] a small amount 
of legislation against a collection of heterodox (though non-Wycliffite) theological 
doctrines, including many Pelagian conclusions, and on the other a huge amount of 
anti-Wycliffite legislation,” which, according to Simpson, “receives much more 
detached and draconian treatment.”141  The arguable similarity of some of these 
banned positions to portions of Piers Plowman cannot be denied and thus must 
account for some of the elliptical cageyness that on occasion appears in the poem, the 
real name of whose author is probably unknown (after all) and whose Latin often 
dares what his English protests “dare not.”  
 Simpson claims that Langland’s avowed reticence out of political 
consideration either ecclesiastical or secular pales in comparison to the hesitancy he at 
least claims to indulge out of “moral discretion,” though the morality responsible for 
that discretion is not his essay’s focus.142 Nevertheless, Langland’s acknowledgement 
                                                 
140 Langland’s introduction of the Latin tag shows his caution, referring to the line as “holy writ” and 
also observing that it will not be read by everyone. In C, the phrase “whoso wole it rede” is replaced by 
the even more cautious “whoso kan rede,” making clearer that the tag’s Latinity makes it safe from the 
wrong eyes. 
141 Simpson, p. 15. On Langland’s association with Wycliffite thinking and/or Lollardy, see for example 
Andrew Cole, “William Langland’s Lollardy,” YLS 17 (2003), pp. 25-54, and indeed that entire issue 
(devoted to the topic); Pamela Gradon,“Langland and the Ideology of Dissent,” Proceedings of the 
British Academy 66 (1982 for 1980), pp. 179-205; and J. I. Catto, chapter 5: “Wyclif and Wycliffism at 
Oxford, 1356-1430,” in History of the University of Oxford, edd. Catto and Ralph Evans, vol. 2: Late 
Medieval Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 175-261. 
142 Such “discretion” is something we don’t see in Mum and the Sothsegger, where Mum is clearly on 
the wrong side of matters and sothsegging should be appreciated more. For more outspoken satire 
dating from about the same period, see J. R. Maddicott, “Poems of Social Protest in Early Fourteenth-
Century England”; James McMurrin Dean, Six Ecclesiastical Satires (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute 
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of political constraints is important, because these would continue in later decades. 
Pronouncements against speech potentially damaging to a ruling elite, “hem that han 
power,” would increase in the aftermath of the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt; shortly 
thereafter, the fifteenth century would see the arrival of what Simpson calls “the 
extremely repressive and exacting Constitutions of Archbishop Arundel drafted in 
1407 […].”143 It stands to reason that, by grappling with restrictions like these, the 
poem would provide a potential model that later writers facing similar (or worse) 
repression could follow.144  In light of what Simpson uncovered about “constraints,” it 
is pertinent to consider what J. R. Maddicott called early fourteenth-century “poems of 
social protest.” Satire in England had for centuries been direct—when it was in Latin. 
“The novelty lies,” as Maddicott writes, “in the conjunction of such traditional 
complaints with new grievances [...] and the voicing of both [...] in English and in 
verse which has some claim to be popular.145 It stands to reason that veiled and 
                                                                                                                                            
Publications for TEAMS, 1991); and Peter R. Coss, ed. Thomas Wright’s Political Songs of England 
from the Reign of John to that of Edward II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
143 Simpson, p. 16. Of special note are constitutions such as the one (number three in the edition cited 
below) demanding that a “prædicator conformet se auditorio, aliter puniatur”: “Insuper, sicut bonus 
paterfamilias triticum spargit in terram ad hoc dispositam, ut fructum plus afferat; volumus et 
mandamus, ut prædicator verbi Dei veniens juxta formam superius annotam, in prædicando clero sive 
populo, secundum materiam subjectam se honeste habeat, spargendo semen secundum conventiam 
subjecti auditorii; clero præsertim prædicans de vitiis pullulantibus inter eos, et laicis de peccatis inter 
eos communiter usitatis, et non e contra; alioquin sic prædicans secundum qualitatem delicti, per loci 
ordinarium canonice et acriter puniatur” (emphasis mine). The text of  the Constitutions I have quoted 
(dated 1408) may be accessed online, transcribed by Katherine Zieman from Fœdera, conventiones, 
litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliæ et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, 
pontifices, principes, vel communitates (1101-1654), ed. Thomas Rymer (London, 1704-35). On the 
later repercussions of Arundel’s prohibitions see Nicholas Watson, “Censorship and Cultural Change in 
Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel’s 
Constitutions of 1409,” Speculum 70 (1995), pp. 822-64. 
144 Simpson points to a later poem much indebted to Piers Plowman, Mum and the Sothsegger, to 
indicate that this did indeed happen (see James McMurrin Dean, Richard the Redeless and Mum and the 
Sothsegger [Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications for TEAMS, 2000]). He goes on to observe 
that later poets such as the author of Mum seem to have used Piers Plowman as justification for a 
satirist’s voice standing outside the conventional authoritative institutions of ethical regulation in 
society, though Langland himself seems to shy away from this view.  
145 See “Poems of Social Protest in Early Fourteenth-Century England,” in England in the Fourteenth 
Century: Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. W. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 1986), pp. 130-44 (quoted at p. 143). 
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cautious topicality would be more important to vernacular satirists than it had been for 
satirists using Latin for their critiques.  
 Surprisingly, however, Maddicott also notes that early fourteenth-century 
English “poems of social protest” were hardly veiled. Although written in the 
vernacular, they are directly—sometimes unambiguously—topical, naming actual 
individuals and giving voice to specific, datable, grievances. Maddicott’s proposed 
rationale for this unexpected topicality is that the works in question, despite their 
vernacularity, circulated only in educated circles. They could well have been written 
by clerical figures such as William of Pagula who, sensitive to injustice and “heirs to 
the whole pastoral, moral, and homiletic tradition of the thirteenth-century Church, 
[were] the natural propagators of complaint.”146 After all, he notes,  
 
The popular literature most likely to have a wide circulation is the 
literature of public entertainment. Yet our ‘protest’ poems seem hardly 
to fall into this category, simply because they must so signally have 
failed to entertain. They are not like the Robin Hood ballads, which we 
know to have circulated widely in oral form: they have no heroes, no 
action and no story. Pieces like the ‘Song of the Husbandman’ are 
simply laments about injustice. The one poem which does have a story 
and a hero of a kind, the ‘Outlaw’s Song of Trailbaston’, is 
nevertheless cast very much in the language of artifice and in a form 
which can hardly have been popular. Professor Legge has written that 
‘it cries out for a tune and to be sung’; yet its rarified style and its use 
of the conventions of romance hardly suggest that it was made to be 
sung to an unsophisticated audience. When the supposed outlaw talks 
of ‘the beautiful shade. . .in the forest of Belregard, where the jay flies 
and the nightingale always sings without ceasing’, we know that we 
are, as it were, in the world of Schubert’s Lieder and not of the Top 
Twenty.147 
 
As Maddicott later observes, those “poems of social protest” that were more widely 
circulated (according to manuscripts) rely much more heavily on satiric convention.  
 
 
                                                 
146 Maddicott, “Poems of Social Protest,” p. 136. 
147 Maddicott, “Poems of Social Protest,” pp. 136-137. 
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The Fate of Estates Stereotypes 
 
 Limited circulation and static recycling of satiric commonplace manifestly did 
not appeal to Chaucer, Gower, and Langland. R. F. Yeager has written that Gower and 
Chaucer’s project was to ennoble English verse to a standard worthy of the ages, 
forging a new and illustrious vernacular literature for English: a project which 
encouraged far more conscious belletrism, more open use of classical and continental 
literary convention, than Langland entertained; and he asks us to 
 
recall the position occupied by Gower and Chaucer in their time. Each 
of them was, in his own way, remaking the face of English poetry [...] 
setting standards for English letters [...] claim[ing] new territory. They 
showed Englishmen capable of writing complex verse, intellectually 
and aesthetically challenging verse [...]. The salient point is that every 
poem of Gower’s pen and Chaucer’s had successively—until the next 
one came along to raise the ante—little competition for the best poetry 
produced in England in the memories of its audience. As [E.V. Gordon] 
has remarked, when Chaucer and Gower were born, “the tradition of 
verbal art had been debased, and poets were often too easily satisfied.” 
When they died, it was a different country altogether.148 
 
Langland does not so utterly re-align English verse with a prestigious continental and 
classical tradition. On the contrary, he has seemed atavistic (conservative at least) in 
using the alliterative line.149 Nevertheless, manifestly, he also responds to a call for 
poetic innovation.  
 These poets’ innovation also extended to their satire, preserving the mode’s 
essential ambiguity—the reliance on “‘artifice,’ through which the satirist maintains 
the limits of his speech”— by using caricature and stereotype to new effect. 
                                                 
148 See Yeager’s insightful remarks on this project in John Gower’s Poetic: the Search for a New Arion, 
Publications of the John Gower Society 2 (Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 1990). I quote pp. 4-5. 
149 Though it might seem otiose to mention it, literary critics once viewed Langland’s alliterative style 
as a consciously nationalistic return to long-forgotten Pre-Conquest verse form: see Sir Israel 
Gollancz’s depiction of Langland as a sort of prophet, patriotically drawing his people back to their 
earlier heritage in “The Middle Ages in the Lineage of English Poetry,” printed lecture (London: Harrap 
& Co., 1920). The same observations could never be made of Gower or of Chaucer.  
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Caricature, or a dramatic simplification of elements and exaggeration of flaws, may be 
inherent to the satiric mode: “a descriptive stance that identifies and focuses on the 
flaws of individuals or groups to suggest its targets’ departure from some ideal or 
normative state while ambiguously deferring the power to effect reform, 
foregrounding its reliance on impressionistic assessment through the use of 
caricaturing bias.” Stereotype, the either direct or ironical attribution to a figure of 
faults deemed particular to his group, is merely a caricaturist’s technique.  
 In the Middle Ages both caricature and stereotype were frequently combined in 
the genre of estates satire, and this too became a site of late fourteenth-century poetic 
innovation. Not out of necessity but in practice, estates satire’s diagnosis almost 
invariably ascribes the ills affecting society to one particular vice (e.g. venality) or a 
group of vices (e.g. the “seven deadly sins”) treated seriatim; these in turn might be 
blamed on one particular group (such as friars or women) or a number of groups 
treated seriatim. Miller observes a common imagery of disease in estates satire, 
usually expressed through the maxim “si caput dolet, membra dolent” (if the head ails, 
so do the members) but, disease imagery or not, the satiric argument almost always 
goes in the same way: a good king, a good pope, a good bishop; good knights, good 
women, good merchants—any group of sufficient weight in society, were it only to 
give up its particular vice or vices, would effect a cure.150  
 It is easy to see the continued viability of this option in shorter, more cautious, 
poetry; and if one grants that, then its unsuitability for ambitious longer poems by 
Langland and his coevals will readily be admitted. Gower is the exception, using 
estates stereotypes quite freely in his works, but even he does not unthinkingly follow 
this tradition.  He draws heavily on lines from Ovid in his Latin Vox Clamantis, for 
                                                 
150 As we shall see, Langland does not hew very closely to this standard view that certain groups have 
specific, inherent flaws.   
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example, using the classical authority as a buttress for his topicality, but he employs 
this critique as much as to entertain a powerful élite. This use of convention should not 
be attributed to sycophancy, as Frank Grady has admonished.151 Instead, Gower was a 
deft manipulator of exemplary narrative and estates stereotypes—conventional means 
of describing society in terms of schematized ideals (which were relatively safe, 
because traditional and non-topical)—using them to draw attention to matters of 
immediate and controversial concern without suggesting unwelcome public policy. In 
the poem “In Praise of Peace,” Gower identifies flaws by praising virtues that (as the 
poem’s exempla quietly demonstrate), may not be there. (His poetic in this instance is 
in the manner of a guilt trip.152) And in the Middle English Confessio Amantis, more 
to the point, Amans and his confessor use this exemplary narrative partly to comment 
on contemporary social “division”—tellingly setting up “a world of identifiable faults 
and of specific agents of correction,” in which “the punishment is limited to this 
world,” with a clear significance for political behavior.153 The Confessio’s prologue 
ambiguously limits its outright claim to social topicality here, too, however, with its 
initial premise: that all the problems in the world owe their existence to the human 
heart.  
 Gower’s characterization in the Confessio Amantis similarly bends convention 
to new effects. Amans and Genius are presented as stereotypes instead of the society 
                                                 
151 Writing about Gower’s “In Praise of Peace,” Grady quotes the rhetorical question of John Fisher—
“Has there ever been a greater sycophant in the history of English literature?”—and provides evidence 
to the contrary. See “The Lancastrian Gower and the Limits of Exemplarity,” Speculum 70.3 (1995), pp. 
552-75.  
152 Whatever qualms we might entertain about these satiric means, the fractious and perilous 
Lancastrian context in which Gower wrote “In Praise” suggests their usefulness and even necessity. It 
inspires the thought that Piers Plowman could not have been written much later than it was, even if 
Langland had been longer lived. That said, the last page of Grady’s essay indicates that the intent to 
write satire was missing from “In Praise of Peace”—not that we can know authorial intent—leading 
him to label it, instead, a “statist apolog[y]” (575). 
153 I quote here from Peter Nicholson, “The Lover, the Confession, and the Tales,” in Love and Ethics in 
Gower’s Confessio Amantis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), pp. 86-87.  
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their discussion inevitably entails, with Amans resembling every narrator of a chanson 
d’amour and Genius possessed of an equally apparent (if less common) literary-
historical background. Gower is careful, moreover, to prevent these characters—they 
are the frame’s only characters—from carrying excessive weight. He lights the fuse 
with Genius early, naming him a priest of Venus rather than the Christian deity. And 
at the end of the poem, Amans too is unmasked: he is a blind old man, John Gower 
implicating himself, whose senectitude (as the prologue promised) mirrors the decline 
of the wider world.154 Yet even as Gower sets these characters firmly in a “moral 
universe” both literary and “self contained,” isolating them in the frame they nearly 
fill, their confessional dialogue’s triangulation presents Amans as a far more realistic 
human being than initial impressions might suggest.155 He makes this “stereotype” the 
representative neither of all humanity (as might Langland) nor entirely sui generis 
(like Chaucer) but plots Amans onto a very close set of coordinates that reveal him as 
“typical” and yet no simple “type.”156 His presence indicates the very wide range of 
choices that all individuals must make, despite very similar circumstances, relative to 
Nature, love, the exercise of reason, and all ethics.157 
                                                 
154 On the history of such imagery in Middle English poetry see James M. Dean, The World Grown Old 
in Later Medieval Literature (Cambridge: Medieval Academy of America, 1997).  
155 Nicholson, “The Lover,” p. 85, who goes on to add that the tales “conplement one another and [...] 
transcend the limitations of the moral frame.”  
156 Nicholson explains in “The Lover” that “Amans is a garden-variety sinner, as opposed to the 
hothouse species in [the Confessio’s] exempla. As such, he is not just more correctable than the sinful 
characters: he provides an ordinary point of reference, someone more like ourselves, for each of 
Genius’ lessons, a point of intersection between the comprehensiveness of Genius’ scheme and ordinary 
experience. [...] ‘Realism’ is always a relative term, but it applies in a precise context here, to the 
relation between Amans’ accounts of himself and the stories that Genius offers for his instruction.” 
(100)  
157 Nicholson offers that “[Amans] is there as a reminder that moral choices must be made by real 
people inhabiting a real world, with all that that implies, both about their necessity and about their 
difficulty” (“The Lover,” p. 101). Nicholson unpacks Gower’s complex sense of the relationship of love 
to reason and Nature—revealing it as more morally rigorous than provided by the Confessio’s literary 
sources, and Gower’s means of exploring wider issues of ethics and morality even outside the amatory 
sphere—in “An Ethics of Love” (Love and Ethics in Gower’s Confessio Amantis, pp. 41-68).  
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  Chaucerian satiric ambiguity positively depends on stereotype in the General 
Prologue, as Jill Mann has best shown. Far from limiting stereotype to just one or two 
characters, as Gower does in the frame to the Confessio Amantis, the frame to the 
Canterbury Tales contains a profusion of estates stereotypes. Chaucer in fact adds to 
the traditionally recognized catalog of estates, creating stereotypes for some that (at 
least in known literature) did not yet exist. Chaucer’s project with these stereotypes, as 
Mann notes, is to suggest that all the Prologue’s characters are individuals—with the 
result that, just as with real individuals, we do not quite know how to judge them.158 In 
fact, as Mann goes on to point out, Chaucer’s estates portraits “consistent[ly] remov[e] 
the possibility of moral judgment.”159 Vice, let alone specific vices, can have no 
permanent home in the Prologue’s reckoning. Chaucer’s “ambiguities”—Mann’s term 
as well as mine—stem from the fact that every impression we gain may be countered 
by another one: we simply cannot know another’s situation.160 In the General 
Prologue, Chaucer explodes the estates model, partitioning not merely every estate but 
also every human heart and every frame of moral reference into individualized, tiny 
boxes.  
 The situation could not be more different for Langland, for whom the idea of 
individuating through stereotypes is only a ruse—albeit a useful one. As Mann 
remarks, Chaucer (unlike Langland) “has no systematic platform for moral values, not 
even an implicit one, in the Prologue”161—with its “ethic of this world”162—but in fact 
                                                 
158 Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire: the Literature of Social Classes and the General 
Prologue to the Canterbury Tales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), e.g. at p. 196. This 
is eminently sensible, and explains why—as Thomas Farrell has reported in a recent article—literary 
critics differ widely on whether or not, for instance, Chaucer approves or disapproves of his non-
monastic Monk in the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales. See Farrell’s “Hybrid Discourse in the 
General Prologue Portraits,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 30 (2008), pp. 39-93. 
159 Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire,  p. 197. 
160 Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire,  loc. cit. “This I take to be the essence of Chaucer’s 
satire,” she writes. “It does not depend on wit and verbal pyrotechnic, but on an attitude which cannot 
be pinned down, which is always escaping to another view of things [...].” 
161 Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire,  p. 192.  
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this is not all. In actuality, Langland’s grounds are very systematic indeed and draw on 
an ethic to which “the world” is opposed. Where Chaucer could preserve ambiguity by 
putting everyone into individualized boxes, then, Langland preserves ambiguity by 
placing everyone into one giant (and well-labeled) box. His “ambiguity” consists in 
observing that what is true for his targets is at least potentially true for all equally—
including his narrator, for whom he suggests the same detailed program of reform. The 
way the prophet Nathan reveals to David his injustice towards Uriah closely 
approximates Langland’s method of identifying vice.163 Readers, other addressees, 
even the narrator’s persona—all are encouraged to castigate problems they then learn 
are their own. Piers Plowman only truly has one great stereotype, viz. all of human 
nature, which it receives and critiques in accordance with ascetic thought. Langland is 
not a misanthrope, as we shall see. He acknowledges human potential and believes in 
a long-range future for human progress, though he sees the means to this perfected end 
as introspective, restrained, and penitential: a program of religious discipline meant to 
reorient individuals’ relationship to themselves, to others, and to the wider world. This 
view shines clearly in one of the poem’s Latin tags: “I, poor, rejoice, while you, O rich 
man, brood.”164  
 
Morality, Religious and Satiric 
 
 I have suggested above that Langland’s asceticism shapes and carries the 
poem’s necessary “ambiguity,” since its detailed and authoritative critique—allying 
closely with sermonic and prophetic modes—implicates all of society, including the 
                                                                                                                                            
162 Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire,  p. 200.  
163 See 2 Samuel 12. 
164 “Pauper ego ludo dum tu dives meditaris,” B.11.269a. It also appears in Alexander of Villa-Dei’s 
thirteenth-century Doctrinale, a leading grammar textbook in verse, line 1091.  
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narrator, towards a constructive end. That said, I think it important to recognize that 
Langland’s satiric poetic did not have to owe its existence to asceticism. Nigel of 
Longchamps and Henry of Huntingdon all claimed an ascetic outlook, and similarly 
criticized human vice in their satire, but any sweeping moral worldview could have 
encouraged social analysis of this sort.  
 The best example of Langlandian ambiguity being used without the backing of 
specifically ascetic thought is probably Wynnere and Wastoure, a debate between the 
forces of miserliness and profligacy quite possibly written earlier than Piers Plowman. 
The poem shares many characteristics with Piers, including a dreaming narrator who 
observes all of society arranged on a broad field. It undermines stereotype much in the 
way that Langland does, albeit with a twist, placing whole armies of estates 
stereotypes under the leadership of either “Wynnere” (who will not spend his money) 
or “Wastoure” (who cannot keep his)—neither of whom appears a clear victor in their 
debate. The end of the poem is missing in the unique mid-fifteenth-century miscellany 
in which it appears, but nothing present in the work suggests a conclusion biased 
towards either party. On the ever more central issue of poverty, for example, the poet 
of Wynnere and Wastoure gives us effectively two distinct satires blaming poverty on 
the bad practices of one spending pattern or another. This double satire cancels itself 
out, leaving the adjudicating king, who never needed to take part in the quarrel in the 
first place, as the only possible victor.  
 Wynnere and Wastoure’s opening lines prominently include prophecy: a detail 
which, in concert with several others, shows a debt to religious thought. Nothing at all 
in Wynnere and Wastoure, however, indicates a thoroughgoing application of ascetic 
ideals to the problems it discusses. Had the poem opened on Langland’s “fair field,” 
we don’t know where “winning” and “wasting” would have appeared upon it. The 
poem is instead dialectic, and amoral to that extent. This dialectic quality should not 
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be surprising, though, since the poem takes the form of a debate. To modern-day 
writers and readers, the idea that two opposing views could ever stand on equal 
footing with each other seems deeply discomfiting. Yet audiences in the Middle Ages, 
somewhat more comfortable with paradox and obviously better disposed to oral 
entertainment, relished the debate form for its small-force dramatic possibilities and its 
capacity as a vehicle for perceptive, often witty, analysis.  
 Of course I don’t want to leave the impression that the popularity of the debate 
form in the Middle Ages points to the existence of an endemic moral relativism 
heretofore unsuspected in medieval society. On the contrary, many medieval debates 
have notably lower stakes than the debates one may observe in Piers Plowman, or 
even Wynnere and Wastoure. Are women good or bad? (Neither answer will 
encourage a change in the rights or privileges accorded to them.) Which of many 
possible types of wines is superior? (See the Bataille des Vins by Henry d’Andeli.165) 
Should a damned sinner blame his body, primarily, or his soul for his predicament? 
(The latter is an interesting example given that what was arguably an address only 
later transformed into a debate during the Middle Ages.166) Here as in other examples 
one can perceive the influence of scholasticism, which as any reader of medieval 
philosophy knows made the form a refined dialectical tool for weighing the relative 
strengths of philosophical arguments. Wynnere and Wastoure collapses stereotypes 
into just two giant ones, but its reliance upon debate makes it “dialectic” as well—
even more openly than Chaucer’s prologue.167 That “dialectic” quality appears 
                                                 
165 For this and other relevant poems of Henri d’Andeli, Alain Corbellari, ed. Les Dits d’Henri d’Andeli 
(Paris: Honoré Champion, 2003). The Bataille des set ars is translated in Louis Jean Paetow, ed. & 
trans, The Battle of the Seven Arts: a French Poem by Henri d’Andeli, Trouvère of the Thirteenth 
Century, Memoirs of the University of California 4.1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1914). 
166 See J. Justin Brent, “From Address to Debate: Generic Considerations in the Debate between Soul 
and Body,” Comitatus 32 (2001), pp. 1–18  
167 Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire, p. 190: “The method of the work is not additive, but 
dialectic; the tales modify and even contradict each other, exploring subjects in a way that emphasises 
their different and opposed implications.”  
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pervasively throughout later fourteenth-century English satire, regardless of how its 
different poets made use of debate convention or indeed of stereotype. Dialectic being 
inherently amoral, the adoption of a “big box” or “small boxes” strategy says nothing 
about a satirist’s actual morality, let alone his religion.168  
 A different dynamic of suspended judgment asserts itself in Piers Plowman 
than in Chaucer, we have seen and will see, where judgment is not so much suspended 
as held in check by the danger of self implication; it is interesting to find that dynamic 
at work, before Langland, in influential Latin poems such as Johannes de Hauvilla’s 
learned Architrenius. The Architrenius seems intent upon criticizing the developing 
university world from which its author arose, according to Wetherbee, and in which a 
good portion of it takes place. This was an unstable social context of exactly the sort I 
have suggested Langland faced; maintaining appropriate ambiguity in criticizing it 
required seeing the humanity behind its fluid estates.169 Despite the encyclopedic 
scope attested by its title of “archweeper,” the marriage with Moderation that 
concludes the Architrenius urges a mean between extremes. Its solutions neither 
drown in the hero’s tears nor sink beneath the flux of dialectic; the poem simply 
                                                 
168 The poet of Wynnere and Wastoure clearly finds the problem of poverty interesting, but shows no 
sympathy beyond that, as if wealth’s failure to help the needy were an intellectual puzzle. Gower’s very 
moral and expressedly Christian worldview seems at times to have a secular political edge. Although 
noting the General Prologue’s ethic “of this world,” Mann hastens to add that “[its] comic irony 
ensures that the reader does not identify with this ethic” (200-201). 
169 As Wetherbee notes in his translation’s introduction, “The bureaucratization of government and 
administration in Church and state had opened new avenues for social advancement and created new 
functions for educated men. At the same time higher education in the liberal arts had become 
increasingly the province of cathedral schools located in urban centers. Out of the growing organization 
and specialization of students and masters was evolving the institution of the university, one of many 
indications of a new sense of identity associated with the possession of knowledge. The intellectual had 
emerged as a social type, a professional class increasingly defined by its role in a secular society, alert 
to the opportunities for advancement that education made possible, and possessed of the artistic skill to 
express its new social awareness in a range of new literary forms. [...] [I]n a bewildering range of Latin 
poetry, ranging from adaptations of vernacular animal fable to the most sophisticated imitations of 
classical models, they maintained a steady barrage of satire, aimed not only at the venality and greed of 
the rich and powerful, but at the avarice and ambition of men whose training and horizons were often 
essentially their own. It is largely for and about such ‘new men’ that the Architrenius was written [...].” 
(ix-x) 
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doubts their practical implementation, instead. This especially, seeming to combine a 
daring sense of moral purpose with a desire for poetic innovation, is a rhetorical 
position one also recognizes in Langland’s poem.  
 For despite what Simpson’s article might suggest, Langland does not indulge 
in poetic obfuscation solely from fear of “constraint,” which influences every satirist: 
his religious ideology also plays a role in what Simpson rightly notes is a prevailing 
“moral discretion.” In fact, Langland shows himself at his most anti-political by not 
being cautious enough—for caring very little, ultimately, for satiric politics as usual. 
Throughout, Langland uses the discourse of debate to his own ends, showing multiple 
sides of arguments to indicate not their equivalency but rather the difficulty of finding 
a solution.170 
 
The Present Study 
 
 How much should we care about ascetic ideology—so often transmitted via 
monastic and academic discourse—even if it is prevalent in the literary record? What 
role do high-medieval monks have in the history of the emotions—and, by extension, 
in the history of emotions literarily expressed—let alone in the history of Langland’s 
poem? The monastic view of satire was by no means the only one in the Middle Ages, 
and monastic restrictions against humor were overturned in literary practice even 
when “ascetic satire” was at its most influential. The idea that asceticism could so 
strongly have affected a poem as late and widely read as Langland’s thus remains 
something of a mystery, given the popularity of humor and frivolity in much late-
medieval satire—and solving that mystery will take time.  
                                                 
170 Again, Langland’s choice to end his poem with an apparent lack of resolution stems more from his 
finding the solution impractical than to finding no solution at all. 
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 Langland’s indebtedness to monastic thought, without a doubt, is as quietly 
expressed as it is profound. Indeed, the poem’s frequently muted appropriations serve 
as evidence for Pearsall’s view that Langland’s “knowledge of devotional and 
contemplative writing is revealed at several points, but [that] he makes his own use of 
what he knows[, rejecting] unworldly and élitist spirituality [while] absorbing much of 
the language and idiom of devotional writing into his own search for a full Christian 
life which will be every Christian’s.”171 This is an apposite remark; Pearsall also 
usefully notes that “[t]he intellectualism that [some] scholars try to thrust upon the 
poem often seems the very thing Langland was trying to avoid.”172 Our fullest 
appreciation of Langland’s “trying to avoid” a set of texts lies, however, in our being 
aware that he is “trying to avoid” it. Likewise, the urgency of the poet’s search to 
represent the way to a “full Christian life that will be every Christian’s life” impresses 
itself more strongly on a reader aware of the apparent boundlessness—and openness to 
adapting tradition—of that search. Although Robert Bultot and Jean Delumeau might 
be a bit sensational in saying that literary contempt of the world directly created 
“Western Guilt culture” and caused today’s “divorce between the church and the 
modern world,” such writings certainly did give literary expression (and a whole array 
of topoi) to common anxieties over sin and death.173  
 Perhaps such topoi, in the end, were simply topoi—literary equivalents of 
culturally imposed “emotives,” expressions of the feelings one thinks that one should 
have and thus express in a particular community.174  This must remain uncertain, 
because the relationship between literary practice and the besetting problems of a 
                                                 
171 Pearsall 1978, repr. 2003, p. 19. 
172 Pearsall, C-text, 2008, p. 8. 
173 See Bultot, most conveniently “Aux Sources du Divorce” and other writings mentioned in a note to 
chapter 4, below; see also Jean Delumeau, Sin and Fear (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990; trans. of La 
Peur en Occident, 1978).  
174 See Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, pp. 18-19. 
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contemporary society is not always proportional or direct—perhaps least of all in 
satire. Still, as Barbara Rosenwein reminds us,  “[t]he representation and discussion of 
emotion in any source ought to be grist for the historian’s mill, since all texts are 
social productions, reflect certain norms, and presumably have impact on at least some 
groups.”175 We can say about works like the Architrenius and De Contemptu Mundi 
that, in them, learned and religious groups managed to continue down the same highly 
textual routes by which their ideology, after all, had been transmitted to them. In that 
regard, finally, these curiously un-funny satires remind us of that transmission and 
change among literary texts of even limited circulation and specialist concern mark the 
transmission and change of intellectual communities, emotional communities, even of 
broader culture.  Moreover, recognizing and exploring in detail the indebtedness of 
Langland’s ascetic thought can help us to explain not only the problematic status of 
free speech in Piers but also the influence of ascetic thought on issues related to 
speech in distantly later periods.  
 To provide as full as possible an understanding of how “ascetic ideology” 
affects the “satiric mode” in Langland’s great poem, this study considers several 
aspects of their close and subtle relationship. It is divided into three parts. Part I, 
including this and the following chapter, notes Piers Plowman’s loose participation in 
                                                 
175 Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” American Historical Review 107 (202), n. 84. 
See also Emotional Communities, pp. 27-29: “Written texts present numerous problems. [...] But the 
historian of emotion is immediately confronted with somewhat different and as yet largely unmet 
challenges. Already long ago we realized that our sources are ‘interested,’ often ‘insincere.’ What 
should we make of them when they purport to tell us about emotions? Further, as composed texts, are 
they not very far from ‘real’ emotions, communicating them (at best) via a distorting ‘second hand’? 
Then, too, do not genres dictate the ‘emotional tenor’ that a text will have, quite independently from 
any supposed community? Finally, are texts not full of topoi, repeated commonplaces derived from 
other places, sources, and eras? When can topoi tell us about real feeling?  [...] The rules of genre were 
not, however, ironclad. They themselves were ‘social products’—elaborated by people under certain 
conditions and with certain goals in mind—and they could be drawn upon and manipulated with some 
freedom. Like Isen and Diamond’s ‘automatic habits,’ they shaped emotional expressions even as they 
themselves were used and bent so as to be emotionally expressive.” Rosenwein’s remarks here refer to 
Alice M. Isen and Gregory Andrade Diamond. “Affect and Automaticity,” in Unintended Thought, edd. 
James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh (New York: Guilford, 1989), pp. 124-52. 
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a formal “genre” of medieval satiric poetry: one characterized in the late fourteenth 
century by ambiguity and, throughout the Middle Ages, by hybridity. Part II explores 
the poem’s critiques of self, others, and society—sites for the satiric “mode”—and 
what Langland’s critiques owe to ascetic thought. Although Langland’s satire 
identifies several flaws with actual ecclesiastical institutions, his interest in promoting 
the building-up of an internal “house of prayer” (domus oracionis) seems genuine. 
Part III explores Langland’s prophetic ideal, suggests an audience that could have 
appreciated it, and traces a posterity that increasingly did not.    
 The several chapters’ arguments ally closely with this larger threefold division. 
I have suggested in the current chapter that Langland’s choice to move away from 
stereotype when promoting “ambiguity,” a necessary feature both limiting and 
preserving satiric freedom of speech, stems not only from religious conviction but also 
poetic dissatisfaction with satire based on “estates.” Langland instead uses ascetic 
circumspection to reinforce his poem’s ambiguity, instead, highlighting that 
acceptable and flawed individuals—exactly like wheat and tares—resist distinction in 
every circumstance. 
 The second chapter appeals to the medieval tradition of commentary on 
classical satire in order explain one of the most confusing aspects of Piers Plowman: 
its occasionally patchwork, hodgepodge, digressive and shifting nature. This makes 
sense, I argue, as a manifestation of the “hybridity” accorded to satire by medieval 
theory, which I divide into “formal” and “conceptual” types. Langland’s use of the 
latter, especially, seems to have had analogues in medieval devotional practices related 
to reading and composition in addition to the precedent of secular poetry. Moreover, 
as these discursive appropriations invariably help to convey the poem’s critiques, they 
thus deserve to be associated with its satire. Here Piers Plowman’s frequent quotations 
from and references to ascetic figures and writings from the patristic period and high 
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Middle Ages suggest that Langland placed a priority on ascetic discourse and thus 
might well have been deeply familiar with ascetic thought.  
 In Part II, chapters three through six use the medieval conceit of the so-called 
“interior cloister” or “cloister of the soul” to explore satire’s outwardly radiating levels 
of critique. Chapter 3 uses the figures of Haukyn and Anima to revise the long-
standing scholarly assumption that Will is a so-called “Goliardic narrator.” Drawing 
on the work of J. S. Wittig and others who have explored what Wittig called “monastic 
psychology,” I argue that the Goliardic figure of Haukyn represents the “old” or 
“outer” man (exterior or vetus homo) in contrast to the so-called “inner man” of 
Anima (the interior homo). My chapter suggests that these episodes promote the 
ascetic virtue of “contempt of self” (contemptus sui)—one of the “walls” in the 
interior cloister, and a discipline designed to nourish the “inner man”—as a model for 
self-critique.   
 Chapter 4 takes up the issue of medieval estates satire most thoroughly 
explored by Jill Mann’s research into the Canterbury Tales’ famous General 
Prologue, and suggests that Langland’s modifications of estates convention uncover 
his rationale for social critique. The poem’s social criticism instead borrows heavily 
on the ascetic ideal of “contempt of the world” or contemptus mundi, which it refers to 
via delicate references perhaps opaque to present-day readers but distinctly 
identifiable upon comparison with medieval devotional texts and pastoralia. This 
disciplinary “wall” in the cloister of the soul was at the time being formulated for 
practice by the laity, and Langland seems to have much the same uncloistered 
audience in mind. Many of the problems the poem ascribes to society derive from self-
serving claims to titles and prerogatives, too unaccommodating and short-sighted a 
pursuit.  
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 Chapter 5 discusses the tension between charitable “love of neighbor” (amor 
proximi) and righteous love for God (amor Dei, sometimes called Veritatis defensio or 
“defense of Truth”), and in so doing attempts to explain how Piers Plowman can at all 
indulge in satiric criticism when the poem’s narrator is repeatedly admonished by his 
interlocutors to stay silent. Its methods should be read in light of  Edwin Craun’s 
work—most recently Ethics and Power in Medieval English Reformist Writing—in 
which Craun has continued to draw scholarly attention to the textual evidence, literary 
and institutional, for the “social practice” of critique.176 This chapter attempts a similar 
investigation on a distinctly narrower scale.  Although medieval canon law did allow 
for clerics throughout the Church hierarchy to make complaints at times and to speak 
out against corruption in their sermons, as I find, monastic thought heavily prioritized 
silence as a way of developing humility, obedience, and greater love of neighbor. The 
chapter thus treats the subject of religious silence at great length, finding the ascetic 
arguments for it made repeatedly (and for the same reasons) in Piers. 
 In Part III, chapters six and seven focus on Piers Plowman’s audience and later 
influence. Chapter 6 considers the poem’s blend of references to (Christian) “biblical” 
and more learned (pagan) “literary” prophecy. It suggests that an audience receptive to 
both types of prophecy and the poem’s clever referentiality might have resembled the 
learned friar John Erghome (O.E.S.A.) professor of theology at Oxford in late 
fourteenth-century England. In that case, Piers Plowman’s quotations deserve all the 
more to be read “florilegially,” as Erghome’s books might have been. More 
importantly, the poem’s satiric ideal could be the same as the fraternal idea of 
redemptio mundi, renewal or “redemption” of the world through the imitation of 
                                                 
176 See Edwin Craun, Ethics and Power in Medieval English Reformist Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  
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Christ. This potential target audience might help to explain the deep ambivalence 
about friars evident from the poem’s final passūs. 
  Chapter 7 begins an assessment of “ascetic satire” after Langland, 
differentiating Langland’s knowledge of ascetic thought from the ascetic discourse 
one finds occasionally in works by the far more famous Geoffrey Chaucer. It suggests 
that Langland’s influence on later vernacular English satire can be traced—for 
instance in Spenser’s Faerie Queene—as a viable way for poets to avoid the dangers 
of both speech and silence. Langland’s subtle and religiously authoritative criticism 
would continue to inspire later writers, such as the early seventeenth century 
“epigrammatist” William Goddard, although this was filtered and distorted by works 
in the Piers Plowman “tradition” (sometimes, ironically, attributed to Chaucer). With 
the poet’s asceticism growing ever further out of reach for early modern readers and 
writers, intent on easy laughs and quick sales rather than personal edification or 
transformative social change, humor began to assert itself once more as the standard 
satiric approach. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SATYRS ON THE ISLAND OF DOCTOR MOREAU: 
DISCURSIVE HYBRIDITY AND THE EVIDENCE FOR ASCETICISM 
 
A strange persuasion came upon me that, save for the grossness of the line, the grotesqueness of the 
forms, I had here before me the whole balance of human life in miniature, the whole interplay of 
instinct, reason, and fate, in its simplest form.177  
  
 In addition to its convincingly rendered atmosphere of suspicion (and resultant 
suspense) H. G. Wells’ ability to tap into the human mind’s natural disgust for things 
that it cannot easily classify makes for one of the most brilliantly chilling qualities of 
his Island of Doctor Moreau. The work’s narrator uses the terms “Beast People” and 
“monsters manufactured” for the unclassified and perhaps unclassifiable entities—are 
they human or animal?—that populate the island. We might, less pejoratively, call 
these “triumphs of vivisection” hybrids. As such, considering them might help s think 
about one of the most significant—and strange—qualities ascribed in the Middle Ages 
to literary satire. 
 But why call hybridity “strange”? What makes the  creatures’ hybridity 
horrify, or  constitutes the problem with departures from the standard issue? In The 
Island of Doctor Moreau, part of the sense of fright that afflicts the narrator (and, by 
extension, the reader) has to do with the sense that categories have been violated: the 
perception of unlawfulness in Moreau’s creative cruelty, to say nothing of Moreau’s 
pride.  He has wrenched the animals into new shapes, ignoring the torturous pain the 
process entails, with the unsettling result that they worship him. His insult to 
established categories has made him both a dictator and a god to a helpless population 
of “experiments.”  
 The sense that Moreau’s pride exceeds the natural order drives the plot. 
Moreau claims no desire to make animals out of humans (though obviously even an 
                                                 
177 H. G. Wells, “The Island of Doctor Moreau,” Seven Famous Novels by H. G. Wells (New York: 
Garden City Publishing, 1934), pp. 69-157 at ch. 17, p. 131. 
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elementary interpretation allows that, by conducting his experiments, he has become 
an animal himself); instead, he communicates a desire to impart human glory to 
simple creatures—or, in other words, to aggrandize his subjects, too. Nevertheless, he 
fails to convince for at least two reasons. First, the subjects for Moreau’s 
experimentation are definitely not willing participants: Wells’ narrator takes great 
heed, as Wells’ doctor certainly does not, to the unspeakable suffering wrought on the 
animals during Moreau’s surgery and afterwards in their quasi-religious servitude. 
Second, the force of “civilization” quickly makes itself known among the hybrids. The 
narrator’s presence triggers a cascade of events that forces everyone on the island to 
choose one aspet of his nature or the other—man or beast—beginning with Moreau’s 
most trusted servant. This forced choice precipitates a conclusion in utter chaos. 
Hybridity quickly becomes a threshold situation pressured to end by a closing door. 
 As Wells suggests here, breaking categories into ambiguity only defers their 
restitution; Moreau’s impudence vanquished, Nature will have won. But the work 
concludes by denying that what is “human,” violently mixed with what is “animal,” 
can simply settle out of emulsion. The part-bestial narrator takes recourse to a 
therapist, one of Moreau’s former colleagues, to tinker with his mind: a desperate 
course of treatment that at book’s close has not yet fully met with success. In so doing, 
Wells reveals the ultimate horror of hybridity to be stability itself: that modulation will 
become a new norm that perpetuates, trapped by inertia on the path to entropy. 
 Wells’ musings over how animal hybrids unsettle us can be applied to books. It 
may be that only academic readers feel a keen urge to classify written texts, and yet 
classifications persist: in general, readers want a sense of what to appreciate or expect 
from what they read. In a world of trans-cultural genres extending from haiku to epic, 
from fable to short story to novella to novel to tome (a line of descent or evolution 
perhaps culminating at the “three-volume novel” hailed so amusingly in The 
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Importance of Being Ernest)—in poetry and in prose, those categories so rarely 
escaped—any work mixing classification will stand out. It can draw appreciation and 
interest, but it can also confuse and annoy.   
 Not surprisingly, therefore, readers of Piers Plowman have been known to 
complain about the poem’s variety of focuses and indeterminacy of genre. Though he 
was a brilliant modern scholar of the poem, writing in the mid-twentieth century, 
Morton Bloomfield felt impelled to write that the poem reads like “a book which is 
seven-eighths footnotes” and “a commentary on an unknown text.”178 His 
contemporary Ethelbert Talbot Donaldson (who co-edited the poem’s central B-text 
with George Kane) marveled in the preface to his own translation at the “truly 
dreamlike abruptness” with which its characters appear and disappear.179 Elizabeth 
Kirk even stated that no one should have to read Piers Plowman for the first time.180 
What seems to discomfit these critics, as well as the readers whose qualms they feel 
obliged to anticipate and address, seems to have a lot to do with the poem’s shifting 
focus—a matter that, not insignificantly I think, also appears to have been on the mind 
of the author himself. The poem’s narrator, Will, expresses repeated confusion over 
the changing identities and natures of his interlocutors, over the settings in which he 
finds himself, and over the terms of the debates in which he joins. One of Will’s 
instructors,  perhaps channeling the author at this point, exclaims with annoyance over 
                                                 
178 These famous remarks appear in Bloomfield, Apocalypse, pp. 31 and 32 
179See E. T. Donaldson’s introduction in Piers Plowman (William Langland): a Norton Critical Edition, 
trans. Donaldson, edd. Elizabeth A. Robertson and Stephen H. A. Shepherd (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Co., 2006).  
180 This remark of Kirk’s, which might be anecdotal, appears on a Piers Plowman syllabus by Elizabeth 
A. Robertson for a course titled “Social Poetics: Piers Plowman and Fourteenth-Century England” at 
the University of Colorado (ENGL 7019-001). Robertson goes on to explain: “It is a difficult poem, but 
once the barrier of the first reading is passed, it is endlessly rewarding as a passionate poetic 
engagement with the most pressing social issues of the late fourteenth century.” I am grateful for 
Robertson for distributing this syllabus, which I obtained when attending a roundtable on teaching Piers 
Plowman during an International Medieval Congress at Kalamazoo. 
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catapulting himself into a digression from his main theme (“This lokynge on lewed 
preestes haþ don me lepe from poverte,” B.11.318).  
 As this chapter will demonstrate, much of the shifting in Langland’s narrative 
may be ascribed to its full and enthusiastic recourse to the hybridity that medieval 
theorists often ascribed to satire. Satire could display hybridity by varying formal 
elements or by drawing on a wide range of possible component discourses. By more 
carefully attending to the latter, we can better make sense of the intellectual traditions 
in which Piers Plowman participates. One important tradition, central among this 
dissertation’s focuses, is asceticism.181  
 
The Hybridity of Medieval Satiric Literature 
 
 What makes medieval satire inherently hybrid, and of what does this hybridity 
consist?  To answer the question requires recourse to the literary theory available to 
medieval scholars and poets, based upon medieval commentaries to satire from the 
classical era medieval scholars would comment on.182 Much of the earliest and most 
important literary theory of satire, as it happens, dates from the Late Antique period: 
in part because this was an age of commentary writing, and in part because no earlier 
literary criticism may be found of the sort that would answer certain basic questions 
one might have about these works. Classical satirists from Lucilius to Juvenal were 
not entirely mindless in their writing—undoubtedly, they held certain assumptions 
about the kind of poetry they composed and the ends to which they might put it to best 
use. Horace in particular, occasionally writing satires with the propriety of satire itself 
                                                 
181 Its contours will be the subject for the second section of this dissertation (chapters three through five, 
on satire’s modal aspects) and its possible home audience will be a topic for chapter 6. 
182 In much that follows I am deeply and expressly indebted to Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory.” My 
view of medieval satiric hybridity and its implications is much broader than his,  however, and I do not 
rely at all on his reading of Piers Plowman in the analysis that follows. 
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as a prime  subject, gives a number of clues as to what he thinks the limits of critique 
for a satirist should be.183 All the same, it is hard to shake the impression that these 
poets viewed satire as subject to current Roman fashion (Quintilian would write, 
proudly, that satire belonged “entirely to us” [tota nostra est]) rather than an entirely 
set formal genre weighted down with precedent.184  
 If anything, the satirists’ attempts at providing their own literary history could 
confuse: since Horace admired the Old Comedy and wrote at one point that the Greeks 
added to yet their dramatic tradition of competing for a goat by introducing a satyr 
who would provide the audience with scurrilous entertainment—producing the “satyr 
drama”—later writers assumed that the satirist was also in some way writing of the 
historical development of satire (a similar word).185 This may explain why Persius, 
who wrote half a century after Horace, considered the censoriousness in Old Comedy 
a proper model for the satirist to follow.186 It might also account for the fanciful 
literary history of satire provided by the not very influential De fabula of Evanthius in 
the fourth century, which Miller notes was written “two hundred years after the canon 
                                                 
183 That said, Horace’s assumptions do not always square with those of Persius or Juvenal. 
184 Compare for instance what Gothic fiction looked like to its innovators in Great Britain and elsewhere 
in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century: not as a genre unto itself perhaps so much as a currently 
fashionable type of story in prose of the sort that had long been written with different themes. Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein had as its germ the challenge of writing a “ghost story”; surely we would say 
“Gothic tale” better fits the bill, but only in the broad elaboration from previous “Gothic” conventions 
by this and other later works does a sense of how the “Gothic” might be defined and even theorized 
become clear. On the genesis of Frankenstein, see Stephen Robert Van Luchene, chapter 5: 
“Frankenstein,” in “Essays in Gothic Fiction: from Horace Walpole to Mary Shelley,” Ph.D. diss, 
University of Notre Dame, 1973, pp. 149-221, esp. at p. 151. 
185 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 76. 
186 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” states that “[n]o examples of poetic satire written between the 
time of Horace’s death (8 B.C.) and the time of Nero’s enthronement (A.D. 54) survived antiquity,” 
though he immediately adds that an early commentary does mention some poets who flourished at this 
time (37). It should be clear by now however that the poets and dramatists seen as comprising a 
“literary tradition” for classical satire were spread out—sometimes at great temporal distance from one 
another—and that in effect each new writer had to construct the tradition leading up to his own work. 
On this phenomenon see the enlightening essay by Borges, “Kafka and his Precursors,” trans. J. E. Irby, 
in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, aug. ed. (New York: New Directions, 1964), pp. 
199-201.  
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of classical satire recognised in the Middle Ages had been completed.” Writing of 
drama, Evanthius states that the Old Comedy was beneficial to public morality 
because it censured specific individuals for their deeds by name. When it became too 
harsh, though, criticizing others by name was made illegal and replaced by coarse and 
irreverent satyra:  
 
Rejecting other etymologies as false, Evanthius insists that satyra was 
named from the satyrs, the gods who indulged in frolics and 
impudence. Satyra was verse (carmen) which, although it employed 
harsh, uncultured jokes about the vices of the citizens (“duro et uelut 
agresti ioco de uitiis ciuium”), nevertheless did not name specific 
individuals (“sine ullo proprii nominis titulo”).  
 
Since those in power saw through such writing, they banned it as well; New Comedy, 
Evanthius explains, was developed as a result.187   
 Evanthius’ account in the De fabula probably bears very little relation to actual 
literary history: as previously stated, the poets’ own references to literature they 
admired could confuse later writers attempting to account for their place in literary 
history as well as their poetic practice. Nevertheless, I think Evanthius’ discussion 
deserves citation here for two reasons. First, it connects the poetics of satire via 
etymology to satyrs specifically; secondly, as Miller goes on to state, it “represents 
satyra as a kind of ‘Middle Comedy.’”188 Miller is interested in the representation of 
satirists as comic poets, but I am interested in how already satire seems to be hybrid: 
something between Old Comedy and New, modeled on divine figures half goat and 
half man. Satire thus receives its identification as hybrid—but not in any specific, 
defined, way—as early as Late Antiquity.  
 For the fourth-century grammarian Diomedes, as indeed for the classical 
satirists (and even Evanthius), the equation of satire with satyrs had everything to do 
                                                 
187 The references to Evanthius appear in Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” pp. 44-45.  
188 op. cit., loc. cit., specifically p. 45.  
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with the bawdiness and rough rusticity of the satyr and nothing to do with the satyr’s 
half-bestial nature. Satires might derive their name from satyrs, Diomedes writes, 
because in them “ridiculæ res pudendæque dicuntur” (laughable and shameful things 
are said)—not because they appear mixed like the creations of Dr. Moreau. Other 
etymologies proposed by Diomedes do however suggest the quality that I have chosen 
to call satiric hybridity. One of the etymologies, to lanx satura, refers to a dish piled 
high with a variety of fine foods presented as an offering to the gods, so named from 
its “copia ac saturitate.” Diomedes also describes satire in terms of a type of 
vegetarian stuffing (or “farcimen”) also known—apparently—as satura, containing 
dried fruits and barley flavored with mead. Finally, satire could derive its name from a 
type of omnibus law containing a multitude of provisions—the lex satura, which his 
authorities perhaps more accurately call lex per saturam—all at the same time. So, 
too, satire can be comprised of several shorter poems. 
 Diomedes’ definitions through etymology for satire achieved much wider 
circulation thanks to their having been transmitted indirectly in the Etymologiæ of 
Isidore of Seville, the most widely influential work of one of the most influential 
authorities for the medieval period. Isidore, too, focused most of the attention in his 
etymologies to satire’s relation to fullness or copiousness—and surely this quality, 
satire’s being able to comprehend several different types of discourses and messages 
at once, must remain our best guide to medieval ideas of satiric hybridity. At the same 
time, though, the idea that “satire” took its derivation from “satyr” (a word whose root 
is unrelated to that for the more commonly attested satur) remained influential. 
According to Miller, 
 
[m]ediæval commentators displayed considerable ingenuity in their 
investigations of the satyri-etymology [and] selected descriptive nouns 
and adjectives—usually six in number—to establish the close 
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correspondence between the characteristics of the satyrs and the 
distinguishing features of satire.189 
 
Manuscripts of medieval commentaries on Juvenal and Persius describe both as 
“leues, nudi, dicaces, saltatores, cachinnones, capripedes [light, naked, witty, leaping, 
jeering, goat-footed]”: exactly six attributes of satyrs.190 Of these, the saltator label 
has the greatest relevance to the idea of satyric hybridity, for in describing both satyrs 
and satires as “dancers” the non-linear and catchall qualities of satiric poetry make 
themselves evident, “[q]uia <satiri> quemadmodum de loco ad locum saltando 
incedunt non gradatim passibus pedum [...].”191 The connection between satire and the 
noun saltatrix that appears in medieval accessūs but not in the earlier vulgate 
commentaries, as Miller goes on to point out, “assert[s] that a satire may lack both 
thematic and rhythmic continuity.” This itself “suggest[s] the spontaneity and energy 
with which satire treats a variety of subjects, varying style and thematic focus as the 
opportunity arises.”192  
 Notably, then, influential etymologies circulating in the medieval period 
describe the poetry of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal and their lesser-known successors 
hardly as unified or stable but rather multifarious in content and operating with a 
profusion of different techniques despite a predominately critical stance. Both the 
satur and “satyr” etymologies for satire suggest that satire not only can but indeed 
                                                 
189 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 164.  
190 This list occurs, according to Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” in “an early manuscript of 
Commentary 2 on Juvenal (London, British Library Royal MS. 15 B XVII [s. X-XI], fol. 73v) “ and 
while perhaps a later, glossed addition to that manuscript also appears in a Juvenal commentary from 
the twelfth century (Miller cites Oxford, Bodleian Library MS. Auct. F. 6. 9. [s. XII], fol. 1r), other 
manuscripts of Commentary 2, and “at least two manuscripts containing commentaries on Persius: 
Bern, Burgerbibliothek MS. 539b (s. XIII); and Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek MS 434 (s. XIII-
XIV).” Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 164.  
191 “Because satires leap, as it were, from place to place rather than proceeding step by step on foot.” 
From the Bern MS, with Miller adding in a note that it also declares that ‘saltansque debet esse satira, 
quod non habet continuum materiam, sic(ut) non habet continuum carmen” and that B.L. Add. MS 
33795 “calls satire saltatrix because it hardly ever keeps to the same subject, but runs to and from from 
vice to vice.” Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 166. 
192 Miller, “Mediæval Literary Theory,” p. 167. 
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must attempt to do and be several things at once—even in rapid succession. The 
etymologies demand hybridity.193 
 
Hybridity in Two Types 
 
 Satiric hybridity was clearly acknowledged, but just as clearly realized in two 
main different ways, in the high to later Middle Ages. Some hybridity seems to have 
been purely formal, the best example of which showing up in the poems of the 
“Goliards” and of Walter of Châtillon. The so-called Vagantenstrophe ‘cum 
auctoritate’ used by such poets consists of a number of lines of (normally accentual) 
Latin verse original to the poet followed by a line (usually in dactylic hexameter) by a 
classical Latin “authority.” Virgil’s Aeneid was one well-exploited mine for satiric 
hexameter tags. The verse of the Goliardic poets exhibits the ironic turn some such 
uses of the stanza could have—an irony rather dependent on one’s knowledge of the 
classical line in its original context—but it bears remembering that some poets, such 
as Walter, might not have been ironic when they imputed Christianity to their Roman 
forebears. The same effect also extended to parodic centos in prose, such as the 
“Gospel of Silver Mark,” and to prosimetra modeled on originally Greek “Menippean 
satire” like the De Planctu Naturæ of Alan of Lille—with its inherent allusions to the 
De Consolatio of Boethius—or the “chantefable” (forever flirting with and trivializing 
romance convention) of Aucassin et Nicolette.  Whether the intention to allude to 
earlier, more authoritative works is to blame for these works’ borrowing of earlier 
forms, or whether an intent to borrow from earlier forms results in the allusions we 
                                                 
193 It could be that Diomedes and company were talking about the shifting in approach from one poem 
to another in a book of satire, but that hardly seems to be how later writers interpreted them.  
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see, can for the moment be set aside. These “satiric” works all indulge in admixtures 
of the formal characteristics of other types of literature.  
 It is of course not hard to find evidence of formal hybridity in later fourteenth-
century English satire, either. Tags from Ovid pepper John Gower’s Latin Vox 
clamantis, a poem whose concern with portraying renegade peasants in animalistic 
terms seems to theorize hybrid appearance as a sort of visual index to immorality just 
as much if not more than any early conception of satire vis-à-vis satyrs. Gower’s 
better-known poem (in English), the Confessio Amantis, gets a great deal of its energy 
by melding the “genres” of love poetry and confession. Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales 
blossoms with appropriations of several genres often taken up parodically, such as in 
bob & wheel romance in the Tale of Sir Thopas; the anonymously composed Wynnere 
and Wastoure (as we have seen) blends both dream vision and debate poetry.   
Are we supposed to take it for a coincidence that these poems which appropriate the 
largest variety of genres also indulge in satire? It might seem that a blending of genres 
is not the same thing as the blending of forms or even texts that one encounters in 
Menippean satires, centos, and chantefables, since if the essence of the satiric mode is 
criticism it is hard to see criticism expressed through form.194 Yet the juxtapositions of 
genre wrought in medieval satire allow their poets to comment on the limitations and 
assumptions inherent in those genres thanks to their shifting forms, and the unsettling 
of expectations provided by shifting genres can also make a satire’s ambiguity more 
acute.  
 Medieval satiric poets perhaps understood hybridity as a quality of satire not 
only because literary theory dictated that this was so, but also since one could exceed 
the typical limits of censure in one genre by even briefly appropriating another one. 
The best example of this generic appropriation comes in the case of political prophecy. 
                                                 
194 Cf. my comments above about characterization and about ambiguity. 
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Prophecy was possessed of an inherent authority to make sweeping judgments entirely 
too excessive in other types of written work, and so a work calling itself prophetic 
could afford such pronouncements. Yet political prophecy also often took on the form 
of riddles or puzzles, as if to indicate that its critical message was safe from unlearned 
eyes and less important than the mental exercise it encouraged. Medieval satire was 
not just formally hybrid as a vestigial generic trait, then, looking back to the “satyr 
drama”: borrowing the forms of different genres (“formal hybridity”) could also 
actually work to enhance and veil satiric criticism, in ways that remain to be explored, 
for many of the works I’ve already mentioned.  
 Satyric hybridity also seems to evince itself on the conceptual level, still 
borrowing from other genres in order to make itself hybrid, as I’ve just suggested, but 
doing so by taking up their typical utterances and discursive terms as opposed to any 
specifically formal characteristics of meter or division. This is “discursive hybridity,” 
rather than formal hybridity, but I choose to call it “conceptual hybridity” below in 
order to avoid confusion with “hybrid discourse” (a term signifying the fusing of 
narratorial and character perspective, whose role in Chaucer’s General Prologue has 
been explored by Thomas Farrell).195 The De contemptu mundi of Bernard of Cluny 
impresses the reader as a work of forbidding and relentless formal perfection, each of 
its lines constrained to the almost “Gothic” complexity of meter that is the tripartite 
and tailed dactylic hexameter. This is very uniform throughout. Yet despite this formal 
unity, the poem’s topics vary over a wide range. The poem does bear the title of Scorn 
for the World (as Pepin’s translation puts it) and the world of necessity consists of 
many things, so such a range is not entirely surprising. Yet when the poem is at its 
most avowedly satiric, it seems consciously to have the ideal of variety—especially 
the ideal of satire as, like the Satyr, saltatrix, leaping from topic to topic—in mind.  
                                                 
195 Farrell, “Hybrid Discourse.” 
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 The Entheticus (maior: de Dogmate Philosophorum)  by the twelfth-century 
scholar John of Salisbury also provides a good example of satire’s conceptual 
hybridity, for while the long series of poems obviously stands alone as one work it is 
hard to tell what genre it might be said to take part in and its variety of subjects treated 
is quite wide. The following statement by the editor and translator Jan van Laarhoven 
(in a chapter titled “valuations” and a section called “confrontations”) deserves 
quoting in this regard:  
 
The ‘lyrical explosion’ of Latin love poetry in the eleventh and twelfth 
century, in particular has been a striking example of the force of 
revitalized Latin culture. But if you seek that kind of poetry, you should 
not read the Entheticus. Better, in that case, to be ‘carried away’ by 
Waddel’s “wandering scholars,” or to rejoice again in the well-known 
anthologies of Langosch, Kusch, or Dronke. We do not know, alas, 
whether John, who was after all a student for twelve years—and in 
Paris at that!—did in fact love this kind of ‘new’ poetry;  the one 
occasion on which he quoted—with approval—two lines of the 
Carmina Burana, cannot be taken as an answer in the affirmative 
(moreover, it was a distich). In fact, the poetry of the Entheticus maior 
and minor [the latter appearing in the Policraticus] is of another sort. It 
does not betray any trace of the ‘modern’ experiments with rhyme and 
rhythm which John’s contemporaries loved so much. There is no trace 
of Goliardic poetry as there is in Abælard, nor of the Leonine verses of 
Bernard of Morlas, nor of rhythmical variations in even lines as there is 
in Bernard Silvestris, nor of the pleasure in rhyme and auctoritas-
quotations which his friend Walter of Châtillon took. All we have is 
one continuous stream of over two thousand classical hexameters and 
pentameters.196  
 
Into this stream of “over two thousand classical hexameters and pentameters” however 
appear biting portraits, critiques of philosophy, religious reflections, and reflections on 
society (as Laarhoven’s judicious editorial division of the poem into separate sections 
and pieces helps in large part to make clear). It is not at all surprising that perhaps the 
most influential piece of scholarship on the work is an article titled “What is the 
Entheticus?”—but it is also quite apt that the answer is, in large part, “satire.”197 
                                                 
196 Laarhoven, Entheticus, p. 92. 
197 Thomson, “What is the Entheticus?” p. 287: “John of Salisbury’s Entheticus de Dogmate 
Philosophorum (the so-called ‘longer Entheticus’ [or Laarhoven’s Entheticus maior]) is a philosophical 
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 Other twelfth-century Latin poetry was equally hybrid in its borrowings, and 
thereby eclectically inventive. The Architrenius, which probably no one has ever 
doubted was intended to be a satire, could scarcely differ more from classical satires in 
form and still remain hexameter verse: it is long, consisting of nine books stretched 
over thousands of lines, and often narrated in the third person. Despite such 
divergences from classical satire, however, its indebtedness to such poetry is 
unmistakable. It owes its nine-book structure not to any logic of its episodes—which 
often break between books without any acknowledgement of the transition (most 
notably in the description of a girl between books one and two)—to Alan of Lille’s 
then-well-known Menippean satire on sexual deviance, the De Planctu Naturæ. And 
while readers are assured of its narrative plot in a reliable (if not authorial) prose 
preface, actual narration in the Architrenius only rarely appears. One instead 
sometimes reads disdainful descriptions provided by the narrator looking through his 
hero’s eyes, and at other times the outbursts of that hero (the Architrenius himself or 
“arch weeper”) as he encounters vice on a quest to interrogate Nature concerning her 
failure to govern man. Speeches deploring human frailty and providing instruction for 
amendment, delivered by learned authorities from the classical world and by Nature 
herself, proliferate. The poem’s epic swagger—its sometimes-excessive detail in high 
register, as in the cap. 14 “description of the girl”—seems both to mock Alan for the 
pretensions of scope in the De Planctu and also to draw respectfully on the tissue of 
epic references underlying occasional mock heroism in classical satirists such as 
Juvenal.198 Here formal features cue readers to conceptual borrowings as well. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and satirical poem [and] the most enigmatic of John’s major works. [...] Such judgments as have been 
passed upon it have been, on the whole, cursory and dismissive.” See also pp. 300-301: “The Entheticus 
is a didactic work in verse,” yet one with which John of Salisbury would become increasingly 
dissatisfied, since “he wished to analyse political systems, not merely to satirize the political scene.” 
198 Wetherbee, Architrenius, pp. 24-31. 
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 Though overall the Architrenius might seem perpetually to look back, it 
actually stands as a harbinger of relative literary modernity that would be a known text 
late into the fourteenth century and beyond.199 Johannes de Hauvilla, wrote from and 
spoke to the concerns of the nascent and flourishing universities rather than the court 
or church, and the poem stands self-consciously both as a monument to and stinging 
indictment of learned ambition—for both of which purposes the work’s familiarity 
with and changes to classical precedent prove to Johannes indispensable. The work 
achieves the state of satire in the highest and truest sense—interrogation of set 
frameworks and assumptions—by leaning on a hodgepodge of earlier satiric writings’ 
ways of making sense of the world and attempting to apply those models to its own 
changed circumstances. The most obvious example of the poem’s conceptual hybridity 
appears in the speeches on morality and vice that proliferate near its end. As I have 
tried to show, however, it conveys a new sense of mixing earlier viewpoints (as well 
as styles) throughout. 
 Like Johannes de Hauvilla, Langland and his contemporaries faced changed 
circumstances which standard literary models failed to match. Nevertheless, they also 
recognized the benefit of interrogating these situations through satire on a shifting 
profusion of topics.  Satire against the “estates” (as Jill Mann has conceived the 
tradition) made an important foundation on which Chaucer and Gower would build. 
Yet, if these writers would not achieve the same dissatisfaction with estates satire as 
Langland, they nonetheless use models of estates as flexible guide lines and starting 
points for their depictions of society rather than rigid frameworks. With each poet 
there are of course differences of emphasis: the Canterbury Tales operate as an 
expansion of estates satire horizontally, incorporating more of both sexes and the 
                                                 
199 See the quotation from Wetherbee’s introduction provided above, to which we might add here the 
assertion that “Johannes is the poet par excellence of the [new] capitalist-careerist mentality” (xvi) and 
Wetherbee’s introduction’s section on the poem’s later “Fortunæ,” pp. xxvii-xxix. 
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merchant class, while Gower expands his vision of estates vertically to discourse 
critically about matters as celestial as the pagan gods (and the baser human passions 
they reflect). For the Confessio Amantis, the estates model of society implicit in 
Gower’s narratives of both national and domestic governance has been successfully 
combined with the psychological speculations inherent in the sacrament of confession 
so as to suggest the way that microcosm—the human heart—can have an effect even 
upon the cosmos. Without the fusion of confessional discourse and satire of the 
estates, the work’s most searching insights would hardly be as possible. Chaucer’s 
non-satiric Parson’s Tale proves the fluency with which the estates model works for 
Chaucer, since this long and earnest criticism of human folly acts with extreme order 
and linearity, providing a taxonomy of the vices and their remedies so pedestrian as to 
render the rest of the poem positively acrobatic in its treatment of the same subjects by 
comparison: the Wife of Bath, by contrast, at once tissue of stereotype and inquisitor 
of facile convention in her prologue, owes her very existence to generic and 
conceptual hybridity.  
 
Piers Plowman’s Appropriations  
 
 Hybridity, both formal and conceptual, contributes even more noticeably to 
Langland’s own poetic practice—yet Piers’ formal hybridity probably stands out the 
most. However one chooses to genealogize the Latin in Piers Plowman, whether as a 
descendant of the stanzas of Walter of Châtillon or as a vernacular reflex of the 
commentary tradition, the poem’s macaronic form is its most obvious example of 
formal hybridity. That said, the fact that the Latin quotations in the poem often act as 
lemmata for the poem’s characters’ action and their discussions neither vitiates nor 
justifies their consideration as an important part of the poem’s satire, since we can 
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observe that many literary works are hybrid in some way formally without expressing 
any other satiric qualities.200 Yet these quotations are indeed often authoritative, 
critical, or ironic commentary on the action of the poem they help to motivate. They 
are inseparable as well from Langland’s Middle English verse. Thus macaronicity acts 
as an important vehicle for Langland’s satiric message.  
 Langland’s conceptual hybridity is even more apparent, first of all in terms of 
its sheer scope. Piers Plowman has been at times compared to a drama, and may 
consciously draw such a comparison from readers, but far from observing the old 
Aristotelian command for unity of setting it seems to want to investigate (and, so far 
as the dream vision conceit allows, take place on) as many levels as possible of human 
experience. Such investigation lends Piers Plowman a cosmic scope, and since it 
touches regularly on the antithesis of Truth and Wrong with which the poem opens it 
invites reflection on both life and afterlife.  If it does not quite reach the abstracted, 
pseudo-Dionysian heights of Bernardus Silvestris or Alan of Lille, its sense of and 
interest in this realm is nonetheless quite comparable to Gower’s in the prologue to the 
Confessio Amantis or Chaucer’s in the end of Troilus & Criseyde. But Piers Plowman 
also operates on a local level, inspecting the relationships that tie individuals to one 
another and their groups to society. Finally and most thoroughgoing the poem 
investigates the human person itself.201 Even here, however, it attends (as Philosophy 
urges Boethius to do in the Consolatio) to a perception of reality parallel to normal 
lived experience.  Such a broad purview does more than signify the poetic ambition of 
Piers. It also aligns the poem with concerns of medieval Christian religious 
philosophy (on which see particularly chapter 3 below), a discourse that would 
                                                 
200 See also such multi-media environments as the virtual front page (not normally given to satire) of the 
online New York Times. 
201 These more intimate settings probably account for most of the poem’s work as “a satire.” 
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seem—at least a first glance—quite separate from the typically more “mondaine” 
concerns of the classical poets. 
  Yet despite this first-glance foreignness of medieval theology to the classical 
tradition of satire, Langland’s incorporation of the former’s concerns actually builds 
on and expands from earlier classical precedent, much in the way that the pseudo-epic 
elements in Johannes de Hauvilla’s Architrenius build on and expand from  pseudo-
epic gestures in Juvenal. Observing this filiation is important, since it helps to preëmpt 
any fear that medieval satire is somehow not as subtle or poetically well conceived as 
classical satire; more to the point of the present argument, a demonstration that 
philosophical speculation can coëxist with satire allays concern that a work like Piers, 
deeply concerned with matters of religion, cannot ipso facto be a satiric work 
Fortunately, such an objection is easily laid to rest. Something of the philosophical 
aspirations of the classical satirists makes itself apparent in the Sermones by Horace, 
which praise self-sufficient moderation: the very first of the poems considers the futile 
aspirations of humanity in the face of fixed bonds set by nature and the gods.202  
 Medieval authors’ more extensive speculation than their classical forebears 
into matters of theology stands out especially from the first line of the first satire of 
Persius, a quotation from the innovator Lucilius that I have also discussed above: “O 
curas hominum! o quantum est in rebus inane!” Daniel M. Hooley makes the case for 
the seriousness of the sentiment—both Stoic and as it were literary theoretical—
behind Persius’ use of the quotation:  
 
Satire’s focus is immediately, and permanently, bifocal: that inane is 
meant to gloss curas hominum as well as rebus [the world], so that 
human responses to pressures from without come under as much 
scrutiny as any absurdity “out there.” Yet rebus doesn’t just mean 
“things”or the stuff of material existence, but the world as seen and 
conceived by people; it entails society, what we broadly call culture, 
and the movements of human history. Crucially, therefore, satire is less 
                                                 
202 See for example the first satire of Horace.  
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about particular things or situations than about how we are connected, 
plugged into the Zeitgeist.203 
 
Yet in the poem itself, a dialogue, Persius’ interlocutor’s response is swift and cutting: 
“who’ll read that?” in Braund’s translation. The poet thus undercuts himself. We have 
already seen that Alan of Lille, on the other hand, in his summa on the art of 
preaching, earnestly takes this same line as one of several mostly scriptural authorities 
advocating contempt of the world.  
 The level of irony or humor with which classical and medieval writers take 
philosophical sentiments does not strike me as being nearly so important as both 
classical and medieval openness to those sentiments’ being voiced. In any case, the 
objection that medieval writers such as Alan of Lille take the Stoic idea too seriously 
and therefore did not understand the satiric context in which the “curas hominum” 
exclamation was voiced will not hold water. Alan specifically writes that Persius (he 
did not know about Lucilius) writes in a “comic” way—to use the translator Gillian 
Evans’ word—but he valued the sentiment nonetheless. By according satire the place 
of authority next to scripture, of course, Alan also suggests that satire can be 
authoritatively serious—that satire of his own era could indulge in exactly the sort of 
in-depth philosophical or theological speculation that Persius’ quotation only flirted 
with. This tightened embrace of un-ironic philosophical reflection thus constitutes an 
advance by medieval writers, even if founded on some misconceptions. 
 Just as Alan of Lille could quote satire from Persius as an authority while also 
understanding that Persius wrote for particular “comic” ends, rather than a learned 
lament redolent of contempt of the world in which the line seemed to fit, so too 
Langland’s satire should not be viewed only as sermonizing even when his writings 
seem appropriate sermonic discourse and mimic its effects. What might seem 
                                                 
203 Roman Satire (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 23. 
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sermonic in Piers Plowman might advance some satiric message, and vice versa. In 
fact, the close relationship in some medieval writing between satiric and sermonic 
modes, at least, can be corroborated by the similarity of medieval satiric “leaping 
about” to the trajectories of medieval sermons. Kirk’s aperçu refers most obviously to 
its constant shifting of subject matter and approach. Speeches on one topic swerve 
suddenly, howbeit on the pivot of a single word, to another just as nimbly as any satyr 
might leap. The labors of John Alford among others have made it clear that Langland 
has as an organizational principle of frequent if not continuous resort collections of 
“distinctiones,” guides used in the Middle Ages for the composition of sermons.204 It 
seems important to point out that these distinction collections are merely a later, 
purely textual replacement for a type of associative thinking. In fact, while the time in 
which Langland’s poem was written makes it likely that Langland did have recourse to 
written distinction collections, it is equally true that any cleric (broadly) who had spent 
a significant portion of his life in service of the Church would have developed a kind 
of interior distinction system.  
 Regardless of its mental or textual vehicle, such associative thinking lends 
itself to changing of subjects and a sort of “jumping about” that earlier in this chapter I 
had referred to as satiric. Monks composed by means of this type of thought. As Jean 
Leclercq writes, “It is this deep impregnation with the words of Scripture that explains 
the extremely important phenomenon of reminiscence whereby the verbal echoes so 
excite the memory that a mere allusion will spontaneously evoke whole quotations 
and, in turn, a scriptural phrase will suggest quite naturally allusions elsewhere in the 
sacred books.”205 While Leclercq refers to high-medieval monastic reminiscence 
                                                 
204 John A. Alford, “The Role of the Quotations in Piers Plowman,” Speculum 52 (1977), pp. 80-99. 
See also H. L. Spencer, “Sermon Literature,” in A Companion to Middle English Prose, ed. A. S. G. 
Edwards (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2004), pp. 151-74 at p. 163.  
205 The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: a Study of Monastic Culture, trans. Catherine Misrahi 
of L’Amour des Lettres et le Désir de Dieu, 3rd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), p. 91. 
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based on and inspiring of ruminatio, rather than later distinction collections or similar 
preachers’ aids made up of written text, his description of the process and its effects 
seems plausibly representative of all:  
 
Each word is like a hook, so to speak; it catches hold of one or several others 
which become linked together and make up the fabric of the exposé. This 
accounts for the difficulty of what is called today research into sources: are the 
monks quoting older versions of Scripture or are they modifying them? Most 
frequently, it would seem, they are quoting from memory; quotations by means 
of the “hook-words,” group themselves together in their minds and under their 
pen, like variations on the same theme. [...] As it had for the Fathers, 
reminiscence on the part of the monastic authors of the Middle Ages had a 
profound effect on their literary composition. The mere fact of hearing certain 
words, which happen to be similar in sound to certain other words, sets up a 
kind of chain reaction of associations which will bring together words that 
have no more than a chance connection, purely external, with one another. But 
since the verse or passage which contains this word comes to mind, why not 
comment on it here? [...] The plan really follows a psychological development, 
determined by the plan of associations, and one digression may lead on to 
another or even to several others. Thus, in the Sermons on the Canticles, in 
connection with these words of the second verse of the Canticle: “Thy very 
name spoken soothes the heart like flow of oil,” Bernard spoke at length on the 
perfumes of the Bride when suddenly he pauses to insert a discourse on the 
praises of humility. Had he lost the trend of his sermon? By no means. He 
realizes that he has gotten away from the Canticle and he does not regret it. He 
takes up again the verse where he had left off. But now Psalm 75 proclaims 
“that in Israel the name of God is extolled” and Bernard introduces a discourse 
on the Synagogue and the Church, devoting an entire sermon to it. In the 
following sermon, he chants the praise of the name of Jesus, and while on the 
subject of the individuals of the Old Testament who bore that name, he 
expounds the Prophets. He compares them to the staff which Elisha sends to 
the sun of the Sunamite before coming to raise him from the dead. Coming 
back to life, the child yawns seven times; thereupon, after a long introduction 
on the meaning of the allegories of the Old Testament, Bernard gives a sermon 
on the seven phases of conversion, and this makes him think of the gifts of the 
Holy Ghost: a new direction in which he willingly follows. This brings his 
mind back, little by little, to the second verse of the Canticle. Now, this series 
of digressions has taken up six complete sermons.206  
 
Associative writing, then, preëminently the sermon, wandered by following 
associative simple reminiscence. Langland’s poem obviously does something similar, 
and so to observe that Piers Plowman owes a lot to the sermon genre and sermon 
discourse is very apt. Nevertheless, Langland’s poem attends to different—less 
                                                 
206 Love of Learning, pp. 91-93. 
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expository, more critical—ends. The satiric and the sermonic modes there are very 
close. For while both the narrator and Will’s interlocutors in the poem often seem to 
be playing exactly the role of preachers, even their hardest held convictions about how 
man or society might achieve better inner health fail in the larger context of the poem 
to be more than tentative. They are questioned by Will, and they are undone by other 
later pronouncements, and they pose paradoxes not easily resolved which ensure that 
even unquestioned recommendations will not always find an easy implementation.207  
 Langland might have composed with written preachers’ aids, or he might have 
composed based on sheer memory in the way of the old monastic writers—but, again, 
his use of preacherly techniques and materials represents an appropriation of means 
rather than a replication of final object. But as with sermons, so too with other forms 
of expression: for Piers Plowman actually seems to draw on several genres, religious 
as well as secular. Some critical readings of Piers Plowman produced in the not-too-
distant past owe themselves in part to an acceptance by late- and “post-” modern 
academic culture of this characteristic feature (once deemed puzzling) of the work’s 
literary technique, namely its leaping not merely from topic to topic but from genre to 
genre as well: its associative movement through complex and dense networks of 
previous text, quoting and re-juxtaposing those materials via a sort of bricolage—a 
term that Derrida has explained:   
 
The bricoleur, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who uses ‘the means at 
hand,’ that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, 
those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived 
with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which 
one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them 
whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if 
their form and their origin are heterogenous—and so forth.208 
                                                 
207 This will appear to be particularly true in the case of silence and judgment of others, to be discussed 
in chapter 5. 
208See Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in The 
Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: the Structuralist Controversy, edd. Richard Macksey 
and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 247-65 at pp. 231-232.  
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This technique achieves a different sort of message and instruction, often much more 
open-ended and thoroughgoingly dialogic in its new narrative setting than it had been 
in its constituent parts.209 As a corollary, having grown increasingly aware of (and 
now more conversant with) the poem’s pastiche of content, scholarship has also 
viewed Langland’s poem as a pastiche of genres transmitted alongside (sometimes 
independently of or over) that content.210  
 One important thread of work both past and present on the poem has asked 
what Piers Plowman gains from any particular genre, where examples of it appear in 
the larger poem and develop along with Langland’s revisions of the work, and how 
this genre imprints itself as well on the poem’s larger shape. The medieval sermon, 
again, appears cited within Piers Plowman; and sermon structure also gives us a guide 
to the structure of the poem.211  In addition to the sermon (as in Holichurch’s speech 
                                                 
209 On this point see the widely referenced work of John Alford, e.g. “The Role of the Quotations,” in 
Piers Plowman,” Speculum 52 (1977), pp. 80-99, which makes the claim that in Piers Plowman “[t]he 
poetry is structurally contingent upon the quotations,” from which “the English radiates outward, like 
ripples.” (89) Alford surveys prior claims about Langland’s lack of literary structure on pages 96-99 of 
that article and concludes (against an early article by George Kane) that “[t]he evidence of the 
quotations, in both their nature and their function, is against the view that Langland ‘speaks, as he 
thinks, impetuously’ and that his writing was ‘governed more by imagination than by intellect.’ On the 
contrary, the picture that emerges is that of a man eking out his poem slowly, even tediously, while 
poring over a variety of commentaries and preachers’ aids—and this picture is entirely consistent with 
the practice of countless of his contemporaries, with the structure of the poem itself, and with the fact 
that he was a tireless reviser.” (99)  
210 For a sense of the contributions made by several genres to Piers Plowman see essays devoted to a 
number of them in  the Alford Companion and also, e.g., Steven Justice, “The Genres of Piers 
Plowman,” Viator 19 (1988), pp. 291-306. Justice argues that “the Visio’s pilgrimage to Truth is the 
search for a genre that will accommodate an authority neither abusive nor idiosyncratic” (290), noting 
that Judson Boyce Allen and Alford’s studies have clarified for us “the conceptual and even narrative 
structure of particular episodes, but not how they emerge into the larger rhetorical structures of the 
poem” (291), finding the “episodic form” and concomitant lack of apparent narrative contiguity pointed 
out by Middleton problematic enough to call for “a vocabulary” that can both acknowledge the 
narrative disruptions endemic to Piers Plowman and ascribe to the poem a progression or unity—
something that readers can make sense of—even so (291, loc. cit. n. 8). Justice finds such unity in “a 
sequence not of narrated actions, but of narrated genres,” declaring that “Langland’s shifting generic 
commitments form the real plot of the Visio” (291). 
211 Alford observes that Langland would have “borrowed” both the “method of the preachers of his day” 
and “their tools as well”—such as John Bromyard’s Summa Prædicantium and other distinction 
collections—to create his citational pastiche (“The Role of the Quotations,” 99).  
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and Reason’s recounted sermon and Anima’s diatribe), the poem also contains drama 
or nods to it (as at the trial of Lady Mede and in almost all of Passus 19). Exempla, as 
from sermons, appear on their own (as in the friar’s exemplum about the saved man 
protected from the sea of sin by a boat) as well as riddles and prophecies (see the 
hardly exhaustive treatment below in chapter 6). The appearance of Holichurch in the 
introduction to the poem has reminded at least one critic of Boethius’ De consolatione, 
while Anne Middleton has detected strong reflexes of the chanson d’aventure in the 
structure of Piers.212 Curtis R.-H. Jirsa has developed the observation even further in 
his examination of the genre of lyric, which similarly informs how Piers Plowman 
unfolds and indicates that Piers Plowman might be read and appreciated as itself a 
kind of lyric—a work at least whose lyricality suits it to the critical practices that have 
often most fruitfully engaged this type of poem.213  
 All studies of generic affiliation within the poem have not been uniformly 
successful, however. Studying the work in relation to the medieval sermon, as has 
already been remarked, G. R. Owst famously opined that it represented the 
“quintessence” of that discourse or genre; in so doing, however, he foreclosed 
discussion of the ways in which Piers Plowman is manifestly not a sermon, no matter 
how much it should happen to borrow from the homiletic practice of its day.214 The 
identification between Piers Plowman and lyric, on the other hand, has had a history 
                                                 
212 On Boethius (when referring to or quoting from De Cons. Phil., I use the Loeb edition given in the 
bibliography), see Justice, “The Genres of Piers Plowman.” On the chanson d’aventure and analogues, 
see Anne Middleton, “Narration and the Invention of Experience: Episodic Form in Piers Plowman,” in 
The Wisdom of Poetry: Essays in Early English Literature in Honor of Morton W. Bloomfield, ed. Larry 
D. Benson and Siegfriend Wenzel (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications of Western Michigan 
University, 1982), pp. 91-122. 
213 See Curtis Robets-Holt Jirsa, “Piers Plowman and the Invention of the Lyric in the Middle Ages,” 
Ph.D. diss, Cornell University, 2008. 
214 Total identification of Piers Plowman with medieval sermon writing is easy to make, harder to 
follow through. For an outline of much more recent and nuanced appreciations of the generic affinity 
between Piers Plowman and the sermon after Owst, see Siegfriend Wenzel’s chapter 6: “Sermons,” in 
the Alford Companion, pp. 155-72.  
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differently instructional. Lyric had been identified in Langland’s opus here and there, 
in individual quotations, but Piers Plowman dwarfs any lyric in form and scale; as a 
result, despite the poem’s lyric quotations, its overall lyricism escaped attention. (Or 
rather, since “lyricism” suggests only tone, its “lyricality” went unheard.215) 
Langland’s generic borrowings, we can now see, often occur as borrowings of literary 
mode—of stances particular to given genres (e.g. “lyricality”)—rather than explicit 
literary form (e.g. “lyric”). The poem’s largest frame, of course, is the dream vision; 
but its main utility for Langland, as I’ve previously suggested, seems to lie in its 
capacious accommodations for all the rest. In and of themselves, as with Langland’s 
use of quotations, these generic appropriations may not always be parodic or 
transparently satiric. Instead their profusion directs us to look beyond genres. 
Langland seems to use all of them as conveyers of the critical investigations that 
indicate an overarching satiric mode.  
 
Discursive Penetration 
 
 Lastly, and most importantly for this chapter, is the question of Piers 
Plowman’s seemingly hybrid worldview, a natural consequence of its free borrowing 
from and adaptation of so many types of written and spoken discourse. The worldview 
of the poem, by which I mean the set of its values and priorities and the most 
important filter through which it evaluates the experiences it claims to recount, seems 
sometimes to come from the world of secular commerce, sometimes from various 
elements within the Christian church, sometimes from civil government and at other 
                                                 
215 It shows us however that lyric in Piers Plowman differs from such writing’s more familiar 
nineteenth-century variety, that the “horizons of expectation” Jaussians might identify in both have 
significantly changed, and that Piers’s lyricality should thus be read in its own (or at least its own era’s) 
terms. 
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times from philosophical allegory or even love lyric. One does not want to be 
reductive here: what Langland takes from each of these spheres, as even the 
interactions between those views, contributes in a telling way to the overall 
perspective of the poem.  
 Some discursive borrowings, however, may have played a more directly 
informative role than others in Langland’s satire. Even if we assume an overarching 
Christian worldview that would influence Langland’s satire as surely as his cosmology 
and ethics, which sounds plausible if not unquestionable, it remains to ask which 
Christianity influenced the poem. Here, the monolithic idea of MEDIEVAL 
CHRISTIANITY might convince one that the case here is open-and-shut. In fact, 
however—as Langland’s poem itself best teaches us—such Christianity (even if we 
ignore the simply unorthodox, the heretical movements, and the Christianity of the 
East) transmitted itself to different groups among laity and clergy alike in different 
ways and even then in varying hues. John Van Engen calls “delusory” and “vain” any 
attempt to recognize a single and unified medieval Christendom.216 The problem we 
still face is how to distinguish between its varieties, despite the apparent ease of 
identifying Christianity as the engine for Langland’s poetic ethic.  
 I suggest that Langland’s hybrid employment of so many genres, forms, and 
rhetorics—his poem’s drawing on the texts of varied disciplines or discourses—helps 
us to understand what Anthony Giddens most usefully has labeled “discursive 
penetration.”217 This topic has not been discussed much by scholars of satire, to my 
                                                 
216 See John Van Engen, “The Future of Medieval Church History,” Church History 71.3 (2002), pp. 
492-522 (quoted at p. 493).  
217 Anthony Giddens, chapter 5: “Ideology and Consciousness,” Central Problems in Social Theory: 
Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1979), pp. 165-97 via H. Marshall Leicester, The Disenchanted Self: Representing the Subject in the 
Canterbury Tales (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 23. The term refers to “agents 
who actively engage and deploy the institutions of their culture both practically and discursively,” 
suggests Leicester; cf. Giddens: “All actors have some degree of discursive penetration of the social 
systems to whose constitution they contribute.” 
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best understanding, but it seems fruitful to me. The idea operating behind the term has 
for decades now been taken as a given in humanistic studies, namely that human 
beings are in large part formed by sets of conventions dictated by the discourses of 
various social spheres to which those individuals belong (e.g. by birth). The talk of a 
group becomes the inner life (not just the talk) of its members. This idea may not seem 
to account for individuality apart from what is dictated by genetics, save that as a 
consequence of being alive one gradually becomes influenced, in differing degrees, by 
the discourses of different spheres. One articulates one’s individuality by, in a word, 
“penetrating” these discourse shells—an issue I will return to after some background.  
 Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish provides a good description of the 
effect exerted by the power structures of discourse-guarding institutions on personal 
formation, at least for a comparatively more modern period—and some attention to his 
view helps to make comprehensible the medieval vogue for, and common appearance 
of, indirect institutional criticism such as satire.218 In the Middle Ages, these “power 
structures” would have been formed based on access to or ability to interpret a limited 
common stock of material that could be changed, if at all, by very few: holy writ, for 
example, or either sort of law. Punishment before the modern era’s “birth of the 
prison” pronounced forcefully those powers to whom or which one was subject. It 
would also have made clear the danger one could face by disregarding the common 
consensus of the law (or at least doing this so openly as to be caught). For the most 
part, a system of constant surveillance to ensure the following of rigorously codified 
statutes was still far in the future. In the contemporary era, an individual (by default, 
allowed to associate) might join a group if he approves of the texts it focuses on (the 
discourses it produces and to which it ascribes) and how it interprets them. This is 
                                                 
218 Michel, Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: the Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
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quite common in the West. These individual freedoms applied more obviously to 
groups in the Middle Ages. This is not to set the birth of the individual to the sixteenth 
century, importantly, but rather to suggest the importance of institutional labels on 
individuals by emerging bureaucracies: a governing body with limited surveillance 
capacity has to pay more attention to groups than to individuals, and so it is no 
surprise at all that society should be conceived of (by medieval thinkers at least) not as 
groups of individuals but more as groups of groups.219  
 The medieval model of the estates, in so far as this simplifying literary 
construct reflected different social roles, indicates that discourses were not evenly 
distributed or evenly available in the Middle Ages. Literacy, for instance, was not 
expected for all groups in society. Moreover, the type of informative or entertaining 
literature approved—or even available—differed sharply between groups.220 This 
made a small canon of texts in free circulation smaller still. The Church obviously had 
a role in enforcing these distinctions, but it also provided an escape from them. While 
not to be confused with a bona fide meritocracy, it allowed sons of high and low estate 
to receive broad education in several subjects. Canon law legislated for clerks in major 
orders knowledge of, if not delight in, secular letters.221  
                                                 
219  For an example of how much group affiliation mattered in this period, even to the point of showing 
up in legislation, see for example 37 Ed. III, cap. VIII-XV (sumptuary laws on the clothing appurtenant 
to the various estates, “for the outragious and excessive apparel of divers people, against their estate and 
degree, to the great destruction and impoverishment of the land” [164]) in Statutes of the Realm. The 
chapter headings, provided by Pickering’s translation as cited above, are as follows. Cap. VIII, “The 
diet and apparel of Servants”; Cap. IX, “The apparel of handicrafsmen and yeomen, and of their wives 
and children”; Cap. X, “What apparel gentlemen under the estate of knights ,and what esquires of two 
hundred mark-land, &c. may wear, and what their wives and children”; Cap. XI, “The apparel of 
merchants, citizens, burgesses, and handicraftsmen”; Cap. XII, “The apparel of knights which have 
lands within the yearly value of two hundred marks, and of knights and ladies which have four hundred 
mark land”; Cap. XIII, “The apparel of several sorts of clerks”; Cap. XIV, “The apparel of ploughmen, 
and other of mean estate[,] and the forfeitures of offenders against this ordinance.” (164-66) 
220 A later chapter discusses the character of Piers and the types of reading he suggests are suitable for 
the different estates. 
221 A good priest was to be “peritus in litteris secularibus”—to an extent. See the discussion in a later 
chapter, below. 
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 It may be a cliché, and to invoke an anachronism at that, to speak here of “self-
realization.” But there can be no doubt that increased literacy and social mobility 
accompany increased and more in-depth exposure to written discourse, as well as 
greater autonomy for appropriating that discourse for oneself. One is always 
astonished at the way in which certain well-regarded medieval monastic figures could 
forbid to their subordinates, and in the most stirring terms at that, exactly the type of 
freedoms they evidently felt able to accord unto themselves. The relatively well-
traveled Anselm, as Robert Bultot noted, was able to forbid to one of his charges 
travel outside of the walls of his cloister—even when matters of grave importance to 
the monk’s family required his presence for resolution.222 Alcuin wrote a letter 
dissuading a young monk from reading too much Virgil, as Leclercq recounts, while 
quoting Virgil repeatedly in the very same letter.223 Both occasions attest to an 
understanding that certain modes of expression or privileges belonged only to those 
who had somehow merited them by station or achieved degree.224  
 Hand in hand with knowledge of literary discourses will come production of 
letters both sacred and secular. In the fourteenth century this was not the clergy’s 
prerogative alone, as the example of Chaucer shows.225 The famed portrait of the 
monk in the Canterbury Tales’ general prologue works successfully as satire precisely 
because the narrator obviously is fully aware of the ways in which the monk violates 
the letter and the spirit of his calling, despite his avowed hearty approval of him. The 
                                                 
222 See Bultot, Christianisme 4.2, p. 113-114. 
223 This anecdote regarding Alcuin is cited in Leclercq’s Amour des Lettres (the French original) at page 
109. On Alcuin and monasticism, see e.g. Mary Alberi, “‘The Better Paths of Wisdom’: Alcuin’s 
Monastic ‘True Philosophy’ and the Worldly Court,” Speculum 76.4 (2001), pp. 896-910. 
224 Anselm’s elevation to the archbishop’s seat at Canterbury is said to have happened almost against 
his will and by pressure from above: the humility topos just behind this account defends against the 
discrepancy I’ve identified; Alcuin might not have been a monk and certainly held a position of greater 
authority than the monk to whom he wrote, but was involved in the monastic world. 
225 Gower’s Confessio makes only parodic use of the confessional model, and the exact clerical status of 
the Pearl Poet and Langland is not presently known. 
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portrait, that is to say, not only shows Chaucer’s familiarity with the supposed norm of 
monastic life by portraying the monk’s actions as being directly contrary to it in every 
respect: it also knowledgeably alludes to the patristic writings and  monastic 
legislation that codify the monastic life. In his description, Chaucer appropriates 
knowledge that we otherwise would have called “clerical.” Chaucer’s astonishing 
Parson’s Tale also betrays “clerical” knowledge, and of course examples could be 
multiplied. 
 One might even call it common, then, for the sufficiently educated to draw in 
both their reading and writing on discourses both sacred and secular. For this reason 
we cannot definitively label Langland as a clerk or totally secular member of the laity 
based on the use of “popular” and religious discourses in Piers Plowman alone 
(though that is probably all we have); it is on other evidence that we suspect him to 
have had some education and clerical training in his earlier years. It is indisputable 
however that Langland’s education enabled him to draw on discourses from both the 
religious and secular spheres, and this is in turn important because Langland’s ability 
to imagine himself both within and outside of the confining discursive boundaries of 
multiple groups enables the friction-charged search for a perfect life out of several 
available (yet flawed) options. While one cringes to describe Langland with such 
dated corporate phraseology as “thinking outside the box,” the poet’s freedom to enact 
his own self definition remains one of the strikingly “modern” aspects of the poem.  
But in the terms of what discourse community does Langland define himself, or Will? 
Put another way, what discourses seem most important to Langland for his own 
reformed self-definition and his suggestions for the reform of others? These discourses 
derive from asceticism. 
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Piers Plowman and High-Medieval Ascetic Discourse 
 
 Up to this point, this chapter has argued that Piers Plowman derives much of 
what has confused its readers about it from its appropriations of a wide variety of 
discourses and an associative organization familiar from preachers’ aids, 
commentaries, and theological writings inspired by ruminatio. The hybridity that 
results thus gives Piers one of the hallmarks of satire as understood in the Middle 
Ages. That it really was satire (as opposed to, say, a sermon) seems clear thanks to the 
poem’s critical interrogations of man and society. These might themselves appear to 
be sermonic, but medieval literary theorists ascribed a great deal of philosophical and 
in its way theological inquiry to the classical satirists. Medieval satirists went even 
further and were even more comfortable discoursing on matters divine. Since sermons 
and satires arguably exist on a continuum (with prophecy), one cannot deny utterly 
Piers’ identity as a sort of “sermon in verse.” But its expositions on Christian history 
serve to remind rather than to convert or comfort—they “preach to the choir” as it 
were—and its guidance into behavior more often serves to further delimit and 
complicate a problem than to resolve it. 
 I have suggested that even though medieval thinkers liked to think in terms of 
social groups (and of individuals in terms of relationships based on office or role) it is 
wrong to claim that medieval satirists were devoid of individuality because they chose 
not to speak of individuals. Thinking in terms of groups was simply more 
convenient—even more so than it is today. Moreover, not only is criticism in satire of 
specific individuals politically dangerous, it is also a bad way to give an example 
unless the narrator’s persona as well (as it appears in relationship to others and God) 
works as a foil or complement in the form of a typical human, simul justus et peccator. 
Without belaboring the point, I certainly hope that it will be clear that a poet’s choice 
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of discourses, to the extent that he has had a choice, indicates choices made by an 
individual. 
 That point granted, one must further concede that the choices presented by a 
text indicate priorities; therefore, does the poet’s choice of a given discourse in Piers 
Plowman suggest a lens through which we might understand the poem’s satire? 
Naturally this is not necessarily the case if certain discourses are borrowed in ways 
that do not bear authority. Yet when a poem’s authoritative characters and its narrator 
support a given discourse’s claims, that discourse seems important to the author. If the 
poem also narrates the undoing of characters who do not take those claims to heart, 
then such appropriation has even more authority. And when that discourse identifies 
and makes claims about the provenance of problems with self, relationships, and 
society, then it most certainly does arguably act as a lens for satire—an ideology 
animating a critical perspective or mode. 
 When one looks for signs of a dominant ideology in the texts from which Piers 
Plowman draws, one sees immediately that it must be Christian. In the first place, as 
has long been clear to Langlandians, the Bible and the Church Fathers act as the 
scaffolding on which the poem builds up its narrative structure. Given what was said 
just above about Chaucer’s familiarity with clerical texts (and the rather limited 
discourse options available), though, their presence is not a huge surprise. How 
Langland uses the Bible, rather than that he uses it, tells us what we still need to know 
about how to situate him religiously. What sort of Christianity do the poem’s varied 
borrowings suggest? 
 Some quotations in the poem are what one might expect, taken from texts 
prevalent and popular at the time. These are not necessarily biblical or patristic in their 
origin or nature, in other words, though they may express more or less religious ideas. 
Examples include the Latin verse of the angel and Goliard in the first passus of the 
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poem, occasional quotations in French, selections from the Distichs of Cato, an 
epigram by Godfrey of Winchester. These and reminiscences or allusions to secular 
poetry (e.g. a whole host of anti-venality satire that Yunck identified behind Lady 
Mede, or the Roman de Fauvel and the Roman de la Rose likewise hinted at) also 
indicate Langland’s reading and would seem to locate his literary culture in an urban, 
university setting—in an upper class, multilingual circle fond of lighthearted, learned 
satire. Langland’s one classical quotation (B.14.307, “Cantabit paupertas coram 
latrone viator”) comes from Juvenal’s tenth satire—and is also quoted by Chaucer’s 
Wife of Bath.226  
 Other quotations, to a degree not seen in for instance the writings of Gower 
and Chaucer, bear markedly the perspective of religious orders—one which often 
works to color the rest. The Juvenal tag was a favored one for authors of texts 
espousing a monastic detachment from material things, as Pepin has pointed out; and 
upon further examination one finds that Langland quotes other texts, less commonly in 
circulation, in order to espouse similar ideas.227  
 In other words, the quotation one finds in Piers from Juvenal is no fortuitous 
accident but one scintilla in a whole sea of data pointing to the influence on the 
poem’s satire of ascetic ideology. The C-text of Piers Plowman provides an example 
in passus 17 (the speech of Liberum Arbitrium):  
 
Iop the parfite patriarke þis prouerbe wroet and tauhte 
to make men louye mesure þat monkes ben and freres:  
“Numquam,” dicit Iob, “rugiet onager cum habuerit herbam, aut 
mugiet bos cum ante plenum presepe steterit?”  
Brutorum animalium natura te condempnat, qua cum eis pabulum 
comune sufficiat. Ex adipe prodiit iniquitas tua. 
Yf lewede men knewe this Latyn a litel they wolden auysen hem 
ar they amorteysed eny more for monkes or for chanouns. 
Allas! lordes and ladyes, lewede consayle haue ʒe 
to feffe suche and fede that  founded ben to the fulle 
                                                 
226 The original (Juvenal 10.22) has “vacuus” for “paupertas,” as I observed in chapter 1 above. 
227 See Pepin, “Juvenal X.” 
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with þat ʒoure bernes and ʒoure bloed by goed lawe may clayme!  
For god bad his blessed, as the boek techeth— 
Honora patrem et matrem, &c.  
To helpe thy fader formost byfore freres or monkes 
or ar prestes or pardoners or eny peple elles. 
Helpe thy kyn, Crist bid, for þer comseth charite, 
and afturward awayte ho hath moest nede 
and ther helpe yf thow hast, and þat halde y charite. (C.17.51-64)  
 
This passage quotes from the Latin Bible—specifically, the commandment to honor 
one’s parents in the Decalogue—as well as from a letter by the important high-
medieval figure Peter of Blois, itself apparently quoting from the works of Hugh of St. 
Victor.228 Neither Hugh nor Peter was a Benedictine monk, of course, but their 
portrayal of man’s nature well suits monastic thought.229 Langland’s quotation 
indicates the continued currency of such thought in the later medieval period as well 
as  what we might call an “ideological antiquarianism”: his interest in religious 
thought of a high level somewhat outside the main stream of what passed for standard 
devotional fare for the laity in his day. The word “parfit” to describe Job isn’t just a 
throwaway adjective but a modifier. It connects Job’s suffering with the quest for 
perfection, and posits that biblical forefather as an early model for the religious 
orders.230 
 It is based on such evidence supporting ascetic ideology’s prominence within 
the poem that the next chapters aim to examine some tenets of the monastic worldview 
and how they might influence Langland’s appropriation of the “satiric mode”—how 
the poet schematizes the wider world to note faults in the social order.231 It makes for a 
                                                 
228 The Latin appears in Peter’s letters—as noted by Pearsall’s edition—as well as in writing by Hugh. 
229 Hugh of St. Victor, as a regular canon like Hugo de Folieto, is nearly a monk and fully capable of 
writing from we may call a “practitioner’s” perspective about asceticism. 
230 In chapter 6 I take a stab at describing how I believe Langland would have encountered quotations 
such as Peter’s, both by reading florilegia and reading texts in general florilegially. See also Robert 
Adams, chapter 3: “Langland’s Theology,” in the Alford Companion, pp. 87-114. 
231 In the first chapter, I defined “satiric mode” as “a descriptive stance that identifies and focuses on the 
flaws of individuals or groups to suggest its targets’ departure from some ideal or normative state while 
ambiguously deferring the power to effect reform, foregrounding its reliance on impressionistic 
assessment through the use of caricaturing bias.”  
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reasonable hypothesis to assume that if a satiric poem conceives of the world in 
religious terms that are broadly monastic, then it owes important aspects of its satire to 
monastic ideology. It is also obvious, all the same, that one cannot uncover the 
ideology of Christian asceticism merely by paying attention to isolated quotations. 
This study will accordingly use the quotations just mentioned as invitations to 
examine this ascetic ideology—in both the quoted and other, related, texts. It will then 
consider how such a worldview is supported and affects the poem itself.  
 Simply observing asceticism’s place in Piers makes for nothing new; it has 
been made before and can be made in different ways. Scholars usually have been 
content to speak of “contemptus mundi” as the main ascetic impulse in the poem, in 
part because one need not necessarily make an involved study of monasticism to 
identify it: D. R.  Howard found it in the writings of Chaucer and other fourteenth-
century secular poets, too, making an undeniable case for its presence in the spirit of 
the times; another scholar’s dissertation understood contemptus mundi to have such 
wide currency because of biblical roots (specifically in the words of Qoheleth, a.k.a. 
Ecclesiastes, declaring that “all is vanity”).232 Morton Bloomfield understood the 
monastic background to Langland’s contemptus mundi to be especially important, but 
he did not do much with this idea and left other scholars to carry the proper 
investigation out.233  
 The next three chapters, comprising part II of the dissertation, will expand on 
Bloomfield’s idea by considering in much greater detail the influence of ascetic 
                                                 
232 See Donald R[oy] Howard, “The Contempt of the World: a Study in the Ideology of Latin 
Christendom with Emphasis on Fourteenth-Century English Literature,” Ph.D. diss, University of 
Florida, 1954. It later became a book, The Three Temptations: Medieval Man in Search of the World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).  For how the ideal was transmitted into the patristic era, 
see Louis Chevallier and Henri Rondet, “L’Idée de Vanité dans l’Œuvre de Saint Augustin,” Revue des 
Études Augustiniennes 3.3 (1957), pp. 221-34. 
233 Noteworthy contributions other than Howard’s, whether expressly indebted to Bloomfield or not, are 
Eric Jon Eliason, “‘Vanitas vanitatum’: Piers Plowman, Ecclesiastes, and Contempt of the World.”  
Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1989.  
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concepts on the levels of criticism (self-criticism, social criticism, judgment of others) 
in the poem. It will advance existing scholarship most importantly by placing 
contemptus mundi in context as only one component wall in a whole complex of 
medieval ascetic ideology upon which Langland’s satire drew. Yet as the argument of 
this study posits, Langland’s poem envisions an exclaustration of monastic ideology, a 
reform of broader society based on ascetic thought. Fourteenth-century England 
witnessed an efflorescence in hybrid ways of living Christianity, in fact—forms of 
living neither entirely in nor out of the so-called “world.”234  As a result of these 
concerns, the poem conceives of traditional cloistered life as a special status: one it 
takes pains not to promote, in favor of guidance to “men þat on þis moolde lyuen.”235 
                                                 
234 See Giles Constable, “The Popularity of Twelfth-Century Spiritual Writers in the Late Middle 
Ages,” in Renaissance: Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, edd. Anthony Molio and John A. Tedeschi 
(Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), pp. 5-28; and Nicole Rice, Lay Piety and Religious 
Discipline in Middle English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
235 B.11.275. For an example, see B.11.255a—glossed as promoting poverty, instead of the usual 
(monastic) contemplative life. For more on active and contemplative lives, see chapter 3 below. See 
also the end of note 392 below for one subtle fourteenth-century devaluation of the cloister.  
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CHAPTER 3 
“COR CONTRITUM ET HUMILIATUM, DEUS NON DESPICIES...”: 
NARRATORIAL GUISES AND CONTEMPTUS SUI 
 
Lex iubet, ut timeas, sed desperare timentem 
non sinit; hoc omni crimine maius habet. 
Omnem cum solvat confessio pura reatum, 
et lavet internus crimina cuncta dolor, 
hoc scelus excludit veniam, poenamque meretur, 
quam prece vel pretio flectere nemo potest. 
Crimina criminibus cumulat, male gesta fateri 
negligit, absorbet vota precesque timor, 
clementem negat esse Deum, nec parcere pronum  
culpis, sed cupidum sanguinis esse putat. [...] 
Proficit ergo bonis iugis meditatio mortis, 
unde perit stultus, qui timet absque modo. 
Est maiestati gratus modus ille timendi, 
crimina qui vitat omnia, spemque fovet; 
qui veritus iustum recolit pietatis, et inde 
iudicis agnoscit nomen et inde patris; 
quique potestatis sic iram vitat, ut instet 
dulcibus obsequiis promeruisse patrem. 
             
           (John of Salisbury, “Despair and Fear”)236 
 
 This chapter begins part II of “Ascetic Ideology and the Satiric Mode in Piers 
Plowman.” In it, my inspection of Piers Plowman’s satire moves away from generic 
hallmarks—ambiguity and hybridity. It moves toward an investigation of how ascetic 
ideology informs the satiric mode. As a mode, satire pronounces criticism on a range 
of levels radiating outwards to the cosmic, to the eschatological—hence satire’s 
frequent affinity with prophecy. But that critique starts much further in, on an 
individual level, before branching out to wider spheres. As it proves difficult to assess 
a poet’s vision of where humanity fails and needs reform without some sense of where 
he sees his own failings or weaknesses to lie, the examination here will begin with 
satire’s critique at the individual, narratorial, even personal level.   
                                                 
236 Laarhoven, Entheticus, II.H. 34, pp. 136-37. Laarhoven’s translation follows unlineated, my 
emendations in brackets: “The law commands that you should fear, but [it] does not allow the man who 
fears to despair; it holds this a greater crime than all others. While a pure confession absolves every 
guilt, and inner grief washes away every crime, this offense excludes pardon and deserves punishment, 
which no one can turn away by prayer or payment. [sc. This] fear <recte Despair> piles guilt on guilt, 
neglects to confess evil deeds, absorbs vows and prayers; it denies that God is merciful and thinks Him 
not inclined to spare guilties but to be eager of blood. [...] [Yet] the constant meditation of death 
benefits the good men, through [which] the fool who fears without moderation perishes. Pleasing to the 
majesty is that manner of fear which avoids all crimes and cherishes hope; which in fear commemorates 
again the justice of piety and thence acknowledges his name of judge and thence of father; and which 
avoids the wrath of the power in this way, so that he may strain to have deserved the father by pleasant 
obedience.” 
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 Some of a satirist’s most penetrating critical insight into the weaknesses of the 
human condition is often, if not always, directed towards his own narratorial persona. 
Such a practice enables the satirist to make very clear that, at times, even he has been 
unable to escape the faults he criticizes. Obviously, one reason for the satiric narrator’s 
self critique might be more political than programmatic; offering a captatio 
benevolentiæ, extending some good will to the targets of the satiric critique (who often 
hold positions of some power and authority) and thereby reducing the “psychological 
noise” that might prevent a serious message from being heard may prove more 
important to a poet than the systematic analysis of all levels of human existence that 
the layout of these chapters may imply the author of Piers Plowman to have had in 
mind.237 In any of these cases, a multivalent analysis of the human condition can 
result. Criticism on multiple levels definitely occurs in Piers Plowman, and an 
analysis of its narratorial self-criticism is therefore in order. 
 The present chapter will begin with some consideration of satiric narrators in 
general. It will question the usual taxonomy of “Horatian” versus “Juvenalian” 
narrators, at least insofar as narrators Horatian and Juvenalian diverge in their 
presentation of narratorial self-criticism. The discussion will move in a new section to 
what Larry Scanlon (for one, in line with many another scholar) calls the humorous 
“begging persona” of the author of Piers Plowman: a persona often identified with the 
narrators of parodic, “Goliardic” satire of the Middle Ages.238 This I will show to be a 
fairly accurate assessment of the evidence. The next stage of the my argument, 
however, will go on to show the incompleteness of the Will-as-Goliard view. I will 
                                                 
237 Similar political considerations might lie behind the satira communis as well—the idea being that to 
criticize everyone can favor no one. 
238 See Scanlon’s essay “The King’s Two Voices: Narrative and Power in Hoccleve’s Regement of 
Princes,” in Literary Practice and Social Change in Britain, 1380-1530, ed. Lee Patterson (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 216-47 at p. 236, which mentions Piers Plowman as a 
“powerful cultural precedent” for “the independent moral authority beggars can possess.” 
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show that the B-text’s presentation of the character of Haukyn—himself something of 
a Goliard!—functions, despite Haukyn’s apparent separate identity, as the poem’s 
most profound instance of narratorial self-criticism. 
 Langland’s treatment of Haukyn, and of a closely attendant foil in the character 
of Anima, opposes Will’s “outer man” or “old man” with his “inner man,” to use the 
terminology of medieval spiritual writings to which Langland might well have had 
access. Such terminology might seem to muddy the waters even further, defining an 
unknown with something even less known, but more clarity ultimately results 
regarding Piers Plowman’s sense of self-reform if we think of the flaws Langland 
associates with the self as worldly and external in explicit tension with other (religion-
minded, internal) elements. It is also helpful to see Anima and Haukyn as not only 
somehow related to Will but actually both aspects of Will existing simultaneously and 
somehow affecting each other—an interaction which I think the “old man” versus 
“inner man” distinction quite nicely allows. Ultimately, it will appear that Langland’s 
mid-poem meditation on the need for proper self-reform (starting with self-criticism) 
draws on that aspect of ascetic ideology known as contemptus sui or “contempt of 
self.” The poem takes pains not to confuse contemptus sui with the dangerous sin of 
wanhope, or despair.  
 
Will, Goliardy, and the Types of Satiric Narrator 
 
 No type of poetry that survives from the Middle Ages inspires such easy 
recognition as so-called “Goliardic” verse, nor may any other lay claim to so wide an 
appeal.239 Irreverent, iconoclastic, and ironic—briefly and wittily countering our worst 
                                                 
239 Collections of Goliardic verse and similar poetry include Helen Waddell’s pioneering classic, The 
Wandering Scholars (trans. Waddell [London: Constable, 1927]); Fleur Adcock, ed. & trans, Hugh 
Primas and the Archpoet, Cambridge Medieval Classics 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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impressions of the era from which they come—the narratives of Goliardic poems 
make for easy, ephemeral fun. The plots stick to the well-known humoristic themes of 
inebriation, seduction, and life on the open road. The poems’ heroes, as well as their 
satiric targets, tend to be lapsed or even completely immoral figures associated with 
the church (as opposed to the knightly or lordly narrators of the pastourelle, for 
instance). 
 Goliardic verse enjoyed great popularity in the Middle Ages, as we can attest 
from its survival, but why or how did such poetry survive? A great deal of the 
medieval entertainment that we would call in one sense or another “popular” after all 
(whether “from the people” or “very much enjoyed”) was, we know, transmitted 
almost exclusively via oral performance; it was not customarily written down. Why 
then were these poems written? We also understand that unrepentently vicious living 
or distortion of Church doctrines, was (naturally) deemed unacceptable by 
ecclesiastical authorities. Why then was this verse, so invested with the parody and 
caricature of the Church and Church authorities, passed along?  A ready explanation 
for any controversial medieval writing’s persistence in the written record holds it to 
have been transmitted through so many manuscripts that, even assuming a huge 
percentage of them to have been destroyed by outraged defenders of various faiths or 
the ravages of time, several still remain. Yet a better explanation, which helps to 
account for Goliardic poetry having been committed to writing in the first place, takes 
into account that persons associated with the Church (and therefore literate) had 
composed and transmitted them, themselves. Certainly the level of literacy enjoyed by 
                                                                                                                                            
1994); George Frisbie Whicher, trans., The Goliard Poets: Medieval Latin Songs and Satires 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949); Paul Lehmann, ed. Die Parodie im Mittelalter: mit 24 
ausgewählten parodistischen Texten, rev. ed. (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1963);  Martha Bayless, Parody in 
the Middle Ages: the Latin Tradition. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). On Goliardic 
poetry and poetic method see especially Jill Mann, “Satiric Subject and Satiric Object in Goliardic 
Literature,” Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 15 (1980), pp. 63-86.  
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Goliardic authors is not under any dispute: their allusions, as well as the spheres of 
culture with which they affect or betray familiarity, point to a level of education by 
their authors which would include skill with writing; as corroboration, Rodney 
Thomson finds these and other satires more and more prevalent with the rise of the 
university in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.240  
 Given that composition in clerical circles seems to have prevented Goliardic 
poems’ censure from the clerical establishment, it seems that Goliardic poems 
benefited from what we might loosely call the “I may pick on my brother mercilessly 
but you may not” ethic that governs so many other types of critical utterance as well. 
Those affiliated with the church could indulge in writing and hearing or reading even 
the worst parodies, being already forever affiliated with the church and familiar 
enough with its customs to recognize poetic distortions. For all that some of these 
works appear ideal for recitation or performance in crowded bars, the university-town 
taverns in which they were belted out likely catered to a clientele of similarly literate, 
educated, religiously affiliated men. Given the era’s constant commerce between 
clerical and lay spheres, it could be that no one would be seriously at risk for 
misapprehending the church from encountering such poems; this general cultural 
familiarity would also help render even the sharpest of Goliardic satires mostly 
harmless.  
 For his part, as we’ve seen already from the first chapter of this dissertation, 
Langland certainly would have had reason to tread carefully in administering satiric 
rebuke and critique in Piers Plowman. The strategies the “Goliards” used that 
rendered their verse impervious to censure would thus likely have been of 
considerable interest to Langland, especially as he appears to have felt at least a loose 
professional affiliation with the church and had received at least some education 
                                                 
240 See Thomson’s “Origins of Latin Satire.” 
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pertaining to a member of the wider clergy. In order to more fully appreciate the ways 
in which Langland takes on the attributes of a Goliardic narrator with his narratorial 
persona, though, we cannot begin from the premise that Will simply is a Goliardic 
narrator. Instead, it will be necessary to consider other established narratorial types, 
locating Will on a continuum between those somewhat imaginary poles.241 
 Literary critics on satire have broadly recognized two main types of satiric 
narrator, namely the Horatian and the Juvenalian. Horatian narrators act slyly and 
wittily, often imputing to themselves a measure of the faults they see in others.242 
According to M. H. Abrams’ handy Glossary of Literary Terms:  
 
[the Horatian narrator] manifests the character of an urbane, witty, and 
tolerant man of the world, who is moved more often to wry amusement 
than to indignation at the spectacle of human folly, pretentiousness, and 
hypocrisy, and who uses a relaxed and informal language to evoke 
from readers a wry smile at human failings and absurdities--sometimes 
including his own.243 
 
                                                 
241 Of course  there is no need to attempt to fit Piers Plowman on the Procrustean Bed of modern critical 
taxonomies in order to carry this task of narratorial type-comparison out, though the very existence of 
such taxonomies (such as M. H. Abrams’ very convenient Glossary of Literary Terms, with Geoffrey 
Galt Harpham, 9th ed. [Boston: Wadsworth Cengage, 2009]) tempts one to do so: is the poem a 
“formal” satire? if so, is it “Horatian” or “Juvenialian”? Is it “indirect” satire? If so—”Menippian (or 
Varronian) “?  As we can see, Piers Plowman from time to time takes on elements of each of these, 
including (although especially in the C-text ) prose. Further, as we are only too aware, contemporary 
critical understandings of satire often arise inductively from evidence overwhelmingly classical and 
early Modern, making the enterprise of trying to read a medieval satire rigidly in those terms even more 
questionable. Given the almost inherently mixed character of satire, and of much medieval satire 
especially—given satire’s fascinating resistance to unequivocal, ironclad definition, that is—it seems 
most advisable to sift through the whole range of possibilities on offer by such a compendium as 
Abams’, taking care to separate the inevitable compound of chaff and wheat. For more on medieval 
satiric narrators, see in addition to works already quoted J.-C. Mühlethaler, “Les Masques du Clerc pour 
Parler aux Puissants: fonctions du narrateur dans la satire et la littérature ‘engagée’ aux XIIIe et XIVe 
siècles,” Le Moyen Âge: revue d’histoire et de philologie 96 (1990), pp. 265-86 and, for some thoughts 
about the difficulty of categorizing non-Goliardic satire from the Middle Ages, specially referencing 
John of Salisbury, Thérèse Ballet Lynn’s Recherches sur l’Ambiguïté et la Satire au Moyen Âge (Paris: 
Nizet, 1977).  
242 This is not to say that Horace was so charming that he did not have to worry about censors. See in 
addition to Braund’s “Libertas or Licentia?” Catherine M. Schlegel, Satire and the Threat of Speech: 
Horace’s Satires, Book 1 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005). 
243 Abrams, Glossary, p. 321.  
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Narrators classified as Juvenalian, on the other hand, are far more given over to rage, 
attacking other people’s failures with more cruelty. Braund observes that  Juvenal had 
numerous precedents for his trademark “savage indignation,” and that he was, even so, 
“continually developing and modifying his satiric persona.”244 Nevertheless, Abrams 
puts it,  
 
[the Juvenalian narrator is] a serious moralist who uses a dignified and 
public style of utterance to decry modes of vice and error which are no 
less dangerous because they are ridiculous, and who undertakes to 
evoke from readers contempt, moral indignation, or an unillusioned 
sadness at the aberrations of humanity. [...] In its most denunciatory 
instances this mode of satire resembles the jeremiad, whose model is 
not Roman but Hebraic.245 
 
Leaving aside for the moment that surely neither Juvenal nor Horace’s poems can ever 
be called in aggregate purely Juvenalian or Horatian—in these terms (and how should 
we classify Persius?)—we can see that Langland, in criticizing others, possesses 
elements of both. More interesting, in any case for the purposes of this chapter, is how 
these narratorial subtypes are said to express self-criticism, and how Piers Plowman’s 
narrator aligns himself in relation to these.  
 Of these two types of narrator, the Juvenalian seems most relevant to some 
medieval monastic satire but least relevant to Langland’s self-questioning enterprise as 
Will.246 Susannah Braund, in her Loeb edition and translation of Juvenal and Persius’ 
poems, has in fact begged the question whether we can speak self-criticism in 
Juvenalian narrators at all—at least, when that narrator himself, in one of Juvenal’s 
poems, is Juvenal: the customary bluster and forthrightness of the Juvenalian narrator 
would seem to emanate from a locus of such intense self confidence, to possess such 
outward aggression that it seems almost impossible to think of this attacker turning his 
                                                 
244 Braund,  Juvenal and Persius, p. 20.  
245 Abrams, Glossary, p. 321.  
246 Braund, Juvenal and Persius, notes that “[o]f the many personæ of Roman satire, it was Juvenal’s 
articulation of indignatio that exercised the strongest influence on subsequent satire,” p. 24.  
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own guns on himself, yet Braund draws our attention past these initial perceptions to 
the irony with which Juvenal invests his narratorial bravado—a surety as ill founded 
as his targets possess about themselves, and so equally worthy of reproach.247 
Moreover, the advice Juvenal’s narrators dispense in the name of correction can prove 
harmful, or so idealistic as to betray a poor knowledge of human nature. In the later 
satires, as Braund notes, “Juvenal [...] has set up a tension between his first-person 
approach, which tends to draw the audience into sympathy with the opinions 
expressed, and the audience’s realisation that the things they are assenting to are 
morally dubious or even reprehensible.”248 Juvenalian narrators can thus express self-
criticism by showcasing their human failure as instruments for correction, juxtaposing 
that failure with the satires’ messages too authoritative and exacting to be uttered by 
anyone but a hypocrite (or a prophet). Without criticizing himself openly, then, 
Juvenal reminds his readers of the vanity of even his own narratorial wishes and of 
how, as a medieval Christian might have thought it, “all flesh is grass.”249 
 Horatian narrators are much easier to speak of in terms of self-criticism, as the 
quotation from Abrams’ Glossary clearly shows. The message in Horace and Juvenal 
                                                 
247 These remarks apply especially well to the earlier works of Juvenal: “Juvenal’s satiric mask or 
persona in Books One and Two is essentially that of an extremist and a chauvinist who sees every issue 
in stark black and white and who becomes passionate in his condemnation of those who offend his 
simplistic morality. Juvenal indicates the limitations of this character by exposing the contradictions 
between his view of himself as a morally pure and superior being and the more objective view of him as 
a narrow-minded bigot” (Braund, Juvenal and Persius, p. 22).  
248 Braund, Juvenal and Persius, p. 24.  
249 Isaiah 40:6-8: “The voice of one, saying: Cry. And I said: What shall I cry? All flesh is grass, and all 
the glory thereof as the flower of the held. The grass is withered, and the flower is fallen, because the 
spirit of the Lord hath blown upon it. Indeed the people is grass: The grass is withered, and the flower is 
fallen: but the word of our Lord endureth for ever.”  See also 1 Peter 1:24, “For all flesh is as grass; and 
all the glory thereof as the flower of grass. The grass is withered, and the flower thereof is fallen away.” 
In this last sense Langland’s narratorial stance—even toward himself—sometimes approaches the 
Juvenalian: Langland might be considered Juvenalian, that is, in so far as he appropriates at times the 
voice of prophecy and in so far as Juvenal sometimes comes across as a prophet without a God. 
Langlandian prophecy has more and greater masters, though, than Juvenal, and so comparison between 
Langland and Juvenal’s narratorial self-criticism must end here. Some consideration of Langland in the 
guise or persona of the prophet will appear later, however, especially in chapter 6. 
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might be the same—that all flesh is grass, as I indicated—but with different manner 
and sequence. And so where Juvenal (like the Hebrew prophet of old, but without the 
same recourse to authority external to and also above himself) sounds out that message 
in angry, minatory terms, Horace does a better job openly of admitting at the same 
time that he too has his faults, perhaps amusing potential targets into seeing the flaws 
in others before bringing the news that they smirk at themselves. Perhaps the most 
iconic case, in Horace or elsewhere, appears in the first of that Roman poet’s 
Sermones: “What are you laughing about?” Horace asks. “Just change the name, and 
this story’s about you.”250 A finer example of Horatian self-criticism appears in 
Horace’s second book: there, eager to please his critics, he agrees that he probably 
should not write any more satiric poems except that otherwise he could not fall asleep, 
and that he lacks the nerve for other pursuits.251 
 The “Goliardic narrator” makes self-criticism an indispensable weapon in its 
satiric arsenal, not merely an incidental one. Heavily invested in parody, Goliardic 
satire often builds up a strong case for its narrator’s (often amusing or shocking) 
fallenness and corruption, sometimes only obliquely following this up with a reminder 
of the rest of humanity’s own failures.  As Anne Middleton has noted, it “castigat[es] 
the vices and sociopolitical perversions of clergy and court through the voice and 
rhetorical posture of one deeply implicated in them.”252Yet while this central dynamic 
usually comes across as humorous, it is not only interesting but important to note that 
the literary historical antecedents for this sort of character are not humorous at all; that 
the Goliard is, in effect, the gyrovagus of longstanding monastic stricture, widened 
                                                 
250 “Quid rides? Mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur” (Saturæ, I.i.69). 
251 This is the same poem in which, as Braund notes in “Libertas or Licentia?,” Horace observes the 
utility of humor for defense against censorship and censure. 
252 Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy,” pp. 256-57.  
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into all types of corrupt members in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, made laughable and 
harmless through the softening distortions of caricature.253  
 The delightful inversion of holiness in a Goliardic satire’s narratorial main 
character helps to explain the satire’s heavy reliance on parody. The parody’s blatant 
being “only in jest” may well help to give a voice to marginalized and excluded 
positions drowned out by the dominant discourse.254 There is certainly something 
delicious in the useful and moral social commentary provided by the professedly 
lapsed Goliardic poets. Further, the very obvious self-parody present in a Goliardic 
satire has the authoritative defense at its disposal of just being a fiction (one reason for 
Thomson’s and similar possible hypotheses about the voices of the unempowered): as 
just a joke that cannot be taken seriously, by a character professedly unworthy to serve 
as role model or advisor to anyone, its offenses are absolved even before their 
commission. Remember that I am an immoral fiction, it declares; how do you propose 
to defend yourself from the judgments proper to your own sins? 
 Because of the instructive character of his faults, Will in Piers Plowman has 
been considered a Goliardic figure with far more frequency and regularity than he has 
been though of as Horatian or Juvenalian. Steven Justice, in his essay on “the genres 
of Piers Plowman,” shows how generic interpenetration may account for some of the 
divergences in normal procedure, or standard procedure, in the poem.255 As noted 
earlier, Anne Middleton has pointed out very cogently that satire “everywhere 
pervades” the poem, especially in its complex presentation of Will qua gyrovague. 
                                                 
253 On gyrovagues and their ilk, see in addition to the description in the Rule of St. Benedict a discussion 
in the helpful Libellus de Diversis Ordinibus et Professionibus qui sunt in Æcclesia, edd. and trans. 
Giles Constable and Bernard S. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). Conrad Leyser explains in 
Authority and Asceticism that,  in the Late Antique legislative tradition upon which Benedict drew, this 
“deliriously misguided monk […] embodies evagatio mentis, the wandering state of attention that 
results from failure to observe a proper occupatio mentis” (119). 
254 So, at least, it is claimed in Thomson’s “Origins of Latin Satire.” 
255 Justice, “The Genres of Piers Plowman,” passim. 
  106   
Wendy Scase has noted how the figure of the Goliard is not only used as a literary 
persona or topoi-collection for entertainment purposes but in fact as the self-
questioning site of some of the poem’s most profound misgivings about society.256 
Ralph Hanna, moreover, has in a touch of puckishness suggested that Will represents a 
type of sui generis holy man, with that sort of personification, whose zeal coupled 
with lack of conventional credentials (like Richard Rolle) creates profound difficulties 
for the questioning of the characters of Reason and Conscience—not just comedy, in 
other words.257 All told, Will’s Goliardic persona accomplishes—or at least is 
necessary for—a great deal of the action in the poem.258  
 Will’s first foray into Goliardy appears at the very beginning of the poem, 
when—“wery forwandred”—Will falls asleep to find himself surveying the various 
orders of society as an outsider.259 Will is not only a vagrant outsider either, we learn, 
but also one with an apparent place in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. We may assume so, 
at least, in so far as corruption within the church becomes the subject of some of his 
most strenuous criticism and some of his most detailed observations in it. More 
directly, Holichurch herself claims Will as one of her own—but Will, suffering typical 
ignorance, goes on to inspire not her confidence but rather exasperated rebuke. Will’s 
mix here of intense identification with the church but lack of a fully legitimate place 
within it from which to reform it—an ability to point out his religion’s faults, 
hampered by an inability to live by its best precepts—is fully consonant with 
Goliardy.260 
                                                 
256 See Piers Plowman and the New Anticlericalism, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 4 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
257 “Will’s Work,” in Written Work: Langland, Labor, and Authorship, edd. Steven Justice and Kathryn 
Kerby-Fulton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), pp. 23-66. 
258 For more on Will’s status as a Goliardic narrator, see the admirable excursus on “Will as Fool” in 
Curtis Maxwell Perrin, “Langland’s Comic Vision,” Ph.D. diss. Yale University, 2005, pp. 263-77. 
259 B.prol.7, cf. B.18.4, “wery of the world.” 
260 Will shows the same mix of characteristics throughout the poem, infuriating or bemusing a whole 
panoply of authoritative interlocutors by turns. 
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Goliardic Narration and Langland’s Contemporaries 
 
 Since a great deal of self-criticism accompanies the Goliardic persona, and 
since Goliards are sometimes hardly more than liminally (and always imperfectly) 
Christian, one might well ask if “Geffrey,” Chaucer’s persona in the Canterbury Tales, 
can also be called Goliardic. He is not, to the extent that he holds no clerical role. 
Most of the poem’s satiric criticism hinges on other characters’ discrepancies, 
moreover, not his. “No.” One might say the same for Gower in the Confessio Amantis, 
despite the fact that neither his main persona of Amans nor the character of Genius can 
be called a conventional penitent or priest. I would like for the moment at least to 
hypothesize that this might be because of those narratorial stances in relationship to 
the agents and actions in the rest of their poems, Canterbury Tales and Confessio 
Amantis respectively. Rather than operating as comic figures apart from the societies 
in which they themselves act, as Will, they are comic figures within those societies. 
Geffrey is one of Chaucer’s pilgrims, Amans a willing listener to Genius’ stories. 
Genius himself might be said to possess a Goliardic mix of clerical and morally 
suspect qualities (in his role of pseudo-Christian confessor and self-implicating 
pseudo-priest of Venus) but he is hardly the poet’s own narratorial persona even if he 
does most of the talking. The end of Confessio Amantis, in which Amans declares that 
his real name is “John Gower,” makes clear Gower’s identification with the lover 
rather than with Genius. Similarly, Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales might contain 
Goliardic narrators, but Geffrey is not one of them. To say that Geffrey and Amans act 
within the rules set by their societies is not to say that Chaucer and Gower were 
powerless to see flaws in that society, just as Will’s outsider perspective does not 
preclude Langland’s possible intense devotion to his contemporary Church. Obviously 
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Chaucer and Gower both write poetry that can be called “Goliardic”—but their 
narrators, as a rule, do not match the Goliardic narratorial profile. 
 On the level of character, it bears noting, all three authors do manage a great 
deal of narratorial self deprecation. Chaucer and Gower’s self deprecation via Geffrey 
and Amans rests with their inability to perform in an exemplary secular way—telling 
good tales, romancing with success—while Langland’s self deprecation through the 
persona of Will stems instead from Will’s unwitting adherence to secular mores even 
as he denounces and questions other characters for why they follow worldly ways as 
much as they do.261 Will is the would-be ascetic surrounded by revelers in a tavern, 
drink in hand; Amans and Geffrey would-be revelers hindered too much by reserve 
and insufficient charisma to win great romantic success. 
 Setting Gower aside—neither Genius nor Amans actually engages with the 
outer world during the Confessio—the difference between Will and Geffrey becomes 
clearest when we compare their attitudes to secular poetry in comparison to their 
poems. Here the differences between Chaucer and Langland can be noticed 
immediately, despite the fact that these near contemporaries both wrote satire in 
Middle English. Nevertheless, even though the fact of the difference between the two 
is noticeable, the quality or character of their difference is complex; it cannot be 
reduced wholly successfully into just a few remarks. Generally, as Troilus & Criseyde 
makes most clear, Chaucer puts a premium on rhetorical virtuosity (from diction to 
syntax) when writing poetry, and has the greatest possible reverence for poets foreign 
and classical (who provide him with much of his material). While a metrical and (as 
far as language-choice goes) a linguistic innovator, Chaucer shows a great respect for 
past rhetoricians regarding how a poem might be structured as well.262  
                                                 
261 See for example the waking scene at the beginning of passus 15. 
262 In particular, as a reminiscence in Troilus & Criseyde makes very clear (Bk. 1, lines 1065-71), 
Chaucer was familiar with Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria nova (editions provided in the bibliography). 
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 It may be, as suggested by A. C. Spearing, that some psychological block 
impeded Chaucer from realizing the grand edifices he blueprinted for his verse, but 
those plans are very telling.263 He wished to apply a high finish, worthy of his models, 
to his poetry. For Langland, however, standing in a relation to Chaucer that John 
Bowers has recently labeled “antagonistic,” almost the reverse scenario seems to 
apply.264 Langland’s poetic or rhetorical models are whatever will enable him to 
justify his procedure, regardless of the status of particular examples—satire and vision 
are among the most capacious of genres and modes. As defensive and even tortured as 
his poem’s discussions of the worthiness of verse can get, he probably did not write 
for connoisseurs of poetic style. Where Chaucer stylistically innovates on borrowed 
designer material, Langland’s poem uses a consciously archaizing (if not actually age-
old) “vintage” verse form to bring across stunningly original meditations. In other 
words, Langland’s medium takes second place to the message. Partisans of Langland 
and Chaucer both would probably agree that these differences between the two poets 
lie more in degree than in kind, obviously, but they point out how—fundamentally—
Chaucer sees poetry in terms of artifice (as at best a monument and at worst a 
bagatelle), while Langland sees poetry in terms of ethical formation (at best a 
prophetic vision but most likely, at worst, a distraction and a sin). 
 Langland’s distrusting view of poetry by turns creeps and rushes in when the 
poem’s attention turns to the Goliardic poets, with which Will so often has been 
identified. Piers Plowman in this way takes up one of the common themes of 
Goliardic poetry—that the poet is fallen and morally suspect—far more than 
                                                                                                                                            
Chaucer might even have gone much, much further, in fact, on which see Thomas Elwood Hart, 
“Medieval Structuralism: ‘Dulcarnoun’ and the Five-Book Design of Chaucer’s Troilus,” The Chaucer 
Review, 16.2 (1981), pp. 129-170. 
263 Spearing made this suggestion in a roundtable on the  “afterlife of the Canterbury Tales” at the 
International Medieval Congress in Kalamazoo, 2008. 
264 John M. Bowers, Chaucer and Langland: the Antagonistic Tradition (South Bend: University of 
Notre Dame, 2007). 
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Chaucer’s rather parodic Sir Thopas ever could. In most of Piers Plowman, it is true, 
there is a curious disjunction or detachment in the way these critiques are voiced: 
often of Will by other characters, or of other characters by Will. But what of Will 
subjecting himself to the same treatment? The instances in which Will criticizes 
himself occur less frequently than one might think, given our foregoing description of 
Will in league with the lightly self-mocking personæ of Horace and the Goliards. One 
moderately successful rejoinder to the qualm could appeal to the nature of the 
characters who question or criticize Will throughout the poem, or who meet with 
questioning and criticism by him: they are on occasion aspects of Will himself, and he 
reflects on his encounters with them afterwards—often in a somewhat tendentiously 
introspective manner, as at the discouraged beginning of passus 13.265 
 At any rate, solidly identifying where Will lies on a continuum between 
“Horatian” and “Juvenalian” narrators is not difficult. Langland does not fail to 
portray himself, through Will, as fallible. Moreover, many of the instances in which 
Will criticizes himself or receives criticism from his several interlocutors (often 
aspects of himself) showcase wit, even humor. These factors both merit his 
classification as more Horatian than Juvenalian, like Geffrey in the Canterbury Tales. 
Further, when we consider how Langland portrays Will as a character—a somewhat 
lapsed religious figure, wandering through the world criticizing others with his 
                                                 
265 “And I awaked þerwiþ, witlees nerhande, / and as a freke þat fey were forþ gan I walke / in manere 
of a mendynaunt many yer after. / And of þis metyng many tyme muche þouʒt I hadde, / first how 
Fortune me failed at my mooste nede; / and how þat Elde manaced me—myʒte we euere mete— / and 
how þat freres folwede folk þat was riche / and peple þat was pouere at litel pris þei sette, / and no corps 
in hir kirkʒerd ne in hir kirk was buryed / but quik he biqueþe hem auʒt or sholde helpe quyte hir 
dettes; / and how þis Coueitise ouercom clerkes and preestes; / and how þat lewed men ben lad, but 
oure lord hem helpe, / thoruʒ vnkonnynge curatours to incurable peynes; / ad how þat Ymaginatif in 
dremels me tolde / of kynde and of his konnynge; and how curteis he is to bestes, / and how louynge he 
is to ech lif on londe and on watre— / leneþ he no lif lasse ne moore— / for alle creatures þat crepen or 
walken of kynde ben engendred; / and siþen how ymaginatif seide ‘vix saluabitur iustus,’ / and whan he 
hadde seid so, how sodeynliche he passed. / I lay doun longe in þis þoʒt and at þe laste I slepte, / and as 
crist wolde þer com Conscience to conforte me þat tyme[...].” (1-22, slightly repunctuated) 
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verse—we must agree with the general literary critical consensus that Langland drew 
on common literary conventions of the gyrovagus or Goliardus in doing so. The critics 
who call Will a type of Goliard are right.  
 Yet we should bear in mind the obvious fact: no one who reads Piers Plowman 
finishes it with the impression that Will matches up with the typical Goliard in every 
respect, or even most respects—hence my writing, just above, that “Langland drew on 
common literary conventions of the gyrovagus or Goliardus in [his portrayal of 
Will]”; he did not appropriate those conventions wholesale. At times, in fact, one gets 
the impression that conventional forms of satiric criticism, which appear steadily in 
the poem, coëxist with some rarer element, evanescent but transformative, flashing in 
and out of detection at the very corners of our vision. Unyielding anger at sin and fear 
of damnation, not forgiving amusement and laughter at corruption and frivolity, 
tincture the entire poem from beginning to end and bubble up regularly throughout it. 
The intense, less humoristic vision of humanity that makes itself known at these times 
cannot be chalked up with satisfactory precision simply as the fruit of “didactic 
traditions.” After all, which didactic traditions contribute to it? And why does this type 
of criticism appear at the very moments in which the poem’s characters are at their 
most belaboringly schoolmarmish, working against them to strike pat conclusions 
down? The next sections of the chapter will attempt to shed light on the issue.  
 
Haukyn 
 
 Most of Langland’s narratorial self-criticism, as we’ve seen, has been 
explicable in light of the Goliardic poetry whose themes and characters it takes on. 
Sometimes, though, what we would expect to see from Langland’s use of Goliardic 
convention has very little resemblance to the narratorial self-criticism that we do see at 
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work in his poem. In order to explore divergences in this respect from the conventions 
of Goliardy, I want here to focus on a portion of the B-text that I consider the most 
striking instance of Will’s narratorial self-criticism, one of the poem’s most interesting 
and profound. Will’s encounter with “Haukyn, the Actif Man.” Interestingly, although 
Will subjects Haukyn to an analysis so detailed and probing that its energy drives the 
episode, Will fails to realize that Haukyn also represents an important aspect of 
himself.  
 Haukyn’s entry into the narrative of Piers Plowman comes as the result of a 
decision made at the end of the episode just preceding it. The episode’s drama unfolds 
in the setting of a dinner party of sorts, which Will, Conscience, Patience, Clergie, and 
a highly educated friar—a “doctour of divinitee” known to preach at St. Paul’s 
Cathedral in London, attend.266 At the end of the dinner, which lays bare the inequality 
and hypocrisy of the friar’s luxurious lifestyle, Conscience (and by extension Will) 
must decide if he would like to continue his travels with Clergie or with Patience in 
search of the mysterious “Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest” that Will has been referred to; 
the question amounts to whether one can best profit from abstract learning or practical 
experience as a guide for doing well in life. Conscience chooses Patience, and they 
meet Haukyn immediately thereafter. 
 To the problem or puzzle of Haukyn, Langland characteristically poses a 
solution in the form of another puzzle: the character of Anima, the main figure in the 
poem’s next lengthy episode. Given that the fraction of Piers Plowman devoted first to 
Haukyn and then to Anima is a relatively large one and, moreover, a multifariously 
complex one, stretching over three passūs and involving the wide-ranging discussions 
of characters who while ostensibly separate from Will are actually aspects of Will in a 
                                                 
266 This is the episode into which passus 13 ultimately opens: “[...] as crist wolde þer com Conscience to 
conforte me þat tyme / and bad me come to his court, wiþ clergie sholde I dyne” (22-23). 
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“dream within a dream,” the exposition that I feel compelled to provide here can only 
touch on certain especially salient points and will have to glide silently by others. I 
want primarily to establish the way in which Haukyn might be considered a Goliard, 
then the way in which (not merely through his Goliardy) he can be considered an 
aspect of Will: Will’s “outer man.” In the ensuing discussion of Anima—whom I 
identify as Will’s “inner man”—I intend to show how Anima’s lecture constitutes a 
lesson in hindsight on how Will might avoid Haukyn’s failure properly to reform.  
 Naturally, before we dive too deeply into the problem of how the character of 
Haukyn reflects that of Will, and how the entire episode involving (and even 
following) Haukyn amounts to an example of this chapter’s focus—the oft-mentioned 
narratorial self-criticism—it would be helpful to consider the character of Haukyn in 
his own right, namely how we know him and in what guises he appears.  These are, 
respectively, Haukyn as the “Actif Man”; Haukyn as Goliard; and Haukyn as sinner. 
The discussion will then move to Haukyn as an aspect of Will himself, the “outer 
man.”  
 
Haukyn as Contemplatiua vita 
 
 Haukyn presents himself first as “Contemplatiua vita” (later “the Actif Man”; 
B.16.2) a title of considerable significance given the events of the poem just prior to 
his introduction. In the sense in which Langland uses it, “actif” does not refer to a 
quality of being always on the go, though Haukyn (as Contemplatiua vita) clearly 
alludes to this sense in line 225, “Al ydel ich hatie, for of Actif is my name”; Activa 
vita, literally “the active life,” is instead the life of the Christian in the secular world, 
the life which Will and Conscience would naturally encounter first after casting their 
lot not with spiritual learning (Clergie) but with experience (Patience). One gains 
  114   
salvation in the active life by the performance of good works—or, put another way, 
because ultimately salvation is believed to come through grace and not on account of 
sufficient merit (as the intrinsic merit of any postlapsarian human is not held to be 
sufficient by itself), the work that Christians in the active life are to do in their pursuit 
of salvation consists of doing good.267 These good works include feeding the hungry, 
clothing the naked, comforting the sick, visiting the imprisoned, and so forth.268 
  The active life is usually contrasted to the contemplative life, a form of living 
charged with “work” of a much more abstract and meditative sort (usually, during the 
Middle Ages, associated with the prayer and offices of the cloistered religious orders); 
and the distinction between lives active and contemplative was commonly illustrated 
by the Gospel Story of Jesus’ visit to the home of the sisters Mary and Martha in the 
Gospels (Luke 10:38-42). Martha in that story runs around busily preparing and 
serving food, picking up the house, and otherwise providing for Jesus’ comfort while 
Mary merely sits at Jesus’ feet and listens to him teach. Jesus by no means condemns 
Martha for her solicitude, but he does give extra praise to Mary for having chosen “the 
better part” of the deal. Thanks to Langland’s associating Haukyn with the active life 
of Martha, then, as opposed to the contemplative life of Mary, Haukyn comes across 
as a standard and theoretically worthwhile model of Christian behavior, but, also, as 
potentially too worldly and therefore an inferior one. 
 Haukyn will turn out to be a problematic figure. Langland’s identification of 
him to the active life conspires to show that, sometimes, we can only appreciate 
Langland’s satire from the vantage of later episodes. Conscience’s rebuke of Clergie 
had made what seemed to be a valid and imitatable rejection of the clerical scholarship 
                                                 
267 It might be useful to observe that this is an idea that has undergone a certain amount of change over 
time. Jean Séguy observes that Protestants do not indulge in asceticism to be saved, but because they 
are saved, for instance. See “L’Ascèse dans les Sectes d’Origine Protestante,” Archives de Sociologie 
des Religions 9.18 (1964), pp. 55-70. 
268 In chapter 4 of the Benedictine Rule, for example, is a list of the “instruments of good works.”  
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that Clergie represents: did not Conscience, whom we have by passus 13 long seen as 
a sympathetic figure, hiss “in clergies ere” that “Me were leuere, by oure lord, and I 
lyue sholde, / haue pacience parfitliche þan half þi pak of bokes”? Yet Haukyn’s role 
as Actiua vita implicitly questions his choice. Given that experiential Patience 
introduces Actiua vita, we may assume that remaining with Clergie would have led 
Conscience to encounter the theoretically superior Contemplatiua vita (avoiding 
Haukyn and his problems entirely).  Yet while a comparison of active and 
contemplative lives demands that Actiua vita cede all claims for being the model life 
to a not-yet-encountered Contemplatiua vita, nowhere here does Langland explicitly 
observe the contemplative life’s superiority over the active; he doesn’t even mention 
the contemplative life Fhere at all, in fact! 
 Langland’s critique here is implicit to the point of being absurd, belatedly 
shoring up Clergie’s validity by identifying Haukyn (whose faults are predictable in 
the theory the poem alludes to but slow to sound at full volume) with Conscience’s 
choice. It sets up a pattern for Langland’s satire, however, in the rest of the episode 
and beyond. Throughout Piers Plowman, as here, tags and allusions to commonly held 
(if scholarly) ideas voice a ringing critique only to the ears of those who can fully 
assess their incompatibility with the action in the narratives on which they depend. To 
whose who cannot confidently grasp the irony of these juxtapositions, though, there is 
little more to notice than the babble of simultaneously presented contrasting positions. 
One might compare Langland’s criticism at such junctures to a radio kit—all the 
component parts are there, but they need to be put together—as opposed to the store-
bought radio we encounter with other satiric writing (which needs only to be “plugged 
in” and “tuned to the right frequency” to play). But however one chooses to think of 
Langland’s procedure for setting out elements first and preventing a reader’s 
connecting them until later, it would be a mistake to consider that procedure somehow 
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unintended or the result of poor planning. Langland’s characters (especially, even 
explicitly, Will) go through the same process of revising earlier assessments that 
attentive readers must: Will and his compatriots recognize the unsavory character of 
Haukyn only after they take the time to inspect him, not immediately, for instance; and 
while all the clues are there to tell us that Haukyn and Will are really one and the same 
being, Will recognizes this only very late. 
 Precisely because we have been led to believe that Patience should be 
preferred to Clergie and (by extension) the active life to the contemplative life, 
Haukyn’s identification with the active life works well as satire. One is predisposed, 
especially if one really does live the active life (as a secular priest or mendicant friar 
would) to see Haukyn as a positive exemplar. Precedent encourages this impression as 
well, since with rare exceptions the characters who stand before Will giving 
instructional or self-explanatory speeches command respect and have good advice to 
give. Langland fully intends to show the weaknesses in the active life, that is, but only 
after his audience has had a chance to identify themselves with it, boasting along with 
Haukyn of its greatness. And even then, Langland chooses to criticize obliquely. The 
episode’s ultimate target may well be the prideful clerks like the “doctour of 
divinitee,” as Anima’s later tirade in passus 15 will reveal. But Langland first presents 
Haukyn, like Will, rather anomalously as a Goliard.  
 
Haukyn as Goliard 
 
 It requires no stretch of the imagination to see Haukyn as a fairly conventional 
Goliardic figure. Haukyn describes himself as a kind of minstrel, even before giving 
his name of “Contemplatiua vita” to Conscience and Patience; and “a Mynstral, as me 
þo thoughte,” is how he appears to Will even before this:  
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‘I am a Mynstrall,’ quod þat man, ‘my name is Contemplatiua vita. 
Al ydel ich hatie for of Actif is my name. 
A wafrer,wol ye wite, and serue manye lordes, 
ac fewe robes I fonge or furrede gownes. 
Couþe I lye and do men lauʒe, þanne lacchen I sholde 
ouþer mantel or moneie amonges lordes Mynstrals. 
ac for I kan neiþer taboure ne trompe ne telle no gestes, 
farten ne fiþelen at frestes ne harpen, 
iape ne Iogele ne gentilliche pipe, 
ne neiþer saille ne sautrie ne synge wiþ þe gyterne, 
I haue no goode giftes of þise grete lordes  
for no breed þat I brynge forþ, saue a benyson on þe sonday 
whan þe þe preest preieþ þe peple hir Paternoster to bidde 
for Piers þe Plowman and þat hym profit waiten.  (B.13.224-37)  
 
Haukyn’s main preoccupation seems to be procuring the fruits of favor, such as fine 
robes, from his patrons (though his words suggest that he also likes to be associated 
with the the holy Piers). Yet the wish is never to be realized, it seems. Despite his, 
self-designation as a minstrel, Haukyn has apparently no (but sc. insufficient) skills at 
entertainment. He can neither sing, nor dance, nor play any musical instrument for his 
profit. 
  Despite a dearth of specialized experience that might seem to doom 
employment prospects, Haukyn also works as a “wafrer” (a maker of what are 
essentially crepes) and manages to turn a profit by selling his wafers to the “grete 
lordes”—often figures associated with the church—he encounters:  
 
And þat am I, Actif, þat ydelnesse hatie, 
for alle trewe trauaillours and tiliers of þe erþe 
fro Mighelmesse to Mighelmesse I fynde hem wiþ wafres. 
Beggeris and bidderis of my breed crauen, 
faitours and freres and folk wiþ brode crounes. 
I fynde payn for þe pope and prouendre for his palfrey.  (B.13.238-44)  
It is of course hard to see why exactly Langland would make Haukyn a waferer when 
he could have given him any other minstrellish task to perform.269 Certainly, Haukyn’s 
                                                 
269 We don’t question the role of minstrel, because it quite nicely stands in for any sort of life that caters 
to the whims of others without edifying them or concretely benefitting society; even hermits—like 
whom Haukyn is “yhabited”—repaired roads; see B.13.284. For more on Haukyn’s role, see Malcolm 
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disavowal of skill in all of these seriatim begs the question strongly enough to show 
that Langland considered his choice of Haukyn’s profession with some care. Yet even 
if the poet leaves us to guess the reasons for this choice, the next few lines of 
Haukyn’s speech establish that Langland might have made Haukyn a waferer to show 
Haukyn’s audience very literally consuming his secular entertainments (guitar music 
and dancing can be ignored and can’t be eaten). Moreover, by Haukyn’s own 
unwitting admission, these entertainments impede his patrons’ further moral 
development: “for may no blessynge doon vs boote but if we wile amende, / ne 
mannes masse make pees among cristene peple / til pride be pureliche fordo, and þat 
þoruʒ payn defaute,” he notes to explain why the pope cannot simply write a 
document to cure the Bubonic plague (B.13.257-59). By making his wafers he of 
course prevents “payn defaute” from occurring among even the most dissolute.  
 An idle entertainer, sycophantically latching on to the established systems of 
the Church  for pay yet paying its doctrines no heed, certainly fits the bill of Goliard. 
The identification is sealed immediately hereafter, when Will inspects Haukyn’s 
sullied “cote of cristendome” and describes in distasteful terms an only superficially 
holy man of pronouncedly vain and wastrellish living (who seems, though he 
obviously does not recognize it, quite like himself):  
 
I took greet kepe, by crist! and Conscience boþe, 
of haukyn þe Actif man and how he was ycloþed.  
He hadde a cote of crisendom as holy kirke bileueþ. 
ac it was moled in many places wiþ manye sondry plottes, 
of pride here a plot, and þere a plot of vnbuxom speche, 
of scornyng and of scoffyng and of vnskilful berynge; 
as in apparaill and in porte proude amonges þe peple;  
ooþerwise þan he haþ wiþ herte or siʒte shewynge hym; 
willyng þat alle men wende he were þat he is noʒt,  
for why he bosteþ and braggeþ wiþ manye bolde oþes; 
and inobedient to ben vndernome of any lif lyuynge; 
and so singuler by hymself as to siʒte of þe peple 
                                                                                                                                            
Godden, “Plowmen and Hermits in Langland’s Piers Plowman,” RES n.s. 35.138 (1984), pp. 129-63 at 
pp. 138-39. 
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was noon swich as hymself, ne noon so pope holy; 
yhabited as an heremyte, an ordre by hymselue, 
religioun saunʒ rule and resonable obedience; 
lakkynge lettrede men and lewed men boþe; 
in likynge of lele lif and a liere in soule; 
wiþ Inwit and wiþ outwit ymagynen and studie 
as best for his body be to haue a bold name; 
and entremetten hym ouer al þer he haþ noʒt to doone; 
willynge þat men wende his wit were þe beste, 
or for his crafty konnynge or of clerkes þe wisest, 
or strengest on stede, or styuest vnder girdel, 
and louelokest to loken on and lelest of werkes, 
and noon so holy as he ne of lif clennere, 
or feirest of feitures of forme and of shafte, 
and most sotil of song oþer sleyest of hondes, 
and large to lene, loos þerby to cacche. 
and if he gyueþ ouʒt to pouere gomes, telle what he deleþ;  
pouere of possession in purs and in cofre; 
and as a lyoun on to loke and lordliche of speche; 
boldest of beggeris; a bostere þat noʒt haþ, 
in towne and in Tauernes tales to telle 
and segge þyng þat he neuere seiʒ and for soþe sweren it; 
of dedes þat he neuere dide demen and bosten; 
and of werkes þat he wel did witnesse and siggen, 
‘Lo! if ye leue me noʒt, or þat I lye wenen, 
askeþ at hym or at hym and he yow kan telle 
what I suffrede and seiʒ and somtymes hadde, 
and what I kouþe and knew and what kyn I com of.’ 
Al he wolde þat men wiste of werkes and wordes 
which myʒte plese þe peple and preisen hymselue: 
Si hominibus placerem, Christi seruus non essem; Et alibi, Nemo potest 
duobus dominis seruire. (B.13.271-312a ) 
 
In short, Haukyn’s character has become threadbare from his hypocrisy: his choice to 
exalt himself by pointing out others’ vices while steadfastly choosing to ignore his 
own. Readers familiar with the numerous Goliardic poems about the preciousness of 
their narrators’ cloaks will appreciate Langland’s delicate irony here. Haukyn, too, has 
a precious cloak donated to him—his “cloke of Christendom,” whose symbolic 
significance such critics as Alford and Watson have pinpointed—but he decidedly 
hasn’t taken care of it as it deserves.270   
                                                 
270 See John A. Alford, “Haukyn’s Coat: Some Observations on Piers Plowman B.XIV.22-27,” MÆ 43 
(1974), pp. 133-38 and Nicholas Watson, “Hawkyn’s Cloak and Patience’s Pater Noster” in YLS 21 
(2007), pp. 83-118. I encountered Watson’s essay at a late stage, and feel gratified that we agree on an 
important point: that Langland concerns himself with the question of ascetic perfection in fallible 
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 The foregoing passage, one of the most remarkable in all of Piers Plowman for 
its psychological acuity, will deserve further comment shortly as evidence for 
Haukyn’s coterminous identity with Will. Here, we need only notice that in its final 
tag it confirms that perhaps the greatest contributor to Haukyn’s “Goliardic” status—
other than his clothing—is his intensely divided loyalty between God and 
Mammon.271 Following the pattern for the satire of retrospection that I had identified 
earlier as operating consistently in the episode, we can see adumbrations of this 
divided loyalty as early as the first few lines of Haukyn’s introduction, in the confident 
and upbeat claim by the minstrel that he “serves many lords.” If in the careening 
catalog of Haukyn’s faults just quoted anything stands out as its grounding theme, 
Haukyn’s desire for public acclaim certainly does: before its concluding tag of “Si 
hominibus placerem, &c.,” the passage tells us of Haukyn’s concern for the approval 
of “men” or “peple” at least six times.272 Yet while Haukyn’s impossible attempt to 
serve two masters and concern for outward show might lie at the root of his troubles, 
the poem will go much further in analyzing Haukyn’s status as a sinner.  
 
Haukyn as Sinner 
 
 Haukyn’s words and actions conflict so intensely that his introduction of 
himself has barely passed before we see him exposed as an audacious sinner, his 
soiled coat’s discolorations and patches rendering testimony to a whole panoply of 
sins. Despite their enormity (or rather because of them, it may be) Haukyn seems 
                                                                                                                                            
secular life and uses the characters of Haukyn and Patience to explore the topic closely. I hope that this 
study can build upon Watson’s by contextualizing the poem further, providing a more thorough 
intellectual framework for Langland’s asceticism. 
271 Matthew 6:24. 
272 The count goes higher if one accepts other references to public opinion in the passage, such as “at 
hym or at hym” or “pouere gomes.”  
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resistant to change course even to save his soul. In fact, when Conscience declares in 
horror that (“Bi crist!”) Haukyn’s “beste cote  [...] haþ manye moles and spottes; it 
must be ywasshe,” the minstrel all but shrugs (B.13.313-14). Any garment worn all the 
time and not replaced with better trappings will deteriorate, he implies; anyone who 
takes extreme care in scrutinizing others all over will no doubt find something to 
criticize in them, after all—and so he claims.273 Here especially, Haukyn comes across 
as overly critical, never willing to receive recommendations from others, “saunz rule 
and resonable obedience” or inherently inobedient.274 
 Even further self exposition from the minstrel will show that Haukyn’s 
resistance to reform rises up from the twin springs of jadedness and inconsistency. 
Haukyn can neither keep with any regimen or regulation in his life for long, as we 
learn;275 he also fails to see how any of the confession and penance recommended him 
by Confession and Patience can possibly prevent his coat from becoming dirty again:  
 
In haly daies at holy chirche whan ich herde masse 
hadde I neuere wille, woot god, witterly to biseche 
mercy for my mysdedes, þat I ne moorned moore 
for losse of good, leue me, þan for likames giltes; 
as if I hadde dedly synne doon I dredde noʒt þat so soore 
as whan I lened and leued it lost or longe er it were paied. 
* * * * * * * * 
Miʒte neuere me conforte in þe mene tyme 
neiþer masse ne matynes, ne none maner siʒtes; 
ne neuere penaunce parfourned ne Paternoster seide 
that my mynde ne was moore on my good in a doute 
than in þe grace of god and hise grete helpes: 
Vbi thesaurus tuus ibi & cor tuum. (B.13.383-88, 394-98a)   
 
Nevertheless, Haukyn proves himself to be quite ready to indulge in self-criticism as 
well (enough to bring about his ultimate downfall at the end of passus 14)—or, as he 
                                                 
273 “Ye, whoso toke hede,” he answers, “bihynde and bifore, / what on bak, and what on body half, and 
by þe two sides, / men sholde fynde many frounces and manye foule plottes” (B.13.315-17). 
274 B.13.285. I use the word “inobedient” as opposed to “disobedient” to emphasize Haukyn’s endemic 
lack of the virtue “obedience” rather than his failure to obey particular commands. 
275 B.13.331: “Ther is no lif þat me loueþ lastynge any while.” 
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puts it, to “frete [him]selue wiþInne” even while he “as a shepsteres shere ysherewed 
[his] euencristen.” (B.13.329-30)  
 
Haukyn as Will  
 
 But can we really consider the self-criticism of Haukyn, who is not literally the 
same being as Will, narratorial self-criticism on Langland’s part? Yes, we can, on 
several counts. First there is the matter of Haukyn’s ontology as a character in a dream 
(allegedly by the poet) featuring such interlocutors as the poet-narrator’s Conscience: 
shouldn’t he be considered an aspect of the narrator, too? It is true that other 
characters appear in the poem that are not psychological faculties, but even these 
(Holichurch or Dame Study) represent aspects of life with which he has deep 
familiarity. Even the King, figuring early on in Piers Plowman, could be said to 
represent lived experience with government rather than any specific king. In any case, 
Haukyn appears notably in that section of the poem known as the “inward journey,” in 
a “dream within a dream” the format of which clearly allows increased focus on 
psychology (as opposed to the external world)—of allowing the irreality that the 
episode will flaunt (as early as passus 15, with its impossible description of Will’s 
next teacher). Still, if Haukyn represents anyone, he represents Will.  
 And the reason that we can claim that Haukyn represents Will is that Haukyn 
so greatly resembles Will.276 While of course no law of poetics dictates that characters 
who resemble each other have to be each other, it is nonetheless also true that Haukyn 
and Will bear quite extraordinary resemblances to each other and that the poem makes 
no attempt to explain these away as unimportant coincidences. Passus 13’s expose of 
the flaws in the previously well-presenting Haukyn make him look like any normal 
                                                 
276 A. V. C. Schmidt’s notes indicate that other scholars have observed this, too. 
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sinful Christian, and are no doubt meant to speak to the spiritual considerations of a 
wider audience, true; others, especially those that peg the speaker as a Goliard, seem 
to speak especially well to the experiences of Will as a reflection of the author of Piers 
Plowman. Examples include Haukyn’s ambiguous, sui generis state as a man of 
religion; the falseness of his poetry; the trenchancy of his criticism of others as well as 
of himself.  Further, of course, there is the matter of a sort of mind-meld between the 
various principals in this episode, such that the characters looking on Haukyn’s coat 
know exactly what sins are represented by which spots. Will takes these initial 
observations even further, actually being capable of narrating the exact circumstances 
behind the sins that so disfigure  Haukyn’s garment. Langland’s effect here, which is 
attractive, perhaps purposely makes it difficult to separate instances in which the coat, 
or Will, or Haukyn, explains one of the coat’s spots: throughout the passus, a 
character’s observation of a place on the garment will ease seamlessly into Will’s/the 
narrator’s explanation of  the circumstances giving rise to it, as I’ve noted. This 
explanation then simply becomes, with no transition at all, Haukyn’s speech about it.  
 It cannot be disputed anyway that Will’s encounter with Haukyn has a 
profound effect on Will, as the transition from passus 14 to 15 makes clear. As the 
curtain falls on passus 14, Haukyn weeps in bitter despair and confusion over his sins, 
unable to see a way out of them; as it rises on passus 15, Will seems to have fallen into 
a similar confusion:  
 
Ac after my wakynge it was wonder longe 
er I koude kyndely knowe what was Dowel, 
and so my wit weex, and wanyed til I a fool weere. 
and some lakkede my lif—allowed it fewe— 
and lete me for a lorel and looþ to reuerencen 
lordes or ladies or any lif ellis, 
as persons in pelure wiþ pendauntʒ of siluer; 
to sergeauntʒ ne to swiche seide noʒt ones, 
‘God loke yow, lordes,’ ne loutede faire, 
that folk helden me a fool; and in þat folie I raued [...] (B.15.1-10)  
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But then why does Langland bother to make Haukyn and Will seem like completely 
separate characters if they are meant to represent the same person? I think that, in part, 
Langland wants to show the disconnect often achieved by those ignoring their own 
faults and pointing out those of others.277 Given that readers of the poem will have 
come to identify at least a little with Piers Plowman’s narrator by the time he appears, 
Haukyn’s covert mirroring of Will enables readers to experience that same disconnect 
themselves. By detaching Haukyn both from the character of Will, as if the two were 
separate, and by giving Haukyn only the most evanescent and inspecific identity as a 
minstrel and man of religion, Langland can allow his poem to perform its most intense 
analysis of character, an analysis from which no one is shielded because almost 
anyone can see himself in the subject of that inspection. No potential readership can 
fail to identify somewhat with Haukyn, but, because he always seems to be 
representing someone else as well, no one will immediately identify with Haukyn, 
either (just as Will does not).  Langland instinctively if not intellectually understood 
that criticism is always harshest if directed at someone else, and he used this 
psychological fact to produce the intensest possible self-criticism in the poem.  
 
Haukyn as Old or Outer Man 
 
 But if we are going to identify Haukyn with any sort of aspect of Will—what 
would that aspect be? As I’ve already indicated at the beginning of this chapter, 
Haukyn acts as a manifestation of Will’s self focused externally, his “outer man.”  
Haukyn’s superficiality, his intense connection to the point of identification with a 
very dirty and neglected ethical cloak, shows him to represent not just a type of person 
                                                 
277 The strategy I am attempting to describe in this paragraph is the same used by the prophet Nathan 
when confronting David about Uriah and Bathsheba: see 2 Samuel 12:1-15. 
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(a Goliard like his alter ego, Will) but also a topos: the “old” and “outer” man.278 If my 
thesis is correct about Haukyn as Will’s outer man, then what the poem wishes to 
emphasize is the character’s prideful selfishness, a self-centeredness ironic in that, to 
the omniscient reproving gaze of the narrator, it centers around nothing—a fascination 
with external show that allows the one constant garment of the wearer, his “cote of 
cristendom,” to be utterly worn through and disfigured with spots and stains.  
 Langland’s focus on Haukyn’s cloak is not unusual. Medieval satire often 
focuses on its targets’ clothing as markers of social status and affiliations familiar or 
professional. In Wynnere and Wastoure, for just one example, the character of each 
group fighting for either title character is described in terms of clothing. In the 
tradition of philosophical allegory, in Menippean satire descending back to Boethius’ 
De consolatione Philosophiæ and taken up brilliantly by authors such as Bernardus 
Sylvestris and Alan of Lille in medieval Latin literature, generally benevolent and 
powerful females of great beauty are distinguished from one another by their names 
but also by their raiment, with clothing providing something of a nonnarrative treatise 
in the powers and spheres of influence and capabilities or domains of those figures.279 
And in Middle English literature of the fourteenth century such detailed descriptions 
are applied to human characters as well (e.g. Gawain in Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight) such that clothing might be said to define or even create literary character for 
such works.280  
                                                 
278 The term comes from the Bible, though it was elaborated by medieval theologians. This idea is 
perhaps best borne out by consideration that the next main speaker in the poem to Will is so very early 
on an (and, I will argue, the) inner man—Anima. Joseph S. Wittig’s article, “Piers Plowman B, Passūs 
IX-XII: Elements in the Design of the Inward Journey,” Traditio 28 (1972), pp. 211-280, in fact shows 
how Langland might have known the idea of the vetus homo. 
279 Here, too, the literature is extensive, but see for example Laura Fulkerson Hodges, Chaucer and 
Clothing: Clerical and Academic Costume in the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales 
(Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 2005). 
280 My reference to twelfth-century and even Late Antique works will indicate that the focus on clothing 
that characterizes much medieval satire is not new in late fourteenth-century England. Nevertheless, 
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 We first come know the superficiality of Chaucer’s Pardoner by his dress, in 
large part, and we know the liminal gyrovagic character of Langland’s Will by his as 
well, but Haukyn’s lack of solicitude for his coat achieves its best irony when we 
consider just how very much Haukyn wants to look good in others’ eyes. Chaucer’s 
description of the Parson in his Canterbury Tales’, which takes pains not to describe 
the parson’s clothing in detail, shows well why Langland should lavish such detail on 
Haukyn’s all-important coat. To normal sight, a cloak as a sign of household or 
professional status—as uniform or livery—would be very visible and also very 
important to the mind of someone so materialistic as Haukyn. Haukyn himself admits 
this to us in his opening speech, claiming (as it turns out, incorrectly) that only the 
pious simplicity of his work prevents him from receiving the “furred gowns” of other 
minstrels that indicate that advancement in the world. We can match Haukyn’s 
sentiments here with Envye’s, later on in Piers Plowman, or the Wife of Bath in 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales—characters nothing if not couture-conscious.281  
 When Haukyn refers with disdain of the gifts of clothing that other minstrels 
have received, then, we should not see him as a pious, linen-clothed Holichurch 
scowling in disapproval at the elaborate ornamentation of a Lady Mede. Haukyn is in 
Mede’s camp, so he scowls in patent jealousy; caring deeply about outer appearance, 
he wants the ornamentation for which he claims not to care. The revelation to 
Conscience, Patience, and Will of Haukyn’s true slovenliness occurs on another level, 
at which external appearance does not matter—the level at which the clothing of 
Chaucer’s Parson is overlooked, indeed: the ethical level at which God sees, for, as the 
                                                                                                                                            
there can be no doubt that the subject of proper raiment was no mere literary tradition in that context, as 
statutes show. 
281 Chaucer’s description of the Wife of Bath’s ostentatious raiment and carriage at church, in the 
General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, is justly famous (lines 445-57). Compare Envye’s 
confession in B.5.110-14: “Awey fro þe Auter turne I myne eiʒen / and biholde how Heyne haþ a newe 
cote; / thanne I wisshe it were myn and al þe web after. / And of his lesynge I lauʒe, it liʒteþ myn herte; 
ac of his wynnynge I wepe and waille þe tyme.” 
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Bible points out, “man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the 
heart.”(1 Samuel 16:7) For Will and his traveling companions to see with this Godlike 
acuity underscores just how atypical and innovative Langland’s satire really is, for two 
reasons. First, Will et al. see at the level of psychological abstraction because they 
themselves are psychological abstractions (even if that is not all they are). Second, 
such vision shows that, despite his concern to provide sharp and detailed self-
criticism, Langland sees his role as satirist as a very authoritative one and even 
prophetic.  
 The remainder of passus 13 details other flaws of Haukyn’s, of which the most 
salient to my argument involve his fickle obduracy to the teachings of the Church: 
 
In haly daies at holy chirche whan ich herde masse 
hadde I neuere wille, woot god, witterly to biseche 
mercy for my mysdedes, þat I ne mornede moore 
for lose of good, leue me, þan for likames giltes, 
as if I hadde dedly synne doon I dredde noʒt þat so soore 
as whan I lened and leued it lost or longe er it were paied. 
so if I kidde any kyndenesse myn euencristen to helpe 
vpon a cruwel coueitise my conscience gan hange. 
And if I sente ouer see my seruantʒ to Brugges, 
or into Prucelond my Prentis my profit to waiten, 
to marchaunden wiþ my moneie and maken here eschaunges, 
miʒte neuere me conforte in þe mene tyme 
neiþer masse ne matynes, ne none maner siʒtes; 
ne neuere penaunce parfournede ne Paternoster seide 
that my mynde ne was moore on my good in a doute 
than in þe grace of god and hise grete helpes: 
Vbi thesaurus tuus ibi & cor tuum. (B.13.383-398a) 
 
Only sickness of body seems able to corrupt Haukyn to truly deplore his sinning, but 
then the sharp knives of his wit turn around on himself and he cannot make amends, 
“that into wanhope he [worþ] and wende noght to be saved / the which is sleuþe, so 
þat may not sleightes [= clergie?] help it / ne no mercy amenden the man that so 
deieþ.” ( B.13.407-409) Haukyn has moved almost completely now from the object of 
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wonder and entertainment to the object of pity and remorse, a man who has fallen all 
too easily into an almost inescapable downward spiral.  
 The end of passus 13 suggests the learned, the poor, and the disabled to 
counter the examples of avaricious “fool sages, flateres, and lyeris,” like Haukyn, 
whose example leads to wanhope. But of the virtues espoused at this point in the 
poem, poverty is clearly the one most focused on—the virtue most often contrasted to 
Haukyn. As the tags applied to the episode make clear, Langland does not oppose 
poverty and Haukyn because he possesses great temporal wealth. Instead, the desire 
for fame and influence associated with Haukyn stems from a pride and worldliness 
antithetical to poverty. One could just as easily point out that the character lacks 
wisdom and puts too much stock in his own comeliness and physical prowess, but 
these are not as much emphasized.  
 Haukyn’s focus on externalities and vice make him Will’s “outer man,” yet it 
bears keeping in mind that, as other critics have noticed, Haukyn’s episode in Piers 
Plowman serves principally to shed light on an aspect of psychology. Haukyn’s 
psychology in turn sheds more light on the “Wastoure” figures that had been so 
bitterly railed against by Piers in the poem’s second vision. It is not unfitting, I think, 
that the poem’s most external character should provide its most profound 
psychological insight: in a graceful chiasmus, the poem’s most internal character will 
follow and provide some of the poem’s most trenchant criticism of  hypocritical, 
Haukyn-like, externally minded opportunists. That character is Anima. 
 
Anima 
 
 The character of Anima appears to Will at a moment of intense and almost 
unresolvable crisis brought on by Will’s encounter with the despair-riven minstrel 
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Haukyn. Langland introduces Anima, I think, in order to suggest, a different way for 
Will to examine himself towards possible self-reform. For the purposes of my 
argument here, it is most important to recognize Anima both as a part of Will and as 
the opposite of Haukyn (facts which require little demonstration). By virtue of the 
name Anima and this character’s knowledge of Will, we can accept an identification 
of Anima with Will’s “soul,” among other interior aspects; since, weirdly, Anima has 
neither tongue nor teeth and appears as altogether “a sotil thing,”  the character reads 
as an almost invisible interiority whose very nature prevents it from even remotely 
resembling the loud, jangling, externally focused and fame-famished Haukyn. 
 Just as certain connections are apparent between Anima and Will, so too 
several contrasts can be noted between Haukyn and Anima. First of all, while both are 
to some extent “Will,” Anima and Haukyn come to Will’s attention from very 
different places. Whereas Haukyn appears to Will and Conscience on the open road as 
they accept the guidance of Patience, Anima appears from within the narrator himself. 
Moreover Haukyn (like Will) is taught and receives knowledge passively, while 
Anima rather passionately teaches with authority. Haukyn receives, and Anima 
imparts, much the same lesson: evidence that suggests that these two very different 
characters are meant to be contrasted. Yet while Will’s experience teaches him that the 
poverty’s value comes from trading in earthly happiness for possible future glory—the 
lesson of poverty as “a good, yet a hateful one”—Anima teaches the necessity of 
giving unto others, even sacrificially, for their sake, with charity (B.14.276 et seq.). 
Moreover, just as Haukyn and Anima are set opposite one another in appearance and 
status, notably, the episodes treating them in passus 14 and 15 respectively also touch 
on obverse and reverse of essentially the same message. The difference in the two 
characters’ presentation of this message, and even between the characters themselves, 
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stems ultimately from a difference in how they display the benefits, drawbacks, scope, 
and rationale for self-criticism.  
 
Anima as Interior Homo 
 
 Anima and Haukyn’s approach to self-criticism reflects itself most strikingly 
of all with their appearance; where the distracted and splintered Haukyn appears to 
read as unitary and very much the character of a ‘real person,’ steady and patient 
Anima comes in so many guises as hardly to appear human at all.  Consider Anima’s 
strange appearance as “a sotil thing withalle / oon withouten tonge and teeth” 
(B.15.12-13). What must such an anomalous creature look like? Could it be described 
as tongueless and toothless because of its immateriality? Is the description merely 
meant as an explanation of Anima’s quiet speaking—perhaps as a “still, small voice” 
as in 1 Kings 19:12? Could Anima’s face be something like a mask?282 While many of 
these explanations seem plausible on their face (as it were), and might contribute to 
what the image of a tongueless and toothless interlocutor communicates, I think that 
Langland’s poem intends the description primarily as a way to contrast Anima with 
the sharp and biting Haukyn, who in passus 13 that “wiþ myʒt of mouþ or þoruʒ 
mannes strengþe / auenge[d] [him] fele tymes, oþer frete [him]selue wiþInne / as a 
shepsteres shere,” this followed by a Latin tag describing a man “cuius malediccione 
os plenum est et amaritundine,” &c. (B.13.330a). Neither the biblical verses nor 
Haukyn’s self description actually mean to describe someone who truly does have 
scissor blades or a sword in place of a tongue, and by the same token Anima’s lack of 
                                                 
282 For the idea that Anima might even represent a vagina dentata, non-dentata, see James Paxson, 
“Piers Plowman: the Copula(tion)s of Figures in Medieval Allegory,” in The Erotics of Rhetorical 
Copulas, Archaic to Early Modern, special issue of the Rhetoric Society Quarterly [= 29.3] (1999), pp. 
21-29 at p. 25. 
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even teeth should not necessarily require us to imagine a creature actually tongueless 
and toothless.  
 Given their reflection of each other, it is not difficult to see Anima and Haukyn 
reflecting different aspects of the self, though Langland never spells out how these two 
very different entities coëxist. When we learn from Will of the base desires and sinful 
psychological drives motivating the minstrel Haukyn’s sometimes apparently virtuous 
behavior, we have to assume that they cannot all stem from the body or the flesh 
(traditionally opposed to the soul) but, being what modern researchers would call 
psychological, pertain more to Haukyn’s spiritual side. They must be “inner.” Yet 
Haukyn’s secret inner motivations in no way reflect Anima, who strongly opposes 
them. Anima even looks, as I’ve indeed just noted, like the very negative of Haukyn. 
If Haukyn represents an eternally focused psychological aspect of Will (the old or 
outer man), Anima thus seems to represent a spiritual aspect. I contend, in fact, that 
Anima represents some quiet, innate, even prelapsarian aspect of Will—the “interior 
homo” or “inner man”—that must be cultivated and heeded. 
  References to the interior homo appear in the biblical letters of saint Paul, 
closely linking the term with ideals of self-reform, even self perfection, and at least of 
self realization.283 To understand the “inner man” was to understand the self, an 
activity commanded by ancient precept (γνῶθι σεαυτόν or nosce teipsum). As such, 
Paul’s references drew on, and contributed to, a broader philosophical history.284 
Epictetus wrote that every man carries inside himself a god to be nourished and 
                                                 
283 See for example 2 Corinthians 4:16, frequently quoted by medieval Latin prose writers: “[T]hough 
our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.” 
284 For what follows, I draw on excerpts cited by the Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, s.v. “Connaissance de 
Soi”: Louis de Bazelaire, “Connaissance de Soi,” in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité Ascétique et Mystique, 
Doctrine et Histoire, ed. Marcel Viller, vol. 11 (Parish: Beauchesne et Fils, 1948), coll. 1511-43. See 
also Boethius, De Cons. Phil, Bk. 2, II prose V, including a reminiscence of Juvenal’s tenth satire. 
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strengthened; Marcus Aurelius wrote that every man carries inside him the source of 
good. Saint Augustine called for each sinner to:  
 
come back, come back, within your heart [...] because the image of God 
is in your heart. Indeed, Jesus Christ lives within the ‘interior man’; 
that is, within the interior man you may renew the image of God, and 
thus know God in its image.285 
For Saint Bernard—I translate from de Bazelaire—“understanding of the self consists 
of three things: first to know what one has done, then to know what one has merited, 
and then to know what one has lost.” He continues: “What therefore does it mean to 
know oneself? Essentially, to become aware of a divine image disfigured.” In other 
words, the “self-knowledge” thought to “renew” the inner man happened as a process 
instead of an event. Yet though this “becom[ing] aware” might happen slowly, it was 
necessary for maintaining—let alone surpassing—human nature. In his 12th sermon, 
“De diversis,” Bernard writes:  
 
Since you were created in the image and resemblance of God, and are 
now become like unto the beasts in losing your likeness, your life is 
still a sort of image. If therefore, as long as you were in grand estate, 
you did not understand that you were the dust of the earth, at least take 
notice—now that you are surrounded by the dust of the abyss—and do 
not ignore that you are the image of God. And blush to have taken on a 
foreign likeness. Remind yourself of your nobility, and be ashamed of 
such a defection. Do not ignore your beauty, so that you might be even 
more confounded by your hideousness.286 
 
Further, as de Bazelaire writes, Bernard and others make humility the basis for 
knowledge of the self: “Humilitas est virtus quā homo verissima sui cognitione sibi 
ipsi vilescit.”287  
 
                                                 
285 de Bazelaire lists the source as In Joan. 17.10. I translate from the Dictionnaire’s translation. 
286 de Bazelaire, whom I translate, cites PL 183, col. 571. 
287 My translation: “The most genuine humility is the virtue through which, thanks to self 
understanding, man might set himself at little worth.” de Bazelaire gives the source here as Bernard’s 
De grad. hum. 1.1 (PL 182, coll. 941-942). 
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 The concept of an “interior homo” or “inner man” appears at least peripherally 
over the ages, as I have just suggested, so there is no reason for Langland not to have 
heard of it. The evidence suggests, however, that Langland also encountered more 
detailed discussions of the term.  In his “Inward Journey” studies, Wittig makes 
reference to the Meditationes piisimæ as the text with whose incipit Scripture hurtles 
Will into his “inner dreams.” According to the Patrologia Latina, the treatise was 
known by many manuscripts as a work “de interiori homini” specifically. Wittig also 
discusses a somewhat similar treatise to the Meditationes piisimæ, the Liber de Spiritu 
et Anima, with whose material Langland might also have been familiar. This work also 
discusses the interior homo, describing it,as a sort of mirror by which one might 
evaluate and improve one’s life.288 Moreover, some evidence suggests that Langland 
could have known the writings of Richard of St. Victor, who also composed a treatise 
on the subject.289 Scholarship on the interior homo as it specifically relates to Piers 
Plowman has only advanced slowly since Wittig’s efforts. It is heartening to note, 
however, that the term has received very recent attention from students of the texts on 
which Langland and contemporaries drew. Ineke van ‘t Spijker, for instance, has 
discussed how the sense of inner life such discourse seems to shed light on differs 
from early modern and later literary ideas concerning interiority:  
 
 
                                                 
288 “Si mulieres speculum suum, in quo facies inspiciunt, cum amiserint, diligenter quærunt, et curiose 
tergunt a pulvere et a sorde: multo amplius speculum interioris hominis debemus et invenire et tergere 
et inspicere; ut in eo totam turpitudinem nostram valeamus deprehendere, et ita per cognitionem 
nostram ad cognitionem Dei pervenire” (PL vol. 40, coll. 779-832, quoted at col. 818). This is a 
particularly telling image, since literary critics have recognized the importance of mirrors as a 
psychological metaphor in Langland’s poem.  In addition to Wittig, who admirably covers the place of 
mirrors in medieval religious thought, see Steven F. Kruger’s reflections on what the mirrors might say 
about Langland’s poetry—both human and aspirationally something greater—in “Mirrors and the 
Trajectory of Vision in Piers Plowman,” Speculum 66.1 (1991), pp. 74-95. 
289 On Langland’s possible knowledge of Richard of St. Victor’s works, see in addition to Wittig’s work 
Hugh White, “Langland’s Ymaginatif, Kynde, and the Benjamin major,” MÆ 55 (1986), pp. 241-48. 
Richard’s treatise concerning the “inner man” is the the De eruditione hominis interioris (PL 196, coll. 
1229-1366A).   
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“Inner life” means different things in different times and contexts. 
Different ages have employed different conceptual tools to contemplate 
this inner life, and the inner life has had varying importance at different 
times. The homo interior of Peter Damian, and of eleventh- and 
twelfth-century monasticism, is of course not the same as Descartes’s 
[sic] “disengaged subject,” who takes the empirical self as something 
external, that is in contrast to a transcendental inner self, or 
Montaigne’s self-scrutinizing inner man, or Cervantes’s [sic] knight of 
the sad countenance, whose outward adventures establish the novelistic 
complement to the philosophical project of modernity’s subjectivity. It, 
the homo interior, is even further from Freudian or other twentieth-
century concepts of the psyche. Peter [Damian]’s homo interior is 
defined by monastic anthropology and traditions, in which, among 
other things, and echo can be heard of the Pauline homo interior[...].290 
With special reference to the treatises of Richard of St. Victor, moreover, Spijker has 
provided careful readings of the way that the “inner man” was thought to be nourished 
and developed through contemplative reading practices in the regular orders.291 She 
shows there more fully what her article on Peter Damian had also claimed, namely 
how, according to this medieval religious thought, “meditating on Scripture can help 
to compose the inner man, as one composes a text.”292 Susan R. Kramer has written a 
dissertation on the interior homo and with Caroline Walker Bynum has co-published 
an essay on the sense of self this concept reveals.293 Finally, Bridget Balint has most 
recently drawn attention to the ways that such views of inner life inform twelfth-
century literary representations of the self and its power to refer to itself.294  
 Anima tells Will “whider I sholde, / and wherof I cam & of what kynde” or in 
other words to understand himself exactly in this way. (B.15.13-14) But of course Will 
                                                 
290 See “Peter Damian and the Homo Interior: Life as a Work of Art,” in Latin Culture in the Eleventh 
Century: Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Medieval Latin Studies, edd. Michael 
W. Herren, Christopher James McDonough, and Ross Gilbert Arthur, Publications of the Journal of 
Medieval Latin 5, vol. 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998),  pp. 464-75 (quoted at p. 466). 
291 See chapter 4: “Richard of St. Victor: Exegesis and the Inner Man,” in Spijker’s Fictions of the Inner 
Life: Religious Literature and the Formation of the Self in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 129-84. 
292 Spijker, “Peter Damian and the Homo Interior,” p. 471. 
293 See “Revisiting the Twelfth-Century Individual: the Inner Self and the Christian Community” in Das 
Eigene, pp. 57-85.  
294 See chapter 3: “Situating the Self,” in Balint’s Ordering Chaos: the Self and the Cosmos in Twelfth-
Century Latin Prosimetrum (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 77-105. I owe some of the references just cited to 
Balint’s kindness and am happy to acknowledge that here. 
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must first attempt to understand Anima, who at even a glance seems very resistant 
indeed to comprehension. Haukyn has a rather perplexingly composite nature, himself, 
but this is nothing to prepare us for the multiplicity of names, titles, even sexes (or 
grammatical genders) ascribed to Anima: Anima, Animus, Mens, Memoria, Racio, 
Consciencia, Amor, and Spiritus, with separate roles for each separate name.295 These 
names and titles draw an implicit contrast between Haukyn and Will (who aspire to 
promotion and influence), and Anima (who claims to have achieved it).  
 
Anima and the Pursuit of Knowledge 
 
 As understanding the self is necessary for reform, it is not surprising that 
Anima—who attempts to teach Will of himself—also attempts to improve him. 
Perhaps oddly, however, Anima first suggests reform by disparaging Will’s desire for 
knowledge. Despite claiming to be a member of a royal court (Christ’s) and despite 
apparently holding on to a large number of titles and honorifics—these both being 
Haukyn’s great desire—Anima wastes little time in criticizing Will for wanting not 
only “þe cause of alle [bisshoppes] names / and of [Anima’s]” but of “alle þe sciences 
vnder sonne and alle þe sotile craftes [...] kyndelych in [hys] herte.”(B.15.45-49) This 
expressed desire for “kynde knowing” of everything causes Anima to call Will 
“inparfit” in line 50,  the choice of which word obviously adds weight to my 
suggestion that the way to perfect oneself lies at the heart of the discussion (and 
indeed the episode). When in the next breath Anima compares Will to “oon of pruydes 
knightes,” like the fallen angel Lucifer, with the tag of “Ponam pedem meam in 
aquilone & similis ero altissimo,” line 51a) we might well hark back to the first time 
                                                 
295 Alford’s Guide to the Quotations, p. 92, identifies this series of names as coming from Isidore of 
Seville’s Etymologiæ, 11.1.13. 
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in which that tag appears, in passus 1: there, Holy Church tells Will of Treuth as a 
“kynde knowing that kenneth in thin herte” (line 142).  
 In both passages the question of what to know, addressed to Will, becomes an 
address to a wider audience. In passus 1, Holy Church had declared Truth the only 
thing worth knowing, calling it “the beste” of treasures.296  In passus 14, Anima makes 
nods to “englisshe men” (line 56) “freres and fele oþere maistres” (line 70) “grete 
clerkes” (line 82) and onwards. But if Holy Church commends Truth to the clerical 
estate (through the ambiguously clerical Will) as the “trieste” of worthy things, 
Anima’s address berates the same groups for their desire to know anything further. 
Anima compares a superfluity of knowledge (even of the sort pertaining to bishops 
presumably) with not only Lucifer but also to honey, as if to the devil’s illicit delights 
or to the very apple that caused the Fall in Eden. Too much knowledge, like too much 
honey, as Anima says, “engleymeþ the mawe”:  
 
‘It were ayeins kynde,’ quod he, ‘and alle kynnes reson 
that any creature sholde konne al except crist oone. 
Ayein swiche Salomon spekeþ and despiseþ hir wittes 
and seiþ, Sicut qui mel comedit multum non est ei bonum, Sic qui 
scrutator est maiestatis opprimitur a gloria. 
To englisshe men þis is to mene, þat mowen speke and here, 
the man þat muche hony eteþ, his mawe it engleymeþ, 
and þe moore þat a man of good matere hereþ, 
But he do þerafter, it dooþ hym double scape. 
‘Beatus est,’ seiþ Seint Bernard, ‘qui scripturas legit 
et verba vertit in opera fulliche to his power.’ 
Coueitise to konne and to knowe science 
Adam and Eue putte out of Paradis: 
Sciencie appetitus hominem inmortalitatis gloriam spoliauit. 
And riʒt as hony is yuel to defie and engleymeþ þe mawe, 
right so þat þoruʒ reson wolde þe roote knowe 
of god and of hise grete myʒtes, hise graces it letteþ.  
(B.15.52-66) 
                                                 
296 line 135, followed by “lereþ it thus, lewed men, for lettred it knoweth / that Treuþe is tresor þe trieste 
on erþe.” 
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In sum, Anima’s speech bears a message common in ascetic writings, albeit here in a 
wider context embracing all of clerical society: that it is indeed possible to know too 
much.297 
 As Anima’s attention turns to wider clerisy and its corruptions, the clerical 
hoarding and ostentatious display of knowledge comes to seem of a piece with other 
kinds of hoarding and display, to which Anima ultimately opposes (inter alia) “parfit 
charite” (B.15.148) Will’s asking about this echoes Haukyn’s exchange earlier with 
Pacience (B.15.149 et seq.).298 The following exposition will demonstrate that does 
not work as an idea for Haukyn to follow, because Haukyn thinks of charity as a 
means of avoiding the hardship imposed by poverty: he contrasts “richesse riʒtfulliche 
wonne and resonably despended” with “pacience pouerte,” in fact (B.14.102-103). 
Anima teaches Will that charity must needs oppose the hoarding of wealth and 
knowledge to which he and other clerics are inclined.  The next subsections will 
discuss Will, Haukyn, and Anima’s varying understandings of and experiences with 
the virtue of charity.  
 
The Promotion of Charity 
 
 As I’ve already noted above, Haukyn’s initial reaction to hearing praise of 
charity is to express skepticism that it can be found outside of the realm of ideas. He 
                                                 
297 The quotation which follows, attributed elsewhere to Augustine, drives the point home: Non plus 
sapere quam oportet sapere.   
298 B.14.98-104, to which one should compare this, begins with an asservation—“Where wonyeþ 
Charite?” quod Haukyn; “I wiste neuere in my lyue / wye þat wiþ hym spak, as wide as I haue 
passed”—quite similar to Will’s “Where sholde men fynde swich a frend wiþ so fre an herte? / I haue 
lyued in londe [...], my name is longe wille, / and fond I neuere ful charite, bifore ne bihynde.” 
Certainly to continue comparing the lessons that Haukyn and Will receive about charity in every single 
particular would cast more smoke than light on the point that I want to make, yet comparing them 
broadly seems helpful and even necessary for illustrating not only the telling similarities between Will 
and Haukyn but also Anima and Patience’s divergent emphases.   
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inquires as to its dwelling place rather abruptly of Patience, even recklessly: 
moderation, though one of Patience’s main subjects, is a difficult matter for the 
excessive Haukyn to grasp. It does not seem possible to Haukyn that Conscience and 
Patience could be telling him the truth when they suggest—indeed, promise—that a 
renunciation of the coveitise that so marks his cloak could ever result in the better 
roles and higher status they have seemed to promise him (14.11). The moderation or 
“mesure” Pacience hails sounds rather too much like a program that must instead lead 
to life-threatening destitution: 
 
‘I shall kenne þee,’ quod Conscience, ‘of Contricion to make 
that shal clawe þi cote of alle kynnes filþe: 
Cordis contricio, &c. 
Dowel shal wasshen it and wryngen it þoruʒ a wis confessour: 
Oris confessio &c. 
Dobet shal beten it and bouken it as bright as any scarlet 
and engreynen it wiþ good wille and goddes grace to amende þe, 
and siþen sende þee to Satisfaccion for to sonnen it after: 
Satisfaccio. 
Dobest shal kepe it clene from vnkynde werkes. 
Shal neuere myx bymolen it, ne moþe after biten it, 
ne fend ne fals man defoulen it in þi lyue. 
Shal noon heraud ne harpour haue a fairer garnement 
than Haukyn þe Actif man, and þow do by my techyng, 
ne no Mynstrall be moore worþ amonges pouere and riche 
than Haukyn wil þe wafrer, which is Contemplatiua vita.’ 
‘And I shal purueie þee paast,’ quod Pacience, ‘þouʒ no plouʒ erye, 
and flour to fede folk wiþ as best be for þe soule; 
thouʒ neuere greyn growed, ne grape vpon vyne, 
all þat lyueþ and lokeþ liflode wolde I fynde 
and þat ynogh; shal noon faille of þyng þat hem nedeþ: 
Ne solitici sitis &c.; Volucres celi deus pascit &c.; paciences vincunt 
&c.’ 
Thanne laughed haukyn a litel and lightly gan swerye; 
‘Whoso leueþ yow, by oure lord! I leue noʒt he be blessed.’ 
* * * * * * * * 
But I listnede and lokede what liflode it was 
that pacience so preisede, and of his poke hente 
a pece of þe Paternoster and profrede vs alle; 
and þanne was it fiat voluntas tua sholde fynde vs alle. 
‘Haue, haukyn,’ quod Pacience, ‘and et þis whan þe hungreþ 
or whan þow clomsest for cold or clyngest for drye. 
Shul neuere gyues þee greue ne gret lordes wrape, 
prison ne peyne, for pacientes vincunt. 
By so þat þow be sobre of siʒte and of tonge, 
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in ondynge and in handlynge and in alle þi fyue wittes, 
darstow neuere care for corn ne cloþ ne for drynke, 
ne deeþ drede, ne deuel, but deye as god likeþ 
or þoruʒ hunger or þoruʒ hete, at his wille be it; 
for if þow lyue after his loore, þe shorter lif þe bettre: 
Siquis amat christum, mundum non diligit istum.299  
(B.14.16-35, 47-60a)  
With surprisingly sharp sociological insight, Patience does go on to admit that 
inequitable resource allocation lies at fault for the division of mankind into rich and 
poor with little in between. Only moderation or “mesure” can prevent the suffering 
that comes of having not enough or the exulting pride that results from (even 
momentarily) having too much: 
  
And if men lyuede as mesure wolde sholde neuere moore be defaute 
amonges cristene creatures, if cristes wordes ben trewe. 
Ac vnkyndenesse caristiam makeþ amonges cristen peple, 
oþer plentee makeþ pryde amonges poore and riche. 
Ac mesure is so muche worþ it may noʒt be to deere. 
For þe meschief and þe meschaunce amonges men of Sodome 
weez þoruʒ plentee of payn and of pure sleuþe: 
Ociositas & habundancia panis peccatum turpissimum nutriuit;300 
for men mesured noʒt hemself of mete and of drynke, 
diden dedly synne þat þe deuel liked, 
vengeaunce fil vpon hem for hir vile synnes; 
so thei sonken into helle, þe Citees echone.301 
Forþi mesure we vs wel and make we feiþ oure sheltrom; 
and þoruʒ feiþ comeþ contricion, conscience woot wel, 
which dryueþ awey dedly synne and dooþ it to be venial.  
(B.14.71-84) 
                                                 
299 The Latin line here is obviously relevant to this dissertation, but to my knowledge the source for it is 
unknown and I have been unable to identify it either. 
300 Had the passage stayed with this explanation it would have been orthodox enough; a strong tradition 
in Christianity, and indeed in the ascetic practices of other religions, maintains that the body is less 
prone to sin when deprived of an excess of food or sleep—just as the quotation about “[o]ciosistas & 
habundancia panis” here declares; see also the brief career of Lechery in the second vision, mentioned 
in chapter 4. But Patience goes beyond this biological justification of “mesure” to arrive at a moral one 
as well. Living by faith, Pacience argues, produces faith; faith itself inspires contrition; contrition, of 
course, creates a desire for confession, which leads to healing penance that “driveth away dedly sin and 
dooth it to be venial,” reforming Haukyn’s life. Incidentally, this section of passus 14 also vividly 
illustrates Langland’s reliance upon distinction collections for the structure of his poem. The word 
“charity” does not appear any earlier in the passus, but “caristia,” which precedes it alphabetically, 
appears only a few lines before Haukyn asks about charity.  
301 The mention of “þe Citees echone” here aligns with what Ludo Milis has identified as a negative 
view of urban life common to monasticism and not necessarily shared by canons or friars. See “Monks, 
Canons, and the City: a Barren Relationship?” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 32 (2002), pp. 667-
88. 
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 It is unsurprising in this light that Haukyn, faithlessly standing at a crossroads 
between caristia (or lack) and his wonted pursuit of excesses, should express 
skepticism regarding charity. Could it be, he wonders anxiously, that “patient poverty” 
is really no better than “richness rightfully dispended”? Yet as we have already seen, 
and as Patience goes on further to explain, salvation can very easily elude the wealthy; 
wealth, like the waters of a river, needs replenishment not to dry up and thus 
encourages the acquisition of more wealth than it does the desire that such wealth be 
“dispended” on the needy.302 Not because of its own inferiority, then, but rather 
because of Haukyn’s selfish desire to practice it from a position of wealth and excess, 
charity takes a back seat to poverty in Patience’s following lines: so much so that 
Haukyn is struck by the praise and asks to learn more about what such “remocio 
curarum” (as Patience goes on to label it) might mean.303 
 Tragically, however, Haukyn fails seriously to consider the life reliant on faith 
that poverty represents. He breaks down in the face of his sins as Patience finishes 
explaining how poverty can be a virtue in many respects—pushed unto despair when 
he realizes he cannot take it on, in a spectacular conclusion to passus 14:  
 
‘Allas,’ quod Haukyn þe Actif man þo, ‘þat after my cristendom 
I ne hadde be deed and doluen for Dowelis sake! 
So hard it is,’ quod haukyn, ‘to lyue and to do synne. 
Synne seweþ vs euere,’ quod he, and sory gan wexe, 
and wepte water wiþ hise eighen and weyled þe tyme 
that euere he dide dede þat deere god displesed; 
swouned and sobbed and siked ful ofte 
that euere he hadde lond ouþer lordshipe lasse oþer moore, 
                                                 
302 On banishing need with plenty, see Boethius, De Cons. Phil., Bk. II prose V, lines 63-seq. ‘You 
want, I think, to banish need with plenty.” See also the New York Times op-ed on the sham of perpetual 
foundations like the one recently set up for the late Leona Helmsley’s dog: Ray D. Madoff, “Dog Eat 
your Taxes?” (July 9, 2008). 
303 B.14.274: “Haue god my trouþe, [...] I here yow preise faste pouerte!” (end-punctuation mine). For 
remocio curarum, see the Latin explanation that follows at B.14.276: “Paupertas,” quod Pacience, “est 
odibile bonum, Remocio curarum, possessio sine calumpnia, donum dei, sanitatis mater, absque 
sollicitudine semita, sapiencie temperatrix, negocium sine dampno, incerta fortuna, absque sollicitudine 
felicitas.” 
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or maistrie ouer any man mo þan of hymselue. 
‘I were noʒt worþi, woot god,’ quod haukyn, ‘to werien any cloþes, 
ne neiþer sherte ne shoon, saue for shame one 
to couere my careyne,’ quod he, and cride mercy faste 
and wepte and wailede, and þerwiþ I awakede. (B.14.323-35) 
 
Haukyn’s meltdown helps to account for Anima’s different promotion of charitable 
practice to Will.  
 
Will and Charity 
 
 In passus 15, Will asks Anima about the location of charity in words similar to 
Haukyn’s, as I have reported—and, when he does so, it is clear that his solipsism has 
not been dislodged by Anima’s opening harangue. Told that charity as a “childissh 
thyng” possesses not immaturity but a child’s “fre liberal wille,” Will thinks of charity 
as a potentially perfect patron but laments that he has yet to meet anyone who doesn’t 
also look out for his own interests when exercising so-called charity:  
 
‘Where sholde men fynde swich a frend wiþ so fre an herte? 
I haue lyued in londe,’ quod I, ‘my name is longe wille, 
And fond I neuere ful charite, bifore ne bihynde. 
Men beþ merciable to mendinauntʒ and to pore, 
And wollen lene þer þei leue lelly to be paied. 
Ac charite þat Poul preiseþ best, and moost plesaunt to oure Saueour— 
Non inflatur, non est ambiciosa, non querit que sua sunt— 
I seiʒ neuere swich a man, so me god helpe, 
That he ne wolde aske after his, and ouþerwhile coueite 
Thyng þat neded hym noʒt and nyme it if he my3te. 
Clerkes kenne me þat crist is in alle places 
Ac I seiʒ hym neuere sooþly but as myself in a Mirour: 
Hic in enigmate, tunc facie ad faciem. 
And so I trowe trewely, by þat men telleþ of it, 
Charite is noʒt chaumpions fight ne chaffare as I trowe.’  
(B.15.151-64) 
 
He has never found “full” charity. (153) When Will goes on to conclude that charity 
must have next to nothing to do with “champiouns fight” in tournements or “chaffare” 
of marketplaces, he acknowledges the presence of bellicosity and acquisitiveness as 
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inescapable contaminants to generosity that would otherwise remain pure. Yet the 
“And so” that leads to this conclusion just after Will’s reference to charity as himself 
in a mirror implies that, even though Will recognizes his own imperfection he still sees 
that Christly ideal as reflected most accurately in himself. This identification holds, 
moreover, no matter how distance-distorted an image Will may produce. As a result 
(since Will is neither much of a fighter nor involved in a business or trade) he may 
conclude Charity’s lack of these aspects as well. It is important to recognize 
Langland’s intentional satire against his persona here: Will did not recognize himself 
in Haukyn when the two were face to face. but now, albeit through a glass darkly, he 
sees God. 
 Rather than rebuke Will for his obduracy, Anima replies (one might say 
charitably) in terms that show how Charity, who “ne chaffareþ noʒt, ne chalangeþ, ne 
craueþ” does fit Will’s solipsistic understanding (B.15.165). Later, however, Anima 
further gives a description of what Charity is not— 
 
For þer are pure proude herted men, pacient of tonge 
And buxome as of berynge to burgeises and to lordes, 
And to poore peple han pepir in þe nose, 
And as a lyoun he lokeþ þer men lakken his werkes. 
For þer are beggeris and bidderes, bedemen as it were, 
Loken as lambren and semen lifholy 
Ac is it moore to haue hir mete on swich an esy manere 
Than for penaunce and parfitnesse, þe pouerte þat swiche takeþ. 
(B.15.201-08)  
 
It more than a little resembles Will’s withering portrayal of Haukyn.304 Like Haukyn 
and other “Goliards,” these are gyrovagues and wastrels obsessed with pleasing the 
powerful. They set as life goals advancement not of soul but of status. While hardly 
known for their largesse, they loudly draw attention to works to win more praise. They 
ally themselves nominally with the clerical estate only to benefit from the perks of 
                                                 
304 See again B.13.271-312. 
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religion (as we shall see the Wastoures do in the second vision). The satire is entirely 
in keeping with Langland’s practice, which I noted above also aligns with the prophet 
Nathan’s rebuke of David concerning Uriah: what seems to be a criticism that the 
target can join in and agree with turns out to be a criticism against the target himself. 
 Anima’s charity too begins with moderation, as did Patience’s poverty, and the 
two seem almost to work as a team. Where Patience drew his examples of 
immoderation from the secular world, Anima’s examples of moderation are all clerks. 
This distinction is especially interesting in light of Anima and Haukyn’s inverse 
reflection of each other—and all the more since Will and Haukyn both are Goliardic 
figures, partly “clerical” and partly secular. Anima’s Bernardine admonition that 
“[b]eatus est qui scripturas legit, et verba vertit in opera” allows us to see, behind the 
general critique, the precept to “docere verbo et exemplo” that Carolyn Walker Bynum 
has found notable in twelfth-century discourse concerning religious life.305 Rather than 
focusing on the integrity of their actions, Anima notes, clerics often spend their time 
enchanted by riches and the rich. But since all that will come to nothing after their 
deaths, the exercise of charity would suit them better.306 
 Again, though, and more than Will, Anima’s image of proper Charity 
resembles a reformed Haukyn. Haukyn had flitted from occupation to occupation out 
of a wasteful restlessness, with “no lif þat [hym] loueþ lastynge any while” (B.13.331) 
Charity however takes on any number of roles but never fails to help others,  never 
feeling the slightest pressure of want or need.  The self-sufficiency Anima speaks of 
                                                 
305 Lines 60-61. See Carolyn Walker Bynum, “Docere verbo et exemplo”: an Aspect of Twelfth-Century 
Spirituality, Harvard Theological Studies 31 (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979). 
306 See also B.12.40-58, in which Charity is described as an amalgam of obedience and moderation or 
temperance. Wealthy and wise men throughout history, the passage notes, have fallen because of their 
wealth and wisdom—“catel and kynde wit was combraunce to hem alle,” since they did not “loue [...] 
as oure lord bit [...] Date & dabitur vobis.”  
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clearly surprises Will, who asks if Charity “haþ [...] any rentes or richesse or any riche 
frendes,” but Anima declares that Charity has none of these:  
 
Of rentes ne of richesse rekkeþ he neuere, 
for a frend þat fyndeþ hym failed hym neuere at nede: 
Fiat voluntas tua fynt hym eueremoore, 
and if he soupeþ eteþ but a sop of Spera in deo. 
He kan portreye wel þe Paternoster and peynte it with Aues 
and ouþerwhile he is woned to wenden on pilgrymages 
ther poore men and prisons liggeþ, hir pardon to haue; 
thouʒ he bere hem no breed he bereþ hem swetter liflode; 
loueþ hem as oure lord biddeþ and lokeþ how þei fare. 
and whan he is wery of þat werk þan wole he som tyme 
labouren in a lauendrye wel þe lenþe of a Mile, 
and yerne into youþe and yepeliche seche 
pride wiþ al þe appuretenaunces, and pakken hem togideres, 
and bouken hem at his brest and beten hem clene, 
and leggen on longe wiþ Laboraui in gemitu meo, 
and wiþ warm water at hise eiʒen wasshen hem after. 
thanne he syneþ whan he doþ so, and som tyme wepynge, 
Cor contritum & humiliatum deus non despicies.  
(B.15.177-194)  
 
Anima thus portrays Charity as an ideal solution to the problem of poverty that 
Haukyn and Patience had uncovered earlier—the problem that those who cling to 
more than sufficient earthly wealth doom those reliant on charity to caristia (dearth) 
and possibly death because of it.  
 Much the rest of Anima’s speech to Will in passus 15 makes the case for the 
reallocation of resources that following true Charity would bring about. It brings up 
several examples, a few of them contrasting the Franciscan eremitic ideal to the four 
orders’ more recent behavior. In so doing, Anima further “toothlessly” satirizes the 
clerical estate by contrasting typical critics—figures directly reminiscent of Haukyn—
with the ideal Christian way, charity, to encounter others’ failings.307 As a practice of 
moderation, Charity can belong to anyone who has any resources at all to give:  
                                                 
307 Anima declares that “[þ]er are pure proude herted men, pacient of tonge / and buxome as of berynge 
to burgeises and to lordes, / and to poore peple hand pepir in þe nose, / and as a lyoun he lokeþ þer men 
lakken hise werkes. / For þer are beggeris and bidderis, bedemen as it were, / loken as lambren and 
semen lif holy, / ac it is moore to haue hir mete on swich an esy mnere / than for penaunce and 
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For I haue seyen hym in silk and som tyme in russet, 
boþe in grey and in grys and in gilt harneis, 
and as gladliche he it gaf to gomes þat it neded. 
Edmond and Edward, eiþer were kynges 
and seintes yset; stille charite hem folwede. 
I haue yseyen charite also syngen and reden, 
riden and rennen in raggede wedes, 
ac bidding as beggeris biheld I hym neuere.  
(B.15.220-27)  
 
Notably, most of Anima’s examples of proper charity concern not only friars but 
anchorites, hermits, and monks proper who follow in some way the “monastic” ideal 
of solitude and prayer. Paul, Anthony, Giles, and Mary Magdalene: all, according to 
Anima, lived on the most meager of resources and placed all their faith in God, 
receiving sustenance miraculously as a result, “in menynge þat meke þyng mylde þyng 
sholde fede.” (B.15.306) By the same token, argues Anima, wealthy laypersons should 
give of their fortunes not to maintain their fellows (as described in B.15.336-37) but 
rather “lawefulle men to lif holy men liflode brynge.” (B.15.307)   
 As Anima counsels, Religious groups that have already received good fortune 
“sholde raþer feeste beggeris / than burgeises þat riche ben as þe book techeþ,” so as 
to escape the corruption that comes from too much wealth (15.342-343). The poem 
appends a lengthy Latin quotation: 
 
Quia sacrilegium est res pauperum non pauperibus dare. Item, 
peccatoribus dare est demonibus immolare. Item, monache, si indiges 
& accipis pocius das quam accipis; si autem non eges & accipis rapis. 
Porro non indiget monachus si habeat quod nature sufficit (343a). 
 
[Because it is sacrilege not to give to the poor what should be theirs. 
Again: to give to sinners is to render burnt offerings to demons. Again: 
O monk, if you are in need and take alms, you give more than you 
receive; if however you are not in need and take alms, then you steal. A 
monk is not in need if he has what nature deems enough.]308  
 
                                                                                                                                            
parfitnesse, þe pouerte þat swiche takeþ” (B.15.202-208). Haukyn, too, is “as a lyoun on to loke and 
lordliche of speche, / boldest of beggeris” while suffering from the rest of the flaws that Anima 
mentions (B.13.301-302).  
308 The phrase “what nature deems enough” here seems to quote from Boethius, De Cons. Phil, Bk. 2. 
proseII. Prose V, line 42. 
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Overreliance on the collection of worldly knowledge and material wealth has 
weakened the clergy, Anima explains, and that weakens all of Christendom. The major 
example that follows amounts to a small vita of Muhammad (“Makometh”), here 
again portrayed as a Christian frustrated in his bid for the papacy when, “þoruʒ wiles 
of his wit and a whit Dowue” that he tamed “in mysbileue men and wommen 
broughʒte / þat lered þere and lewed ʒit leeuen on hise lawes.” (B.15.409-11) Now 
“for drede of þe deeþ I dar noʒt telle truþe / how englisshe clerkes a coluere fede þat 
coueitise hiʒte,” Anima adds, with disingenuously periphrastic self-censorship, 
continuing in a similar vein until the end of the passus against the avarice of the 
clergy.  
 Anima’s shifting lines of attack against now the worldly knowledge, now the 
worldly striving after wealth of corrupt clergy (and corrupt laity) can generate some 
confusion. The discussion sometimes seems to divert from general self-reform towards 
how to remedy that love of money which is the root of all evil. Haukyn’s problems 
were any number of sins, after all, not just avarice—and yet that seems to be the focus 
here. The avarice Anima decries is not wholly avarice for money, however, nor is the 
charity Anima espouses completely pecuniary charity. Money is merely a convenient 
way of expressing all the temporalia these wayward figures seek. The subject has not 
changed from self-reform after all. 
 The well-regulated and almost cyclical life Anima ascribes to Charity—with 
its periodic cleansings of soul with weeping and with singing—need not be said to 
represent any one type of life, as we have seen. Nevertheless, its fittingness as a 
representation of monastic life, entered around the divine office, stands out. Anima’s 
connection of ideal monastic life with perfect charity also suggests that Anima 
opposes Haukyn’s slip towards despair by proposing a different practice of self-
reform, known (especially in the context of  monasticism) as contemptus sui.  
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Contemptus Sui 
 
 Anima’s discussion of charity to Will goes further, completing an 
argumentative arc or turn of thought that had begun at the close of the second vision, 
but it seems to me that we can pause here, as the portrayal of Charity just presented 
brings to the forefront the main mystery underlying self-criticism in the poem: namely, 
how far is it supposed to go? To the casual observer, a comparison of Haukyn at the 
end of passus 14 with Anima’s charity here in passus 15 would not allow for much 
contrast at all. Both figures bewail their sin, and both cry. From a subtler theological 
standpoint—of the sort Langland would readily have apprehended, if not Will—there 
are important differences on display between the two, even in this apparently common 
activity.  Charity acts out of well-regulated ascetic introspection, the “contemptus sui” 
I have mentioned above and shall turn to soon below; the prideful Haukyn, however, 
has run aground on the shoals of wanhope, or despair.  
 As medieval writers understood it, despair or wanhope was a danger arising 
from the sin of acedia or sloth. Acedia, a term first invented by the Desert Fathers of 
early eremitic monasticism, was also known as the “noonday demon.”Andrew Crislip 
has traced the history of the term, beginning with its early depiction as both an actual 
demon and chief of demonic thoughts in the fourth-century writings of Evagrius of 
Pontus.309 As Crislip notes, however, its similarity with a range of modern, non-
religious afflictions has made it valuable to historians of emotion. Andrew Solomon, 
for instance, reads acedia in terms almost purely of what we would now call 
depression.310 Though it provides the title of his book, he sees it almost entirely as a 
                                                 
309 See “The Sin of Sloth or the Illness of the Demons? The Demon of Acedia in Early Christian 
Monasticism,” Harvard Theological Review 98.2 (2005), pp. 143-69. 
310 Andrew Solomon, chapter 8: “History,” The Noonday Demon: an Atlas of Depression (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 285-334, esp. pp. 293-295f. 
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much earlier era’s attempt to understand a complexly manifested disease. Rainer Jehl, 
on the other hand, finds acedia’s similarity with contemporary “burnout syndrome” to 
be telling—and his dwelling on the comparison is valuable, in so far as early 
techniques to battle it might help to inspire ways to treat “burnout” now.311 Still other 
scholars have focused on its medieval instantiations. Alexander Murray, for example, 
considers desperatio in relation to medieval thought about suicide.312 Jean-Charles 
Nault, thinking of contemporary Christians, uses medieval and modern theology to 
examine not the negative thoughts themselves but the divine sense of calling they 
refuse.313 He labels acedia the “enemy of spiritual joy” because this word—meaning 
“the lack of care for one’s salvation”—represents a paralyzed, intensely self-
preoccupied refusal to accept anything less than the perfect happiness of heaven while 
simultaneously feeling barred from it. Murray’s view is probably too narrow, and 
Nault’s certainly too capacious, adequately to describe the vice depicted in Langland’s 
poem. Then again, these scholars have not had Langland specifically in mind. 
Siegfried Wenzel, who has considered Piers Plowman, does perhaps the best service 
Langlandians when he describes sloth in terms of incommensurability: the feeling that 
one could never possibly make up for all of one’s earlier shortcomings.314 
 While at first the apparent impossibility of the task of making amends for one’s 
sins might appear to inspire a jaunty, flippant jadedness (for which Haukyn is 
Langland’s exhibit A), that defensive reaction only allows problems to grow worse; 
when they are faced, if they are faced, the reaction turns into an impossibly depressed 
                                                 
311 Rainer Jehl, “Acedia and Burnout Syndrome: from an Occupational Vice of the Early Monks to a 
Psychological Concept in Secularized Professional Life,” in In the Garden of Evil: the Vices and 
Culture in the Middle Ages, ed. Richard Newhauser, Papers in Mediæval Studies 18 (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediæval Studies, 2005), pp. 455-76. 
312 See “The Sin of Despair,” cited earlier. 
313 See “Acedia: Enemy of Spiritual Joy,” trans. Christina Strafaci, Communio 31 (2004), pp. 236-59. 
314 See The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1960). 
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bleakness. The very word, “wanhope” signifying more doubt than certainy about an 
individual’s ability to counter sin, was not this poet’s own invention. Nevertheless, 
Langland uses the word with etymological sensitivity. The warning in passus 7 to 
Sloth—“Ware thee fro Wanhope, wolde thee betraye” (B.5.444, emphasis mine)—
associates with the affliction a verb very much in keeping with this sense of doubtful 
jadedness rather than full-blown suicidal tailspin we might expect. Nevertheless, one 
does lead towards the other. To draw on a famous image from Book One of Spenser’s 
Faerie Queene, Despayre with his rusty knife lies at the end of the process for 
Langland, in which self defense treasonously ushers in its opposite, self-contempt.  
 G. K. Chesterton once strikingly observed that the apparent self-hatred of the 
would-be suicide is actually hatred (and despair for the improvement of) everything 
else in the world.315 For this reason,  to speak of “self-contempt”  rather quickly brings 
to mind figures like Alcyon, the dubious antihero of Spenser’s Daphnaida.316 As 
passus 14 ends, Haukyn is frozen on the brink of just that sort of self-contempt. (Will, 
waking up from his vision of Haukyn’s descent toward despair, seems to experience a 
reaction to the dream less pronounced but more active as well—he has not lost hope so 
much as respect for the virtue of others and, weirdly, the propriety of conventional 
societal rules.) Infelicities of translation bring it about that Anima’s preferred alternate 
path for self-criticism, one which leads to heights instead of depths, can also translate 
as “self-contempt” despite its difference in practice, so I will render it here as 
“contempt of self.”  
 
                                                 
315 Chesterton writes that “[t]he suicide is ignoble because he has not this link with being: he is a mere 
destroyer; spiritually, he destroys the universe”—in chapter 5: “The Flag of the World,” Orthodoxy 
(New York: John Lane, 1908), pp. 119-47 at p. 133.  
316 See, for example, lines 414-20 of that poem: “I hate to speake, my voyce is spent with crying: / I 
hate to heare, lowd plaints haue duld mine eares: / I hate to tast, for food withholds my dying: / I hate to 
see, mine eyes are dimd with teares: / I hate to smell, no sweet on earth is left: / I hate to feele, my flesh 
is numbd with feares: / So all my senses from me are bereft.” 
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 Contempt of self or contemptus sui is, alas, alarmingly difficult to research 
except in its monastic context and in relation to other practices (contemptus mundi, for 
example). Brian Stock helpfully provides a view of the background on literary self-
introspection out of which contemptus sui would develop, though he does not use the 
term.317 The paradoxically self-edificatory effects of contemptus sui appear from 
Richard of St. Victor’s De exterminatione mali et promotione boni (with extended 
discussions of contemptus sui); in a later treatise possibly by Jodl von Kastl titled De 
adhærendo Deo, the fifteenth chapter is devoted to the question of “Contemptus sui, 
qualiter causetur in homine, et quam utilis sit?” 318  Susan R. Kramer and Caroline 
Walker Bynum attempt to show how a sense of “selfhood” was shored up by the 
practices no less than the doctrines of  religious life, with amor proximi causing the 
“interior homo itself [to be] a stimulus of the interior homo of neighbor.”319 Though 
they mention the “inner man” and the Christian ideal of “amor proximi,” however, 
they do not mention contempt of self alone. 
 Even so, the term’s bothersome connectedness tells us something. First, it is an 
idea almost (but as we shall see not entirely) inseparable from monasticism. Second, 
contempt of self forms part of a complex of ideas and shares their ultimate goals. 
Whereas slothful wanhope stems from a sort of pride, contemptus sui distinguishes 
itself as an antidote to pride, being in theory the way an ascetic avoids exulting in his 
own righteousness and discipline. Along with “contempt of the world” and “love of 
neighbor,” it was often held to stand as one of the columns in what has variously been 
                                                 
317 See “The Self and Literary Experience in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages,” New Literary 
History 25.4 (1994), pp. 839-52. 
318 Richard’s De exterminatione is PL 196, coll. 1073C-1088A; the De adhærendo Deo, print 
publication information unknown, has been transcribed for online access by Èulogos IntraText® (2007). 
The De adhærendo faintly echoes discourse on the “inner man” by stating that weeping and other 
practices of denying self-worth “day by day” (de die in die) make the soul more more precious to God. 
The greater importance it ascribes to weeping as a key to contempt of self indicates, however, that its 
sense of psychology may be less sophisticated than what one finds in other texts cited here. 
319 Quoted from “Revisiting the Twelfth-Century Individual,” p. 85. 
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called the spiritual edifice or the cloister of the soul, the very terms of which sugest 
strongly their morally formative, constructive, indeed “edifying” and sheltering roles.  
 Contempt of self could appear to be a species of contemptus mundi, since it is 
often referred to right alongside contempt of the world, but it also deserves to be 
considered as distinct from the latter practice. As the term implies, its main area of 
application is the self. Human beings are inherently social creatures, and even 
professedly urban poets like Langland and Chaucer admitted in their writings to the 
corrupting influence of people in groups together. But while it might seem useful to 
consider contemptus sui an antisocial goal—since what better way to show yourself-
contempt than by withdrawing from friends and family?— presence as well as absence 
factors in. Contempt of self concerns things embraced as well as cast aside. The very 
idea of contemptus sui being monastic, after all, it was traditionally or originally 
understood to flourish in monastic communities.  
 The monastic community, however, as anyone even remotely familiar with the 
concept of monasticisim knows, is not a normal social arrangement. Or rather, 
although the coördination of men in the monastery is no different from other types of 
societal order (someone needs to prepare food, someone needs to dispose of waste) it 
pushes at the bounds of normality by putting any usual, everyday human interactions 
at an absolute minimum (so far as practical reality will allow). The organization in 
typical cenobitic (or communal) establishments has been described as top-down, with 
orders and authority deriving from God through the person of the abbot, each working 
at a particular task to ensure the community’s continued health and solvency—rather 
in the manner of a beehive. In this organizational perspective, the monastic 
community also resembles the military, with the important difference that the military 
usually encourages its members to lead normal lives when not in the direct service of 
its (temporary and changeable) mission goals. The monastery asks its denizens to 
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forswear many aspects of normal life forever—too many for listing—in the service of 
a mission and goals that remain unchanged. These are the “dura et aspera per quæ itur 
ad Deum.”320 
  What of the self in such situations? What of normal human drives and dreams 
for property, status to impress others, a supportive and socially occupying life with 
other human beings? The monasteries of the most reformed communities, such as the 
Carthusians or the Benedictine St. Romuald’s Camaldolese, answer with their very 
architecture: while nominally cenobitic, denizens of these monasteries spend their 
nonworking hours in private cells, or hermitages, around the main monastery 
church.321 With the self’s usual props taken away, the monk can work on the 
purification of his being—its purgation from sin, and from the desire for constant 
commerce with other people.322  
 What really distinguishes the monastery, then, and allows for contempt of self 
there, is a radically different sense of what it means to be a human being—a radically 
different anthropology, to use the theological term favored by Robert Bultot. This 
anthropology is the anthropology of angels, not of men—the bios angelikos, or 
“angelic life,” inerrantly pure, unmoved by the material world, obediently hierarchical. 
John Freccero has provided the backstory for this monastic aspiration, mentioned 
throughout the works of Robert Bultot as the goal of becoming perfect in order to 
replace prehistorically fallen angels.323 Yet as both Jean Leclercq and Karl Suso Frank 
                                                 
320 The dura et aspera are mentioned in chapter 58 of the Rule, in which a newcomer intent upon 
joining a given monastery should be informed of all of the difficulties that lie in store. 
321 For more on this system of organization see Knowles, Pachomius to Ignatius. 
322 A tablet set prominently on the church sanctuary floor at the Camaldolese Bielany Klasztor on the 
“Silver Mount” outside of Krakow, Poland, avoids the plural even in the monastery’s only communal 
place:  “Commissa  Mea Pavesco * Et Ante Te Erubesco * Dum Veneris Iudicare: * Domine, Noli Me 
Condemnare.” 
323 See Bultot, Christianisme 4.1 and 4.2, passim and John Freccero, chapter 6: “The Neutral Angels,” 
Dante: the Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 
110-18. 
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influentially have noted,  monks’ desire to live like angels was gratified in this life, 
too, motivating their behavior of individual monks in every respect and even the 
placement of their communities (frequently on mountains).324 This is not to say that 
the angelic life was uncontroversial or unproblematic. Ellen Muehlberger has pointed 
out that the disembodiment of angels vexed early Christian ascetics, whose angelic 
piety had to be embodied.325 Ludo Milis, moreover, has argued that the pursuit of the 
bios angelikos made monks attempt—and sometimes succeed—at being irrelevant to 
the rest of the secular world.326 It is safe to conclude, then, that the angelic life’s 
glowing ideal contributed to its staying power in the medieval ascetic imagination far 
more than its pursuit on earth—always already flawed—ever could. The often-severe 
Meditationes piisimæ, which scholars assume that Langland would have known, 
contains a glowingly apocalyptic vision of humans joining the ranks of angels at the 
end of time.327  
 As with contempt of self and other aspects of ascetic ideology this dissertation 
will explore, the theory of the angelic life so indelibly tinctured the ascetic experience 
that Langland, whose angels often seem more like pieces of stage machinery rather 
than starry messengers, need not have been specifically aware of the theory in order to 
draw on it in his poem. Still, it is my opinion that Langland did indeed draw upon this 
theory. To do so he would only have needed to desire to present a monastic ideal as an 
ideal applicable for all lives—and it seems amply likely that he did at least so much. 
Even Haukyn’s name of Activa vita implies the existence of a Vita contemplativa, as I 
                                                 
324 See Jean Leclercq, La Vie Parfaite: points de vue sur l’essence de l’état religieux (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1948) and Karl Suso Frank, ΑΓΓΕΛΙΚΟΣ ΒΙΟΣ: Begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum 
“engelgleichen Leben” im frühen Mönchtum (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964). 
325 See “Ambivalence about the Angelic Life: the Promise and Perils of an Early Christian Discourse of 
Asceticism,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 16.4 (2008), pp. 447-78. 
326 See Angelic Monks and Earthly Men: Monasticism and its Meaning to Medieval Society 
(Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999). 
327 “Fulgebit sicut sol humanitas glorificata: quieta erit et concors carnis et spiritus societas. Angelorum 
et hominum erit gaudium unum, unum colloquium, unum convivium” (col. 493C). 
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have already noted—and, as I have already pointed out as well, the flaws in the one 
(experienced after Conscience casts his lot with Patience)  imply the soundness of the 
other (reached through Clergie). After all, the form of living practiced by monks was 
seen as an example of the contemplative life par excellence. Therefore, in so far as the 
Haukyn episode centers on the issue of self-criticism and finds the way in which 
Haukyn criticizes himself a thing to be avoided, it sets up the self-critical procedures 
of the Vita contemplativa as its natural ideal: an ideal of contempt of self.  
 That said—that contempt of self appears healthier and more admirable than 
despair—does not make the practice of contemptus sui at all pleasant. As a form of 
self-criticism its narrow purpose is to make a sinner mindful of his faults, not to isolate 
him from the judgment and corrective sight of others.328 In so far as all humans are 
fallen, moreover, it presupposes that the sinner will have many flaws to be mindful of. 
The “misery of the human condition,” about which Cardinal Lothario dei Segni wrote 
his famous treatise before becoming Pope Innocent III, is recognized to have the roots 
of its corruption within the fallen human self.329 Focusing on the dignity of man, about 
which Lothario apparently wished to write a second treatise, doesn’t figure into the 
equation by that reckoning. That man was created “a little lower than the angels” 
(Psalm 8:5) is not cause for celebration and hope, but rather mourning that the short 
distance between the two should be so hard for mortal man to scale.  
 Contempt of self begins with not only a recognition but an exaggeration of the 
distance between man and angel, in fact—and in the illusion that the sins of the sinner 
in question are almost immeasurably greater than his neighbor’s sins. The example of 
                                                 
328 See above on the interior homo, which contemptus sui seems designed to nourish and form. 
329 For a convenient translation, see Donald R. Howard, ed. and Mary Dietz, trans., On the Misery of the 
Human Condition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,1969); Howard discusses the influence and editorial 
history of this work in, chapter 2: “Renaissance World-Alienation” of The Darker Vision of the 
Renaissance: Beyond the Fields of Reason, ed. R. S. Kinsman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1974), pp. 64-75 on pp. 55ff. 
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the Apostle Paul’s letters take a prominent role here.330 Paul considers himself “the 
least of all the saints” in Ephesians 3:8, who in his laments over the conflict between 
his (outer) body and “inward man” attest to Jesus’ remark in Mark 14:38 that “the 
spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.”331 As far back as the psalter, in point of fact, 
the sinner declares that he “is a worm, and no man”332 Seeing his very nature from 
conception onwards to partake of the lowest and most revolting substances—blood, 
decay, slime—inspires a poor assessment of the physical world and his body’s 
participation in it. If one cannot completely realize the bios angelikos in life one can at 
least aspire to it, and one was meant to nourish such aspirations with images such as 
these.  
 Contempt of self might have helped to suppress an ascetic’s pride in being able 
to live away from community, but it cannot be denied that the same practice could 
bring on,  encourage, and even exaggerate symptoms of what we would recognize as 
depression. It is commonly understood increased exposure to negative ideas and 
images increases the risk of depression, and researchers currently believe that dwelling 
on negative phenomena—or “ruminating”—makes depression worse. The risk for 
depression also rises with increased focus on the self: poets who use the first person 
singular pronoun a great deal die sooner, more susceptible to suicide, than those who 
lean more on the second and third persons and do not dwell on their own 
                                                 
330 Paul’s letters comprise the earliest books of the New Testament, though this was not known during 
the Middle Ages. 
331 Romans 7:21-25: “I find then a law, that when I have a will to do good, evil is present with me. For I 
am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man: But I see another law in my members, 
fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members. 
Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, by Jesus 
Christ our Lord. Therefore, I myself, with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of 
sin” (emphasis mine). 
332 Psalm 21:7, “But I am a worm, and no man: the reproach of men, and the outcast of the people”; cf. 
Job 25:4-6: “Can man be justified cfompared with God, or he that is born of a woman appear clean? 
Behold even the moon doth not shine, and the stars are not pure in his sight. How much less man that is 
rottenness and the son of man who is a worm?” 
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misfortunes.333 At the same time, the viability of monasticism as a way of life would 
have been severely hampered were the contempt of self it promoted to have led 
inexorably to mental illness of this sort. Though to plumb the issue adequately would 
require a (very interesting) study in its own right, a dangerous overindulgence in 
ascetic discipline seems to have been strenuously guarded against in the regular 
orders’ typical practice.334  The Benedictine Rule dictates that a monk should live in a 
community and achieve a sufficient level of spiritual fitness before going out alone as 
a hermit, for instance; a would-be anchorite who had not previously been affiliated 
with a cenobitic community required the permission of a bishop.  
 It also bears remembering that the point of contemptus sui’s sometimes 
gruesome attendant meditations on the vileness of the material self and the sins to 
which it is prone is or was not impotent, self-destructive rage at a condition that could 
not be bettered, but rather mourning for one’s fallen humanity. It amounted to a 
shifting of solicitude towards the immortal part of one’s makeup, and the zeal to take 
upon oneself the disciplines necessary to foster that immortal part—the inner man. In 
that way, one could pursue perfection (at least so far as possible in this life). While 
wanhope (as Langland’s poem tells us) derives from sloth and is marked by 
unwillingness and then inability to take proper self-reforming action, the practices 
                                                 
333 See Shannon Wiltsey Stirman and James W. Pennebaker, “Word Use in the Poetry of Suicidal and 
Nonsuicidal Poets,” Psychosomatic Medicine 63 (2001), pp. 517-522. 
334 Moreover, practiced with all due precaution, ascetic contempt of self might well have been of some 
psychological advantage. A recent and fascinating article discusses the “analytic-rumination 
hypothesis” recently developed Andrew Thomson and Paul Andrews. According to this idea, the 
brooding or dwelling that characterizes one particular strain of depression could help to focus the mind 
on finding solutions to problems otherwise unsolved: an important finding, if true, because the great 
prevalence of a disorder that can strike at any age and yet has seemed to have no evolutionary benefit at 
all has so far confounded researchers. It bears noticing that monks used the word ruminatio to describe 
one of their most typical reading practices. Contemptus sui and its attendant meditations—also 
charactized by repeated return to sometimes-somber ideas—seem to present a stylized version of the 
depressive behavior here described, one designed to reap its benefits while escaping its pathology. See 
Jonah Lehrer, “Depression’s Upside” (New York Times Magazine, February 25, 2010), pp. 38-[44?].  
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ideally nourished by contemptus sui constitute very purposeful and constructive action 
like that of Charity. 
  To the historian of satire, what payoff does the promotion of contemptus sui at 
this point in the poem give us? Is it even correct to say that Langland writes in terms 
of contemptus sui rather than conventional confession and penance? In addition to the 
foregoing points, it should be plain to see that Langland does not advocate confession 
and penance alone for self-reform, or rather that his ideal goes further. (Confession 
and penance—non-public and repeatable—derive at any rate from monastic practices, 
as Alan Thacker among others has pointed out, and so it is not surprising that late-
medieval writers found monastic expositions on these issues compelling 335) Chaucer’s 
Parson’s Tale, for instance, which could not hew closer to the pastoral concerns of the 
secular clergy, quotes repeatedly from St. Bernard of Clairvaux. As Haukyn’s (and, 
elsewhere, Sloth’s) jadedness shows, Langland does not portray confession and 
penance alone as a solution for human sinfulness, because living the active life entails 
the risk of succumbing to wanhope—of suffering a jadedness about sin that can make 
conventional opportunities and calls for restitution powerless.  
 Still, though Langland’s ideal for self-reform comes somehow from the 
cloister, he obviously does not set up claustral living as a practical solution for human 
sinning, any more than he suggests universal kingship (a role also ascribed, 
metaphorically, to Charity). Instead, Charity appears to be a virtue that may be 
practiced by anyone disposed to do so. And alongside Charity, Langland’s poem sets 
regularity of life, if not all out Regular living. Constantly exercising charity, indeed, 
leads to “welhope” (B.13.453). That this can be experienced in the active life, at very 
                                                 
335 Thacker’s remarks appear in “Monks, Preaching, and Pastoral Care in Early Anglo-Saxon England,” 
in Pastoral Care before the Parish, edd. John Blair and Richard Sharpe (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1992), pp. 137-70. On the challenges of a confessor’s knowing and helping to reform the interior 
disposition of his charges in confession, see Mary C. Mansfield, The Humiliation of Sinners: Public 
Penance in Thirteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).  
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least among those who choose Patience as their travel partner, becomes quite clear 
from the tag “Paciences vincunt” to describe ascetics and martyrs not formally 
monastic throughout Anima’s passus 15 speech.  These embrace poverty not to snare 
for themselves remocio curarum but rather out of self-sacrificial love. 
 Understanding contemptus sui, as this chapter has shown, can allow us to 
differentiate between Haukyn’s bleak tears in the grip of wanhope and the more 
regularly occurring yet constructive tears said to accompany Charity (in Anima’s 
speech).336 That in turn helps us to see how the rather bizarre-looking figure of Anima 
serves as a foil to Haukyn, acting as the wise and steadfast “inner man” to the wildly 
disruptive folly prone “outer man” of  Haukyn. Although Conscience and Patience’s 
advice for Haukyn to embrace poverty is not misguided, it also fails to move him. His 
concluding outburst stems from his inability to consider self-improvement through 
changed behavior remotely possible. Anima’s encouragement of charity changes the 
emphasis enough to suggest that even a king may reap the benefits of the life of the 
                                                 
336 On the healing power of tears in medieval religious thought, and the “compunction” meant to inspire 
them, much of interest has been written and a number of works have already been cited in this study 
including those by Piroska Nagy. Jean Leclercq provides a brief sketch of the history and valences of 
this idea in his Amour des Lettres, which sheds considerable light upon the course of action 
recommended for Haukyn: “Le premier résultat de cette expérience de la misère de l’homme, pour le 
chrétien qui sait l’interpréter, c’est l’humilité, autrement dit le détachement du monde et de nous-
mêmes, et de notre péché, la conscience du besoin où nous sommes de Dieu. Telle est la componction, 
sous le double aspect qu’elle revêt: componction de crainte, componction de désir. Primitivement le 
mot compunctio est, dans l’usage profane, un terme de médecine: il désigne les élancements d’une 
douleur aiguë, d’un mal physique. Mais il a surtout été employé dans le vocabulaire chrétien avec un 
sens qui, sans perdre contact avec ses origines, est cependant plus riche et beaucoup plus élevé. La 
componction devient une douleur de l’âme, une douleur qui a, simultanément, deux principes: d’une 
part le fait du péché et de notre tendance au péché—compunctio pænitentiæ, timoris,  formidinis—
d’une autre part le fait de notre désir de Dieu, et déjà de notre possession de Dieu. S. Grégoire, plus que 
d’autres, a mis l’accent sur ce dernier aspect: possession obscure, dont la conscience ne dure pas, et 
dont, par conséquent, naissent le regret de la voir disparaître et le désir de la retrouver. La ‘componction 
du cœur,’ ‘de l’âme’—compunctio cordis, animi—tend donc toujours à devenir une ‘componction 
d’amour,’ ‘de dilection’ et ‘de contemplation’—compunctio amoris, dilectionis, contemplationis. La 
componction est une action de Dieu en nous, un acte par lequel Dieu nous réveille, un choc, un coup, 
une ‘piqûre,’ une sorte de brûlure. Dieu nous excite comme par un aiguillon: il nous ‘point’ avec 
insistance (cum-pungere), comme pour nous transpercer. L’amour du monde nous endort; mais comme 
par un coup de tonnerre, l’âme est rappelée à l’attention à Dieu.” (34-35). 
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poor, however; it depicts poverty not as a way to stay out of trouble, but as a way for 
one’s troubles to do one some good. This change, which Anima presents less in terms 
of different behavior than in terms of psychological readjustment, is contemptus sui.  
  We have already seen that, in the ascetic ideological framework, self-criticism 
plays an important role. Langland’s self-criticism, though critics have associated it 
with Goliardic models, occurs most deeply when Will sees “himself” as a Goliard 
(Haukyn). The encounter moves past light self-parody, typical of Goliardic verse, and 
and toward an ascetically minded meditation on the rewards of contemptus sui versus 
the dangers of wanhope or despair. Patience urges Haukyn—Will’s “outer man”—to 
repent of his flaws by letting go of exterior things, unwittingly triggering his despair. 
In response, Anima (Will’s “inner man”) shows Will how to recognize and attend to 
his intrinsic spiritual worth, following an ideal of charity.  
 One of the hallmarks of Piers Plowman as a satire, as the passūs featuring 
Haukyn and Anima show, is that it tends not to criticize particular ways of life (e.g. 
minstrelsy) as much particular sins or errors in thought (e.g. avarice). As we shall see 
abundantly the next chapter, ascetic ideology provides the rationale for this restraint. 
Although the next chapter will focus more on the way in which Langland attempts to 
revitalize society with “contempt of the world” or contemptus mundi, contemptus sui 
cannot be left behind. That ideal demands that the criticism in the poem balance its 
assessments of others with criticism of the self. 
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CHAPTER 4 
“IN CHARNEL AT CHIRCHE...”: 
CONTEMPTUS MUNDI AND THE ‘REGULATION’ OF ESTATES 
 
Unde quamvis iste mundus promittat in hac vita corporis sanitatem, vitę diuturnitatem, fortunę 
prosperitatem, et penitencię oportunitatem, invenies tamen ipsum falsum et decipientem. Experimento 
autem videmus tota die quod sanitas corporalis vertitur in infirmitatem, vitę diuturnitas in temporis 
brevitatem, fortunę prosperitas in adversitatem, penitendi oportunitas in inpenitencię malignitatem. 
Unde de sua falsitate ait Augustinus in sermone De miserrima vita dicens: “O,” inquit, “vita presens 
non est hęc via vera quam nobis ostendis, quia aliis te ostendis longam, ut perdas; aliis brevem, ut dum 
penitere vellent de peccatis non permittas; aliis latam, ut faciant quod voluerint; aliis angustam, ut non 
possint benefacere.” Hęc ille. Satis ergo patet quod mundus et eius avaricia capitalis inimicus est 
homini. 337  
 
 Like many writers before and after him, including fellow poets in fourteenth-
century England, William Langland found it useful to connect self and world by 
analogy, presenting reform of one as key to the reform of the other. This statement 
implies that Langland’s use of ascetic thought as a model for critique of the self would 
be matched by an equally ascetic portrayal of, and set of prescriptions for, society—
but “contempt of the self” or contemptus sui is one thing, contemptus mundi or 
“contempt of the world” quite another. The idea of man as microcosm linking the self 
and the world informed even cosmography in the Middle Ages, and the discipline of 
maintaining the sobriety of the self was available for acceptance by all; the idea and 
discipline of contemptus mundi, on the other hand, guided the cloistered life of 
“regular” religious alone.338 For how could the message to reject and denounce the 
                                                 
337 “Therefore, even though the world may promise during this life health of the body, length of life, 
good fortune, and an opportunity to do penance, you will yet find it to be false and deceitful. By 
experience we see every day that bodily health turns into sickness, a long life into a short while, good 
fortune into bad, the opportunity to do penance into evil impenitence, and so forth. Therefore, in his 
sermon on this wretched life Augustine speaks of the world’s falsehood as follows: ‘O present life,’ <he 
says,> ‘this is not the true way you show to us, because for some you are long, only to ruin them; for 
others short, so that when they want to repent of their sins, you do not let them; for some you are wide, 
so that they may do what they want; and for others you are narrow, so that they cannot do good.’ <So 
Augustine.> Thus it is manifest that the world with his avarice is a chief enemy to man.” Siegfried 
Wenzel, ed. & trans. Fasciculus Morum: a Fourteenth-Century Preacher’s Handbook (London: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), IV.iii., p. 326. 
338 Monastic reformers such as Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Damian viewed contemptus mundi and 
monasticism as inseparable—a matter I touch on below. See also the vast panoply of relevant works by 
Robert Bultot mentioned earlier, especially what exists of his vast and unfinished Christianisme et 
  161   
ways of the secular world contribute to the secular world’s improvement? Contemptus 
mundi could not—and cannot, in fact—be lived in “the world” with the hope of having 
any benefit to it (at least, not literally). I will focus in this chapter on the striking way 
that Langland more figuratively conceives it to apply to all groups in secular society, 
especially the laity. 
 I aim to center my discussion of how Langland proposes contemptus mundi as 
a means of social reform in passūs 5-7 of the B-version of Piers Plowman, with 
occasional reference to important variants in the C-version of Piers. (These passūs 
constitute the narrator’s second dream, which scholars commonly refer to as the 
poem’s second “vision.”) To be sure, several of the estates (or groups in the social 
order) appear prominently very early on in the work; in fact, its opening vision of 
human activity on the “fair field full of folk” constitutes a survey of these estates. 
While that first broad social purview merely identifies social problems before giving 
way to other expository matter, the second vision offers an important sustained 
examination of how the estates not only (imperfectly) do but even how they (ideally) 
should work together. Moreover, the second vision frames its treatment of current 
disorder in relation to prospects for future harmony by drawing attention to the link 
between society and self, the micro-to-macrocosmic relationship that mandates 
personal correction as the prerequisite for social change.  
 This second vision first presents a sermon ad status, or to the assembled 
estates, preached publicly by the character of Reason (who had begun this poem in the 
role of a king’s officer but here takes on an ecclesiastical persona). After this sermon, 
and inspired by it, the poem describes a general confession of sins—or rather, by the 
sins, made up for the most part (strikingly) by the apparently self-nullifying 
                                                                                                                                            
Valeurs Humaines: la doctrine du mépris du monde en Occident de Ambroise à Innocent III (Louvain: 
Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1963).   
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confessions of the individual sins themselves. The character of ‘Repentaunce’ then 
inspires the people assembled for the occasion to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of 
St. Truth, as Reason’s sermon had encouraged. No one knows how to find the shrine, 
however, except Piers: a humble plowman who enters the narrative in this scene, 
Piers, a long-time employee in St. Truth’s hire who offers detailed directions to the 
shrine (no doubt the same tower in which Truth was seen to dwell at the very opening 
vision of the poem). Unfortunately, the would-be pilgrims find these directions far too 
complicated to follow without further assistance—and Piers courteously offers to take 
the pilgrims to the shrine, himself. He only needs to finish plowing a half-acre in his 
care, he says, and then will be ready to go.  
 At the offer of assistance from the collected pilgrims, so that they can make 
their way sooner, Piers suggests several tasks. In return, he promises to provide the 
workers with food and other material support. A considerable number of workers 
refuse to labor for him, though, and instead attempt to extort continued wages. Piers 
finds himself unable to maintain order after this provocation and calls on the help of 
Hunger to coerce the pilgrims into honest and productive work. When Hunger leaves 
at harvest time, called off at Piers’ behest lest the famished pilgrims starve to death, a 
pardon arrives from Truth: the plowing of the half-acre, however imperfectly and 
almost tragically realized, amounts to a pilgrimage for those who had honestly 
labored. Piers and a priest dispute the meaning of the pardon from Truth as the vision 
ends.  
 Taken serially, these events can strike readers as motivated less by compelling 
narrative logic than the accretive chaos familiar from scriptural commentaries and 
dreams (and indeed the poem does owe much of its structure and inspiration to 
exegetical material and literary “dream vision” convention). Nevertheless, as John 
Burrow has shown, the second vision’s episodes do reasonably cohere: while Burrow 
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allows that its details tend to obscure the second vision’s structure, it follows the 
familiar pattern of sermon—confession—repentance—pilgrimage—pardon.339 
Keeping that narrative arc in mind, we can now look rather more closely at its 
components, especially at how the imagery in the sermon that initiates the vision 
provides essential guidance for interpreting the sections that follow.  
 
The Arboreal Iconography of Contempt 
 
 According to Alan of Lille’s influential Summa de Arte Prædicatoria, 
preaching may be defined as “open and public instruction in faith and behavior, whose 
purpose is the forming of men; it derives from the path of reason (ex ratione semita) 
and from the fountainhead of the ‘authorities.’”340 Though Langland may not have had 
this precise definition in his mind when writing Piers Plowman, Reason does deliver 
the sermon that begins the second vision and seems to do an exemplary job with that 
delivery. Like many preachers, Reason begins with a reference to current events. He 
expounds the moral significance of plagues and tempests that had affected England in 
recent times, including an image of one storm’s aftermath that I find centrally 
important for the entire vision:  
 
He preued þat þise pestilences were for pure synne, 
and þe Southwestrene wynd on Saterday at euen 
was pertliche for pride and for no point ellis. 
Pyries and Plumtrees were puffed to þe erþe 
in ensample, segges, þat ye sholden do þe bettre; 
beches and brode okes were blowen to þe grounde 
and turned vpward hire tail in tokenynge of drede 
that dedly synne er domesday shal fordoon hem alle. 
                                                 
339 John Burrow, “The Action of Langland’s Second Vision,” Essays in Criticism 15 (1965), pp. 247-
68; repr. in Robert J. Blanch, ed., Style and Symbolism in Piers Plowman: a modern critical anthology 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), p. 210. 
340 “Prædicatio est  manifesta et publica instructio morum et fidei, informationi hominum deserviens, ex 
rationum semita, et auctoritatum fonte proveniens.” (PL 210, col. 111) See Gillian R. Evans, trans., 
Alan of Lille: the Art of Preaching (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications), 16-17. 
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Of þis matere I myʒte mamelen wel longe, 
ac I shal seye as I sauʒ, so me god helpe, 
How pertly afore þe peple preche gan Reson. (B.5.13-23) 
 
In part because the image appears merely to transmit a short topical, historical 
reference to the so-called Great Wind of 1362, commentators have focused on how 
these lines provide a terminus a quo for the A-text in which they first appear.341 The 
passage has also likely failed to receive much critical scrutiny because the poem itself 
scurries past it so quickly: though Will observes his next breath that of such things he 
could “mamelen wel longe,” he nonetheless hastens onwards, in a breezy synopsis of 
the rest of the sermon, to matters allegedly more deserving of attention. The effect 
here thus more than a little resembles that of video footage presented in advance of the 
11 p.m. television news, in which a smattering of directly recorded conversation or 
public address (presented at first unmediated on tape) quickly fades behind an anchor 
or reporter’s commentary.  
 
                                                 
341 Beginning sometime in the evening of January 15th, 1362, the south of England was ravaged by a 
giant windstorm—a tempest that some accounts tell us lasted for as long as five days. The wind’s 
merely being recorded in chronicles tells us something of its strength; all the more does one 
commentator’s note that it knocked the steeple off of Norwich cathedral. Further testimony to the 
wind’s power comes from its survival in popular memory, one John Richesdale recounting the event 
secondhand in one of his sermons (he was not alive at the time to witness it himself but had heard vivid 
accounts).  Those who did witness or hear about the Great Wind of 1362, obviously, wanted to know its 
cause. A contemporary interpretation held that the wind had originally swept up from Africa to do its 
damage—understandable given that it emanated in any case from somewhere to Great Britain’s south—
and for that reason it is tempting to see in the 1362 tempest a hoary ancestor to another great windstorm 
that ocurred in our lifetimes, one which knocked down a great many of the trees in the gardens at 
Versailles. Thus the chronicles of Walsingham (“nothus Auster Africus”) and Murimuth (“ventus 
vehemens notus Australis Africus tanta rabie”). For these references and more see Oscar Cargill, “The 
Date of the A-text of Piers Ploughman,” PMLA 47 (1932), pp. 354-62. For the contemporary storm at 
Versailles, see Suzanne Daley, “Storm Kills 62 in France, Switzerland and Germany” (New York Times, 
Dec. 27, 1999) and “An Ill Wind Gives Versailles the Push it Needs” (New York Times, Jan. 20, 2000). 
Meteorological reflections on the storm were not so common in fourteeenth-century England, notably, 
as were theological ones. See here particularly Thomas Brinton, sermon 41 (1374), ed. Sister Mary 
Aquinas Devlin in The Sermons of Thomas Brinton, Bishop of Rochester: “Secundo nos excitat ad 
timorem Dei excellencia diuine pietatis, que in finali iudicio male iudicata reiudicat et scrutatur. Si 
timor fuit magnus nobis Anglicis paucis annis elapsis vidisse per ventum arbusta erui, domos opprimi, 
pinnacula et ecclesias dirui [...] quomodo in iudicio non erit maior timor quando ‘Arescent homines pre 
timore que superuenient vniuerso orbi’ (Luce 21)” (I.184). 
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 Using that modern analogy, Reason’s quoted remarks here amount to little 
more than scene-setting local color.  Yet any sustained examination of the passage 
reveals the disingenuousness of Will’s so quickly passing over it. In general Langland 
is not known for the lexical ornamentations and rhetorical excesses of his fellow poets 
in the so-called “alliterative revival,” such as we find abundantly in the works of the 
dazzling Pearl Poet, but we do hear precisely those highly artificial and attention-
grabbing effects in these lines. In an essay devoted to Langland’s poetic style in 
comparison to that of his contemporaries, Burrow has identified several common 
features of typical “alliterative revival” style—all of which this exceptional passage 
displays.342 Even an archaizing and high-styled synonym for men, “segges,” makes an 
appearance.343 The passage thus uses not merely local color but also rhetorical 
highlighting, working to impress readers with Reason’s skill at sermonizing while also 
subtly underscoring (even theorizing) the rationale for its call to repent. 
 For just as evident to certain fourteenth-century persons encountering the lines, 
if equally overlookable to literary critics today, would have been their intellectual 
history. Reason’s brief but poetically show-stopping reference to wind-felled trees 
alone has roots firmly planted in the rich loam of medieval literary imagery, theology, 
and social theory. As a result, these lines become deeply imbued with associations 
concerning the nature of human beings, the world, sin, productivity, and final 
judgment. We might ask just what about a fruit tree’s death signals the necessity for a 
human being’s improvement; how could “pieries and plumtrees [...] puffed to the 
erthe” serve at all “in ensaumple” to “segges”? Yet in the Gospels, the failure of a 
fruitbearing tree actually to bear fruit (generally figs) serves as an index of its failure 
                                                 
342 J. A. Burrow, “The Audience of Piers Plowman,” Anglia 75 (1957), pp. 373-84. 
343 This is not to suggest that Langland’s passage here can rival the refulgent Pearl Poet at the latter’s 
stylistic full throttle; ten or so other synonyms for “man” that one will find easily in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight, for instance, do not appear in Piers. 
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to do the work for which it had been planted. In that case, the offending tree usually is 
cut down (and in one Gospel case, is cursed and withers away).  
 The fate of the fruit trees metaphorically standing in for humans in Matthew 3 
and Luke 3 seems most immediately viable as Langland’s source, here—especially 
verses 8 and 10 of Luke 3, quoting the preaching of John the Baptist: “Bring forth 
fruits worthy of penance [...] For now the axe is laid at the root of the trees. Every tree 
therefore that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be cut down and cast into the fire.”344 
Likewise, in his terrifying first meditation, St. Anselm applies these verses comparing 
soon-to-be-cut-down trees to sinful humans.345 I present a modern translation of the 
Anselmian passage below, but a Middle English version appears in the fourteenth-
century Middle English religious didactic poem par excellence, the Pricke of 
Conscience:346   
 
Barren tree, where is your fruit? You deserve to be cut down and burnt, 
cut up and put on the fire; where is your fruit? At least you bear the 
sharp and bitter thorns of sins. Would that they might prick you to 
repentance that they might be broken, or become so bitter that they 
might disappear. Perhaps you think of some sin as small? Would that 
the strict judge would regard any sin as small. But, alas for me, surely 
all sin dishonours God because it disobeys his laws? Where then is the 
sinner who dares to call any sin small? To dishonour God: how small a 
thing is that? Barren and useless wood, deserving eternal burning, what 
reply will you make in that day when at the twinkling of an eye an 
                                                 
344  “Facite ergo fructūs dignos pænitentiæ [...].  Iam enim securis ad radicem arborum posita est: omnis 
ergo arbor non faciens fructum exciditur, et in ignem mittitur” (Luke 3:8-9). This passage should also 
be read in terms of the epistle of James 3:12, Luke 6:43-44, Matthew 12:33, and perhaps even Romans 
11 on the goodness of a tree being indexed by the quality of its fruit; cf. the cursing of the tree in Mark 
11. Langland was certainly familiar with the passage from James 3, among these, and its Gospel 
sources, as he quotes it later in the second vision.   
345 Middle English didactic literature often quotes “Anselme” as if he had invented this type of ascetic 
thought, but its pedigree (like its currency) was obviously more extensive. 
346 Importantly, the Pricke survives in far more manuscripts even than Piers Plowman.  For a sense of 
the literary historical context in which such a work appeared, see especially Leonard E. Boyle, “The 
Fourth Lateran Council and Manuals of Popular Theology” in The Popular Literature of Medieval 
England, ed. Thomas Heffernan, Tennessee Studies in Literature 28 (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1985), pp. 30-43. For a sense of the writings transmitting technical instruction (as in 
relevant canon law and its interpretation) to parish priests, see Boyle’s essay on “The Oculus Sacerdotis 
and Some Other Works of William of Pagula” in Pastoral Care, Clerical Education, and Canon Law, 
1200-1400”  (London: Variorum Reprints, 1981), item IV, pp. 81-110. 
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account is demanded of you for all the time that has been dealt out to 
you? How have you expended it? Whatever then is found in you that 
has not been directed according to the will of God, whether in work or 
leisure, speech or silence, to the smallest thought, even all your living, 
will be condemned. How many sins will then rush forward as from an 
ambush, which at present you do not see at all. They are surely many, 
and probably more terrible than those that you do not see.347 
 
No axe lies at the root of the trees that Reason describes in Piers Plowman, as it so 
vividly does in Anselm’s treatment. Nevertheless, the wind that knocks the trees 
over—simply viewed on the literal level, as sent “pertly for pruyde and no poynt 
ellis”—does represent divine punishment of the sort that threatens humankind.348  
While the trees cited in the biblical passages and in Anselm’s meditation arguably 
represent human beings, Reason’s reference to “beeches and broad oaks” turning up 
their “tails” out of “dread” also very likely draws on a more thoroughgoing 
anthropomorphism of trees (or perhaps an arborification of human beings) current in 
                                                 
347 The Anselmian passage’s original Latin is not given in Pricke’s text however (on which see below) 
and is at any rate merely paraphrased from its source, presumably because including the entire work 
would halt the motion of the poem: a formal breakdown even shorter quotations risk. For the text it 
paraphrases, though, see the translation by Benedicta Ward in The Prayers and Meditations of Saint 
Anselm (Baltimore: Penguin, 1973), pp. 221-4 (quoted at p. 222).  
348 For one thing, powerful winds that knock down everything in their path are one of the so-called “XV 
signs before doomsday.” On the history behind the XV signs, and the Old French intermediary version 
of the portents lying behind most allusions to them in Middle English, see William W. Heist, The 
Fifteen Signs before Doomsday (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1952). Heist mentions 
the sermon in Piers, which he sees as a possible reference to the signs but one that puzzles him as well. 
“[Langland] does not, of course, specifically mention the legend or say that the storm precedes the 
Judgment by any particular interval,” Heist writes. “It is all very vague—just a general sign of terror, 
though pretty clearly influenced, in the descriptive details, by the legend. So it seems unlikely that the 
author thought the tempest and the uprooted trees were an actual and immediate sign of Doom, in the 
sense of the legend. After all, more than the time allotted by the legend must have passed after the date 
of the storm before he got around to writing this passage, which also, whether by the same author or by 
another reviser or revisers, was allowed to stand in the later forms of the poem. Perhaps the legend was 
regarded even in the fourteenth century as more picturesque than probable” (189-90).  I am very 
grateful to Thomas D. Hill for this and other references to the XV signs. The interpretation I will offer 
below helps to explain away some of what perplexed Heist about Langland’s usage of the passage: if 
Langland were using the image of the wind-blown trees to refer to man as an arbor inversa, then no 
“time stamp” on the tempest—or its concurrence with the previous five or six “signs”—would be 
necessary. It also seems probable that Langland draws on a common symbolism, showing up later in 
Piers in fact, of the secular world as a “wikked wynd. See Maxwell Luria and Richard Lester Hoffman, 
edd. Middle English Lyrics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.), 1974, at #166 (c. 1500—but traditional 
material—in Oxford, MS Bodl. 7683), on p. 238. 
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the Middle Ages: the idea of sinful man as an “inverted tree” that appears in the 
treatise “On the Wretchedness of the Human Condition” (De miseria humanæ 
condicionis) of Cardinal Lothario dei Segni (later Pope Innocent III).349 It appears in 
the Pricke of Conscience, too—a text so thoroughly monitory in both tone and 
approach that a Bodleian Library MS of the Pricke, no doubt alluding to Innocent’s 
text, titles it “On the Wretchedness of the Human Race” (De miseria humani 
generis).350  
 It may seem surprising that the Pricke’s imagery should draw so heavily from 
terrifying works like Innocent’s De miseria, meant to awe and amaze, but Langland 
and his contemporaries also drew on such works. Chaucer himself translated 
Innocent’s treatise, he claimed in the Prologue to his Legend of Good Women, and 
used it as a source for his Man of Law’s Tale. Gower, noting in the Prologue to his 
Confessio Amantis that “now stant the crop under the rote” (line 119), might also hark 
back to a long intellectual history for the idea.351 A similar image of cosmological 
                                                 
349 The De miseria appears most conveniently in Donald R. Howard, ed., and Mary Dietz, trans. On the 
Misery of the Human Condition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). Much of the De miseria humane 
condicionis seems similar to the pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piisimæ de cognitione humanæ 
condicionis, a matter especially interesting in light of the fact that, just as the former work was known 
by Chaucer, the latter seems indisputably to have been known to Langland: Joseph S. Wittig identifies 
the Meditationes piisimæ as the “treatise whose incipit ‘Scripture’ quotes at the beginning of B, Passus 
XI, and whose popularity is attested by the fact that there are, for example, three copies of it preserved 
in the Chapter Library of Worcester Cathedral.” See Wittig’s “Witte and ‘Wikked Will’: the Role of 
Affectus in Spiritual Ascent,” ch. 1 of “Piers Plowman B, Passūs IX-XII: Elements in the Design of the 
Inward Journey,” Ph.D. diss. Cornell University (1969), p. 5.  
350 A long work covering “some 9,624+ lines in Morris’s [EETS] edition,” it aims to describe the 
wretchedness of man’s life from conception onward, the instability of the world, death, purgatory, 
Judgment Day, the pains of hell and the joys of heaven; it devotes one of its seven books book to each. 
Information on the manuscripts of The Pricke of Conscience comes from Robert E. Lewis and Angus 
McIntosh, A Descriptive Guide to the Manuscripts of Prick of Conscience, MÆ Monographs, n.s. 12. 
(Oxford: Society for the Study of Mediæval Languages and Literature, 1982). As Morris prints The 
Pricke of Conscience in his edition, the Pricke looks Langlandian in its use of interpolated Latin. 
Nowhere does the Pricke incorporate Latin as seamlessly as Langland does, though, or interpret it with 
so much license. This impression is confirmed by several manuscripts’ practice of separating the 
quotations from the main text as marginal glosses. The Pricke of Conscience rhymes, sometimes 
irregularly and often in metrically uneven couplets: a jarring effect that Langland’s versification avoids. 
351 The image also has classical antecedents. See A.B. Chambers,” ‘I was but an inverted tree’: Notes 
toward the History of an Idea,” Studies in the Renaissance 8 (1961), pp. 291-99.  
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inversion appears in the twelfth-century “Mirror for Fools” (Speculum stultorum), to 
name just one satire known in the fourteenth century.352 The concept was no doubt 
wide spread. Nevertheless, the Ricardian poets would have most easily have found the 
image of man as an inverted tree in the Latin De miseria—possibly mediated by this 
passage from the even more readily available Pricke:  
 
A man es a tre, þat standes noght harde, 
of whilk þe crop es turned donward, [662] 
and the rote to-ward þe firmament, [663]353 
als says þe grete clerk Innocent: 
Quid est homo, secundum formam, nisi quedam  
arbor eversa, cujus radices sunt crines; 
truncus est caput cum collo; stipis est pectus cum 
alvo, rami sunt ulne cum tibiis; frondes sunt 
digiti cum articulis; hoc est folium quod a ven- 
to rapitur, et stipula a sole siccatur.  
He says, “what es man in shap bot a tre 
turned up þat es doun, als men may se, 
of whilk þe rotes þat of it springes, 
er þe hares þat on þe heved hynges; 
þe stok nest þe rot growand 
es þe heved with nek folowand; 
þe body of þat tre þar-by 
es þe brest with þe bely; 
þe bughes er þe armes with þe handes 
and þe legges with þe fete þat standes: 
þe braunches men may by skille call 
þe tas and þe fyngers alle; 
þis is þe leef þat hanges noght faste, 
þat es blawen away thurgh a wynd blaste,  
and þe body alswa of þe tre, 
þat thurgh þe son may dried be.”354 
 
                                                 
352 “Nil cum præterito præsens mihi tempus habere / cernitur, in caudam veritutur omne caput. / Fit de 
nocte dies, tenebræ de luce serena, / de stulto sapiens, de sapientie nihil.” (lines 19-22) This work, by 
Nigel of Longchamps, is the “Book of Daun Burnel the Asse” mentioned by Chaucer.  I use the edition 
mentioned in the bibliography. 
353 This passage in Gower precisely echoes the diction of Pricke 662-63, but then again “crop and 
roote” (uninverted) was a common idiom; see for example Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde II.348. The 
ability to grow trees upside down is one of the so-called “miracles of the Antichrist” sometimes 
conflated with the XV signs by the fourteenth century. I am also obliged to Thomas D. Hill for a 
number of references to this effect, among which Piers Plowman B.20.51-57 (noted by Barney’s 
commentary ad loc.), where the Antichrist’s inversion of non-symbolic trees also speaks to a universe 
out of harmony with divine order. 
354 Richard Morris, ed., The Pricke of Conscience (Stimulus conscientiæ): a Northumbrian Poem [...] 
(Berlin: A. Asher & Co. for the Philological Society, 1863) at I.662-687.  
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Langland, whose only other nod to Innocent III’s writings may not actually be one,355  
strikingly echoes this passage.  Its concern with fragility aside, the image’s moral 
force is somewhat implicit.356 Only because we know that the treatise speaks of the 
human condition’s sinful wretchedness do we understand in moral terms a comparison 
writers also made on the basis of shape (secundam formam) alone. Yet Reason’s 
image of “beches and brode okes” that “turned vpward here tayl in tokenyng of drede / 
that dedly synne ar domesday shal fordom hem alle” would to Langland’s readers 
necessarily have signified sinful man, the inverted tree whose deadly sin of 
unfruitfulness will consign him to hell.357 Certain manuscripts of Piers Plowman make 
the moralizing link between Reason’s doomed trees and his sermon’s flawed human 
auditors even stronger, substituting the more emphatically moralizing “us” (ous) for 
“them” (hem) in the phrase “dedly synne er domesday shal fordoon hem all.”358  
 As allusions in the Speculum stultorum and Confessio amantis prologues 
imply, the image of an inverted tree could be used as a commentary on the effect of 
microcosmic man’s indissoluble but broken link to nature, the erstwhile master of all 
creation’s distortion of the very nature of the universe thanks to the enormity of his 
                                                 
355 John A. Alford, “Some Unidentified Quotations in Piers Plowman,” Modern Philology 72.4, p. 398 
(on C.10.212, “Non licet vobis legem voluntati, sed voluntatem coniungere legi”). 
356 It would be fascinating to know if Innocent were aware of the passage in Peter Damian’s works 
comparing the righteous man of religion to a leaf not blown away by the wind (quoted in Spijker, “Peter 
Damian and the Homo Interior”).  
357 For the way in which Innocent would reference human “unfruitfulness,” see the passage in the De 
miseria just preceding the one quoted by the Pricke, all under the heading “What Kind of Fruit a Man 
Produces” (c. VIII): “O vile indignity of the human condition, O undignified condition of man’s 
vileness! Look at the plants and the trees—they produce flowers, foliage, and fruit; you produce nits, 
lice, and tapeworms. They pour forth oil, wine, and balsam; you give off spit, urine, and dung. They 
breathe forth a sweet odor; you give off a dreadful stench. As the tree is, so is the fruit, for the bad tree 
cannot bring forth good fruit, nor the good tree bad fruit” (On the Misery, 11-12; for its scriptural 
allusions see Luke 6:44  et sim. , cited elsewhere in Piers). Innocent’s tree does not reference the fruit 
of works, then—that comparison, if not Langland’s alone, appears in a pseudo-Bonaventuran analogue 
I must needs leave for later—but relates to the body itself.  
358 B.5.13. “Hem,” as the lectio difficilior, more common reading, and the best describer of why trees 
would want to quiver anyway, stands in the Kane-Donaldson B-text and the Kane-Russell C-text; but 
two MSS of B (FH) read “vs.” Not far from half the C-text manuscripts (P2PERMVAQSFKGN) read 
“ous.” 
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sin. Moreover, just as the image of the inverted tree in ascetic discourse implies a 
direct relationship between mankind and nature, it also very usefully sets forth a 
means by which one of the most misanthropic of ideologies (by appearances) could 
discuss and even suggest corrections for the relationship of human individuals to 
larger human society. As this chapter will go on to show, Piers Plowman uses the 
ideology of “contempt of the world” (contemptus mundi) in its attempt to assess and 
counsel society in a roundabout, indirect way. The poetic fireworks set off during the 
sermon’s discussion of the felling of trees by the Great Wind constitute the first 
inkling we have  that Langland will attempt such a rapprochement between claustral 
(“cloister-related,” or monastic) and secular ways of thinking in the second vision.  
 
Avoiding Estates Satire 
 
 Reason’s admonishment to the assembled masses that they, like so many 
“piries and plumtrees [...] beeches and brode okes,” will meet with destruction at the 
last judgment unless they change quickly gives way to what Reason would have his 
hearers actually do for their reform. Interestingly, when the poem shows us how 
“pertly afore the people to preche gan Reason,” it describes not Reason’s counseling 
his audience or congregation as individuals, but rather focusing his address to those 
people as groups. It obviously makes sense that a preacher would not focus on 
individual circumstances pertaining to each listener in a very public sermon delivered 
before a massive gathering, but Langland did not have to depict Reason as a preacher. 
That he nevertheless did suggests that Langland found societal groups to form a good 
intermediary level between person and society, therefore a good locus for promoting 
the individual virtues that might lead to societal reform—and the rest of the vision 
bears this suggestion out.  
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 In a summary as brief as he had given for Reason’s sermon-prologue (or 
prohemium) on the plague and the Great Wind, Will recounts Reason’s message to 
these various societal groups:  
 
He bad Wastoure go werche what he best kouþe 
and wynnen his wastyng wiþ som maner crafte. 
and preide Pernele hir purfil to leue 
and kepe it in hire cofre for catel at nede. 
Tomme Stowue he tauʒte to take two staues 
and fecche Felice hom fro wyuen pyne. 
He warnede watte his wif was to blame 
that hire heed was worþ a marc & his hood noʒt a grote. 
He bad Bette kutte a bouʒ ouþer tweye 
and bete Beton þerwith but if she wolde werche. 
He chargede Chapmen to chastiʒen hir children: 
‘Late no wynnyng forwanye hem while þei be yonge, 
ne for no poustee of pestilence plese hem noʒt out of reson. 
my sire seide to me, and so dide my dame, 
“Lo, þe leuere child þe moore loore bihoueþ”; 
Qui parcit virge odit filium: 
whoso spareþ þe spryng spilleþ hise children.’ 
And siþen he preide prelates and preestes togideres, 
‘That ye prechen þe people, preue it yowselue, 
and dooþ it in dede, it shal drawe yow to goode. 
Lyue as ye leren vs; we shul leue yow þe bettre.’ 
And siþen he radde Religion hir rule to holde 
‘Lest þe kyng and his conseil youre comunes apeire 
and be Styward of youre stede til ye be stewed bettre.’ 
And siþen he counseiled þe kyng his commune to louye: 
‘It is þi tresor if tresen ne were, and tryacle at þy nede.’ 
And siþen he preide þe pope haue pite on holy chirche, 
and er he gyue any grace gouerne first hymselue. 
‘And ye þat han lawes to loke, lat truþe be youre couetise 
moore þan gold ouþer giftes if ye wold god plese; 
for whoso contrarieþ truþe, he telleþ in þe gospel, 
Amen dico vobis nescio vos.  
And ye þat seke Seynt Iames and Seyntes at Rome, 
sekeþ Seynt Truþe, for he may saue yow alle. 
Qui cum patre & filio; þat faire hem bifalle 
that seweþ my sermon’; and þus seyde Resoun.  
(B.4.24-59) 
 
Beginning with the estate of commons or laborers: to non-workers, represented by 
“Wastoure,” he encourages gainful employment (a self-negatory reform that will be 
the hallmark of the vision’s next section); to married folk who already work, women 
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and men generally, Reason encourages industry and thrift; merchants, as he goes on to 
specify, should be careful not to spoil their children for any reason. Next, Reason 
addresses the clerical estate, urging priests to live according to their teaching and for 
the religious orders to better manage themselves, while the pope should concern 
himself first and foremost with his own affairs. Third, the noble and governing classes 
should strive for righteousness rather than gold and bribes, and, finally, anyone 
interested in going on a pilgrimage should seek “Saint Truth” before all other far-off 
shrines. 
 In all this estates-based instruction, though, estates satire is conspicously 
lacking. True, Reason does provide advice based on commonly held assumptions 
about the proclivities and weaknesses of the various social orders, the basis of that 
genre.359 But Reason seems content only to offer advice that applies generally and 
often overlaps, not taking the satirist’s essential next step of explaining how specific 
unreformed groups have ruined the world for everyone else. For all estates could 
benefit from increased thrift and industry, just as no estate should lavish excessive 
money on clothing and just as no estate should spoil its children. All estates should not 
only teach but live as good examples for others, striving for proper management of 
their affairs before attempting to manage others’. No estate should put its private 
interests and desires for gain above what is lawful or right. Reason enjoins pilgrims to 
“sek[e] Seynt Truþe” more than “Seynt Iames and Seyntes at Rome,” but, in theory, 
pilgrims could be members of any estate (B.5.56-57). 
 In the general confession guided by Repentance that follows, Langland 
continues to focus on separate sins as opposed to the social groups that might best 
                                                 
359 A classic text for the discussion of fourteenth-century estates satire, such as that exemplified in 
Chaucer’s General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, is Jill Mann’s Chaucer and Medieval Estates 
Satire. Her most major contribution is to show that Chaucer, not content with earlier conventions, 
modifies them. In so doing, she shows, he creates characters who seem more like “real people” than the 
stereotypes upon which they build.   
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exemplify them, an approach that becomes evident from the confessions of Pernele 
(representing pride or superbia) and Lechour (representing lust or luxuria) that go 
first.360 Pernele, said to suffer from the “proude herte” that might afflict anyone 
enamored of “purfil,” decides to love her finery less. Lechour chooses to abstrain from 
most food and drink every Saturday for seven years—a penance that tells us nothing 
of his place in society, either.361 With vanity about physical appearance persisting as a 
misogynist stereotype about women even in the present day, and lechery a stereotype 
still associated with men, Pernele and Lechour could even now stand in for just about 
any man or woman in all society.  
 By this point in Piers Plowman, a reader is to be forgiven for feeling not very 
surprised or puzzled over anything at all—but even the most jaded reader must pause 
                                                 
360 The passus 5 confession of the sins has appeared to contain some of the most successful and 
entertaining satire in the poem, despite certain anomalies this chapter will also go on to point out, 
possibly because the grotesqueness of its caricatures and the misinterpretations of Repentance’s words 
give it a sort of humor that other instances of satire in Langland do not always provide. Giving clues to 
character by describing traits of clothing and physiognomy (which the fuller version of this chapter 
describes in more detail) is of course exactly Chaucer’s technique in the General Prologue to his 
Canterbury Tales, in which the vices and affections of nearly every character are blazoned on them—
perhaps for the narrator to ignore, or for him not to understand, but for us quite clearly to see. (I 
discussed Langland’s use of this technique for describing Haukyn in chapter 3.) As Jill Mann shows in 
her Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire, such portraits develop in accordance with the medieval satiric 
tradition of satira communis, general satire, in which people in each of the “estates” or every order in 
society come under censure for the wickedness of their ways (see a typical, if early, example among 
Henry of Huntingdon’s epigrams under the appropriate title of “Satira Communis” in Diana Greenway, 
ed. and trans. Historia Anglorum, also referenced vis-à-vis Piers Plowman by Norton-Smith). 
Langland’s sins may seem less human, more indirect, and less mordantly witty by comparison with 
Chaucer’s rich depictions—but also more vivid, somewhat more even-handed, and more to the point in 
terms of their social analysis. And while Langland’s personified sins might not fit the standards that we 
apply to contemporary satire, they more than exceed the level of description offered by what John D. 
Peter (Complaint and Satire) rather misleadingly labeled medieval “complaint” (indeed, Peter was 
compelled from the outset to allow the portrait of Sloth as “closer to Satire than is [Langland’s] wont” 
[6]).   
361 The penance that Lechour vows to undertake may seem ludicrously excessive, to “drink but mid the 
duck and dyne but ones”—and thus entirely comic. Yet fasting and avoidance of alcohol were 
considered standard remedies for unchecked yearnings of the flesh (as various earlier medieval writings 
de jejunio and even the fourteenth-century Fasciculus morum contemporary to Langland make very 
clear).  
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at the “Confession of the Sins.” What, exactly, can this episode possibly mean? 362 
One explanation might read the confession as an authorial joke made at Reason’s 
expense: Reason had heretofore proven extremely idealistic, and now, with 
Repentance encouraging the sins to confess themselves following the sermon, 
Reason’s idealism wins its (impossible) crown. Yet this interpretation introduces 
further difficulties. First, Repentance has not yet appeared in Piers; we have no reason 
to accept him as the target of mockery by the poet. Second, even more importantly, 
insulting Reason’s aspirations clearly has no merit. Third, even if Langland did want 
to paint Reason in a bad light—for example because Langland was secretly a 
Satanist—it’s hard to imagine how having his call so thoroughly succeed would 
achieve the intended goal.363 
 If we persist in looking for a “target” to the sins’ strange self-abnegating 
confession, as I think we must, then we will find it in the sins themselves rather than in 
Reason or Repentance. Langland makes the vices’ humanity clear, as we have already 
seen in the case of Lechour and of Pernele, but at the same time gives all but Pernele 
the name of a capital sin. By denying human names to human characters, Langland 
suggests a general humanity depraved to the point of becoming indistinguishable from 
its errors; notably, his descriptive portraits better illustrate the nature of the sins in 
question than their characters’ particular estates.  
 Langland did not eschew estate identification altogether in describing the sins, 
of course. Envy’s cloak has the “foresleves” of a friar’s frock, Wrath hangs about the 
                                                 
362 As Burrow notes on pp. 209-10 in “The Action of Langland’s Second Vision,” cited above, the 
second vision very confidently narrates a series of events whose connection does not seem immediately 
apparent to a contemporary reader: “ ‘A well-constructed plot,’ [according to Aristotle,] ‘cannot either 
begin or end at any point one likes.’ But an action which begins with a confession, proceeds with a 
ploughing and ends with a pardon can hardly be called usual or natural, let alone necessary. On the 
contrary, it seems quite arbitrary. One feels one could extend it indefinitely, with masses, sea-voyages, 
community singing and the like, ‘beginning or ending at any point one likes.’” 
363 This theory was actually alleged by a speaker in a Piers Plowman session at the 2008 International 
Medieval Congress at Kalamazoo. 
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houses of religious orders when stirring up his trouble, and Coveitise very obviously 
works as a merchant of some sort. Still, Langland’s associations between sins and 
estates cannot be called ironclad identifications, and his estate identifications 
themselves do not appear programmatic. As with Pernele and Lechour, we cannot tell 
which estate some sins might belong to. With Gluttony, for instance, the choice seems 
arbitrary: the confession portrays him distinctively as a friend of off-hours laborers 
(quite in line with the revelers that fete the character Hunger later on in the vision, 
during harvest), but passus 12’s dinner scene featuring the fraternal “doctor of 
divinity” (mentioned above, ch. 3) shows gluttony in a more upper-caste context as 
well. The portrayal of Sloth, finally, draws on depictions of multiple estates rather 
than clearly on one, from ignorant layman to priest, merchant to noble. Sloth finally 
decides to be a pilgrim, but any of his possible social classes could go on pilgrimage 
and in fact the collective audience of Reason’s sermon does.364  
                                                 
364 When Sloth cannot stay awake even long enough to finish the least part of his confession unaided, 
Langland clues us in to the torpid essence of the sin, and we can see its hypocrisy when Sloth declares 
not to know the Paternoster but to be deeply familiar with “rymes of Robyn Hood and Randolf Erl of 
Chestre / ac neither of Oure Lord ne of Oure Lady the leeste that evere was maked” (B.5.395-97) as if 
Sloth were some minor country nobleman. Yet when Sloth follows this to say that “I have be preeste 
and person passynge thirty wynter, / yet kan I neyther solve ne syge ne seyntes lyves rede [...] / ac in 
Canoun ne in the Decretals [...] rede a lyne” in lines 415-21, he appears to be some particularly 
undeserving member of the clerical estate. When we see Sloth admit to keeping very poor records of his 
financial transactions, especially his debts and past-due payment to his workers, he appears to have a 
place in the commercial world. My focusing on the elements of numerous ways of life indicated by 
Sloth’s confession should not necessarily deny Sloth’s unity as a person. Just because Sloth’s 
confession presents him as a nobleman, a businessman, and a parson does not mean that Langland 
intended him to be three entirely separate individuals rolled up into one (though how he can say that he 
doesn’t know the Paternoster and tends only to arrive at church at the mass’s concluding words, yet can 
also claim to have been a priest for thirty years, rather escapes me). Just as likely, Langland portrays 
Sloth on the model of someone who, while technically “preest and person,” also commands a sizeable 
household and workforce and frequently borrows money from others. But although a real human being 
can exist in three different spheres simultaneously, they are nonetheless different spheres. It is true of 
course that a common gambit of medieval estates satire decries members of a given estate for 
encroaching upon the identity and activities of another in order to take on some of that second estate’s 
advantages without its normally attendant responsibilities. But Langland’s Sloth depicts three separate 
enroachments of this sort at once, all going in different directions. Langland uses the same technique in 
describing Wrath: he is former gardener for a convent of friars, and the nephew of an abbess, usually 
unwilling to visit monasteries but known to do so on occasion.  
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 The way that the confession scene treats the psychological faculty of “will” 
(not properly a sin but, of course, connected to sinning) clearly shows that Langland 
recognizes how any number of vices might affect a person in society. Will, after all—
most obviously—is the name of the poem’s narratorial persona. When Repentance’s 
exhortations cause “wille to wepe water wiþ his eyen” as the confession of sins 
commences, though, “will” pretty clearly represents the voluntas that can cause so 
many of these sins to come about. The poem does not mention the voluntas in each of 
the sins’ confessions, but it appears in enough of them to make a noticable leitmotiv in 
the scene. Will is next mentioned as faulty and in need of correction in the confession 
of Envy, where the vice complains that his appetite has been ruined “[f]or enuye and 
yuel wil is yuel to defie” (B.5.122). Sloth also confesses fear of how he shall be 
judged as an employer “whan we shul rede acountes: / so wiþ wikked wil and wraþe 
my werkmen I paye.” (B.5.427-28) The most interesting depiction of Will/will in the 
episode occurs at the end of the confession of Wrath himself, in which both the 
narrator and the faculty of voluntas momentarily seem fused:  
 
‘Now repente,’ quod Repentaunce, ‘and reherce neuere 
Counseil þat þow knowest by countenaunce ne by speche;  
and drynk nat ouer delicatly, ne to depe neiþer, 
that þi wille ne þi wit to wraþe myʒte turne:  
Esto sobrius!’ he seide, and assoiled me after, 
and bad me wilne to wepe my wikkednesse to amende. 
(B.5.87-182)  
 
“Wilne,” in the last line quoted above, is not a noun but an infinitive verb, “to want 
to.” Nevertheless, because the narrator’s name is Will and because Repentance turns 
to him just after admonishing the sin of Wrath against drinking that might turn his will 
into wrath, it is impossible to disagree entirely with the reading in the Cr and 
(corrected) M witnesses of the B-text, “And bad him Wyl to wepe his wikkednesse to 
amende” (B.5.183).  In that case, judging from the logic of the lines, it would appear 
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that Reason’s almost magical command to “be sober”—“Esto sobrius!”—has changed 
drunken wrath back into sober Will. Here, Will especially invites comparison with the 
narratorial persona (given the similarity between Repentance’s instructions here with 
Holichurch’s admonishment not to drink and later characters’ injunctions to be quiet), 
creating a fascinating self-identification of Langland the satirist and the most 
discordant of deadly sins.365   
 Langland’s references to the will throughout the Confession of the Sins, and 
especially his self portrait as Wrath, inspire us to look for representations of the 
narrator elsewhere in the scene as well. One of the most promising candidates, a 
certain “Roberd the Robbere,” closes the scene just as a generic personified “wille” 
opened it—with tears. There is no mention of “wille” specifically here, and it could be 
that in the case of Envy’s confession “wille” has no important role either, yet in 
opening the entire confession with a weeping voluntas, then featuring a sin midway 
through that seems to conflate both this voluntas and the narrator, and in ending the 
confession with the tears of an outlaw—estateless but becoming, as persons from any 
estate can, a pilgrim (like the similarly multi-status Sloth)—Langland implies (or we 
may infer) that Reason’s earlier allusion to the dire fate meeting unfruitful trees here 
meets its most poignant human referent so far. Robert, who more realistically than the 
self-abnegating sins cannot “wene to wynne wiþ craft þat [he] owe[þ],” helps to 
establish two of the greater poem’s most important themes. First, no human can ever 
fully reform without Grace, an idea I will deal with more fully by discussing 
Langland’s prophetically conveyed “satiric norm” (and eschatological ideal). Second, 
Piers Plowman does not blame the estates as failed systems so much as he blames 
flawed individuals for the unregulated and unfruitful estates: a theme that finds further 
                                                 
365 Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the poem’s uneasy tension between the criticisms launched 
by its satire and the Christian imperative (forever alluded to and directly cited by Langland)  not to 
judge others. 
  179   
corroboration in the scene of plowing and pilgrimage that follows. In the next section 
of this chapter, I intend to show that Langland suggests the ideology of contempt of 
the world (contemptus mundi) as a way to reform dysfunctional society’s self-
absorbtion and lack of productivity. 
 
The Regulation of Estates 
   
Possumne te absolvere? Ab excommunicatione bene possum te absolvere, sed ab 
irregularitate non.366 
 
 As I have already shown, the arboreal image that appears in Reason’s sermon 
in passus 5 (at the beginning of Piers Plowman’s second “vision”) identified 
perverted, unfaithful human nature as the most pressing problem facing humanity. 
Subsequently, in the Confession of the Sins, Langland seems more interested in 
blaming problems with society on individual sins rather than on estates as would have 
been typical. Langland even suggests perversion of the will as a cause for some of 
these sins, which implies narratorial self-criticism as well. The motif of weeping used 
by Langland throughout the confession scene—first of the will, then of Robert the 
Robber for an inability to repair his fallen humanity or to become a more fruitful 
member of society—underscores Langland’s emphasis on the role of the invididual in 
either bringing about or healing society’s fallen state.  
 Even so, although it emphasizes the role of the individual will, the Confession 
of the Sins also shows that individual sinning is frequently aided and abetted by the 
secular society that it harmes. About halfway through the Confession scene, the 
lengthy narrative concerning Gluttony makes that much clear. While Gluttony hastens 
                                                 
366 “Can I absolve you from excommunication? Certainly. From irregularity? No.” Simon of Gaunt (de 
Gandavo), from a “Sermon Preached at Oxford on Ash Wedneday, 11 February 1293,” in Oxford 
Theology and Theologians c. AD 1280-1502, edd. Franz Pelster and Andrew George Little, Oxford 
Historical Society 96 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 205-15. I owe this reference to Paul 
Hyams. 
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to the church so that he might be properly shriven, an alehouse offering rich foods 
with heavy spices tempts him to sin again. Langland continually juxtaposes the wild 
conviviality of Glutton and his fellows with the regular hours of the church office 
during the scene, going to great lengths satirically to caricature this lover of fine foods 
and friendly company as a human factory for swill and waste so foul that no dog 
would ever eat it. The line that Glutton “pissed a potel in a Paternoster while” has been 
seen as evidence of a quintessentially vernacular Christian understanding of time, as if 
Langland really were wholly interested in the actions of Glutton and his fellows and 
knew only Church-inspired phrases to mete out the time of day (on which view, Piers 
Plowman’s narrative about Gluttony goes on at such length because the poet found the 
subject matter especially entertaining). Yet a more productive understanding of the 
scene attributes more artistry to Langland. In the time it takes for someone to pray the 
Our Father and thereby produce some real “fruit” of repentance, Gluttony has 
produced only a potful of urine. He has failed to empty himself of wickedness—and 
Langland has endeavored to inspire in his readers an edifying disgust, as a result, at his 
secular failure to be ruled 
 In the Confession of Wrath, Langland also purposefully contrasts the regular 
life of the church with the haphazard life of the sins. Recounting his days in the 
employ of varied religious communities, Wrath points out that most places he would 
visit fostered him all too gladly. Only Benedictine monasteries put a damper on him, 
chastizing Wrath severely. I do not at all mean to claim that the Benedictines come 
across here as ideal. All the same, it seems unambiguously noteworthy that at least one 
type of regular, religious society should be able to stamp out one of the sins. 
Langland’s (relative) gentleness in his critique of monks during the confession of 
Wrath does not come about accidentally, then, I propose, but rather follows naturally 
from what we have seen elsewhere in the passus: that the sins are fostered by their 
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social networks’ unethical—because unregulated—life. As Repentance (true to the 
etymology of his name) makes clear in his denunciations of Coveitise and Gluttony, 
the poem suggests that giving up a sin involves not only a change of behavior but a 
changeover to a more structured—again, regulated—social context.  Although 
Langland may have reservations about its practical application, he clearly considers 
ascetic practice not only a viable method for criticizing the self but also a way to live 
in the world as a Christian.367  
 
A Brief History of “The World”: the Roots of Langlandian Contempt 
 
 But why “contemn” something so multifaceted as “the world”? Contemptus 
mundi, like its neighbors contemptus sui and amor proximi, occupies a space between 
pure ideology and lived practice. It is a virtue, commanded by precept to be cultivated, 
which cannot be expressed in just one way but a cluster of ways—just as telling 
someone to conserve the environment expects more than his merely installing 
fluorescent lightbulbs, or merely recycling, so too the precept for someone to contemn 
                                                 
367Here, as elsewhere, I describe the ideology I see Langland’s satire drawing on as “ascetic” rather than 
“monastic.” The monastery is often understood to be where Christian ascetic practice sees its purest 
possible realization and its most perfect form, but since all Christianity upheld ascetic ideals to some 
extent it would be impossible in this space to make the case that Langland had gotten all of his ascetic 
ideas from monasticism. Even granting that monks were responsible for an impressive number of 
opuscula from which Langland would draw, the poet need not necessarily have encountered these in a 
monastery as a monk. Moreover, as Piers Plowman itself makes clear, Langland would try to promote 
this ideology as a possible help to other groups in society who were not monks: friars, secular clergy, 
and, of course, the laity. Since Langland does not suggest that these groups give up their wonted lives to 
begin anew as monks, “ascetic” seems much the better term for describing what the poem does suggest 
they do. The claim that Langland owes his understanding of ascetic ideology to high-medieval written 
exemplars requires defense, I think, but fortunately may be justified easily on three grounds. First, the 
high-medieval monastic ideal of contempt of the world or contemptus mundi became widely influential, 
even in its own age, outside the cloister. Second, these texts enjoyed popularity in the later Middle Ages 
as well, and are in fact drawn on in subtle ways and even quoted throughout Piers Plowman. Third, 
while changing circumstances naturally inspired change in how contemptus mundi was viewed in late 
medieval England, these are best seen as innovations and thus best viewed alongside earlier 
formulations of that particular ideal. 
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the world expects him to do more than lock himself away from human society. 
Certainly the “world” is a complicated place, and as John Van Engen has noted the 
term and medieval Christians’ relationships to it both require further study.368 Seen 
from Langland’s medieval, Christian perspective, it causes multitudes of problems for 
the Christian; depending on the extent to which one is ensnared by or enamored of it, 
it can foster any one or several of a multitude of sins (as we’ve seen).   
In intellectual-historical terms, contempt of the world has been traced back to the 
classical philosophy of Stoicism. While it no doubt shares in Stoicism’s legacy, 
however, by the Middle Ages the two could be considered sufficiently different to 
deserve two different names. Stoicism properly so called was pagan, even nontheistic, 
and philosophical. Contempt of the world though was explicitly Christian. And while 
one can imagine anyone embracing Stoic ideals, contempt of the world, developed in 
the Stoicism-influenced ascetic “communities” of Christianity’s early Desert Fathers 
seems to have found its best and fullest possible expression in the rigorous, regulated 
life of hermits, anchorites, canons, and (most obviously) monks.   
 According to the preëminent twentieth-century scholar on contemptus mundi, 
Robert Bultot, influential thinkers such as Saint Anselm of Canterbury encouraged 
contemptus mundi for all estates—but only as realized in the strictly cloistered life of 
monasticism. Bultot recounts Anselm’s visions, seen “au cours d’une maladie,” when 
the saint “etait moine depuis peu”:   
 
L’image qu’Anselme se fait du monde est extrêmement sombre; elle 
baigne dans l’horreur et le dégoût. Il était moine depuis peu qu’au cours 
d’une maladie, une vision vint l’arracher à lui-même. Il vit un fleuve 
impétueux où se déversaient les immondices de toutes les rivières et les 
lavures de l’univers entier; son eau impure tourbillonnait, charriant 
d’horribles détritus. Tout ce qu’il pouvait atteindre, ce fleuve 
l’emportait avec lui, roulant pêle-mêle hommes et femmes, riches et 
pauvres. Pris de pitié à ce spectacle hideux, Anselme s’enquit d’où ces 
gens pouvaient tirer de quoi vivre et étancher leur soif. On lui répondit 
                                                 
368 See John Van Engen, “The Future,” at pp. 509-512 for perspicacious remarks. 
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qu’ils vivaient de l’eau qui les emportait et en faisaient même leurs 
délices. ‘Comment! s’écria Anselme indigné. Quelqu’un qui aurait bu 
de cette saleté pourraît-il prétendre à l’honneur d’être homme?’ ‘Ne 
t’étonne pas, répliqua son compagnon, ce que tu vois, c’est le fleuve du 
monde qui emporte les hommes du monde. Mais veux-tu connaître ce 
qu’est la vraie vie monastique?’ Et il le conduisit dans l’enceinte d’un 
vaste cloître; les murs étaient recouverts d’argent très pur, l’herbe 
même qui poussait sur le sol avait des reflets d’argent; douce et 
agréable au-delà de toute idée humaine, elle s’inclinait doucement 
lorsqu’on se reposait sur elle et se redressait aussitôt qu’on se relevait. 
Un charme incomparable remplissait ce lieu. Aussi Anselme choisit-il 
d’y habiter. Son guide alors lui demanda: ‘Veux-tu savoir ce qu’est la 
vraie patience?’ Sur son ‘oui’ ardent, Anselme fut rendu à lui-même: 
plus de guide, plus de vision; il gémit et se lamenta. Mais de ce 
moment ‘il s’appliqua à fuir d’autant plus l’horreur de la première 
vision qu’il s’abandonnait à jouir de la douceur de la seconde,’ et 
résolut d’attirer les hommes à la vie monastique. Pour Anselme donc, 
l’humanité se partage en deux groupes: une massa damnata livrée au 
pécheé et la société des moines.369  
 
Afterwards, as Bultot quotes another scholar remarking, “peu de saints ont pratiqué au 
même degré le Compelle intrare.”370 We can quibble with the extent to which Bultot’s 
analysis views Anselm’s and other thinkers’ discussions of contemptus mundi as 
accurately representing their “horror” and “disgust” at the sæculum. It seems just as 
likely that, especially allowing for the amplifying powers of rhetoric reported 
secondhand (here by Eadmer), these negative feelings have been exaggerated from 
principled dislike to active and viscerally experienced “contempt.” Anselm’s 
utterances on contempt of the world helped to create for his subordinates and others 
influenced by him the emotional code according to which other monks could pattern 
their own expressions of “contempt.”  
 Piroska Nagy’s essay on monastic tears and their apparent subjectivity 
provides a window on how the practices of contemptus sui gave rise, paradoxically, to 
increased attention on the effects of such an emotional code. As she writes, 
 
L’individualité se révèle et s’affirme donc par les larmes. Mais d’un 
autre côté, il faut bien ces jaillissements ‘soudains’ et ‘incontrôlés’ qui 
                                                 
369 Bultot, Christianisme 4.2, p. 84-85. 
370 Bultot, Christianisme 4.2, p. 105. 
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‘s’échappent,’ pour l’expression du soi, car l’émotion—comme la 
réflexivité—‘se cache’ derrière une maîtrise ‘raisonnée,’ la figure 
sociale. [...] Les pleurs semblent être d’un côté une expression de 
l’intériorité, de ce, qu’on a de plus authentique et individuel en nous, ce 
qui définit le plus profondément notre identité personnelle; de l’autre 
côté les pratiques des pleurs, comme celles du rire ou de l’amour, ou 
comme les formes que prennent l’angoisse ou la peur à telle ou telle 
époque, se constituent en système et semblent avoir des explications et 
des significations en termes sociaux, des implications sur la 
représentation de la personne même. [...] [L]’individu est prisonnier de 
son époque jusqu’aux termes mêmes dans lesquels il formule tant son 
identité que son malaise.371 
 
Therefore, just as it presumably was not only his own innate or God-given sensibility 
that led Anselm to “hate the world” but rather the influential discussions or discourses 
of others (despite his visions), so too we should read Anselm’s and others’ statements 
on contemptus mundi in part as expressions of what Barbara Rosenwein claims that 
one William Reddy has called “emotives,” or the set of statements a given “emotional 
community” (Rosenwein’s term) or social group more generally allows as acceptible 
for the expression of feelings.372 Rosenwein likes the characterization of “emotives” as 
emotional “rough drafts,” a term which underscores the very rhetoricality of these as 
well as the mediated nature of (indeed) all texts.373 Though Anselm’s actual hatred of 
                                                 
371 See “Individualité et Larmes Monastiques: une Expérience de Soi ou de Dieu?” in Das Eigene und 
das Ganze: zum Individuellen im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum, edd. Gert Melville and Markus 
Schürer, Vita regularis (Ordnungen und Deutungen religiosen Lebens im Mittelalter) 16 (Münster: Lit, 
2002), pp. 107-29 (quoted at pp. 128-29). 
372 I have already made reference to this term in the introduction, citing Rosenwein’s Emotional 
Communities, pp. 18-19. 
373 François Vandenbroucke, in Pourquoi?, accounts for the ideology’s later-medieval influence in a 
variety of ways: first by asserting character flaws peculiar to famous expositors of the idea (such as 
Romuald, Peter Damian, and Joachim of Fiore); then by quoting Bultot to the effect that everyone in the 
Middle Ages practiced contempt of the world (“une foule obscure de petits et de sans grade l’ont 
partagé” [53]); then by observing that, in “certaines périodes sombres de l’histoire” (suspiciously the 
eleventh and twelfth, then fourteenth through sixteenth, centuries), “l’univers chrétien, et surtout celui 
d’Occident, a médité avec effroi et gémissement sur les maux de temps.” (53) His next suggestion 
accords (despite certain choices of phrasing) best with my own: that “la vocation des moines les mettait 
en contact avec l’idéal chrétien dans toute sa pureté, et, en face, ils ne trouvaient souvent que des 
contrefaçons, des compromis, le péché sous ses formes les moins nobles. [...] [E]n dépeignant et en 
stigmatisant les mœurs de leur temps, ils en sont venus à dépasser leurs propos et à poser des 
affirmations de principe [avec] excès de langage que, de notre point de vue actuel, nous pouvons 
regretter dans leurs prises de position.” (54-55) Vandenbroucke then offers the exceptionally interesting 
idea, though one I would consider difficult to prove, that in attempting to escape the empty hierarchies 
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the extramural world cannot be certain, then, we can be certain at least of the 
association here between monasticism and contemptus mundi that his works imply—
an association that would weaken and secularize, of course, even as both remained 
well represented in medieval religious life. It is most interesting that John of 
Salisbury’s poems in the Entheticus Maior make Stoicism the object of satire—along 
with Epicureanism and sophistry—and contemptus mundi the object of praise.374  
 To return to Langland and to begin with the process of considering Piers’ 
recommendations of contempt of the world for the estates, I want first to observe that 
expressions of “contempt of the world” occur earlier than the pilgrimage that follows 
the general confession in that poem. (Because this study focuses on Piers Plowman B, 
discussion of these C-version additions—and thus, as it happens, most of the way that 
Langland promotes contemptus mundi for the clerical estate—wil be discussed last in 
terms of revision from B to C.) Where it does appear, contemptus mundi usually 
comes across as a virtue to be cultivated by individuals for individual ends, while 
because of the nature of the characters in the vision it amounts to a fix for social ills.  
 The contempt of the world promoted by the monastic reforms had two distinct 
characteristics that deserve remarking upon. First, it emphasized separation from 
secular activities; originally, as in Late Antiquity, this separation was understood to be 
                                                                                                                                            
and rituals and “œuvres” of the Christian church in pursuit of a higher ideal, “d’innombrables fidèles 
poursuivent leur salut en dehors des voies traditionnelles de la Parole de Dieu et des sacrements, en 
attachent une valeur salutaire définitive à des pratiques ascétiques, à des dévotions,” paradoxically “à 
des ‘œuvres’ en un mot.” Because they did not know any better, and because they fervently wished to 
save monasticism from “[le] chaos spirituel vers lequel l’Europe se précipite,” they took up spiritual life 
“en adoptant et en répandant les méthodes d’oraison qui, en dehors de leurs milieux, se géneralisent 
alors.” (55-56) Those “méthodes” from “en dehors” were ascetic and partook of the contempt of the 
world. For the state of “pessimism” in Langland’s time, see e.g. Robert E. Lerner, “The Black Death 
and Western European Eschatological Mentalities,” The American Historical Review 86.3 (1981): 533-
52 and Jean Delumeau, Sin and Fear. 
374 See Laarhoven, Entheticus,  poems 33 (“Stoicism and fear of death”), 36 (“Stoicism and 
Providence”), and 47 (“Deceiving world and true love”) in Part II, section H.   
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quite literal.375 Second, as the word “contemptus” implies, separation from the world 
was also to be accompanied by a dismissive reflection on worldly things and the 
unwholesome effects they have had on the world-contemner during his (or her) secular 
life. In either of these, contemptus mundi’s heritage from Stoicism can be clearly 
felt—as well as the two mindsets’ divergence.376 According to the medieval ascetic 
Christian worldview, believers should actively fight the “three foes” of the world, the 
flesh, and the devil while fearing the terrors of the Last Judgment.377 Meditations on 
man as an inverted tree or bag of slime, in so far as they focus not only on the vileness 
of the self (proper realm of contemptus sui) but also the sinful nature of worldly life, 
fit perfectly within this long literary and intellectual heritage.  
 The message of contemptus mundi writings (and as a result the essential 
hallmarks of contemptus mundi) remained unchanged even as the context became 
more laicized, vernacularized—in a word, secularizied. As we have seen, for instance, 
the enormously popular Pricke of Conscience quotes approvingly from Anselm’s 
                                                 
375 On stabilitas loci in the Benedictine Rule see Jean Leclercq, “La Séparation du Monde dans le 
Monachisme au Moyen Âge,” in La Séparation du Monde, ed. Albert Plé (Paris, 1961), 75-94 and Giles 
Constable, “Monachisme et Pélerinage au Moyen Âge,” repr. in Religious Life and Thought (London,Æ 
Variorum, 1979), item III, pp. 1-27, as well as Délatte’s Commentaire.  See also my “Cluniac 
Promotion of Pilgrimage” in The Encyclopedia of Medieval Pilgrimage, edd. Larissa J. Taylor et al. 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 111-112. Chapter 11 of Richard of St. Victor’s De exterminatione mali et 
promotione boni, titled “De vano vel vero mundi contemptu” (coll. 1079D-1080B) in fact makes the 
case for literal separation with a nod to a Roman satirist: “Sed videte ne forte non sufficiat nobis et 
vobis mutasse locum non animum: ‘sæculum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt,’” he writes 
(col. 1080A), thus paraphrasing  “cælum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt” (Horace, epistle 
1.11) 
376 I refer again to the poems on Stoicism and on contempt of the world in John of Salisbury’s 
Entheticus. Both a medieval monk and a classical Stoic could express detachment or separation from all 
manner of temporal things—except in law, after all, the contemporary term for this sort of behavior, is 
not “being contemptuous” but “being philosophical.”  Still, the monk would more likely express his 
separation and detachment more literally (through enclaustration and refusal of worldly goods, like 
meat). A Stoic, on the other hand, would recognize that he does not really need the temporal goods he 
still (perhaps moderately) continues to enjoy; being suddenly deprived of them, albeit not his intent, 
would inspire neither happiness or sadness on his part but rather continued equanimity or apatheia. 
Stoic apatheia, of course, can hardly label properly the wide emotional range deemed suitable in the 
central Middle Ages for one practicing contemptus mundi. 
377 On the “three foes” see Donald R. Howard’s works—notably The Three Temptations. For more on 
Piers and the eschaton, please refer to this dissertation’s chapter 6. 
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meditations without any expectation whatsoever on the part of its readers to take up 
monastic life. Piers Plowman, too, takes up the message of contemptus mundi writings 
in the second vision, while allowing for changes in the ideology’s application.  
The promotion of contemptus mundi to non-clerical estates by Piers in the second 
vision is not overly subtle—one can see it there—but it defies immediate identification 
as contempt of the world in the way described thus far.378 Most obviously, its 
difference stems from the fact that its would-be practitioners are not at all monastic. 
They will not be and are not cloistered, so the way in which they might flee the world 
cannot be literal either. Just as importantly, the reason that we might not immediately 
see contempt of the world being recommended in the second vision has to do with 
what else happens in the episode, since much of the vision investigates other estates 
that were not under heavy consideration in the Confession of the Sins. In its central 
“plowing scene,” the second vision turns more fully to the wider range of estates to 
examine how the various groups in society function and interrelate. As it does so, it 
draws on contempt of the world. 
 The “plowing scene,” initiated by passus 6, revises the opening scene of the 
poem sowing the irregular, self-serving interests seen on the “fair field full of folk” in 
a new and productive arrangement. Piers has by this point agreed to help the newly 
confessed pilgrims to the shrine of St. Truth, claiming to know the location as well as 
a “clerk knows his books”; told to wait while he finishes working his half acre, they 
                                                 
378 For Langland’s praise of contemptus mundi among regular religious orders, see R. E. Kaske, 
“Langland and the Paradisus Claustralis,” MLN 72.7 (1957), pp. 481-83. The idea of a paradisical 
cloister is also covered in Bultot, ed. Dialogus de Mundi Contemptu, vel Amore, attribué à Conrad 
d’Hirsau, [avec] extraits de l’Allocutio ad Deum et du De veritatis inquisitione: textes inédits, Analecta 
Mediævalia Namurcensia 19 (Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1966). See also both argument and 
bibliography in Jean Leclercq, “Le Cloître est-il-un Paradis?” in Le Message des Moines à Notre 
Temps, edd. Fumasoni Biondi et al. (Paris: Fayard, 1958), pp. 141-59. Thomas D. Hill’s essay on the 
Middle English “Land of Cockaygne” also suggests a vernacular poet’s familiarity with this central 
metaphor. See “Parody and Theme in the Middle English ‘Land of Cockaygne’,” N&Q  220 (1975), pp. 
55-59. 
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volunteer to provide him with their aid. Though impatience alone might have inspired 
them, it seems, Piers nevertheless soon finds that many of the pilgrims are willing to 
work for him; he accordingly promises them both food and pay in return.   
 In order for his work on the half acre to be maximally productive, Piers 
provides overlapping, mutually reinforcing tasks for the other estates—a call for 
coöperation between the estates especially noteworthy in Piers’ instructions to the 
knight:  
 
Curteisly þe knyʒt conseyued þise wordes: 
‘By my power, Piers, I pliʒte þee my trouþe 
to fulfille þis forward þouʒ I fiʒte sholde. 
Als longe as I lyue I shal þee mayntene.’ 
‘Ye, and yet a point,’ quod Piers, ‘I preye þee of moore: 
Loke þow tene no tenaunt but truþe wole assente, 
and þouʒ þow mowe amercy hem lat mercy be taxour 
and mekenesse þi maister maugree Medes chekes; 
and þouʒ pouere men profre þee presentes and ʒiftes 
nyme it noʒt an auenture þow mowe it noʒt deserue. 
For þow shalt yelde it ayein at one yeres ende 
in a wel perilous place þat Purgatorie hatte. 
And mysbede noʒt þi bondeman, þe bettre shalt þow spede; 
thouʒ he be þyn vnderlyng here wel may happene in heuene 
that he worþ worþier set and wiþ moore blisse: 
Amice, ascende superius. 
For in Charnel at chirche cherles ben yuel to knowe, 
or a knyʒt from a knaue; knowe þis in þyn herte. 
* * * * * * * * 
‘I assente, by Seint Iame,’ seide þe knyʒt þanne, 
‘for to werche by þi word while my lif dureþ.’  
(B.6.33-49, 55-56) 
 
But even though Piers envisions a social world of interlocking powers and 
responsibilities of the most pragmatic sort, the justification he gives for this new order 
comes straight out of the discourse of contemptus mundi.  
 The Fasciculus morum, in an exhortation to contempt of the world in its book 
on avarice (a vice that also lies at the heart of social problems in this scene) offers a 
striking analogue to Piers’ remark about the “Charnel at chirche” and its dissolution of 
estates:  
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Thus, in order to quench worldly glory we must always hold our death 
before the eyes of our mind. Whence Augustine says beautifully on his 
book On True Innocence, in the last chapter: “O greedy man, you 
blossom with riches and boast of the nobility of your elders; you exult 
in your country, the beauty of your  body, and the honors that are 
bestowed on you by others. Look at yourself, that you are mortal and 
dust and will go to dust. Look around you, at those who once shone in 
like splendor before you. Where then are the civil powers you strove 
for, where are the unsurpassable orators, the leaders, the tyrants? Is not 
all this dust and ashes, is not all their memory contained in a few 
verses?”  And he continues: “Look, then, at their graves and see which 
is lord and which is slave, which is poor and which is rich; tell, if you 
can, the defeated from the king, the strong from the weak, the beautiful 
from the ugly. Keep this in mind, then, that you may not become proud. 
You will remember it once you have looked at yourself.” “Remember, 
therefore, your last end, and you will never sin.” For his end comes 
upon man quickly and unexpectedly like a thief.379 
 
Piers’ own actions can be read as the sort of preparation one would normally make for 
an upcoming pilgrimage, but, in the passage, his disdainful commentary on wealth 
stands out along with his reflections on impending death. One reason that pilgrims 
drew up wills before going on their journeys seems to have been the likelihood of 
unforseen fatal disaster.  Piers prefaces his own will by declaring that he has grown 
old and that upon his death his (parish) church will have his bones and that the money 
he leaves behind will be used to pay his debts before going to his wife.  
 This also closely matches discusson of contemptus mundi provided by the 
Fasciculus morum, which declares that healthy contempt of the world, “uprooter of 
avarice, consists of three things: memory of the Lord’s passion, meditation on the 
                                                 
379 “Et ideo ad mundane glorie extinccionem semper est mors ante oculos mentis premeditande. Unde 
pulcre aid Augustinus libro De vera innocencia, capitulo ultimo dicens: ‘Diviciis,’ inquit, ‘flores, o 
avare, et de maiorum nobilitate te iactas. Exultas enim de patria, de pulcritudine corporis, et de 
honoribus, que tibi ab hominibus deferuntur. Respice, inquit, teipsum, quia mortalis et terra es et in 
terram ibis. Circumspice, qui ante te similibus fulsere splendoribus. Ubu ergo sunt quos ambiebas 
civium potentatus, ubi insuperabiles oratores, ubu satrape, ubi tyranni? Nonne omnia pulvis, nonne 
favilla, nonne in paucis versibus eorum memoria est?’ Et sequitur: ‘Respice ergo sepulcra eorum et vide 
quis dominus, quis servus, quis pauper, quis dives; discerne, si poteris, vinctum a rege, fortem a debili, 
pulcrum a deformi. Memor ergo (dicit Augustinus) esto ita quod aliquando ne extollaris. Memor autem 
eris (dicit ipse) te seipsum respexeris.’ Hęc ille. ‘Memorare ergo novissima, et in eternum non 
peccabis.’ Ipsa enim caute et inopinate ad modum furis hominem solet invadere.” (Fasciculus morum, 
ed. Wenzel, 384-385) 
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certainty of death, and love of voluntary poverty. [...] Therefore, Blessed Jerome says: 
‘He who reflects that he will die and leave to the world all the goods that were granted 
to him, easily scorns everything.’ Whence Job exclaims: ‘My days will be shortened, 
and only the grave remains for me.’”380 Piers practices, and suggests that the knight 
also practice, the same essential characteristics of contemptus mundi (namely negative 
reflection on corrupting worldly goods and a dose of anxious preparation for the 
afterlife) without, however, taking up the cloistered monastic life one would expect 
from “classic” high-medieval treatments of the theme. 
 Most importantly, Langland’s espousal of contempt of the world in the second 
vision helps us to understand his general satiric practice. Thus far in the plowing of the 
half acre episode we have witnessed very little that looks like satire—though the 
episode’s highly schematic characterization does match expectations. We have instead 
observed instructions for proper societal interaction that happen to be founded upon 
contemporary treatments of contempt of the world. Moreover, after asking Piers how 
they might help him and then readily acceding to his advice, the women, knight, and 
other pilgrims do little worthy of mockery or rebuke. Not everyone, however, will 
follow Piers’ advice as readily agreed: Langland’s satire focuses on these characters, 
appearing across the estates, and labels these as “wasters.” 
 In addition to bearing striking resemblance to gyrovague or Goliard figures 
(mentioned already in chapter 3 above),  Langland’s “wastours” have a pedigree in 
earlier satire and debate. Whereas the other work’s eponymous Wastoure stands out as 
representing a viable (if not entirely respectable) way of conducting secular life, 
however, the wastours that crop up on Piers’ half acre merit blame for the upheaval 
                                                 
380 [N]ota quod iste mundi contemptus avaricie extirpator in tribus consistit, videlicet in dominice 
passionis recordacione, in certe mortis consideracione, in voluntarie paupertatis dilectione. [...] Et ideo 
dicit beatus Ieronimus: ‘Facile,’ inquit, ‘contempnit omnia qui se cogitat moriturum et omnia bona 
concessa mundo relinquenda.’ Unde Iob: ‘Dies,’ inquit, ‘mei breviabuntur et solum michi superest 
sepulcrum.’ ” (Fasciculus, ed. Wenzel, pp. 384-385)  
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and disunity of society itself. Significantly, as Piers points out multiple times, 
wastours ruin the “world”—and, for that, they merit Piers’ intense and even 
apocalyptic furor. Their comically bad attempts to get out of work also provide a very 
interesting thematic echo to the image of fruit trees blown untimely to the ground at 
the beginning of passus 5, since the wasters—doomed to perdition at the last 
Judgment—are also unproductive, and unfruitful, inversions of what they would claim 
to be (holy men). Langland himself seems to draw the parallel, as Piers’ forcing them 
to work by calling down the wrath of Hunger on them does lead to productivity—and, 
ultimately, even harvest time. In using contemptus mundi ideas in the B-version of 
Piers Plowman, Langland thus places special emphasis on coöperative productivity. 
 Langland saw, however, that the solution to the societal problems so ably 
sketched out in the plowing scene lay not merely in productivity. Enforced labor does 
not achieve all the objectives that Langland would see fostered in society, in large part 
because it brings about results that can only be temporary from unwilling actors under 
pressure of duress. Langland therefore promotes a revision of mindset, not just 
practice, in the would-be pilgrims. We have already seen that this mindset and 
practice, as originally promoted by Piers, are both consonant with some contemporary 
(late fourteenth-century) treatments of contemptus mundi. Furthermore, as I shall 
suggest, this new light on the second vision’s intellectual history suggests Langland’s 
view of how plausible secular contempt of the world might be and helps to refine the 
way we might interpret one of its key episodes.  
 
Metaphoric Landscape and Literal Sense 
 
 As we saw in examining the second vision’s Confession of the Sins, Langland 
often satirizes society by showing various groups or people completely willing to take 
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on reforms and generally perform tasks for which they prove completely unfit. The C-
text of the poem adds an instructive example of the same thing happening with the 
knight, who agrees to help to enforce Piers’ rules for working on the half acre but then 
fails to prevent the wastours present from lazing about anyway. For whatever reason—
the poem leaves it up to us to decide—the knight will not prosecute such loafers. The 
B-version does not really hold the knight accountable for this lack of enforcement, 
interestingly, focusing instead on the incorrigibility of the offending wastours. In the 
C-version, on the other hand, the knight seems much more worthy of blame. To judge 
from the small addition here, “for the knyght wil nat,” the poem blames the knight’s 
inaction on willful (and criminal) laziness.  
 The C-version draws further attention to the knight’s inaction by introducing  a 
little-noticed pun. There, the knight swears not by St. Truth to do all that he can to 
help Piers with his plowing, but by “St. Gyle.” St. Gyle refers to Saint Giles, who in 
fact had a shrine local to Langland’s Malvern Hills.381 But “gyle” also means “guile,” 
a fact a medieval reader would have been able to appreciate—especially in a satire.382 
The interchangeability of the two very different senses here, of a knight who will help 
Piers out of pious devotion to Truth and a knight who promises to defend Piers only 
out of guile nicely shows how powerful a satiric instrument for Langland an 
ambiguously abstract or concrete noun may become.  
 Throughout the second vision, characters’ tendency to understand conflicting 
senses of the same term sparks much of the poem’s satire—a matter anticipated, 
characteristically for Langland, by Reason’s opening speech.383 Reason’s instructions 
                                                 
381 R. E. Kaske, “Piers Plowman and Local Iconography,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 31 (1968), p. 161. 
382 See the title of the medieval “Gospel of (Silver) Mark” for a similar style of pun. 
383 See also R. E. Kaske, “Holy Church’s Speech and the Structure of Piers Plowman,” Chaucer and 
Middle English Studies in Honor of Rossell Hope Robbins, ed. Beryl Rowland (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1974), pp. 320-27. 
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there could apply equally well to almost any social group, given that all the addressees 
of the sermon are human beings rather heavily encumbered by sin. As I have argued, 
the confession of the sins focuses more on the socially harmful and self-corrupting 
nature of the sins’ unregulated secular life than the wickedness of any particular estate. 
(That is, Coveitise appears in the guise of a bad merchant, but all merchants in the 
poem do not merely represent the sin of greed.) Nevertheless, the terminology of 
estates completely occupies the second vision’s characters, who busy themselves 
trying to maximize their privileges. Piers’ famous call for help to Hunger, especially in 
the C-version, comes about in response to the pilgrims’ clinging to privilege and 
unwillingness to take on the discipline of labor.  
 The wasters who so alarm Piers spend their days gambling and dice playing 
but would present themselves to Piers as congenitally disabled, or exempt from travail 
by virtue of their (clerical) estate, or otherwise entitled to skip work; the knight with 
whom Piers so explicitly negotiates a social contract before the plowing begins “wil 
nat” come to Piers’ defense in the C-version (C.8.170)—and in the B-text apparently 
cannot help Piers. The knight does “curteisliche” accede to Piers’ request and threaten 
Wastoure to “abigge by þe lawe, by þe ordre þat I bere!” (B.6.164, -66) In response, 
though, Wastoure “leet liʒt of þe lawe and lasse of þe knyʒte” (B.6.168) The key to 
understanding such a puzzling interchange lies with the backing the knight gives to his 
threat: not fear of force but respect for some authority inherent in the order of 
knighthood.384 The beginning of the pilgrimage to Truth provides an even better 
illustration of how spectacularly the second vision’s characters err in interpreting the 
instructions given to them by Piers and Reason, and of how readily they agree to 
                                                 
384 On this reading, the C-version’s phrase “for the knight wil nat,” while blunter than its counterpart in 
the B-text, could have been inserted by a revisor sensitive to the implications of the 1381 peasants’ 
revolt: better that Wastoure not be brought to heel because the knight has failed to exert his power than 
to call into question whether aristocratic power even exists. 
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challenges they are altogether unprepared to meet. The poem describes them 
proceeding forward not in any holy, earnest, devout manner, even if Robert’s 
confession had caused us to expect that of them. Instead, the would-be pilgrims 
“blustreden forth as beasts over bacches and hilles / til late and longe,” becoming 
exhausted and lost (B.5.514-15).    
 The poem underscores the insufficiency of the pilgrims’ physical search for the 
shrie of St. Truth by concluding it with the appearance of a real, professional pilgrim 
whose attire (including a hat encrusted with pilgrims’ badges) the poem terrifically 
lampoons.385 This palmer or professional pilgrim, claiming to have visited shrines for 
his “soule hele”—but really, we suspect, for profit—would not be out of place in the 
Canterbury Tales. But he also fits easily into one of the major inquiries of the vision. 
Do the “signes that sitten on [his] hatte” (B.5.529) matter at all? Does winning them, 
even after legitimate travel, constitute any accomplishment for the soul? Certainly not 
in this particular instance. The professional pilgrim’s (honest) admission that he 
cannot tell the pilgrims the way to Truth, his reason being the richly rewarding 
observation that no pilgrim attired as a pilgrim “with pyke ne with scrippe” had ever 
before asked to see Truth, makes the point mordantly well (B.5.538).   
 The immediate subsequent arrival in the narrative of Piers the Plowman 
himself drives the point home. As his name suggests, he is not attired like a pilgrim at 
all. Nor does he even present his role as one of pilgrimage. He therefore appears at 
once more “real” and “down to earth” than the professional pilgrim, and yet unlike 
that well-travelled palmer he also claims to know Truth and can teach the way there, at 
once, with no payment needed at all. Readers of Piers Plowman will have noted the 
juxtaposition of literal and figurative landscapes before, but I think that it is especially 
important to point out their coëxistence as a tool of Langland’s satire—not just of the 
                                                 
385 I discuss this passage in The Encyclopedia of Medieval Pilgrimage, pp. 480-483, s.v. “Palmer.” 
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pilgrims’ apparent blockheaded attempt to reach “saint Truth” by physical travel but, 
more broadly, of their overall worldview. 
 The pilgrimage scene in Piers Plowman is so famous, and so central, that 
critics who have found the sequence of events leading up to it rather bizarre never 
question whether or not it actually exists. John Burrow, for instance, rightly explains 
the sermon and confession that begin the second vision as fit preludes to a pilgrimage; 
his suggestion that the pilgrimage represents an especially “tough” penance necessary 
for the granting of the pardon, which concludes the second vision, definitely has merit. 
But other forms of tough penance would also have been possible, as the poem’s 
subsequent metamorphosis of pilgrimage to plowing itself attests. Elizabeth Salter 
comes closest to explaining the pilgrimage in Piers by equating it with the interior, 
mystic pilgrimages written about by Langland’s literary predecessors and 
contemporaries.386 Nevertheless, since the second vision also concerns itself with non-
spiritual comportment (following the laws, for instance, and laboring as the needs of 
society dictate despite even legitimate claims to clerical exception) the issue of how to 
see the world, of how to read reality, becomes even more central to these scenes.  
 How to “read reality” is a matter Augustine had discussed in the De doctrina 
christiana, which uses the imagery of a journey in a famous section of Book I’s 
chapter 34:  
 
Consider that although Truth itself, and that Word through whom all 
things were made, was made flesh that it might dwell among us; the 
Apostle yet says, ‘[if] we have known Christ according to the flesh, 
[now] we know him so no longer.’ [...] Thus the Apostle, although he 
was still walking on the road and following God who was calling him 
to the glory of his Heavenly vocation, yet ‘forgetting the things that are 
behind and stretching forth to those that are before,’ he had already 
passed the beginning of his ways. That is, he was no longer in need of 
that which is an approach and a setting out on the journey to all those 
                                                 
386 Elizabeth Salter, as Elizabeth Zeeman, “Piers Plowman and the Pilgrimage to Truth,” Essays and 
Studies by Members of the English Association n.s. 11 (1958), pp. 1-16, repr. in Blanch, ed., Style and 
Symbolism in Piers Plowman (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), pp. 117-31. 
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who wish to arrive at [T]ruth and to rest in eternal life. [...]  Thus it may 
be understood that nothing should hold us on the road, for the Lord 
Himself, although He saw fit to become our road, did not wish to hold 
us upon it, but wished that we pass on, lest we cling in infirmity to 
temporal things, even though He took them up and wore them for our 
salvation. Rather let us run through them quickly that we may be 
worthy to approach and to reach Him who freed our nature from 
temporal things and made a place for it on the right hand of the 
Father.387  
 
Neither Augustine, nor, I trust, Langland would deny that the call for spiritual 
development itself requires a sort of inner pilgrimage of the type that Salter suggests; 
even on the metaphysical, metaphoric level on which he speaks, Piers still sets forth an 
itinerary towards the pilgrims’ destination. But in order to arrive at Truth, as Langland 
and Augustine both make clear, one must arrive at the figurative level first. Visible 
reality itself is something to be worked, and passed, through.  
 The conflict between literal and figurative ways of seeing comes to a head in 
the action of passus 7, the so-called “pardon passus.” After Piers and his followers 
have succeeded in bringing in the harvest, and by consequence bidding farewell to 
Hunger (whom Piers had called down to force their labor out of desperation at lazy 
wasters), Truth decides to reward Piers and anyone who might wish to help him with 
yet more plowing—this time, of the whole earth. The exact applications of the pardon 
do not need much discussion, I think, though we should note that the more 
professional and urban social groups inspire the greatest attention here: merchants, 
                                                 
387 D. W. Robertson, trans., Saint Augustine: on Christian Doctrine (New York: MacMillan, 1958; repr. 
Prentice-Hall, 1997), pp. 29-30. The Latin appears in PL 34, cap. 34, coll. 33-34: “Vide quemadmodum 
cum ipsa Veritas, et Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia, caro factum esset, ut habitaret in nobis (Joan. 
III, 3, 14), tamen ait Apostolus: Et si noveramus Christum secundum carnem, sed jam non novimus (II 
Cor. 5, 16). [...] Apostolus igitur quamvis adhuc ambularet in via, et ad palmam supernæ vocationis 
sequeretur vocantem Deum, tamen ea quæ retro sunt obliviscens, et in ea quæ ante sunt extentus 
(Philipp. III, 12-14), jam principium viarum transierat; hoc est, eo non indigebat, a quo tamen 
aggrediendum et exordiendum iter est omnibus qui ad veritatem pervenire, et in vita æterna permanere 
desiderant. [...] Ex quo intelligitur quam nulla res in via tenere nos debeat, quando nec ipse Dominus, in 
quantum via nostra esse dignatus est, tenere nos voluerit, sed transire; ne rebus temporalibus, quamvis 
ab illo pro salute nostra susceptis et gestis, hæreamus infirmiter, sed per eas potius curramus alacriter, ut 
[col. 34] ad eum ipsum, qui nostram naturam a temporalibus liberavit, et collocavit ad dexteram Patris, 
provehi atque pervehi.” 
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lawyers, and beggars, groups groups that the earlier vision largely ignores in its 
treatment of the estates. What does require comment, however, is the opposition 
between Piers and priest that suddenly develops when Piers has finished explaining 
the document’s contents to the several estates.  
 The crisis of the section comes as the priest demands to read the pardon and 
“construe” it for Piers in English; with Will looking on, Piers shows the priest the 
pardon, only to hear him declare that there is no pardon at all—just two lines taken 
from the Athanasian Creed. One could probably contrast Piers’ and the priest’s stances 
here as “the letter” versus “the spirit,” with the words of Paul hanging over all of it 
that “the Spirit giveth life, but the Letter killeth.” It might be closer to the truth to 
claim though that Langland has in mind here a slightly emended verse, namely that 
“the spirit giveth life—letters kill.” For by questioning the status of the document 
from Truth, and especially the ability of Piers (a straightforward vernacular Christian) 
to interpret it, the priest esentially nullifies Piers’ teaching, prioritizes “real” pardons, 
and offers nothing as an alternative but more cynical reliance upon the system of 
confessors and indulgences and all manner else that the vision previously had 
condemned.  
 Such faithless elitism triggers Piers’ anger, but the surprising quotations from 
the Bible with which he expresses it meet with only a snide rebuke from the priest. 
While it may not make much sense on one level for Piers to speak in Latin—and that 
would be the literal level represented by the priest—on a spiritual level, Piers’ Latin 
does make abundant sense as a signifier that he authoritatively knows the Bible. When 
Piers famously rips the pardon in two out of consuming anger—“for pure tene” 
(B.7.119)—then, we have not only a signal that paper pardons by themselves are 
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useless, as other scholars have argued, but also that the very presence of a literal level 
at all is confusing and misleading.388  
 I find further support for this interpretation in Piers’ actions just following the 
tearing of the pardon, when Piers gives up plowing to concentrate—rather 
ascetically—on the betterment of his soul:  
 
‘I shal cessen of my sowyng,’ quod Piers, ‘& swynke noʒt so harde, 
ne aboute my bilyue so bisy be na moore; 
of preieres and of penaunce my plouʒ shal ben herafter, 
and wepen whan I sholde werche þouʒ whete breed me faille. 
The prophete his payn eet in penaunce and in sorwe 
by þat þe Sauter vs seith, and so dide othere manye. 
That loueþ god lelly his liflode is ful esy: 
Fuerunt michi lacrime mee panes die ac nocte. (B.7.121-28a) 
 
Piers’ use of Latin here and in subsequent lines arouses the suspicious rebuke of a 
priest, with whom he wrangles. They continue to argue angrily after this, and the 
passus itself will continue with the narrator’s musings at sunset over the possible 
meaning of his dream—but Piers’ disavowal of plowing here effectively marks the 
end of the second vision’s grand experiment in secular contempt of the world. To 
achieve true contemptus mundi and regularity of life, Piers must separate from the 
disorderliness of the system of estates; finally admitting the pilgrims’ tragic failure “to 
bear fruits worthy of repentance,” he announces his decision to retire from literal 
reality altogether. He will not appear in the poem as a normal, mortal plowman again. 
                                                 
388 B.7.119. See among others Robert Worth Frank, “The Pardon Scene in Piers Plowman,” Speculum 
26.2 (1951), pp. 317-31. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AMOR PROXIMI, VERITATIS DEFENSIO:  
THE PROMOTION OF SILENCE AND THE CHALLENGE OF JUDGMENT 
 
God in þe gospel grymly repreueþ 
alle þat lakkeþ any lif and lakkes han hemselue. 
 
(B.10.267-268 [Clergie]) 
 
 Anyone considering the binary commonly made composed of “self” and 
“world” would be forgiven for thinking it leaves an element out. Contemptus sui and 
contemptus mundi presuppose even for solitaries that some supportive community be 
somehow extant to assure success to the the ascetic contemner of self and world. 389 
The level of others or neighbor lies somewhere between the self and the world, and 
like both of these it poses its own challenges or even problems. 
 The largest problem posed by other human beings, only exacerbated by 
secularity, is that it is by no means easy to tell if another should be part of one’s 
special inner circle or subset of society. It is after all fairly safe to assume that 
inherently separated ascetic religious life sets up strong obstacles and Shibboleths that 
will keep someone not of pronounced devotion and sincerity of character well and 
firmly out. A default inclusivity holds sway in secular life, on the other hand (at least 
by comparison), which might lie behind contemptus mundi.  It certainly lies at the 
basis of Piers’ own critique of wastours and other nonlaborers of dubious validity 
during Piers Plowman’s second vision: how is anyone supposed accurately to assess 
whether claims of clerical privilege, let alone physical disability, are legitimate or not? 
Should these claims be honored during times of hardship?  
                                                 
389 Note back in chapter 3 the discussion of how solitary life for any Christian required “vetting” and 
approval from higher up; there is also extensive evidence on the patronage welcomed if not actively 
sought after—of monarchs, for example—by solitaries: see Ann K. Warren, Anchorites and their 
Patrons in Medieval England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Consider also that oft-
touted landmark of early Middle English prose, the Ancrene Riwle: while indubitably enclosed in the 
walls of a church, the addressees of this text also have servants to take care of them and the occasional 
(albeit discouraged) visit from locals, family, and friends. 
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 The flip side to this problem of others also comes in passus 7, in the second 
vision, when Truth—pardoning good workers openly through the agency of Piers—
sends a message under secret seal to merchants:  
 
Treuþe herde telle herof, and to Piers sente 
to taken his teme and tilien þe erþe, 
and purchaced hym a pardoun a pena & a culpa 
for hym and for hise heires eueremoore after. 
And bad hym holde hym at home and erien hise leyes, 
and alle þat holpen to erye or to sowe, 
or any maner mestier þat myʒte Piers helpe, 
pardon wiþ Piers Plowman truþe haþ ygraunted. 
* * * * * * * * 
Marchauntʒ in þe margyne hadde manye yeres, 
ac noon A pena & a culpa þe pope wolde hem graunte 
for þei holde noʒt hir halidayes as holy chirche techeþ 
and for þei swere by hir soule and so god moste hem helpe 
ayein clene Conscience hir catel to selle. 
Ac vnder his secret seel truþe sente hem a lettre, 
and bad hem buggen boldely what hem best liked 
and siþenes selle it ayein and saue þe wynnyng, 
and make Mesondieux þerwiþ myseise to helpe, 
wikkede weyes wightly amende 
and bynde brugges aboute þat tobroke were, 
marien maydenes or maken hem Nonnes, 
pouere peple bedredene and prisons in stokkes 
fynden swiche hir foode for oure lordes loue of heuene, 
sete scolers to scole or to som kynnes craftes, 
releue Religion and renten hem bettre. 
“And I shal sende myselue Seint Michel myn angel 
that no deuel shal yow dere ne in youre deying fere yow, 
and witen yow fro wanhope, if ye wol þus werche, 
and sende youre soules in saufte to my Seintes in Ioye.” 
Thanne were Marchauntʒ murie; manye wepten for ioye 
and preiseden Piers þe Plowman þat purchaced þis bulle. 
(B.7.1-8, 18-39) 
 
Having made this special provision for merchants, the poem then turns to members of 
the legal profession. Though their constant quest for profit might come across as 
immoral, the poet suggests, the use of incoming profits not for personal enrichment 
but for improving the lives of others will merit Truth’s approval and reward. As with 
the coëxistence-induced conflict in the second vision between literal and spiritual 
ways of seeing, then, so too the dangerous indistinguishability between self-
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abnegating ascetic and self-serving secular ways of life. This issue has not been 
resolved by the end of the second vision, merely had its contours traced.  
 This chapter will focus on what the rest of Piers Plowman, the so-called “vita 
de Dowel, Dobet, et Dobest” does both further to explore and resolve the problems 
posed by others to the larger project of self perfection and of world reform. The first 
section of the chapter will provide a long reading of the vita, mainly considering when 
it is appropriate to criticize others, given our lack of perfect knowledge of others’ 
intents. In the second section I will explore the relevance of canon law and 
conventional scriptural interpretation to the issue, arguing that the poem urges silence 
even where criticism or rebuke might seem most warranted by custom and good sense. 
In the chapter’s third section I will explain how silence instead of rebuke was 
considered among theorists of monastic asceticism to help foster both humility and 
obedience—important contributors to amor proximi, or love of neighbor, in contrast to 
a desire for Veritatis defensio also pursued in the poem. A conclusion will attempt to 
assess the implications of my argument for Langland’s poem as a satire and as the 
product of a writer in a specific social circle or community. 
 
Rebuke and the Problem of Insufficient Knowledge 
 
 As the last chapter noted, the second vision of Piers Plowman—and in effect 
the entire visio—ends with an odd, contentious exchange between Piers Plowman 
himself (as a character) and an unnamed priest. I have already explored some of the 
implications of what light Piers’ rebuke might be able to shed on the poem’s 
conception of the “world” (in all that word’s simultaneous literal and figural, 
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metaphorical, spiritual, or metaphysical senses).390 But if the scene is shocking and 
notable at all, it gains these qualifies not from the ways of seeing that it juxtaposes so 
much as from the “territorial” conflict between estates that Piers and the priest 
embody. It does not seem right for a priest to be challenged on the proper 
interpretation of a religious document by a plowman, and certainly not for the 
challenge to be a successful one.  
 Piers’ conflict with the priest ends the so-called visio, and it introduces to the 
vita, which follows, evidence that the larger poem differs from much didactic 
literature of the Middle Ages by sincerely questioning the reliability of the very 
sources of authority it cites in the manner of debate.391 Although this debate element 
adds enormously to Piers Plowman’s richness as a critique of society, it also makes 
any exposition of these episodes exceptionally hard to follow. As such, I will follow 
my usual practice of providing a brief and rather schematic synopsis of the relevant 
episodes while paying attention to problems of limited knowledge—and the possibility 
of improper judgment—on which those episodes shed light.  
 The vita section of Piers Plowman begins as a clean break from the preceding 
poem by depicting Will as awake, a fact that gains renewed and increased significance 
when we consider both the length of this waking episode and its juxtaposition with the 
end of the preceding second vision (in which the narrator “muses” a long time on the 
significance, whether prophetic or misleading, of dreams). The episode begins 
expressly with the narrator’s quasi-autobiographical assertion that he was searching 
for “Dowel,” and the vita itself begins with Will searching for Dowel in exactly the 
literal reality so disparaged by Piers in the passus just before this one.  
 
                                                 
390 On these many, many senses—from world as mass of land to world as giant chessgame—see the 
long entry in Bromyard’s Summa Prædicantium (edition listed in bibliography), s.v. “Mundus.” 
391 Debate is common, of course, but deconstructing one’s own bases of knowledge in this way less so. 
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 That Will’s search for “Dowel” begins while Will is awake, in the “literal 
reality” aforementioned, strikes me as important because that fact prepares us to 
recognize the “worldliness” of the search—and thus the “worldliness” of the answers 
Will’s questioning at first receives. The literalness of the situation does not depend 
solely on its waking setting but is rather corroborated by it: Will searches the land for 
Dowel, just as the pilgrims of passus 5 had equally searched for the shrine of St. Truth, 
and he meets with a comparable lack of success. Thinking much like those earlier 
pilgrims, Will finally thinks that he Will find directions for his quest when he meets 
with a pair of Friars Minor—representatives, like the professional palmer encountered 
by the pilgrims, of a religiously sanctioned mode of life whose distinctive 
characteristic is to wander over the earth. Hailing the friars using his best behavior, 
Will asks if they might have encountered Dowel anywhere: a pauper’s hovel? a king’s 
court? somewhere in between? Where does “do evil” dwell, for that matter? Will is 
being especially literalistic here, when assuming that Dowel and Doyuel could have 
physical coordinates—indeed, “dwell” on the earth—and when he assumes that the 
answer to the question must lie with religious authorities.  
 The friars’ response to Will sheds light on both Will’s and the friars’ error, 
which concerns the propriety of whether special communities of knowledge can lay 
claim to a correspondingly more blessed life. “Mary,” they reply, “amonges vs 
[Dowel] dwelleth / and ever hath, as I hope, and euere shal herafter” (18-19); Dowel 
“dwells,” if anywhere, abstractly with them. (Therefore Will is mistaken to regard 
Dowel as being located in any one visible place.) On the other hand, as Will promptly 
points out with a cry of “contra” (the word traditionally signaling an opposing view in 
scholastic philosophical debate), the obvious fact that even a truly holy person (the 
“sadde man”) sins continually according to scripture renders spurious their claim 
constantly to be assisted by Dowel (B.8.20). The truth of the fraternal position, 
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though, one friar explains, can be easily demonstrated by a “forbisne” of a man in a 
boat, buffeted by winds yet not pitched into the sea:  
 
‘I shal seye þee, my sone,’ seide þe frere þanne, 
‘how seuen siþes þe sadde man synneþ on þe day. 
By a forbisne,’ quod þe frere, ‘I shal þee faire shewe. 
Lat brynge a man in a boot amydde a brood watre; 
the wynd and þe water and þe waggyng of þe boot 
makeþ þe man many tyme to falle and to stonde. 
For stonde he neuer so stif, he stumbleþ in þe waggyng, 
ac yet is he saaf and sound, and so hym bihoueþ, 
for if he ne arise þe raþer and rauʒte þe steere 
the wynd wolde wiþ þe water þe boot ouerþrowe. 
There were þe mannes lif lost for lachesse of hymselue. 
Riʒt þus it fareþ,’ quod þe frere, ‘by folk here on erþe. 
The water is likned to þe world þat wanyeþ and wexeþ; 
the goodes of þis grounde arn like þe grete wawes, 
that as wyndes and watres walkeþ aboute; 
the boot is likned to þe body þat brotel is of kynde, 
that þoruʒ þe fend and þe flessh and þe false worlde 
synneþ þe sadde man seuen siþes a day. 
Ac dedly synne doþ he noʒt for dowel hym helpeþ, 
that is charite þe champion, chief help ayein synne. 
For he strengþeþ þee to stonde and steereþ þi soule 
that, þouʒ þi body bowe as boot dooþ in þe watre, 
ay is þi soule saaf but þow þiselue wole 
folwe þi flesshes wille and þe fendes after, 
and do deedly synne and drenche þiselue. 
God wole suffre wel þi sleuþe if þiself likeþ, 
for he yaf þee to yeresʒyue to yeme wel þiselue 
wit and fre wil, to euery wiʒt a porcion, 
to fleynge foweles, to fisshes and to beestes. 
Ac man haþ moost þerof and moost is to blame 
but if he werche wel þerwiþ as dowel hym techeþ.’  
(B.8.26-56)  
 
With Dowel as the boat protecting the man inside from the sea of the world (an old 
image dating back in Christian writings to Late Antiquity), winds and waves may 
knock him down or toss him about but he will still be preserved from drowning. Only 
giving into the flesh and the devil—effectively leaping out of the boat into the 
maelstrom waiting outside—will seal one’s fate for sure.  
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 Certainly Will’s tepid answer makes for one of the most perplexing aspects of 
the discussion here, and an important one for us to consider on the subject of judging 
others. Will listens to the “forbisne” answering his vigorous objection without further 
interruption, but at the moment one might have expected him to accede to the 
soundness of the point he only demurs instead, claiming “no kynde knowyng” of what 
the friars say before politely excusing himself from them to continue his search 
elsewhere (B.8.57 et seq.). What could possibly merit the weakness of this reply? On 
the one hand, Will’s answer here is anything but impolite—hardly in keeping with the 
vigorous “contra” he had challenged the friars with just a few lines earlier. On the 
other hand, it is hard to imagine a simpler and more vivid “forbisne” of the ubiquity of 
Dowel—even in the presence of sin—that the friar’s illustration of a man challenged 
by ocean storms in a boat. Nor does the friar here appear to promote the dangerous 
complacence, the unhealthy desire for ease, that marks out more clearly sinful friars in 
the poem. Instead, as he points out, God will very contently “suffer wel [...] sleuthe,” 
since he gave humankind free will, but will hold a sinner greatly accountable at the 
last if he does not “werche wel [...] as Dowel hym techeth.” This friar hardly sounds 
corrupt, though it should be noted that this explanation does not back down very far 
from the earlier implicit claim to increased holiness from specialized knowledge. 
 Will’s response to the fraternal “forbisne” would doubtless make more sense to 
Piers Plowman’s interpreters, had they only the benefit of some direct analogue to the 
“forbisne” with which to contextualize the scene. As improbable as the assessment is 
when applied to any medieval poet, especially this one, A. V. C. Schmidt’s edition of 
the B-text declares that the image of a man in a boat protected by Dowel is an 
invention mostly original to Langland.392 An analogue of sorts may be found, 
                                                 
392 Schmidt, p. 438: “The application of the ‘boat’ to the friars themselves is attacked in a Wycliffite 
sermon on Mt 24; but L. develops his image in a way that seems independent and original here.” 
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however, whose differences from what shows up in Piers Plowman may help 
Langland’s technique (in so far as we must consider it satirical, especially) to be 
explained—and Langland himself might have encountered at least one example of this 
analogue, appearing as it does in one of the sermons of famous thirteenth-century 
canonist and preacher Thomas of Chobham. Here Chobham fuses those two old 
commonplaces, the “sea of the world” and the “ship of the church,” in order to imply 
that a good Christian—not, in other words, a particular type of Christian—may escape 
“shipwreck” if he stays within the protective vessel of his faith.  
 
Stulti ergo sunt qui in predicta naue explorant gaudia mundi, quia 
semper ad ultimum patietur naufragium illa nauis, et numquam 
perueniet ad portum. Set intremus nauem Simonis, que etsi sepe 
fluctuet numquam tamen mergitur. Et in ea est malus crux Christi, in 
quam apenditur et expanditur uelum sacre Scripture, quia per crucem 
Christi uelum templi scissum est, ut Mathei XXVII, id est sacra 
Scriptura aperta et manifestata est. [...] Qui autem in hac naui non est, 
numquam transibit mare huius mundi sine naufragio. Set quia in hac 
naui Dominus est, qui in illa permanserit non potest ei tempestas maris 
nocere.393 
                                                 
393 See sermon XIX in Thomas of Chobham’s Sermones, ed. F. Morenzoni (CM 82A, 1993, accessed 
online via the CLCLT database). The sermon’s shipwreck imagery not surprisingly is echoed in 
Bromyard’s Summa Prædicantium, s.v. “Peccatum,” but there the life of a religious order is interpreted 
as a possible danger: “Propter huiusmodi pericula, vt venialia caueamus: Primo nos hortatur Cæsarius 
Homelia 6. ad monachos, dicens: ‘Certi sumus carissimi: nisi caueamus, & nisi quotidie nostras 
[resecemus] passiones, & in bonis operibus viriliter desudemus: deteriores nos efficimur, quam in 
sæculo fuimus: ita vt fiant extrema nostra peiora prioribus. Et infra: Homil. 3. Quomodo nauis 
postquam pelagi fluctus euasit: si in portu sentina integra non fuerit, de minimis guttis impletur, & 
mergitur. Sic & monachus victus & superatus, huius mundi criminibus: quod periculosis fluctibus cum 
ad portum monasterij venerit: si tepide & remisse operatus fuerit, & negligenter vixerit, & minima & 
quotidiana peccata de animæ suæ sentina haurire neglexierit: in portu naufragij crimen incurrit.’” [On 
account of such perils, that we might beware of venial sins, in the first place Cæsarius exhorts us in his 
sixth homily, to monks, saying “We are certain, beloved: unless we take care, and unless we daily 
(restrain) our passions and manfully exert ourselves in doing good works, we will be made worse than 
we were before in the world, so that our ends become worse than our beginnings.” And further, in 
Homily 3, “just like a ship after it escapes the waves of the sea, if its hull will not be whole in port, it 
will fill from the smallest leaks, and sink—just so the monk, conquered and overcome by the errors of 
this world, if when he comes to the port of the monastery from the perilous waves: if laxly and remissly 
he should do his work, and neglectfully live, and should fail to bail out the hull of his soul from small 
sins committed every day, he will suffer the shipwreck of vice while still in port.”] This view is not 
exceptionally favorable to cloistered religious life, which Bromyard seems to be suggesting as a risky 
last resort for the sinner. For some corroboration of that reading, see the same work in Article 7, s.v. 
“Mundus”: “Contra tam multas mundi infatuationes, & poenas, & pericula tria sunt remedia, seu 
documenta, que docent, mundi contenta esse fugienda, ne ab eis infatuetur, & penas quis incurrat & 
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This analogue, if Langland expected readers to have encountered something like it 
more commonly than the friars’ analogy, explains Will’s “Contra!” quite well: readers 
can see that the fraternal answer here is too insular and secure, not only dubiously 
clever, since it posits Dowel just with friars and not in Christianity writ large. The 
friars have a point, of course, in their claim that Dowel and Doyuel may be found 
everywhere. In that, they usefully instruct Will. But Will has a point as well, solid 
grounds for disagreement with their explanation as presented to him. 
 As the Chobham analogue strongly indicates, Will’s uneasy interchange in 
passus 8 with representatives of the Order of Friars Minor introduces to the poem’s 
vita a matter first touched on during Piers’ wrangling with the priest: the claim of 
specialized communities of knowledge, status, or discourse to a monopoloy on doing 
well or living the best of all possible lives. Can any learned knowledge ever be a 
match for “kinde knowing”? Can any group, any behavior, any set of beliefs or 
practices by itself ensure the presence of “Dowel”? The answer the poem seems to 
posit for this major question of whether any community can teach one how to do well 
appears to be “No.”  
 This interpretation unfolds iteratively, following the structure of the Vita itself. 
Before the poem’s clamorous last few passus and catastrophic final commingling of 
wheat and tares at the barn of “Unity,” the poem presents a pattern of interlocutors for 
Will who start out quite concretely human and external to the narrator but grow 
progressively more interior and more abstract. The next personage to speak to Will 
after he parts with the friars, after all, Thought, seems to the narrator “a muchel man as 
                                                                                                                                            
pericula. Quorum primum est in interiori contemplatione. Secundum in exteriori custodia, seu 
refrenatione. Tertium in fuga & elongatione.” [Against so many infatuations, and punishments, and 
perils there are three remedies or teachings when teach that the happiness of the world should be fled 
lest one become infatuated by them and incur their punishments and perils, the first of which consists of 
interior contemplation, the second in exterior guardianship or restraint, and the third in flight and 
removal (from the world).] 
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me [...] like to myselve” (B.8.70); one of the last characters to speak to Will in this 
series, Anima, is “a sotil thyng withalle [...] oon withouten tongue or teeth”(B.15.12-
13). Each speaker in the progression from Thought to anima has his or her own 
particular angle from which to see the issues just before described, especially that of 
how other people might help one to lead a more virtuous life, but consistent messages 
do emerge from the vita’s succession of debates. This progression of speakers 
accompanies a deepening of the dream that constitutes the poem’s central fiction as 
well, featuring at least two “dreams within the dream” that require discussion now.  
 In the poem’s unfolding toward and into its central “inner dreams,” Langland 
ties the problem of knowledge—when do we have enough? where do we come about 
it?—to the politics of rebuke. The first message that Langland enables us to extract 
from the string of interlocutors featured in the vita is that pure cleverness, of the sort 
that one might find in or read from books, is to be avoided. This “problem of  
knowledge” and Langland’s desire to test its bounds might deserve interpretation as 
part of what Andrew Galloway has called “a contemporary context of discussion about 
the decadent nature of contemporary uses of knowledge.”394 In describing Dowel, 
Dobet, and Dobest to Will, Thought gives attention to all three as exemplifying a life 
distinguished by not cleverness or boastfulness but rather a congruence of honest, 
faithful labor with honest, faithful words. Dobet, according to Thought, follows Paul’s 
sentence—“Libenter suffertis insipientes cum sitis ipsi sapientes”(B.8.93). He is 
charitable to the “vnwise” but does not necessarily attempt to rescue them from their 
lack of wisdom. Wit, the next speaker, continues the theme, declaring inter alia that 
those who live well help each other, support each other, and lead lives whose apparent 
fruitfulness and wholesomeness is matched by real integrity: again, not cleverness for 
its own sake.  
                                                 
394 See “Chaucer’s Former Age and the Anthropology of Craft,” ELH 63 (1996), pp. 535-53 at 539. 
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 Wit perhaps most famously locates Dowel in the human body—the “castle of 
Caro,” built by God to house his beloved soul—and focuses in that portion of his 
speech on the interaction and coöperations between the soul and the senses, the 
faculties and grades of Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest (the last of whom acts as a tutor to 
Anima). Later,  Wit also speaks of interactions between humans, drawing attention to 
the history of marriage as a illustration of how both humans and God are best served 
by mutual aid, law-following, and charitable intent. Interestingly, the very 
collaborative nature of an ideal society as described by Wit seems to regard 
knowledge almost as unimportant so long as works and deeds inspired by that 
knowledge are perfeormed in consonance with each other and in accordance with 
God’s law. The Castle of Caro, for instance, is “as muche to mene as man with a soule 
/ that he wroʒte with werk and with word bothe.”395 Regarding marriage and the 
raising of children, an odd illustration which follows, the message from the second 
vision comes through again with the Scriptural tag that “numquam colligunt de spinis 
uvas nec de tribulis ficas.”396  
 As the vita goes on, however, the content of knowledge—even disciplinary 
boundaries between Theology and the other arts—becomes ever more pressingly 
interrogated. The next character to speak to Will, Wit’s wife “Dame Study,” strongly 
rebukes her husband for having any instructive words about the nature and purpose of 
man to a figure she considers unworthy to merit that knowledge. Dame Study’s 
identity as Wit’s wife, as bears observing, is part of Langland’s satire: human 
intelligence desires to know and express as much as it can, while the study whose 
action constitutes the pursuit of that knowledge presents itself forefully as an activity 
only for the deserving few. Another reason that Study should be presented as a “dame” 
                                                 
395 B.9.52; cf. lines 44-46, with a stress (resonating with the last line of passus 8) on the goodness 
inherent in matching words and deeds. 
396 B.9.155a; Matthew 7:16. 
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and as Wit’s wife might also stem from Langland’s sense that her opening sentiments, 
a worry taken from the parables of Jesus that hogs would merely “dravel upon” pearls 
given to them, display a stereotypically feminine hyperbole and care for delicate 
things; the injunction not to throw pearls to swine, though, comes from the Gospel of 
Matthew, chapter 7.397 It was in high-medieval theological writings often invoked at 
the beginning of a work to signify its intended appreciation only fully by a closed few 
cognoscenti.398 Study is, moreover, harsh (as anyone who has ever attempted studies 
of any sort should know)—another good reason for the poem’s satiric caricature of the 
figure as a shrewish wife. Dame Study’s long rebuke of Wit contains the impressive 
pedal point of “wilneþ nevere to wite” at the end, as she quotes and then rails against 
the impertinent theological disputations of untrained and undiscerning laity: 
 
‘“Why sholde we þat now ben for þe werkes of Adam 
roten and torende? Reson wolde it neuere! 
Vnusquisque portabit onus suum, &c.”  
Swiche motyues þei meue, þise maistres in hir glorie, 
                                                 
397 See also D.43 c.2 in Gratian’s Decretum, quoting Origen: “[...] Solliciti enim esse debemus, ne 
margaritas nostras mittamus ante porcos. Sed ob alias causas utile est uiri huius me habere noticiam. Si 
enim sciam, quia in his, de quibus non potest dubitari quod bona sint, emendatus est et inculpabilis (hoc 
est, si sobrius, si misericors, si iustus, si mitis, et humanus est, que utique bona nullus ambigit), tunc 
consequens uidebitur, ut ei, qui obtinet bona uirtutum, etiam quod deest fidei et scientiæ conferatur, et 
in quibus maculari eius uita uidebatur, que est in reliquis probabilis, emendetur. Si uero in his, que 
palam sunt, peccatis inuolutus permanet et inquinatur, non me oportet aliquid de secretioribus et remotis 
diuinæ sententiæ proloqui, sed magis protestari, et conuenire eum, ut peccare desinat et actus suos a 
uiciis emendet. [...]” We cannot know, of course, if Langland had this particular injunction not to throw 
pearls before swine in mind when writing Piers. Nevertheless, the differentiation between the inwardly 
virtuous man and a man “inuolutus” (clothed) in sin provided in this portion of the Decretum has a 
striking resonance with Will’s later self-confrontation in the persona of Haukyn. Both types of men—
virtuous and sin-enveloped—require further “emendation” (the same verb in both cases) before being 
committed with the “secretioribus et remotis diuinæ sententiæ.” In whatever the virtuous man appears 
“maculari,” “emendetur.” And the sinful man should be enjoined (protestari) “ut peccare desinat et 
actus suos a uiciis emendet.”  
398 See for instance the opening to Alan of Lille’s summa known by its incipit as the “Quoniam 
homines,” in P. Glorieux, ed., “La somme Quoniam homines d’Alain de Lille,”Archives d’Histoire 
Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 20 (1953), pp. 113-364: “Indignis vero nostri tractatus claudatur 
intelligentia; attestante enim Aristotele: minuit secretorum maiestatem qui indignis secreta divulgat; nec 
fas est, ut Dionisii testantur eloquia, in porcos projicere invisibilium margaritarum inconfusum et 
luciforme beneficumque ornatum. Ab hoc etiam opere demolentium emulorum arceatur accessus, ne 
eorum venenosis obiectaminibus eclipsim nostri operis patiatur igniculus.” (120) 
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and maken men in mysbileue þat muse on hire wordes. 
Ymaginatif hereafterward shal answere to youre purpos. 
Austin to swiche Argueres he telleþ þis teme: 
Non plus sapere quam oportet. 
Wilneþ neuere to wite why þat god wolde 
suffre Sathan his seed to bigile, 
ac bileueþ lelly in þe loore of holy chirche, 
and preie hym of pardon and penaunce in þi lyue, 
and for his muche mercy to amende vs here. 
For alle þat wilneþ to wite þe whyes of god almyʒty, 
I wolde his eiʒe were in his ers and his hele after, 
that euere eft wilneþ to wite why þat god wolde 
suffre Sathan his seed to bigile, 
or Iudas þe Iew Iesu bitraye. 
Al was as he wolde—lord, yworshiped be þow, 
and al worþ as þow wolt whatso we dispute— 
and þo þat vseþ þise hauylons for to blende mennes wittes, 
what is dowel fro dobet, now deef mote he worþe, 
siþþe he wilneþ to wite whiche þei ben alle. 
But he lyue in þe leeste degre þat longeþ to dowel 
I dar ben his bolde borgh þat dobet wole he neuere, 
theiʒ dobest drawe on hym day after ooþer.’ 
(B.10.115-39, emphases mine) 
 
The rebuke also cleverly dramatizes the oppressive effect too much can appear to have 
on the intelligence: hearing Study’s declamation against learning, Wit “bicom so 
confus he kouthe noʒt mele / and as doumb as a dore drough him aside,” and refuses 
to respond to Will’s entreaties (B.X.140-42).  
 Langland’s presentation of Study as married to yet abusive to the intelligence 
suggests that the question of what learning might be appropriate to a given Christian 
depends quite strongly on that person’s character, his intent, and the community of 
discourse or discipline in which he would like to be bound. These requirements 
become very clear after dame Study’s opening harangue, as Will swears allegiance to 
her. (Wit, vanquished before Study’s verbal onslaught, has signalled to Will that he 
should do this.) Accepting his deference, Study goes on to tell Will just how he might 
gain the knowledge that he seeks. In so doing, she admits him ever deeper to a 
specialized community of knowledge. 
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 What comes across as most striking, when one inspects Study’s instructions, is 
that the very clerical knowledge viewed so skeptically elsewhere in the poem appears 
as the truest and best sort of knowledge of all. It is hard not to associate Clergie even 
with Truth, here, in fact, since Study’s directions to her “cosyn,” direct Will along a 
landscape just as metaphysical as in Piers’ directions to the shrine of Truth: 
 
‘For þi mekenesse, man,’ quod she, “and for þi mylde speche 
I shal kenne þee to my Cosyn þat Clergie is hoten. 
He haþ wedded a wif wiþInne þise woukes sixe, 
is sib to þe seuen artʒ, þat Scripture is nempned. 
They two, as I hope, after my bisechyng 
shullen wissen þee to dowel, I dar wel vndertake.’ 
* * * * * * * * 
‘Aske þe heighe wey,’ quod she, ‘hennes to Suffre- 
Boþe-wele-and-wo if þat þow wolt lerne; 
and ryd forþ by richesse, ac rest þow noʒt þerInne, 
for if þow couple þee wiþ hym, to clergie comest þow  neuere; 
and also þe longe launde þat lecherie hatte, 
leue hym on þi left half a large myle or moore 
til þow come to a court, kepe-wel-þi-tunge- 
fro-lesynges-and-liþer-speche-and-likerouse-drynkes. 
Thanne shalow se Sobretee and Sympletee-of-speche, 
that ech wight be in wille his wit þee to shewe. 
So shaltow come to Clergie þat kan manye wittes. 
(B.10.152-57, 62-72) 
The reason for the poem’s somewhat puzzling recommendation of Clergie here, I 
think, appears between the lines of Study’s directions: true clerical knowledge can 
come only to the student prepared properly by (an essentially ascetic) self-abnegating 
self-reform. Moreover, part of this life preparation for attaining clergie requies the 
abandonment of many other types of knowledge in favor of Clergie’s spouse, 
Scripture—disciplines Study claims to have created “folk to deceyve,” distracting 
unworthy inquirers into the secrets of God from the path that would take them there. 
(B.10.221) These were, Study tells Will, “sotiled and ordeyned” by Study herself; but 
such tools will prove useless, she indicates, for anyone interested in learning the 
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knowledge of Theologie to which Clergie can lead (B.10.220).399 Theology operates 
only according to the rules of love, she notes, and runs counter to the logic of ever 
other discipline in “ten score” ways (B.10.185-91).  
 Study’s distinction between Theology (to be prized) and other disciplines (to 
be avoided) prepares the dispute that Will will have about the value of book learning 
with Clergie and, especially, Scripture. Although Clergie and Scripture welcome Will 
to their house and show themselves to be on very good terms with Wit and Studie, 
Clergie nonetheless tells Will that much of the practice of his discpline consists in 
believing certain articles of faith passed down as law after their initial inspired 
delivery, for which Clergie gives as an example the writings of St. Augustine 
 
Austin þe olde herof made bokes, 
and hymself ordeyned to sadde vs in bileue. 
Who was his Auctour? alle þe foure Euangelistes. 
And Crist cleped hymself so, þe scripture bereþ witnesse: 
Ego in patre et pater in me est, et qui videt me videt et patrem meum. 
Alle þe clerkes vnder crist ne koude þis assoille, 
but þus it bilongeþ to bileue to lewed þat willen dowel.400 
Much of what constitutes the proper exercise of Clergie, as it happens, consists of 
discipline not unlike that which led Will from Study to Clergie in the first place, with 
the difference that Clergie’s discipline calls upon the student to receive and follow the 
precepts of holy writ rather unquestioningly.  
 Clergie also seems to limit Will (or indeed the will) by forbidding him from 
using his knowledge towards the assessment of and correction of others. Instead, 
Clergie instructs Will as earlier interlocutors had as well, telling him to live with a 
congruity of words and works, “appearing to be as [he is] and being as [he] 
appears.”401 This in and of itself should be reward enough, Clergie contends, as 
                                                 
399 Here, as shall be quoted later, D.37 c.10, where “quæritur an sæecularibus litteris oporteat eos esse 
eruditos,” provides a useful gloss.  
400 B.10.249-54. In  the C-text, this is stronger.  
401 B.10.260-63: Appare quod es vel esto quod appares is line 261a. 
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thriving life comes from one’s living as one is called to and death from any life 
otherwise, the prime example here being formal, regular, religious life shaken by 
corruption in recent years:  
 
Amonges riʒtful religious þis rule sholde be holde. 
Gregorie þe grete clerk and þe goode pope 
of religion þe rule reherseþ in hise morales, 
and seiþ it in ensample þat þei sholde do þerafter: 
whan fisshes faillen þe flood or þe fresshe water 
thei deyen for drouʒte, whan þei drie lenge; 
riʒt so by religion, it roilep and sterueþ 
that out of couent and cloistre coueiten to libbe. 
For if heuene be on þis erþe, and ese to any soule, 
it is in cloistre or in scole, by manye skiles I fynde. 
For in cloistre comeþ no man to carpe ne to fiʒte 
but al is buxomnesse þere and bokes, to rede and to lerne. 
In scole þere is scorn but if a clerk wol lerne, 
and great loue and likyng for ech loweþ hym to ooþer. 
Ac now is Religion a rydere, a rennere by stretes,  
a leedere of louedayes and a lond buggere, 
a prikere on a palfrey fro place to Manere, 
an heep of houndes at his ers as he a lord were, 
and but if his knaue knele þat shal his coppe brynge 
he loureþ on hym and lakkeþ hym: who lered hym curteisie? 
Litel hadde lordes to doon to ʒyue lond from hire heires 
to Religiouse þat han no rouþe þouʒ it reyne on hir Auters. 
(B.10.297-318)   
 
For religious to live as their rule instructs them to, with obedient leaning that does not 
stray out into the wider word, is “hevene [...] on þis erthe,” equalled only by the 
similar scholarly solicitude and removal from too worldly affairs afforded to 
“religious” in university settings as well. Parish priests, nuns, monks, canons, and 
friars who use their exalted status and learning to oppress others and advance 
themselves will merit punishment from the secular government into whose affairs they 
have so impiously strayed, Clergie continues, finishing with a famous prophecy to that 
effect.402 
                                                 
402 B.10.319-35. The reforming king mentioned by the prophecy was interpreted by early modern 
readers as a clear reference to Henry VIII—on which see Derek Pearsall’s brief discussion in, 
“Langland and Lollardy,” YLS 17 (2003), pp. 7-23. Further reception of Langland into the early modern 
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The rather restrained lifestyle that Clergie seems to prescribe for the various members 
of the clerical estate must strike Will as too weak and lacking in splendor to constitute 
the most proper way of living possible. So it seems, at least, as Will follows Clergie’s 
awed and forbidding reference to the powers of secular nobility by asking if perhaps 
the powers of that estate constitute “Dowel.”403 Scripture intercedes to explain to Will 
how this cannot be so, noting that the wealth that accompanies “dominus and 
knighthode” prevents easy entry into heaven, even makes it “impossible” (B.10.336, 
341).  
 But this is learning that Will cannot abide. Aren’t all those baptized, no matter 
what their status, worthy of heaven?404 When Scripture denies this, ascribing the 
privilege of such saving by baptism only to cases “in extremis,” such as converts from 
other religions—observing that Christians have a responsibility to follow Christ’s law 
of taking care of their brethren—Will can take no more. “Manye tales ye tellen that 
Theologie lereþ,” he complains, lashing out (B.10.379), “and litel am I þe wiser” 
(B.10.377). In so doing, he betrays his lack of charity towards his own brethren:  
 
That Salomon seiþ I trowe be sooþ and certein of vs alle: 
Sunt iusti atque sapientes, & opera eorum in manu dei sunt, &c. 
ther are witty and wel libbynge ac hire werkes ben yhudde 
in þe hondes of almyʒty god, and he woot þe soþe 
wher, for loue, a man worþ allowed þere and hise lele werkes, 
or ellis for his yuel wille and enuye of herte, 
and be allowed as he lyued so; for by luþere men knoweþ þe goode. 
And wherby wiste men which is whit if alle þyng blak were, 
and who were a good man but if þer were som sherewe? 
Forþi lyue we forþ wiþ liþere men; I leue fewe ben goode, 
For quant ‘oportet’ vient en place il nyad que ‘pati.’ 
And he þat may al amende haue mercy on vs alle, 
for soþest word þat euer god seide was þo he seide Nemo bonus. 
(B.10.436-447) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
period appears in Sarah Kelen, Langland’s Early Modern Identities, The New Middle Ages (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).  
403 “Thanne is Dowel and Dobet,” quod I, “dominus and knyʒthode?” (B.10.336) 
404 “Contra!” quod I, “by crist! þat kan I wiþseye, / and preuen it by þe pistel þat Peter is nempned: / 
that is baptiʒed beþ saaf, be he riche or pouere” (B.10.349-51). 
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Will seems capable of admitting his own faults, this outcry reveals, but unwilling to 
attribute goodness to other people. He will merely tolerate other humans, in so far as 
their badness will enable him to know the good, recognizing the utility of falseness for 
understanding what is true in a way that might bring to mind his urgent entreaty to 
Holy Church at the beginning of passus 2.405 He still does not yet recognize merit 
outside of himself. From philosophers to farm workers, Will understands those who 
have won sainthood and glory only to have done so via special exception—certainly 
not avoidance of sin or mastery of doctrine. This view motivates uncharitable 
ignorance of others’ good deeds. Will’s despairing disdain for the learning he so far 
has accrued, his complaint that Scripture’s teachings seem eminently self 
contradictory and unhelpful, ends passus 10.  
 Undoubtedly, Will’s outcry is too complex to cover completely here. It goes a 
long way towards dismantling itself, for example, by using examples from the Bible to 
demonstrate clerical knowledge’s uselessness. Its importance is clear, all the same, as 
it ends the A-version of the poem. And at least three important facts stand out by the 
passage’s conclusion. First, Will’s overarching concern is how to come by Dowel, 
Dobet, Dobest—the happy and blessed life—with all his attention on that salvation 
and none for the inherent merit of the methods suggested to him for achieving this. 
Parish priests, he cautions, should conform their words and deeds when discharging 
their responsibilities to the faithful. Why? Because not to do so would lead to 
damnation. Second, because clerical knowledge hardly leads to an understanding of 
God’s ways, it should probably be avoided altogether. Will’s main example here 
comes from contrasting the lives of such wise men as Solomon and Aristotle with 
Saints Mary Magdalene and Paul, not to mention Saint Augustine and even Jesus 
                                                 
405 “Yet kneled I on my knees and cried hire of grace, / and seide, ‘mercy, madame, for Marie loue of 
heuene, / that bar þe blissed barn þat bouʒte vs on þe Rode, / kenne me by some craft to knowe þe 
false’” (B.2.1-4). 
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himself. Third, the complaint of Will to Scripture cues us in to Will’s social vison at 
this point, in which most of humanity is wicked and should be merely tolerated for its 
instructional value as to what goodness is not. As we have seen, Will here makes a dig 
at the theological knowledge provided by Scripture; there is, he suggests, no good 
life—only blessed ignorance—such that only God may choose to save or damn and 
will do so arbitrarily.  
 Will’s renunciation of clerical knowledge and scriptural authority, combined 
with his denial of inherent goodness in any ministry, makes for a brash argument. 
Will’s basing this argument on Scripture itself seems an especially devastating 
deconstruction of his previous interlocutors’ claims. It quite notably fails to move 
Scripture, however, as the beginning to passus 11 shows:  
 
 
Thanne Scripture scorned me and a skile tolde, 
and lakked me in latyn and liʒt by me sette, 
and seide, “Multi multa sciunt et seipsos nesciunt.” 
Tho wepte I for wo and wraþe of hir speche 
and in a wynkynge worþ til I weex aslepe. (B.11.1-4) 
 
Will had already been instructed by Dame Studie to abandon the book learning of the 
sciences in favor of Clergie; now, abandoning clerical learning because of Theology’s 
apparent inconsistency and complexity—indeed, apparently abandoning the authority 
of all types of learning and the merits of his fellow human beings along with it—he 
has no one to rely on at all but himself. Will has doomed himself, at least at this point, 
to being a total outsider.  
 As the quotation from the beginning of passus 11 above shows, the poem takes 
a surprising shift here and causes Will not to wake up but in fact to fall asleep even 
more deeply than before. The two “inner dreams” or “dreams within a dream” that 
follow, signalled by what Wittig identified as a quotation from a high-medieval, 
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pseudo-Bernardine treatise on contempt of self and of the world called the 
Meditationes piisimæ de cognitione humanæ condicionis, initiate Will’s progress in 
learning to recognize himself and how he might learn properly to live—a process that 
will conclude with the vision of charity gestured to by Anima some passūs on. I 
believe that the inner dreams also add something important to the overall poem’s 
treatment of how others should be treated and their knowledge employed, despite 
these inner dreams’ focus (well attested by Wittig, Schmidt, and Simpson among 
others) on Will’s psychology.406 After all, the “inner dreams” help Will to establish 
how he should use his own knowledge in making judgments and, as Scripture’s tag 
from the Meditationes suggests, self-knowledge and self-reform should precede the 
reform of others and even of the world at large.  
 The first inner dream, coming so closely on the heels of Will’s rather lengthy 
rebuke of Scripture and concomitant renunciation of all specialized knowledge 
(especially that of Clergie), quite understandably returns Will to the path he had not 
taken on the road to Clergie and Scripture’s house. Study had earlier forbidden Will to 
travel on “the long londe that lecherie hatte,” with its pun on “Langland”; Will 
recounts that now, however, Fortune has “rauysshed” him into the “lond of longyng” 
(11.7-8). There, “in a Mirour that hiʒte middelerþe” (B.11.9), Will is allowed to see 
the sort of life that he could have lived had he not devoted himeslf so carefully to 
study, namely a life in which all his desires might receive instant gratification. 
Fortune’s two daughters, meanwhile, Concupiscencia carnis and Coveitise of Eyes, 
cling to him rather wantonly and promise to stay with him forever (as long, that is, as 
                                                 
406 Wittig’s “Inward Journey” studies are important texts for understanding the role of the inner dreams 
in the poem’s treatment of Will’s psychology (which Wittig calls “monastic psychology”); see also A. 
V. C. Schmidt, “The Inner Dreams in Piers Plowman,” MÆ 55.1 (1986), pp. 24-40. James Simpson’s 
essay, “From Reason to Affective Knowledge: Modes of Thought and Poetic Form in Piers Plowman,” 
MÆ 55.1 (1986), pp.1-23, is also worthwhile for a sense of how Langland’s sense of psychology 
informs his poetics. 
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Fortune favors his youth:  B.11.12-33). A more enigmatic figure in attendance with 
these, Will’s “pride of parfit living,” urges Will to think nothing more of the learning 
he once had sought (11.15-16).  
 The kind of life of pleasure offered to Will in this first dream seems perfectly 
nice at first, but as the dream develops it becomes more sinister. Elde, or old age, 
warns that Fortune and her daughers will one day forsake Will, and with a character 
named Holynesse mourns that Will should waste his life on ruinous pleasures. Will, 
too, begins to notice the superficiality of the company he had begun to keep, and 
criticizes the friar to whom (in lieu of a parish priest) he had been instructed to confess 
his sins. At this point the dream-narrative shifts again and, with the reintroduction of 
Scripture and the sudden arrival of the posthumously saved Roman emperor Trajan to 
the scene, focuses anew on just those questions of salvation and right living that had 
occasioned Will’s break with authority in the first place. Here a consensus develops 
that the path through the thickets of apparently conflicting theological lore is love; that 
books may be useful, but only so long as they have that interpretive key—and only so 
long as their knowledge leads primarily to the reform of the self. A quotation 
attributed to pope Gregory the Great (“Melius est scrutari scelera nostra quam 
naturas rerum”) nicely sums up this central idea, that contempt of self should go 
before disdain for others (B.11.231). Unlike in the later Haukyn episode, though, the 
emphasis here is not so much on the self for its own sake as on the self as an 
alternative to other subjects of knowledge. The first inner dream focuses on showing 
Will his own weakness for this reason, that he might have some idea of spiritual 
authority’s proper strength and aims.  
 The second inner dream, by a fitting contrast, shows Will a view diametrically 
opposed to his solipsistic view in Fortune’s mirror. If that first vision had exulted in 
Will’s youth, the blessings of Fortune, the pleasures of lust, and the mastery over all 
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things accorded to him by virtue of perfect living, this next inner dream approaches in 
detail and scope the learned panoramas of twelfth-century philosophical poetry and 
their depictions of all nature as inspired and moved by a divine Ratio incomparably 
greater in reach than mortal man;  
 
Ac much moore in metynge þus wiþ me gan oon dispute, 
and slepynge I seiʒ al þis, and siþen cam kynde 
and nempned me by my name and bad me nymen hede, 
and þoruʒ þe wondres of þis world wit for to take. 
And on a mountaigne þat myddelerþe hiʒte, as me þo þouʒte, 
I was fet forþ by forbisenes to knowe 
thorugh ech a creature kynde my creatour to louye. 
I seiʒ þe sonne and þe see and þe sond after, 
and where þat briddes and beestes by hir make þei yeden, 
wilde wormes in wodes, and wonderful foweles 
wiþ fleckede feþeres and of fele colours. 
Man and his make I myʒte se boþe. 
Pouerte and plentee, boþe pees and werre, 
blisse and bale boþe I seiʒ at ones, 
and how men token Mede and Mercy refused. 
Reson I seiʒ sooþly sewen alle beestes, 
in etynge, in drynkynge and in engendrynge of kynde. (B.11.320-336) 
 
The vision continues, enchanting Will with the resplendent marvels of nature that it 
shows him. Will’s view of the regularity of the earth sours, however, when he notices 
how Reason carefully orders the life of every other living thing—“rewarded and ruled 
alle beestes”—but does not moderate the actions of human beings. “[M]any tyme me 
þouʒte,” he admits, that “no Reson hem ruled, neiþer riche ne pouere” (B.11.370-72).  
 Like many other observations in the vita, this hardly qualifies as a new one—
even, that is, for the narrator. Very early on in the vita, Will had been told that the free 
will of human beings gave freedom of a sort that no other animal could enjoy. Here, 
however, Will sees the downside of the disparity. Like the archweeper of Johannes de 
Hauvilla’s poem, Will could be said to regret his own inability to live according to the 
divine Ratio. From an ascetic vantage point, one might say that Will regrets himself, 
or more precisely regrets that the natural world (animals lacking voluntas being not 
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subject to the will) seems to function so well. I do not think allusion to the 
Architrenius or ironic reference to Will’s name beyond Langland’s capacity by any 
means, but I also think that the passage’s most important criticism is something else 
entirely. The satiric “edge” to Will’s dissatisfaction here is that Will does not weep 
over or chastise himself (as ascetic thought would dictate that he should) but instead 
chastises Reason and God for making it difficult to be human and to support and learn 
on other human beings in turn.  
 Memorably, of course, and importantly for this chapter, Reason knocks Will 
flat for his vain insolence in making that criticism, or indeed any criticism of others, 
since Will himself remains so ill-informed:  
 
Thanne I rebukede Reson and riʒt til hym I seyde, 
‘I haue wonder in my wit, þat witty art holden, 
why þow ne sewest man and his make þat no mysfeet hem folwe.’ 
And Reson arated me and seide, ‘recche þee neuere 
why I suffre or noʒt suffre; þiself hast noʒt to doone. 
Amende þow, if þow myʒt, for my tyme is to abide. 
Suffraunce is a souerayn vertue, and a swift vengeaunce. 
Who suffreþ moore þan gode?’ quod he; ‘no gome, as I leeue. 
He myʒt amende in a Minute while al þat mysstandeþ, 
ac he suffreþ for som mannes goode, and so is oure bettre. 
Holy writ,’ quod þat wye, ‘wisseþ men to suffre: 
Propter deum subiecti estote omni creature. 
Frenche men and fre men affaiteþ þus hire children: 
Bele vertue est suffrance; mal dire est petite vengeance. 
Bien dire et bien suffrir fait lui suffrable a bien venir. 
Forþi I rede,’ quod reson, ‘þow rule þi tonge bettre, 
and er þow lakke my lif loke þyn be to preise. 
For is no creature vnder crist can formen hymseluen, 
and if a man myʒte make laklees hymself 
ech a lif wolde be laklees, leue þow noon oþer. 
Ne þow shalt fynde but fewe fayne wolde heere 
of hire defautes foule bifore hem reherced. 
The wise and þe witty wroot þus in þe bible: 
De re que te non molestat noli certare. 
For be a man fair or foul it falleþ noʒt to lakke 
that shap ne þe shaft þat god shoop hymselue, 
for al þat he wrouʒt was wel ydo, as holy writ witnesseþ: 
Et vidit deus cuncta que fecerat & erant valde bona. 
Euery creature in his kynde encreesse he bad 
al to murþe wiþ man þat moste wo þolie, 
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in fondynge of þe flessh and of þe fend boþe, 
for man was maad of swich a matere he may noʒt wel asterte 
that som tyme hym bitit to folwen his kynde; 
Caton acordeþ þerwiþ: Nemo sine crimine vivit.’ (B.11.374-404) 
 
As he considers this rebuke with shame, waking up with a start, Will considers himself 
to have learned the proper lesson: to “se muche and suffre moore” (B.11.412). But if 
God may see all, and no one suffer more than He, that still does not entirely answer for 
Will, really, what Dowel really means—and that had been the motivating search 
behind all the previous activity in the vita. Dowel, after all, as a term, implies doing. 
Will’s encounter with yet one more interlocutor, Ymaginatif, provides the answer.  
 As a mental faculty, “Ymaginatif” was apparently understood in Langland’s 
era to possess the power of combining images and memories in hindsight.407 
Therefore, not surprisingly, Ymaginatif focuses his remarks on the episode with 
Reason that had gone immediately before, offering some suggestions to Will on what 
really was at stake in the dream that occasioned Reason’s rebuke. As Ymaginatif goes 
on to explain, Will is especially wrong to judge any of his targets so far (Scripture, 
God, or Reason) negatively based on misunderstanding. Despite serial speakers’ 
frequent calls for contiguity between inner intentions and outwardly visible actions 
based on the injunction of “Appare quod es, vel esto quod appares,” as at B.10.261a, 
the intentions of others often cannot be known. Ymaginatif proves to be especially 
critical, as well—as the poem is throughout—of empty appeals to clerical privilege by 
those who would shirk their proper duties in society. The knowledge often reached 
                                                 
407 On this figure see first Bloomfield, Apocalypse. For an especially focused study attuned to a 
particular strand of medieval faculty psychology see Ernest N. Kaulbach, Imaginative Prophecy in 
Piers Plowman (Cambridge: D. S.  Brewer, 1993). An interesting treatment that considers how this 
character functions literarily may be found in Ralph Hanna, “Langland’s Ymaginatif: Images and the 
Limits of Poetry,” in Images, Idolatry, and Iconoclasm in Late Medieval England: Textuality and the 
Visual Image, edd. Jeremy Dimmick, James Simpson, and Nicolette Zeeman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 81-94.  See also Hugh White, “Ymaginatif, Kynde, and the Benjamin 
major,” mentioned earlier. 
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after by clerics, Ymaginatif cautions, amounts to no more than “sapiencia huius 
mundi”: the wisdom of this world, which is “foolishness to God” (B.12.138a).  
 A stunning conceit based on the image of a peacock drives home Ymaginatif’s 
point in passus 12:  
 
Kynde knoweþ whi he dide so, ac no clerk ellis. 
Ac of briddes and of beestes men by olde tyme 
ensamples token and termes, as telleþ þise poetes, 
and þat þe faireste fowel foulest engendreþ, 
and feblest fowel of fliʒt is þat fleeþ or swymmeþ. 
And þat is þe pecok, & þe Pehen wiþ hir proude feþeres 
bitokneþ riʒt riche men þat reigne here on erþe. 
For pursue a pecok or a pehen to cacche, 
they may noʒt flee fer ne ful heiʒe neiþer; 
for þe trailynge of his tail ouertaken is he soone. 
And his flessh is foul flessh and his feet boþe, 
and vnlouelich of ledene and looþ for to here. 
Right so þe riche, if he his richesse kepe 
and deleþ it noʒt til his deeþ day, þe taille is al of sorwe. 
Riʒt as þe pennes of þe pecok peyneþ hym in his fli3t, 
so is possession peyne of pens and of nobles 
to alle hem þat it holdeþ til hir tail be plukked. 
And þouʒ þe riche repente þanne and birewe þe tyme 
that euere he gadered so grete and gaf þerof so litel, 
thouʒ he crye to crist þanne wiþ kene wil, I leue 
his ledene be in oure lordes ere lik a pies chiteryng,408 
and whan his caroyne shal come in caue to be buryed 
I leue it flawme ful foule þe fold al aboute, 
and alle þe oþere þer it lith enuenymeþ þoruʒ his attre. 
By þe po feet is vnderstande, as I haue lerned in Auynet, 
executours, false frendes, þat fulfille noʒt his wille 
that was writen, and þei witnesse to werche as it wolde. 
Thus þe Poete preueþ þe pecok for hise feþeres; 
so is þe riche reuerenced by reson of hise goodes. (B.12.235-63) 
 
The wealthy may gain ‘reverence’ because of their ‘goodes,’ but those same goods 
will prevent their flight just as the peacock’s tail prevents it, too, taking flight. At the 
end of life, the cries of the rich man for God’s mercy will be little more than the 
                                                 
408 This statement seems to be a reverse of the proverb, which Langland quotes earlier and in fact uses 
to conclude his A version, that a “breuis oratio penetrat celum.” For that and other parœmiological 
analogues see Thesaurus Proverbiorum Medii Ævi: Lexicon der Sprichwörter des romanisch-
germanischen Mittelalters, edd. Samuel Singer et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997), bd. 4, p. 235 s.v. 
“Gebet” at 4.2.1. 
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chattering of a magpie—or, indeed, the hoarse cries of a real peacock, whose calls 
Ymaginatif recollects a few lines earlier than the passage quoted here. The wretched, 
ugly feet of the peacock are interpreted here much as feet would occasionally be 
interpreted by certain medieval religious writers: the ugly feet indicate the inability for 
the rich man to carry out any plans for his spiritual advance through good deeds thanks 
to the falseness of those who work as his executors.409 
 This is not to say, however, as Ymaginatif also explains in this passus, that all 
clerical knowledge is bad or that pious simple-hearted rustics necessarily receive 
salvation more easily than avaricious cardinals and bishops.410 Christ was born poor, 
yes, but the angels who announced his birth announced it to all classes of society and 
bade all these to visit the child:  
 
‘To pastours and to poetes appered þe Aungel 
and bad hem go to Bethlem goddes burþe to honoure 
and songe a song of solas, Gloria in excelsis deo. 
Riche men rutte þo and in hir reste were 
tho it shon to shepherdes, a shewer of blisse. 
Clerkes knewen it wel and comen wiþ hir presentʒ 
and diden hir homage honurably to hym þat was almyty. 
Why I haue told þee al þis, I took ful good hede 
how þow contrariedst clergie wiþ crabbede wordes, 
how þat lewed men liʒtloker þan lettrede were saued, 
than clerkes or kynde witted men of cristene peple. 
And þow seidest sooþ of somme, ac se in what manere. 
Tak two stronge men and in Themese cast hem, 
and boþe naked as a nedle, hir noon sadder þan ooþer. 
That oon kan konnynge and kan swymmen and dyuen; 
that ooþer is lewed of þat labour, lerned neuere swymme. 
Which trowestow of þo two in Themese is in moost drede, 
he þat neuere ne dyued ne noʒt kan of swymmyng, 
or þe swymmere þat is saaf by so hymself like, 
ther his felawe fleteþ fortþ as þe flood likeþ 
and is in drede to drenche, þat neuere dide swymme?’ 
‘That swymme kan noʒt,’ I seide, ‘it semeþ to my wittes.’ 
                                                 
409 For this view, see John Freccero, chapter 2: “The Firm Foot on a Journey Without a Guide” in 
Dante: the Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 
29-54 at pp. 38-42 (on the feet of the soul) specifically. 
410 See especially the apologia in favor of clerical learning at B.12.92-127. We therefore can see in 
Ymaginatif’s speech a partial answer to the dilemma over learning that concluded the A-text of Piers, 
passus 11, and to which the poet in B and C would with obvious dissatisfaction return. 
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‘Riʒt so,’ quod þe renk, ‘Reson it sheweþ 
that he þat knoweþ clergie kan sonner arise 
out of synne and be saaf, þouʒ he synne ofte, 
if hym likeþ and lest, þan any lewed sooþly.’ (B.12.149-73) 
 
This later image of two men cast naked into the Thames will most immediately remind 
the reader of the friars’ earlier boat analogy, although (like the sermon from Thomas 
of Chobham on which I have suggested Langland bases the friars’ exemplum) it saves 
itself from criticism by discussing the Christian life generally and not the advantages 
of being a member of any one particular order or rank. With this exemplum, 
Ymaginatif cautions, Will should not scorn the trappings of high clerical status 
reflexively, since there are advantages to being educated and ensconced in the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy that might not readily appear to an outsider.  
 As I have attempted to show in this section of the chapter, the issue of how one 
might best interact with “others” in society amounts, for Langland, to a question of 
knowledge and more specifically communities of learning or of knowledge. Will’s 
progress in the vita from interlocutor to interlocutor in his search for “kynde 
knowinge” of Dowel, especially given the content of the episodes, suggests of course 
that knowledge of how to live “well” (the blessed, proper life) must be grounded in 
knowledge the self. Less clear, however,  are the implications of such self-knowledge 
on one’s interactions with others. Which “others,” one wonders, can provide one with 
the best knowledge according to which one might organize one’s earthly life? How, 
once one has achieved a special vantage point over society thanks to one’s acquisition 
of specialized knowledge, should one use that knowledge to bring others criticism and 
reform? As Will’s experience so far in the vita makes clear, to criticize others based 
on one’s own authority and knowledge places one in a dangerous position. 
 
  226   
To rebuke another based on one’s own assumptions of authority entails the risk of 
misjudging based on a misappropriation of another’s intentions or qualifications. For 
this reason, I think, the poem’s main satire in this section focuses on the peacock-like 
falseness of so many of the clerical estate, with their useless worldly wisdom. It 
juxtaposes these with Will’s expressions of the belief that he does not need or else 
completely transcends such knowledge. Dame Study’s rather boilerplate assertion that 
the true, best sort of knowing about man’s place in the universe should not be tossed 
like pearls before swine but also cannot be understood without love carries throughout 
the episode (even though Will seems not to get the message). It also helps us interpet 
even better Will’s rather strange attitude toward the two friars of passus 8: on the one 
hand, their lesson cannot entirely be scoffed at, since it leads one to Dowel; on the 
other hand, Dowel cannot really dwell with them unless they follow the precepts of 
love.411  
 One certainly can’t escape the conclusion here that, human knowledge 
suffering from the weaknesses it does, Piers Plowman should encourage Christians to 
exercise exceptional caution when judging others. As the next sections of this chapter 
will show, the poem urges far more caution than canon law or conventional wisdom 
(so far as we know it) would have deemed appropriate.  
 
Christianity and Judging Others: Some Institutional Evidence 
 
 Surely it should not surprise anyone that Piers Plowman suggests restraint in 
judging others, yet the poem’s identity as a work of satire makes the question very 
interesting and worthy of exploration indeed: satire consists, after all, of judgments 
                                                 
411 Recall from Study’s assessment of theology in passus 10 that this highest of the “sciences” has a 
basis in love, wherefore “for it leteþ best bi loue I loue it þe bettre,” Study declares; “Loke þow loue 
lelly if þee likeþ Dowel, / for Dobet and Dobest ben drawen of loues scole” (190-93). 
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about others. The Bible notably states that human beings should be solicitous of one 
another even in Genesis, showing Cain’s monstrosity from his question, “Am I my 
brother’s keeper?” (Genesis 4:9). Later, in Leviticus, the command for humans to love 
their friends (one another) enters the law.412 This later command itself enters the 
Gospels at Matthew 5:38-48, when Jesus translates and builds on it for his followers. 
As we shall see, the sentiment behind such statements animates Langland’s treatment 
of the issue in Piers Plowman. All the same, Langland focuses on that root principle 
first (if not exclusively) by considering the issue of proper judgment so problematic 
for any satirist and especially for a Christian writer. The precise issue of how and 
when to judge would no doubt have been of some interest to Langland’s readers as 
well, not because they themselves were also satirists but rather because they would 
have been interested in the proper conduct of religious life as well. Since as we know 
episcopal authority regulated the activities of friars, the lives of the laity, and the 
conduct of priests, it seems suitable to begin with an overview of relevant canon law. 
It is all the more fitting, of course, given the early attested ownership of Piers by 
priests, to say nothing of evidence about the poet’s “circle” and intended audience 
internal to the poem.  
 The so-called Distinctiones in Gratian’s twelfth-century concordia 
discordantium canonum, or Decretum, seem most relevant to me out of all that 
monumental corpus of collected canon law, as these tend to focus on the knowledge 
and behavior proper to a cleric or other officially recognized (thus legislated) member 
of the church.413 What we learn here is not surprising, but nonetheless it does bear 
                                                 
412 Leviticus 19:18: “Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens. Thou shalt love thy 
friend as thyself. I am the Lord.” 
413 My quotations of the Glossa ordinaria on Gratian and other front matter are derived from a copy of 
the Venice edition of 1600 located at the Library of Congress: Decretvm Gratiani emendatvm, et 
notationibvs illvstratvm, vnà cvm glossis Gregorii XIII. Pont. Max. iussu editum; et nunc recens cum 
additionibus [...] Augustini Caruitæ [...]. I am grateful to Meredith Shedd-Driskel, Law Curator at the 
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repeating, since in the Decretum’s discussion of how a cleric should behave it places 
its discussions along the same axes that Langland seems to in the vita, namely what 
knowledge a cleric should have and what his relationship to the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy should be.  
 The Decretum proves especially helpful for its discussion of clerical 
knowledge, which takes up a significant of part Gratian’s Distinctiones (DD) 36-43, 
specifically in the context of the work’s description of what qualities a would-be priest 
ought to have. These distinctiones, numbered 21 to 101, constitute the so-called 
“tractatus ordinandorum” or exposition of the rules governing clerical behavior.414 I 
limit my inquiry to the small range represented by DD.36-43, which, as a metrical 
index to the Venice edition of 1600 describes it, imparts the following information 
(with each line number corresponding to a separate distinction):  
 
36. Instruit hæc prudens quod debeat esse sacrandus. 
37.  Hæc prohibit legere gentilia metra sacratum. 
38. Scripturas sacras sacrandus scire iubetur. 
39.  Vult hæc Pontifices callere negotia secli 
40.  Internis pars dena quater virtutibus ornat. 
41. Sit modis ingressu, cunctis, verboque, ciboque. 
42. Clericus hospitijs peregrinos collocet omnis. 
43.  Factis et verbis doctor sis, atque pudicus. 
44. Vites ingluuiem conuiuia, siue tabernas. 
45. Atque caue quenquam palma lingua ve serire. 
46. Respuit hæc hominem, distinctio litigiosum.415 
 
One of the most interesting for examination vis-à-vis Piers Plowman must be D.37, 
studded with its pronouncements on the value of poetry to the clerical estate. D.37’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Law Library Collection Services Division, Law Library of Congress, for giving me access to and 
allowing me to photograph this material. 
414 This range seems most relevant to Langland’s poem, though we ought to recognize that distinction 
35—which declares that a would-be priest must not be “uinolentus,” also echoes Piers Plowman. 
Holichurch, after all, begins her instructions to Will by reminding him not to overdrink; and, as the 
Decretum points out with reference Proverbs 20:1, “Lvxoriosa res uinum, & tumultuosa ebrietas, omnis, 
qui cum his miscetur, non erit sapiens.”  
415 I do not know what “ve serire” might mean in line 45, and I assume that there is a compositor’s error 
to blame. Carin Ruff has helpfully suggested “palma linguave sævire,” “to vent one’s rage [...] by 
means of hand or tongue.” 
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discussion of education in general, at c.10, seems to trace a trajectory through the 
various disciplines quite  similar to Will’s in the vita; training in grammar leads to the 
ability to read scripture, here, just as (in Langland’s poem) study leads ultimately to an 
ability to scrutinize the scriptures:  
 
Item Ieronimus super epistolam ad Titum. Si quis gramaticam artem 
nouit uel dialecticam, ut recte loquendi rationem habeat, et inter false et 
uera diiudicet, non inprobamus. 1. Geometria autem et aritmetica et 
musica habent in sua scientia ueritatem, sed non est scientia illa scientia 
pietatis. Scientia autem pietatis est legere scripturas et intelligere 
prophetas, euangelio credere, apostolos non ignorare. 2. Gramaticorum 
autem doctrina potest proficere ad uitam, dum fuerit in meliores usus 
assumpta.  
 
Just as in Piers Plowman, such disciplines as science and math provide instruction and 
knowledge but not “scientia illa pietatis,” Theology.416  
 The opening capitula of D.37 make several claims to the effect that secular 
literature is not to be enjoyed by priests to the exclusion of sacred letters. As canon 2 
declares in the words of Jerome, priests who “omissis euangeliis et propheciis uidemus 
comedias legere, amatoria bucolicorum uersuum uerba cantare, tenre [sic] Virgilium 
[...] crimen in se facere uoluptatis.” Yet D.37 c.11 explains one way in which secular 
knowledge might be approached by a priest. It refers to the biblical story of the 
Hebrew prophet Daniel who, in the land of the Babylonians, like his fellow Jews, “de 
mensa et uino regis nolunt comedere, ne polluantur [...]. Discunt autem, non ut 
sequantur, sed ut iudicent atque conuincant [...].”  D.37 ends with capitula (cc) 15 and 
                                                 
416 One might recall Study’s overview of the sciences and “sotil craftes” in opposition to Theology at 
passus 11. D.37 c.10 in Gratian’s Decretum seems relevant to that passage: “Si quis artem grammatican 
nouerit, vel dialecticam, vt rationem recte loquendi habeat, & inter falsa & vera dijudicet, non 
improbamus. Geometria quoque, & arithmetica, & musica habent in sua scientia veritatem: sed non est 
scientia illa, scientia pietatis. Scientia pietatis est nosse legem, intelligere prophetas, Euangelia credere, 
Apostolos non ignorare. Grammaticorum autem doctrina etiam potest proficere ad vitam, dum fuerit in 
meliores vsus assumpta.” The gloss clarifies that in its reference to geometry that “quadriuiales scientiæ 
veritatem in se habent: sed non sunt scientie pietatis, & assumende. Sed vetus & nouum testamenta sunt 
scientie pietatis, & assumendæ, & grammatica in bonos vsus assumpta proficere potest. De astronomia 
non facet mentionem: quia hec abijt in desuetudinem, vt 26.q.2.5. his ita.” 
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16. The first presents a quotation attributed to Isidore of Seville in chapter 13 of his 
Sentences (“de summo bono”), arguing strongly that “prohibetur Christianus legere 
figmenta poetarum, quia per oblectamenta fabularum nimium mentem excitant ad 
incentiua libidinum,” to which Gratian responds with a dictum of presumably helpful 
intended synthesis:  
 
Ut itaque ex premissis auctoritatibus apparet, inperitia sacerdotibus 
semper debet esse aduersa, quoniam, cum per ignorantiam cecati aliis 
ducatum prestare ceperint, ambo in foueam cadunt; unde dicitur in 
Psalmo: ‘Obscurentur oculi eorum, ne uideant, et dorsum eorum 
semper incurua.’ Cum enim obscurantur illi, que preeunt, ad ferenda 
onera peccatorum facile sequentes inclinatur. Elaborandum est itaque 
sacerdotibus, ut ignorantiam a se quasi quandam pestem abiciant. Licet 
enim seruus nesciens uoluntatem domini sui, et non faciens, dicatur 
uapulare paucis, nontamen hoc de omnibus generaliter intelligitur. Ut 
enim ait Apostolus ‘Qui ignorat, ignorabitur.’ Quod de eo 
intelligendum est, ‘quo noluit intelligere, ut bene ageret.’ [...] 
 
Knowledge is, as D.38 will make clear, of the utmost importance to the priest.417 But 
Will’s interlocutors mainly express annoyance at ignorance of canons and liturgical 
books, familiarity with which the Decretum also finds most important.  D.38 c.12 
makes a point of urging scholars—“scolastici”—not to look down upon 
“ecclesiasticam simplicitatem”; but even here the “simplicitatem” absolutely must not 
refer to utter ignorance so much as a different culture of  learning and dissemination of 
knowledge.418 D.38 c.10 quotes Gregory the Great’s Moralia in Job to claim that “Qui 
ea, que Dei sunt sapiunt, a Domino sapiuntur, et qui ea, que Dei sunt, nesciunt, a 
Domino nesciuntur.”  
 
                                                 
417 Apparently with great satisfaction after these and similar arguments, Gratian’s 39th distinctio turns 
to the issue of a cleric’s potential business (negotium) in the secular world by declaring, “ecce,” that 
“plenarie monstratum est, quod sacerdotes oportet litterarum tam sacrarum quam secularium esse 
peritos.” 
418 Paul Hyams informs me, in fact, that the admonition addresses twelfth-century scholarly 
sophisticates not to disdain canonically relevant writings from the ninth century. On the “culture of 
learning” and its varieties in the Middle Ages, cf. Jean Leclercq’s bright differentiation between 
scholastic and monastic writing at the beginning of L’Amour des Lettres and passim. 
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But statements such as these in D.38—and there are many more—only serve as a gloss 
on the great generalization that ends D.37 c.16, with its warning that “Non omnis 
ignorans est immunis a pena.” Rather, as the canon goes on to clarify, ignorance only 
provides an excuse (for it must, some time) where no opportunity to gain knowledge 
has been given. Those who have simply ignored putting into practice what they have 
had a chance to learn are liable. This statement (only in context solely applicable to 
clerics) obviously has extraordinary relevance to Piers Plowman, which, though it 
ended its A-version with a despairing claim that the simplest of Christians may 
“percen with a paternoster þe paleys of heuene,” launches in the B and C texts a wide-
ranging exploration of how learning (though sometimes a rather bitter fruit) can lead 
to the salvation of Christian perfection rather than the ignominy of a prideful, 
Luciferian, fall.419   
 It follows at very least that Langland, if he did not make direct use of the 
Decretum, did concern himself with the problem of clerical knowledge not just from 
his own possibly idiosyncratic experience but also in line with the guidelines of 
ecclesiastical authority. And once we admit that the Decretum can provide worthwhile 
commentary on Langland’s views about clerical knowledge, it naturally follows that 
the Decretum’s pronouncements on clerical behavior based on specialized knowledge 
can usefully help to explain—or at least contextualize—Langland’s.420 After all, even 
if Langland were totally unfamiliar with the Decretum and happened to disagree with 
                                                 
419 The reader is directed to the chapter’s opening synopsis, especially concerning Ymaginatif, above. 
420 Did Langland actually know Gratian? I would not make an unqualified claim. In the first place, the 
status of canonical works such as the Decretum in medieval England has been a matter of long debate: 
see for example Charles Donahue, “Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: Stubbs vs. 
Maitland Re-Examined after 75 Years in the Light of some Records from the Church Courts” in 
Michigan Law Review 72 (1974), pp. 647-716. Donahue noted (even “after 75 years”) that “precisely 
how [papal collections] were authoritative [in the English ecclesiastical courts] may still be regarded as 
an open question”—a question that Stubbs himself had asked (653, emphasis mine). As such, would 
Langland have needed to know Gratian? And yet Kerby-Fulton, in her plenary lecture to the 2010 
International Medieval Congress at Kalamazoo, has observed in line with other scholars that Langland 
and other late-medieval poets in Middle English (most definitely Hoccleve) had been employed as 
clerks and scribes of texts including canon law.  
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all canonical wisdom (as we can see that he does not), the guidelines explained in its 
tractatus ordinandorum would have influenced the thought and behavior of many of 
his clerical contemporaries—certainly a major part of his intended audience (and so 
Lawlor and Vaughan, despite some differences, have agreed).421  
 The Decretum’s rules according to which a cleric may go about (1) openly 
criticizing his superiors, (2) openly criticizing the church, and in (3) openly criticizing 
others are obviously of special interest here.422 In the limited range of distinctiones to 
which I have already drawn the reader’s attention in this chapter, D.40 makes the 
strongest claims relevant to the just use of ecclesiastical authority, pointing out that a 
priest’s office does not hold him above others so much as it holds him to a higher 
standard—a matter that Craun, among scholars of Middle English, has also 
explored.423 For this reason it seems apposite that capitulum 2 of the distinctio 
observes how “non est facile stare in loco Petri et Pauli et tenere cathedram 
regnantium cum Christo.” Indeed, as a host of following capitula claim, a priest or 
other ecclesiastical figure only gains authority by the rectitude of his life and not the 
                                                 
421 See e.g. Traugott Lawler, “The Secular Clergy (again): a Brief Rejoinder to Míċeál Vaughan’s 
Response,”a forum item, YLS 17 (2003), pp. 203-07.  
422 The Decretum discusses these matters in the closest practical detail in the series of “Causæ” (a series 
of constructed hypothetical cases on which Gratian poses questiones) that make up the work’s second 
part (see for instance the first three Causæ), but because of their practicality and the constraints of time 
they might not necessarily shed light on the current study; any in-depth investigation of these vis-à-vis  
Piers Plowman, in any case, will have to wait for later.  
423 See e.g. c.1, “Offitium sacerdotii non confert, sed adimit [= takes away], licentiam delinquendi.” 
Edwin D. Craun’s work on “fraternal correction” as it appears in Langland and elsewhere has notably 
led the pack by drawing the attention of Middle English specialists on how a high-ranking cleric might 
respond to criticism from lower-status individuals. See Craun’s “‘Ʒe by Peter and by Poul!’: Lewte and 
the Practice of Fraternal Correction,” YLS 15 (2001), pp. 15-25 (with responses by David C. Fowler and 
Lawrence M. Clopper following on pp. 26-29 and 30-32 respectively)—and now also Craun’s book, 
Ethics and Power in Medieval English Reformist Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). Gratian’s Decretum sheds light on his findings, too, with D.38 c.16 quoting a letter by Pope 
Clement to declare that “nullus episcopus propter obprobrium senectutis uel nobilitatem generis a 
paruulis uel minimis eruditis, si quid forte est utilitatis aut salutis, inquerere negligat,” lest he be thought 
“rebelliter.” At the same time, as D.42 c.3 declares, “verba predicationis persecutoribus suis prelati non 
subtrahant.” This sort of teaching and admonishment obviously does not extend to actual litigation, as 
C.2 q.7 (et sim.!) in the second part of the Decretum helps make clear. 
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status of his position, his wealth, or his birth; he should thus conduct his own life with 
moderation (c.5 for instance)  and treat others with equal hospitality—even the poor, 
with whom a bishop should not feel ashamed to dine (D.40 c.7 and D.42 c.1). His life 
and not his titles give him his place in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as D.40 makes 
clear.424  
 All the above, it needs recognizing, need to be read in light of the much more 
general legal theory presented earlier in the Decretum. Starting especially at capitula 
4, distinctio 21 declares in no uncertain terms that judgments are to pass from higher 
to lower figures in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and not the other way around.425 The 
Decretum further explains this top-down system in the next distinctio on analogy with 
the privileged status enjoyed by Rome among the auther patriarchates (such as 
Constantinople): judgments cannot pass from lower to higher elements since authority, 
also, moves from the higher central portions of the hierarchy outward and 
downward.426 One refrains from passing judgment on one’s superiors or indeed the 
central administration of the Church because one lacks the authoritative standing to do 
so. Reproof in any case should be gentle, benevolent, non-injurious physically.427 And 
it should also be patient and delivered in moderation: a cleric placed in the position of 
critiquing others should not be “litigiosus” or think, modo rusticorum, “garrulitatem 
                                                 
424 D. 40, esp. c. 12; see also C.2 q.7, cc. 33-34. Cf. Langland’s B.11.290-317 and its discussion of 
dubious ordination—a digression for which the speaker apologizes. 
425 For questions of judgments and complaints communicated between the clerical estate and various 
grades of the laity, one will have to refer to the Causæ in the Decretum’s second part. 
426 D.22; cf. D.21 cc.1-3. Though to my knowledge Gratian does not mention this, the angelic hierarchy 
was thought similarly to be disposed. See for one fascinating and edifying example Paul Rorem’s work 
on John Scotus Eriugena’s commentary and translation of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s work on 
the “celestial hierarchy,” the Expositiones in Ierarchiam cœlestem Iohannis Scoti Eriugenæ (Eriugena’s 
Commentary on the Dionysian Celestial hierarchy [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediæval Studies, 
2005]). 
427 D.45.  
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auctoritatem [esse].”428  Will discovers the necessity for a would-be critic to rely on 
patient authority after his rebuke of Scripture launches him into the first of his “inner 
dreams.”  
 Piers Plowman unquestionably recognizes basic premises (also set out in the 
Decretum) concerning the proper judgment of others—no matter how Langland might 
have encountered these. This fact explains the vita’s repeated calls to refrain from 
making aggressive verbal attacks about others’ ethical standing or sanctity in light of 
official hierarchies, precepts, and models for dispute. Yet the poem far more 
aggressively promotes the Bible’s “evangelical counsels” or “counsels of 
perfection”—to turn the other cheek—than to follow even the fairest, best-regimented 
process for seeking justice.429   
 Canonical statues, strictures, and other recommendations derive the authority 
of their opinions from various sources, such as collections of papal decretals, but one 
of the most primary sources of authority for such theory in every way must be the 
Bible. The Langland at least considers this to be so stands out clear fro the prominent 
place that Study accords to Scripture in the vita.430 Of biblical passages on the proper 
                                                 
428 D.46. I have not yet had a chance to consult the possibly related D.93, though the Venice edition of 
1600 at least declares that it concerns “obedientia minorum erga maiores,  & quod nullus debet 
communicare inimicis Romanæ Ecclesiæ.” 
429 See Paul R Hyams, Rancor & Reconciliation in Medieval England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), which glosses the Glossa Ordinaria on Matthew 5:29-48. Hyams observes that “seeking justice 
through process of law,” in the Glossa, “is not more than a first step available to the uncultivated rudes 
unable to reach beyond it to the fuller justice of the Gospels, whose goal is salvation and which dictate 
nonresistance to evil. All Christians, laymen included, should not only not retaliate against their 
enemies; they should bear their injuries patiently, as Christ and the saints had before them.” (45) He 
adds that “[t]his counsel of perfection permits vindicta to be administered to wrongdoers for their 
correction by someone without anger in authority”—which strikes me as a loophole designed to admit 
action at court—but notes its limited success some pages later in commenting upon Thomas of 
Chobham’s “deep suspicion of litigation,” especially for “perfecti (monks, friars, and perhaps secular 
clergy too), held to a higher standard[.]” (55) As I note below, Langland’s Lewtee seems to 
acknowledge the one process of legal denunciation that Chobham did find admitted for perfecti—given 
sanction by the Gospels. But Langland seems uncertain about even this, at least for “persons and 
preestes and prelates of holy chirche” (B.11.98).    
430 There, Scripture is possessed of an immense authority in the same base text for that highest service 
of theology, which it is important to recognize was the prestige discipline of the day in the way that 
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treatment of others that Langland could have known, the injunction from Luke 6:37—
to “judge not, and ye shall not be judged” (nolite iudicare, & non iudicabimini)—
holds pride of place together with “Judge not, that you may not be judged” (nolite 
iudicare, ut non iudicemini) in Matthew 7:1.431 As in Langland’s poem, this 
pronouncement or critique of others appears in connection with discussion of Christian 
knowledge in the Gospel chapter, too, which also contains the injunction so avidly 
cited by Study to not throw pearls before swine.432  
 Of course it is tempting to try to read every episode in light of the “nolite 
iudicare” injunction, and I do not deny that to do so would be rewarding. I do worry 
that such an exercise would be tendentious and nearly interminable, however, and so 
wish here to reference quickly just a few cases that might be expanded upon later as 
necessity and clarity warrant. In the first, the figure of Lewtee lectures Will on the 
propriety of “fraternal correction” (the term Craun uses) citing “nolite iudicare”; in the 
second, Patience bids Will to be quiet during his dinner with the “doctor of divinity”; 
in the third, Anima claims to “lakke no lif.” After touching on these, simply to show as 
transparently as possible how the issue of judgment gets developed by each in turn, I 
would like to return to Will’s conflicts with Scripture and Reason and the lessons of 
Ymaginatif.  
 Will’s interactions with Lewtee are probably most important here and so 
deserve their pride of place, as that character—appearing pivotally between Will’s 
“inner dreams” after Will’s dismissive outburst against and subsequent banishment by 
Scripture—provides a set of rules, as it were, for judgment of others. But Lewtee 
appears, unfortunately, as a dismayingly ambiguous figure whose exact nature and 
                                                                                                                                            
“rocket science” proverbially is in ours (requiring the maximum amount of university training for a 
doctorate in it to be awarded). 
431 Langland quotes Luke 6:37 at B.12.89. 
432 Biblical commentaries, which I hope to explore more thoroughly at a later date, note that one should 
not judge others temerarie or “rashly.” 
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intellectual- or literary-historical resonances scholars are still attempting to trace.433 
We can be certain at least that his appearance at the end of Will’s first “inner dream” 
comes about in response to Will’s disillusioned lecturing of a friar who had been 
attempting to serve as his confessor.434 Friars, Will had been declaiming, only care to 
hear confessions and to bury the dead in order to receive financial gain; baptism, still 
apparently a prerogative of the parish churches into whose territory friars insistently 
encroach, has more merit as a sacrament and forgives sins as well—yet because of its 
relative unprofitability has not been coveted by the friars nearly as much. This is a 
bold criticism of the friars, yet even as Will makes it Lewtee appears and comments 
on it:  
 
And lewtee louʒ on me for I loured on þe frere; 
‘Wherefore lourestow?’ quod lewtee, and loked on me harde. 
‘If I dorste,’ quod I, ‘amonges men þis metels auowe!’ 
‘Ʒis, by Peter and by Poul!’ quod he and tok hem boþe to witnesse: 
Non oderis fratres secrete in corde set publice argue illos. 
‘They wole aleggen also,’ quod I, ‘and by þe gospel preuen: 
Nolite iudicare quemquam.’ 
‘And whereof serueþ lawe,’ quod lewtee, ‘if no lif vndertoke it 
Falsnesse ne faitereie? for somwhat þe Apostle seide 
Non oderis fratrem. 
And in þe Sauter also seiþ dauid þe prophete 
Existimasti inique quod ero tui similis &c. 
It is licitum for lewed men to legge þe soþe 
If hem likeþ and lest; ech a lawe it graunteþ, 
Excepte persons and preestes and prelates of holy chirche. 
It falleþ noʒt for þat folk no tales to telle 
Thouʒ þe tale were trewe, and it touched synne. 
Þyng þat al þe world woot, wherefore sholdestow spare 
To reden it in Retorik to arate dedly synne? 
Ac be þow neueremoore þe firste þe defaute to blame; 
Thouʒ þow se yuel seye it noʒt first; be sory it nere amended. 
Thyng þat is pryue, publice þow it neuere; 
Neiþer for loue looue it noʒt ne lakke it for enuye: 
Parum lauda; vitupera parcius. (B.11.84-106a) 
                                                 
433 I am aware that Conrad van Dijk of  the University of Western Ontario has been doing work on this 
and related concepts (e.g. equity). Nicolette Zeeman also provides some helpful bibliography in her 
discussion. See “The Condition of Kynde,” in Medieval Literature and Historical Inquiry: Essays in 
Honor of Derek Pearsall, ed. David Aers (Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 2000), pp. 1-30. 
434 See B.10.61-83 for the episode, which follows Will’s abandonment by Fortune upon meeting with 
Elde. 
  237   
 
It is hard at first reading, or even at third or fourth, to tell exactly what is at stake in 
Lewtee and Will’s exchange here. Obviously it regards the propriety of Will’s 
criticizing the friar, and the poet quite cleverly introduces quotations here that 
acknowledge that by playing between the narrow and wider senses of the word frater 
(Friar versus brother).435 But the passage’s wit extends even further, and to 
acknowledge that wit will probably aid in a better understanding of the exchange.  
 The primary engine of the wittiness that I’ve observed is the very situation that 
gives the dialogue rise: a debate, in a poem which by its very nature judges others, on 
whether or not judging others is ever right. Will has just been openly criticizing a friar 
and now stares glowering at him, when Lewtee appears with a laugh and asks him 
why he glowers. He has been wondering, we immediately learn, whether or not he 
should make his differences with the friar publicly known or not—but of course, being 
part of the poem already, the public’s knowledge has been assured! Lewtee, as 
Craun’s fine article has shown, argues for “fraternal correction” of the sort indicated 
by the first of the Scriptural tags, viz. “Do not revile fratres secretly in your heart, but 
publicly dispute with them” (B.11.87a).436 Will’s somewhat dour response is that the 
friars themselves would prefer not to be publicly disputed, and would rely on the 
precept to not judge “anyone” in order to press that case.437 But not judging anyone, as 
Lewtee’s rejoinder points out, utterly vitiates the whole purpose of law if carried to its 
                                                 
435 Alford notes in his Guide to the Quotations, p. 72, that Langland makes the original “fratrem” plural 
“to apply to the friars. The verse is commonplace in antimendicant writings,” he adds, as Scase’s study 
(on the poem and “the new anticlericalism”) shows. See Piers Plowman: a Guide to the Quotations. 
Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies 77 (Binghamton: SUNY Binghamton, 1992), p. 72. 
436 There was a process for this, outlined in canon law: the denunciatio evangelica (so named from its 
basis in Matthew 18:15-17. The process, which seems to have influenced English “equity” proceedings, 
is explained by Helmut Coing in “English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law,” 
Law Quarterly Review 71 (1955), pp. 223-41. The development of the process finds a good exposition 
by Charles LeFebvre in the Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique, vol. 5, coll. 557-69, s.v. “Évangélique 
(Dénonciation).” 
437 Quemquam is not a direct quotation from the Gospel passage in question. 
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extreme; take away the ability to admonish and correct others, and what then do you 
have? It is true, Lewtee adds, that Paul had handed down the precept—but, Lewtee 
continues, “David the Prophet” also declared that it would be a mistake for anyone to 
believe that unjust acts might go unpunished.438 
  At this point, the problem of to what extent Will might judge (though of course 
for readers of the poem he has been judging plenty already) becomes more difficult 
with Lewtee’s explanation. Lewtee observes that “ech a lawe”—both laws, temporal 
(Roman) law and spiritual (capitula) law—allow non-clerics, “lewed” men, to “legge 
þe soþe” or stand up for the truth (B.11.96). The poem had presented Will as 
something of a cleric, however, and in the past seemed to accord to clerics the sole 
status with lofty enough vantage to properly judge others. Holy Church’s first words 
to Will, overlooking the fair field, make that lofty status quite evident, but other 
interlocutors’ criticisms of Will’s judgments, as well as canon law as we have seen, 
have questioned it.  
 What Lewtee presents as useful clarification throws the entire structure into 
uncertainty of what the right path may be at exactly the moment in which Will most 
suffers from such doubt. Moreover, Lewtee’s judgment on judging others seems also 
to question the value of literature as a vehicle for such criticism—again, ironically to 
read in a poem. The passage seems to find fault not only with “persons and preestes 
and prelates of holy chirche” who challenge and attempt to correct others but also their 
doing so with “tales to telle.” Even if “þe tale were true”—even fiction that “touched 
synne”—why “reden it in Retorik?” These and the following injunctions to “persons 
and preestes and prelates” to keep mum about scandals that they might encounter, 
                                                 
438The line quoted, “Existimasti inique,” comes from Psalm 49:21, the first line of which—“these things 
didst thou do, and I was silent” might be important for what it could might indicate about Langland’s 
understanding of religious silence. 
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since “it falleþ noʒt for þat folk no tales to telle,” implicate Will as some sort of cleric 
himself.  
 Nevertheless, the poem does not conclude here with a shudder and blush of 
shame for being a poem containing satire. Lewtee’s last word on the propriety of 
fraternal correction is a Stoic-sounding quotation, attributed to Seneca, declaring that 
one should be sparing in praise and even more sparing in blame.439 When Scripture 
chimes in at this point with a leap of joy into the air out of agreement with Lewtee’s 
assessment that clerics should not judge, Will seems to cast himself again in the role 
of a “lewed” man, as much as agreeing with Scripture and Lewtee that clerics should 
be careful of what they allow the “lewed” to hear. But, again oddly, he does so by 
expressing his own misgivings about Scripture’s telling tales—this time a perfectly 
orthodox recounting of the parable at Matthew 22:14, which seems to indicate the 
arbitrariness of all these restrictions on judgment:  
 
‘He seiþ sooþ,’ quod Scripture þo, and skipte an heiʒ and preched.  
Ac þe matere þat she meued, it lewed men it knewe, 
Þe lasse, as I leue, louyen þei wolde 
The bileue of oure lord þat lettred men techeþ.  
This was hir teme and hir text—I tok ful good hede— 
‘Multi to a mangerie and to þe mete were sompned, 
And whan þe peple was plener comen þe porter vnpynned þe yate 
And plukked in Pauci pryueliche and leet þe remenaunt go rome.’ 
Al for tene of hir text trembled myn herte, 
And in a weer gan I wexe, and wiþ myself to dispute 
Wheiþer I were chosen or noʒt chosen  [...] 
(B.11.107-107) 
 
In light of predestination, what does it matter who tells a tale or refrains from doing 
so? Moreover, Langland seems implicitly to argue, if Scripture can decrease faith by 
recounting Scripture in orthodox sermonic style (having a “teme” and “texte”) then 
perhaps poetry can increase faith even when it indulges in satire. 
                                                 
439 “parum lauda; vitupera parcius,” a variant of “lauda parce, vitupera parcius” or “praise sparingly, 
and blame more rarely still” as I might translate it: B.11.106a. 
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 That said, my reading of the scene must be contrasted to Nicolette Zeeman’s. It 
diverges significantly from mine, seemingly because Zeeman assumes that “Wil” [sic] 
does not enjoy any clerical status when he speaks. I agree that he has distanced 
himself from the ecclesiastical hierarchy enough to speak as an outsider both to the 
wider Church and to the religious orders. He speaks explicitly against the benefits said 
to derive from clerical learning, for instance. Moreover, he also reproves friars for 
being overly clever—for seeking to hear confessions, when it would be better for them 
to baptize. In speaking out against them, though, he exhibits his own clerical learning. 
This learning is presented as having come from thought, wit, and study. It has also 
increased under the tutelage of Clergie and Scripture. Certainly Will and Scripture 
have had a disagreement at this point. Nevertheless, Scripture’s disagreement with 
Will has not led her to banish Will from her presence entirely. Instead, with the incipit 
of an ascetic treatise often presented in manuscripts as a work “de interiori homini,” 
Scripture’s rebuke leads Will into further (inner) instructive dreams. Will’s squabble 
with friars appears there, and needs to be recognized in that context. 
 Zeeman writes, however, even though Will as narrator also continues to speak 
of the lewed as a demographic not his own, that Will “contrast[s] himself to the lettred 
[friars in B.11.83].” Moreover, she continues, 
 
Wil [sic] draws support from natural sources, the non-theological virtue 
of lewtee and the secular literary modes of satire. Influentially 
associated by Kean with loving adherence to the law and defined as 
‘justice in a wide sense,’ Lewtee implies the accessibility of the law 
and the possibility of an accord between natural rectitude, natural 
observation, and the need for natural forthrightness of speech. Lewtee 
makes clear his affiliations with a secular literary tradition of moral 
satire and Retorik (B.11.96-102). Even Lewtee’s allusion to the 
requirement that priests keep confessions secret argues for lay people 
speaking out. Lewtee brings together the laity, kynde morality, kynde 
understanding, and kynde textuality. When at the end of the narrative 
Scripture makes a much more terrifying moral and eschatological 
proposition—in the kynde and accessible form of a biblical social 
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exemplum—Wil is ready to understand at least its moral implications 
and how they apply to himself. [...] [When hearing the exemplum,] Wil 
recognises the application of moral categories, first to others, then to 
himself.440 
 
It could be that Lewtee’s uncertain instructions to Will—to act in one way if one of 
the “persons and preestes and prelates of holy chirche,” another way if he is plainly 
“lewed”—make best sense as more working-through of Will’s options, as a poet for 
instance, should he upon waking further embrace or reject a clerical career whose 
certainty of succeeding, according to R. B. Dobson and T. A. R. Evans, would have 
been a matter in the late fourteenth century for doubt.441 Ymaginatif alludes to Lewtee 
in a way that accords with my interpetation here, describing how to “[do] as lewte 
techeþ” might mean various things depending on one’s profession (B.12.32). 
                                                 
440 Zeeman, “Condition,” p. 14.  
441 On the highly uncertain prospects for clerical employment in Langland’s era see for example R. B. 
Dobson, chapter 13: “The Religious Orders, 1370-1540,” in History of the University of Oxford, edd. J. 
I. Catto and Ralph Evans, vol. 2: Late Medieval Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 539-79, 
detailing from pp. 567-69 the on-again-off-again variability of university study by members of the 
religious orders. “[F]ew of the late medieval religious now best remembered for their contributions to 
theological debate were able to become permanent figures on the Oxford scene,” he writes (568). As for 
the likelihood of obtaining ecclesiastical preferment instead of a scholarly position, T. A. R. Evans 
notes a severe shortage of “available benefices” from the late fourteenth century onward (537), such 
that “[t]he difficulties of scholars in finding benefices were echoed in the poems of Audelay and 
Hoccleve [and] of course voiced in particular by the clergy themselves” (534). Universities did make 
strong efforts to promote their graduates with letters, alumni outreach, and policymaking (533ff). They 
also created “minor positions [that] may have tided a man over while he was a student, or may perhaps 
have provided the first stage in the establishment of connections which could lead to more substantial 
preferment[, though] they must themselves have been [...] the ultimage destination in the careers of 
many university men. (536). In sum, “[m]en trained in the university were not guaranteed a place even 
as the rector of a parish, and competition for these benefices may have become stiffer in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries” (533), not least because “it was not until the later sixteenth or early seventeenth 
century that the parish clergy of England came to be trained predominantly in the universities” (538), 
corresponding with which facts “[p]reliminary investigations suggest that the number of men ordained 
priest in English dioceses fell dramatically in the second half of the fourteenth century” (537). “[I]t is 
possible,” Evans suggests, “that a rising proportion of men with a university education were seeking 
non-clerical careers” (538). In this situation, circumstances might well have compelled Langland to 
remain a poet—and to present his narrator, Will, as only anomalously clerical. (Evans’ essay is chapter 
12: “The Number, Origins, and Careers of Scholars” in the History of the University of Oxford 2, pp. 
485-538.) On the actual lives of the beneficed clergy, as opposed to satiric caricatures such as 
Langland’s in the portrait of Sloth, see Nicholas Bennett, “Pastors and Masters: the Beneficed Clergy of 
North-East Lincolnshire, 1290-1340,” in The Foundations of Medieval English Ecclesiastical History: 
Studies Presented to David Smith, edd. Philippa Hoskin, Christopher Brooke, and Barrie Dobson, 
Studies in the History of Medieval Religion 27 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2005), pp. 40-62. 
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 Another rather central episode involving the propriety of judging others also 
occurs in relation to the friars, this time in passus 13 at Patience’s banquet with a 
prestigious fraternal “doctor of divinity”; and here, too, the poem contrasts preaching 
with open confrontation.  The friar, Will knows, had been preaching even at Saint 
Paul’s in London about the necessity of deprivation and suffering for a Christian to be 
confident that he was faithfully following of the way of Christ—but here at this 
dinner, at which everyone else finds himself eating verses of penitential psalms and 
other rather gristlesome textual fare, the friar gluts himself on such real delicacies as 
“mortrewes and potages.”442 Will, empassioned more than ever before to anger, 
mutters to himself about the injustice just loudly enough for Patience to hear; Patience, 
especially true to the post-medieval meaning of his name, urges patience.  
Will continues toboil inside, despite this sound advice. He even wishes fervently that 
the fine dishes that so artlessly cram the friar’s mouth could at once transform to 
“molten leed in his mawe and Mahoun amyddes,” reserving to the friar a death similar 
to but more ignominious than the execution visited upon Crassus (B.13.83). Not 
surprisingly, then, Will does angrily address—but no sooner has he begun to do so 
than Patience restrains Will with a hard and significant glance. Will should not judge 
the friar, Patience ultimately explains, because the punishment stemming naturally 
from the friar’s overindulgence will visit itself upon him in due course with horrible 
(albeit rightful) indigestion. That punishment will likely prove more instructive than 
any chastizing words, Patience suggests. 
                                                 
442 For the menu, see B.13.34-63. As Gratian points out at D.41 c.2,  “non cibus, sed appetitus in culpa 
est.” The doctor’s drinking heartily mid-sentence, and the indigestion he will feel thereafter according 
to Patience, shows though that “appetitus” is also an issue here. Langland’s depiction of the two 
different meals served at the dinner also appears to allude to how “cibus” might reflect the diner’s social 
status—in an interesting recollection of classical dinner satires, such as Juvenal 5 and Horace Bk. 2, 
satire 8. 
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 Two conclusions follow from Will’s interlocutors’ urging him not to judge. 
Unlike in canon law, in which certain social and hierarchical arrangements—
arrangements of polity—need to be observed, Will is urged to “lakke no lif” 
(B.11.210). Anima also, at 15.249, also claims to “lakke no lif.” No one should 
begrudge the division of society into various groups, these characters say. Instead, one 
should if anything scrutinize how each member of a social group comports himself. 
The second conclusion, drawing on an exemplum Langland’s poem also quotes 
approvingly, is that it is far better to allow individuals to discover the error of their 
own ways: a drunk, fallen into a ditch, will learn more from waking up in the ditch 
than from being dragged away from it just before he would have fallen in.  Here, too, 
the poem displays a cunning awareness of its likely but not necessarily clerical 
audience, with the narrator coyly interlarding his scriptural tags against false 
“brethren” (in the manner, even, of William of St. Amour) with a feigned care not to 
reveal to the “lewed” his indulgence in this most common type of anticlerical (inter-
clerical) satire.443  
 Another interesting test case for how one should or should not judge others in 
the poem occurs at passus 15, in Anima’s speech, a major portion of which concerns 
the limitation of worldly learning proper to a cleric. With a long quotation from 
[pseudo-] John Chrysostom, provided untranslated in Latin, it ostentatiously and 
firmly closes off some of its most trenchant interclerical criticism from uneducated 
ears. The problem that Anima points to, of course, is exactly what triggers that long 
speech—first to Will, but soon cycling out into a lecture against the entire clerical 
establishment: the hypocritical disjunction of outer sanctity and inner sin presented 
earlier by Haukyn (thereby Will). But while the authoritative quotation from 
                                                 
443 On the legacy of William of St. Amour, see most prominently Penn R. Szittya’s Antifraternal 
Tradition in Middle English Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
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Chrysostom arises out of and folds back in to comical and even biting criticism against 
“preestes” and their ilk for such hypocrisy, its uncompromising depiction of the entire 
Church as unhealthy and dying because of these clerics cannot be seen by the entire 
Church. What comes across without the Latin is a criticism vivid but not authoritative, 
instead: an almost comical depiction of clerical fops who care for beer more than 
breviaries. (B.15.110-28)  
 Throughout the vita, the poem sets up as a major problem the danger that 
criticism might be voiced where unnecessary or even harmful, urging a discretion 
purely in line with scriptural and canonical teachings. These scriptural and canonical 
teachings do, as earlier indicated, allow for clerical figures to be aware of secular 
writings of all sorts—of the good, to take them up as part of the “spoils of the 
Egyptians,” and of the bad to know what to avoid. They also constrain criticism 
between leaders in the ecclesiastical hierarchy such as bishops and the people (clerical 
and lay) under their charge to regulated channels.  
 But Gratian’s Decretum, for one, cannot explain the emphasis on absolute 
silence we so often find in Piers, since the silence urged in the Decretum is silence 
maintained almost solely out of respect for higher authorities. It is telling, I think, that 
in the one clear place that the Decretum urges a cleric to be quite vocal about the 
corruption of his brethren outside of preaching (and urges him certainly not to be “a 
bono taciturnus,” which can be of greater harm) it refers to a figure who has no 
temporal overlords.444  Not to praise the good or blame the bad leads untold legions of 
                                                 
444 See D.40 c.6, according to which “Dampnatur Apostolicus, qui suæ et fraternæ salutis est 
negligens”: “Si Papa suæ et fraternæ salutis negligens reprehenditur inutilis et remissus in operibus suis, 
et insuper a bono taciturnus, quod magis officit sibi et omnibus, nichilominus innumerabiles populos 
cateruatim secum ducit, primo mancipio gehennæ cum ipso plagis multis in eternum uapulaturus. Huius 
culpas istic redarguere presumit mortalium nullus, quia cunctos ipse iudicaturus a nemine est 
iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide deuius; pro cuius perpetuo statu uniuersitas fidelium tanto 
instantius orat, quanto suam salutem post Deum ex illius incolumitate animaduertunt propensius 
pendere.”  
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people towards hell as with a chain. It is true that, where the question of judging or 
correcting one’s equals or subordinates comes into play, even the Decretum urges a 
cleric to make use of words of reproof (and not to change his message out of fear of 
secular persecution, according to D.40 c.3). Yet silence is most useful and even 
lavishly to be praised for lesser clerics to employ, as the long first capitula of 
distinctio 43 argues. Nevertheless, this silence will not work if the (e.g.) priest being 
silent does not also—however discretely and cautiously—make use of corrective 
words. I provide the Latin for the passage followed directly by a translation, because 
its length forbids either from being placed in footnote form: 
 
Pudicus quoque debet esse sacerdos, ut et moribus, et uerbis pudorem 
indesinenter exhibeat. Unde in Canticis Canticorum genæ sponsæ, id est 
predicatores, turturi comparantur. 1. Debet etiam gratiam docendi habere, quia 
ut Ieronimus ait: “Innocens absque sermone conuersatio, quantum exemplo 
prodest, tantum silentio nocet. Nam latratu canum et baculo lupi sunt arcendi.” 
In ipsa autem doctrina discretum oportet esse rectorem, ne aut tacenda proferat, 
aut dicenda taceat. 
 
Unde Gregorius in XV. capitulo [Part. II.] sui Pastoralis [c. 4.] ait: 
 
C. I. De discretione predicationis, et silentii.  
 
Sit rector discretus in silentio, utilis in uerbo, ne aut tacenda proferat, aut 
proferenda reticescat. Nam sicut incauta locutio in errorem pertrahit, ita 
indiscretum silentium hos, qui erudiri poterant, in errorem derelinquit. Sepe 
namque rectores improuidi, humanam amittere gratiam formidantes, loqui 
libere recta pertimescunt, et iuxta ueritatis uocem nequaquam iam gregis 
custodiæ pastorum studio, sed mercenariorum uice deseruiunt, quia ueniente 
lupo fugiunt, dum se sub silentio abscondunt. Hinc namque eos per Prophetam 
Dominus increpans ait in Ysaia: “Canes muti, non ualentes latrare.” Hinc 
rursum queritur dicens in Ezechiele: “Non ascendistis ex aduerso, neque 
opposuistis murum pro domo Israel, ut staretis in prelio in die Domini.” Ex 
aduerso quippe ascendere est pro defensione gregis uoce libera huius mundi 
potestatibus contraire. Et in die Domini in prelio stare est prauis decertantibus 
ex iustitiæ amore resistere. Pastori enim recta timuisse dicere, quid est aliud 
quam tacendo terga prebuisse? qui nimirum, si pro grege se obicit, murum pro 
domo Israel hostibus opponit. Hinc rursus delinquenti populo dicitur in 
Hieremia: “Prophetæ tui uiderunt tibi falsa et stulta, nec aperiebant iniquitatem 
tuam, ut te ad penitentiam prouocarent.” Prophetæ quippe in sacro eloquio 
nonnunquam doctores uocantur, qui dum fugitiua esse presentia indicant, que 
sunt uentura manifestant; quos diuinus sermo falsa uidere redarguit, quia, dum 
culpas corripere metuunt, incassum delinquentibus promissa securitate 
blandiuntur, qui iniquitatem peccantium nequaquam aperiunt, quia ab 
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increpationis uoce conticescunt. Clauis quippe apertionis est sermo correctionis 
quia increpando culpam detegit, quam sepe nescit ipse etiam qui perpetrauit. 
Hinc Paulus ait ad Titum: “Ut potens sit ad exhortandum in doctrina sana et 
eos qui contradicunt, redarguere.” Hinc per Malachiam dicitur: “Labia 
sacerdotis custodiunt scientiam, et legem requirunt ex ore eius, quia angelus 
Domini exercituum est.” Hinc per Ysaiam Dominus ammonet dicens: “Clama, 
ne cesses, sicut tuba exalta uocem tuam.” Preconis quippe offitium suscipit, 
quisquis ad sacerdotium accedit, ut ante aduentum iudicis, qui terribiliter 
sequitur, ipse scilicet clamando gradiatur. Sacerdos ergo, si predicationis est 
nescius, quam clamoris uocem daturus est preco mutus? In Actibus 
Apostolorum: hinc est enim, quod super pastores primos in linguarum specie 
Spiritus sanctus insedit, quia nimirum, quos repleuerit, de se protinus loquentes 
facit. Hinc Moysi precipitur in Exodo, ut tabernaculum sacerdos ingrediens 
tintinnabulis ambiatur, ut uidelicet predicationis uoces habeat, ne superni 
inspectoris iudicium ex silentio offendat. Scriptum quippe est: “Ut audiatur 
sonitus, quando ingreditur sanctuarium in conspectu Domini, et non moriatur.” 
Sacerdos namque ingrediens uel egrediens moritur, si de eo sonitus non 
audiatur, quia iram contra se  occulti iudicis exigit, si sine predicationis sonitu 
incedit.  Apte autem tintinnabula uestimentis illius describuntur inserta. 
 
Vestimenta etenim sacerdotis quid aliud quam recta opera debemus accipere? 
Propheta attestante, qui ait in Psalmo CXXXVI.: “Sacerdotes tui induantur 
iusticia.” Vestimentis itaque illius tintinnabula inherent, ut uitæ uiam cum 
linguæ sonitu ipsa quoque opera sacerdotis clament. Sed cum rector se ad 
loquendum preparat, sub quanto cautelæ studio loquatur, attendat, ne, si 
inordinate ad loquendum rapitur, erroris uulnere audientium corda feriantur, et 
cum fortasse sapientem se uideri desiderat, unitatis compagem insipienter 
abscidat. Hinc namque ueritas dicit in Marco: “Sal in uobis, et pacem habete 
inter uos.” Per sal quippe uerbi sapientia designatur. Qui ergo sapienter loqui 
nititur, magnopere metuat, ne eius eloquio audientium unitas confundatur. 
Hinc Paulus ait ad Romanos: “Non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere, sed 
sapere ad sobrietatem.” In Exodo in sacerdotis ueste iuxta diuinam uocem 
tintinnabulis mala Punica coniunguntur. Quid enim per mala Punica nisi fidei 
unitas designatur? Nam sicut in malo Punico uno exterius cortice multa interius 
grana muniuntur, sic innumeros sanctæ ecclesiæ populos unitas fidei contegit, 
quos intus diuersitas meritorum tenet. Ne igitur rector incautus ad loquendum 
proruat, hoc, quod iam premisimus, per semetipsam discipulis clamat ueritas in 
Marco: “Habete sal in uobis, et pacem habete inter uos”: ac si figurate per 
habitum sacerdotis dicat: Mala Punica tintinnabulis iungite, ut per omne, quod 
dicitis, unitatem fidei cauta obseruatione teneatis. 
 
1. Prouidendum quoque est sollicita intentione rectoribus, ut ab eis nullo modo 
non solum praua, sed nec recta quidem nimie et inordinate proferantur, quia 
sepe dictorum uirtus perditur, cum apud corda audientium loquacitatis incauta 
inportunitate leuigatur, et auctorem suum hec eadem loquacitas inquinat, que 
seruire auditoribus ad usum profectus ignorat. Unde bene per Moysen dicitur 
in Leuitico: “Vir, qui fluxum seminis patitur, inmundus erit.” In mente quippe 
audientium semen secuturæ cogitationis est audita equalitas locutionis, quia, 
dum per aurem sermo concipitur cogitatio in mente generatur. Unde ab huius 
mundi sapientibus in Actibus Apostolorum predicator egregius semiuerbius 
uocatus est. Qui ergo fluxum seminis sustinet, inmundus asseritur, quia 
multiloquio subditus ex eo se inquinat; quod si ordinate promeret, prolem 
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rectæ cogitationis edere in audientium corde potuisset, dumque incautus per 
loquacitatem diffluit, non ad usum generis, sed ad inmundiciam semen fundit. 
Unde Paulus quoque, cum de instancia predicationis discipulum admoneret, 
dixit ad Timotheum Ep. II.: “Testificor coram Deo et Christo Iesu, qui 
iudicaturus est uiuos et mortuos et aduentum ipsius et regnum eius, predica 
uerbum, insta oportune, inportune.” Dicturus: “inportune,” premisit: 
“oportune,” quia scilicet apud auditoris mentem ipse sua uilitate se destruit, si 
habere inportunitas oportunitatem nescit. 
 
[Part 1. A priest also ought to be virtuous [pudicus], so that both by his actions 
and by his words he might ceaselessly exhibit virtue—for which reason in the 
Song of Songs the eyes [genæ; also “cheeks”] of the bride, that is preachers, 
are compared to turtledoves.  
 
1] He ought also to have a willingness to teach, because, as Jerome says: 
“Upright behavior performed without words may be harmed by silence as 
much as it may be advanced by example. For wolves are kept away with a 
stick and the barking of a dog.” But in the same teaching the rector ought to be 
careful lest he promote things best left unspoken of or keep silent about things 
that should be talked about.  
 
Whence Gregory in the 15th chapter (part 2) of his work on Pastoral Care (ch. 
4) says:  
 
Canon 1. Of the Discretion of a Preacher, and of Silence 
 
[For the following, I use the translation by Henry Davis for the Ancient 
Christian Writers series.445] 
 
 
The ruler [rector] should be discreet in keeping silence and profitable in 
speech, lest he utter what should be kept secret, or keep secret what should be 
uttered. For just as incautious speech leads men into error, so, too, 
unseasonable silence leaves in error those who might have been instructed. 
Often, indeed, incautious rulers, being afraid of losing human favor, fear to 
speak freely of what is right, and, in the words of the Truth, do not exercise the 
zeal of shepherds caring for the flock, but serve the role of mercenaries; for 
when the wolf appears, they flee and hide themselves in silence. Wherefore, 
the Lord reproves them thorugh the Prophet, saying: They are dumb dogs, not 
able to bark.  
 
Again, He complains of them, saying: You have not gone up to face the enemy, 
nor have you set up a wall for the house of Israel, to stand in battle in the day 
of the Lord. Now, to rise up against the enemy is to oppose worldly powers 
with candid speech in defence of the flock. To stand in battle in the day of the 
Lord is to resist from love of justice evil men who contend against us. For if a 
shepherd feared to say what is right, what else is that but to have turned his 
back by not speaking? But when one places himself in front of the flock to 
                                                 
445 See Henry Davis, trans., Gregory the Great: Pastoral Care. Ancient Christian Writers 11 
(Westminster:  Newman Press, 1950), pp. 51-53. 
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defend them, he obviously is opposing a wall for the house of Israel against the 
enemy.  
 
Hence again, it is said to the sinful people: Thy Prophets have seen false and 
foolish things for thee, and they have not laid open thy iniquity to excite thee to 
penance. Now, teachers are sometimes called Prophets of Sacred Scripture, in 
that they point out the fleeting nature of the present and disclose the future. 
Here they are accused by the divine utterance of seeing what is false, because, 
by fearing to reprove faults, they vainly flatter evil-doers by promising them 
immunity. They fail to disclose the wickedness of sinners by refraining from 
words of reproof.  
 
Indeed, the word of reproof is the key of detection, since reproof discloses the 
sin of which frequently even the doer is unaware. Wherefore, Paul says: . . . 
that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers. 
So by Malachias it is said: The lips of the priest have knowledge, and they shall 
seek the law at his mouth, because he is the Angel of the Lord of Hosts.  
 
Wherefore, through Isaias the Lord admonishes, saying: 
 
Cry, cease not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet. He who enters on the priesthood 
undertakes the office of a herald, so that he cries out and precedes the coming 
of the Judge, who follows with terrible mien. If, then, the priest does not know 
how to preach, what vocal sound is this mute herald likely to give?  
 
For this reason, then, the Holy Spirit settled on the first Pastors in the form of 
tongues; for to those whom He fills, He instantly gives His own eloquence. 
Therefore, Moses is enjoined to see that when the priest enters the Tabernacle, 
he should be encompassed with little bells, a sign that he must be endowed 
with utterance for preaching, lest by silence he provoke the judgement of Him 
who sees from on high. For it is written: . . . that the sound may be heard when 
he goeth in and cometh out by the sanctuary in the sight of the Lord, and that 
he may not die. The priest going in or coming out dies if not sound is heard 
from him: that is to say, he arouses the wrath of the hidden Judge against him 
if he goes without the utterance of preaching.  
 
The little bells are fittingly described as fixed to the vesture; and indeed, what 
else is to be understood by the priest’s vestments but his righteous works? The 
Prophet witnesses to this when he says: Let thy priests be clothed with justice. 
Therefore, little bells are fixed to the vesture, that even the works of the priest 
should loudly proclaim his way of life in the sound of his speech. 
 
But when the ruler prepares to speak, he must bear in mind to exercise a 
studious caution in his speech, for if his discourse, hastily given, be ill-ordered, 
the hearts of his hearers may be stricken with the wound of error, and when, 
perhaps, he wishes to appear wise, he will by his lack of wisdom sever the 
bond of unity. For this reason the Truth says: Have salt in you, and have peace 
among you. By salt the wisdom of speech is indicated. He, then, who strives to 
speak wisely, should greatly fear lest by his words the unity of his hearers be 
confounded. Wherefore, Paul says: Not to be more wise than it behoveth to be 
wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.  
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Hence in the vesture of the priest, in accordance with the divine word, 
pomegranates are added to the little bells. What else is symbolized by 
pomegranates but the unity of faith? For as in the pomegranate many seeds 
within are protected by one outer rind, so, unity in faith comprehends 
numberless people of Holy Church, who, though varying in merits, are retained 
within her. Therefore, lest the ruler rush into careless speech, what we have 
said is proclaimed by the Truth to His disciples: Have salt in you, and have 
peace among you—as though He should say in employing the symbol of the 
vesture of the priest: “Join pomegranates to the little bells, so that in all that 
you say you may guardedly and cautiously maintain the unity of the faith.”  
 
Rulers must also see to it with careful concern that not only should nothing evil 
proceed from their lips, but that not even what is proper be said in excess or in 
a slovenly manner. Often the force of what is said is wasted, when it is 
enfeebled in the hearts of the hearers by a careless and offensive torrent of 
words. Indeed, this sort of loquacity defiles the speaker himself, inasmuch as it 
takes no notice of the practical needs of the audience. Wherefore, Moses aptly 
said: The man that hath an issue of seed shall be unclean. For in the mind of 
the hearers the seed of their subsequent thought depends on the nature of what 
they have heard, since with the reception of speech through the medium of 
hearing the thought is begotten in the mind. Hence the great preacher was 
called by the philosophers of this world a “word-sower.” He, then, who suffers 
an issue of seed is said to be unclean, because, given as he is to much speaking, 
he defiles himself by the fact that if he had been orderly in his speech, he could 
have produced a progeny of righteous thought in the hearts of his hearers; as it 
is, by spreading himself out in immoderate worldliness, he has an issue of seed 
not for the purpose of progeny, but to serve defilement. 
 
Wherefore, Paul also, admonishing his disciple to be instant in preaching, said: 
I charge thee before God and Jesus Christ, who shall judge the living and the 
dead, by His coming and His Kingdom: preach the word, be instant in season, 
out of season. When he was about to say “out of season,” he premised, “in 
season,” for if being in season is not combined with being out of season, the 
preaching destroys itself in the mind of the hearer by its worthlessness. 
 
This is a subtle take on the benefit of silence among those subject to canon law, given 
that “unseasonable silence leaves in error those who might have been instructed.” 
Throughout the Decretum, in fact, Gratian recognizes a tension between a preacher’s 
responsibility for teaching—even to administer reproof—and his need as the member 
of a complex hierarchical body not to speak out of turn or improperly question those 
placed in positions above him.446  It should be obvious by now that this set of 
                                                 
446 These forces press against each other—politely but with intense pressure—in D.43 c.5 (“Eternæ 
dampnationis penam incurrit predicator, qui semen diuini uerbi non spargit”) in which the Decretum 
attempts to acknowledge the necessity for discretion and the demand for outspokenness.  It begins with 
an excerpt from “Nicolaus Papa” urging that failing to sow the seeds of divine wisdom is far more 
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counterbalanced prompts toward clerical speech and silence differs quite strikingly 
from the absolute prescriptions that Will encounters in the vita—and I will discuss 
why the prescriptions are so absolute in the next section of this chapter. I believe that 
it also can be explained by a consideration of monastic thought on the issue of one’s 
relationship to one’s fellow human beings: a relationship in which the humblest 
possible silence is of paramount importance.  
 
Ascetic Silence and Amor Proximi 
 
 What theory lies behind Piers Plowman’s heavy emphasis on the benefit of 
silence? The preceding section of this chapter began with the observation that, despite 
the caution Will’s interlocutors urge for Will when he might wish to criticize others, 
canon law and scripture do allow for some judgment to take place. Langland would 
have been aware of these provisions, I contend, since the poem frames the discussion 
of proper judgment in some of the same terms and based on some of the same key 
scriptural texts: in terms of the behavior best befitting a “cleric” (possessed of or 
striving after “clergie”), with respect to the proper types of learning and knowledge 
such a figure might have and in relation to where that figure stands in (or outside of) 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Yet that section of the chapter ended with the observation 
                                                                                                                                            
dangerous than failing to observe an appropriate silence: “Dispensatio est nobis celestis seminis 
iniuncta; ‘uæ si non sparserimus, uæ si tacuerimus.’ Quod cum electionis uas formidet et clamet, quanto 
magis cuilibet metuendum est? Proinde, sicut non leue discrimen incumbit pontificibus, siluisse quod 
congruit, ita his (quod absit) non mediocre periculum est, qui cum debeat parere, despiciunt.” To this 
Gratian adds the following (politically fastidious) remarks: “Paritet quoque obseruare debet sacerdos, ne 
indignis et non intelligentibus secreta misteria sua predicatione reserare incipiat. Qui enim ea docet, que 
ab auditoribus intelligi non ualent, non eorum utilitatem, sed sui ostentationem facit. Unde in 
expositione: ‘Beati inmaculati,’ dicitur: ‘Vicium animi est, indignis secreta uulgare, quod fit uel 
loquacitate incauta, dum sine iudicio uolat irreuocabile uerbum, uel adulatione, ut ei placeat, cui secreta 
reuelat, uel iactatione scientiæ, ut plura scire uidentur.” In quibus omnibus profecto datur intelligi, 
quanta debeat esse discretio in predicatione sacerdotis, qua si forte caruerit, tanquam torto naso, 
sacerdotalis offitii iudicatur indignus.” 
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that the poem’s conclusions, especially with Reason and Ymaginatif, seem to take a 
far harder line on the question of when one might judge his fellows than either canon 
law or scriptural commentary would suggest.  
 Reason’s rebuke to Will, that Will should not meddle with judging the affairs 
of others without first becoming “lakless” himself—that Will should “suffre” God to 
“suffre” not only because God is superior to him in the great hierarchy of all beings 
but also because to imitate God’s “suffering” is an important goal—makes of silence 
not just an inconvenience to be endured or a helpful political skill to cultivate but in 
fact a virtue to be pursued. This leads me now to locate the ideal of silence in ascetic 
ideology. The chapter will then consider the relationship of silence-holding to 
interactions with others according to ascetic thought before concluding with some 
thoughts about how this aspect of the satiric ideal in Piers can possibly square with the 
poem’s project as a satire. 
  The first clue presented to us that Piers Plowman considers silence something 
more important than respectful restraint is that Will’s interlocutors seem to value 
silence as a badge not just of deference but of wisdom—a wisdom that goes beyond 
mere circumspection. What is spoken might be knowledge, even clerical, but what’s 
not spoken for fear of misconstrual might well be more profound: Theology. It is for 
this reason, presumably, that Study tells her husband not to speak: the knowledge she 
fears Wit will share too openly belongs to this guarded and misunderstandable realm. 
Her reference to not casting pearls before swine corroborates this interpretation, 
appearing as it does with such regularity in theological treatises such as Alan of Lille’s 
Quoniam homines (which itself gestures towards descriptions of theology in works 
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such as pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystica Theologia: a text that, as Igino Cecchetti has 
noted, speaks of wisdom being born out of silence itself).447  
 Likewise, when Scripture rebukes Will for his quite lengthy backlash at her, 
her admonition seems to imply that Will’s knowledge of “many things” (multa) has 
incited him; if he had only known himself, he would have stayed properly quiet. 
Indeed, as Ymaginatif goes on to observe in passus 12, knowledge in abundance left 
unmatched by virtuous behavior stemming from that knowledge “swelleþ a mannes 
soule” (B.12.57). Of course the most obvious connection made between silence and 
wisdom in Ymaginatif’s speech or elsewhere is the tag, familiar to Boethius and most 
widely known through Cato that “philosophus esses, si tacuisses.” Speaking based on 
a presumption of sufficient knowledge, as context makes clear, shuts off the 
opportunity to gain more knowledge. It opens the speaker to rebuke for overreaching, 
as Scripture and Reason’s rebukes of Will’s talking back both prove. 
 In addition to impeding wisdom, speaking seems to be associated with the loss 
of paradise. Ymaginatif quite strikingly recasts the story of Adam and Eve’s expulsion 
from Eden in this light: 
 
Adam, whiles he spak noʒt, hadde paradis at wille, 
ac whan he mamelede about mete, and entremetede to knowe 
the wisedom and þe wit of god, he was put fram blisse. (B.11.417-19) 
 
Two matters regarding speech here seem pertinent. First, Adam lost paradise by 
“mameling aboute mete,” or talking about his food (B.11.418). I do not think that the 
                                                 
447 Igino Cecchetti, “‘Tibi silentium laus.’” Miscellanea Liturgica in Honorem L. Cuniberti Mohlberg, 
vol. 2 (Rome: Edizioni Liturgiche, 1949), pp. 521-70. On the pseudo-Dionysian philosophy referenced 
there as it would have been encountered in medieval schools, see L. Michael Harrington,  A Thirteenth-
Century Textbook of Mystical Theology at the University of Paris: the Mystical Theology of Dionysius 
the Areopagite in Eriugena’s Latin Translation, with the Scholia translated by Anastasius the Librarian 
and Excerpts from Eriugena’s Periphyseon, Dallas Medieval Texts and  Translations 4 (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2004) and James McEvoy,  ed. & trans. Mystical Theology: the Glosses by Thomas Gallus and 
the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia, Dallas Medieval Texts and 
Translations 3 (Leuven: Peeters, 2003).  
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Book of Genesis makes as much of Adam’s discussion of the  apple as Ymaginatyf 
indicates, but it is true that first Eve (with the serpent) and then Adam (with Eve) 
allow themselves to discuss the subtle meanings of God’s earlier prohibition against 
the forbidden fruit and therefore are fatally swayed in the course of the story.448 
Second, with far greater scriptural backing, Adam is held here to have wanted to know 
the “wisdom and wit of God” when he ate the apple.  
 This desire to know is not, in and of itself, tantamount to actual speech. 
Nevertheless, Adam’s action of taking the apple and eating it does amount to an oral if 
not literally vocal vote against the Edenic status quo, for which “speech” Adam 
forfeited such the access to God’s wisdom as he had earlier enjoyed. Nor is 
Ymaginatif’s reference to the Adam and Eve story here just a random exemplum, as 
Ymaginatif’s return to the same figures later on makes clear: 
 
Kynde kenned Adam to knowe hise pryue membres, 
and tauʒte hym and Eue to helien hem wiþ leues. 
Lewed men many tymes maistres þei apposen 
why Adam hiled noʒt first his mouþ þat eet þe Appul 
raþer þan his likame alogh; lewed asken þus clerkes. 
Kynde knoweþ whi he dide so, ac no clerk ellis. (B.12.230-35) 
Here, again, speech loses Paradise. Even the “lewed” are said to understand intuitively 
that the actions of Adam’s mouth were primarily to blame for the first man’s default. 
It is hard to imagine them actually asking the question here ascribed to them here, 
moreover, which Langland thus probably inserts tendentiously to advance his point. 
 A somewhat anomalous third case appears a few passūs later on, specifically 
passus 16, in the poem’s vision of the (apple-)tree of Charity.449 In this episode, the 
tree and the blossoms and fruit on it are constantly running the risk of falling down 
and are supported by staves set up to brace the tree against the opposing winds. The 
                                                 
448 See Genesis 3 for the narrative. 
449 Penn Szittya, drawing a comparison with the trees Wrath grafted (B.5.139-41), agrees that the tree of 
Charity’s “foliage [...] is also verbal.” See Szittya, The Antifraternal Tradition, p. 256 and its larger 
discussion of friars’ linked faults of “word and werk” on pp. 249-255ff. 
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staves represent the power of the Trinity—“potentia dei patris,” “sapiencia dei patris 
(þat is þe passion and þe power of oure Prince Iesu),” and, presumably, the grace of 
the Holy Ghost.450 Whatever else this polysemic tree and its situation might be said to 
represent—and it certainly goes on to represent quite a lot—many of the elements 
have something to do with propriety of speech.451 The leaves, we learn immediately, 
“ben lele wordes, þe lawe of holy chirche” (B.16.6). The blossoms “ben buxom speche 
and benigne lokynge” (B.16.7) Of the winds blowing to attrack the tree, conceived of 
as the traditional “three foes” (the world, the flesh, and the devil) only the first—the 
world—seems at a glance not to be concerned with speech, being said only to 
engender a leaf-gnawing coveitise when it blows. The leaves it “forfreteþ” (B.16.29) 
however, let us remember, do represent “lele words” and the laws set down by the 
church. And the other two winds definitely concern speech. The wind that represents 
the flesh, as Piers explains to Will,  
 
norisseþ nyce sightes and anoþer tyme wordes 
and wikkede werkes þerof, wormes of synne 
and forbiteþ þe blosmes riʒt to þe bare leues. (B.16.33-35) 
 
Here “sightes” and “werkes” receive pejorative modifiers—“nyce” meaning foolish or 
silly, “wikkede” enjoying its current denotation—but “wordes,” intrestingly, though 
they are allied with or bring about or might themselves even be “wormes of sinne,” are 
here only represented as “wordes”: as if words were sin enough.  
 Compared to these fairly brief references to speech, telling though as they are, 
the third wind—the devil—seems more associated with “wordes” even than a 
lexicographer. He attacks the tree with “vnkynde Neighebores,” “backbiteres 
                                                 
450 B.16.30, 36-37; the third stave or “pile” is not glossed, though. 
451 Alford’s remark in “The Design of the Poem,” in the Alford Companion, speaks to this polysemy: 
“This allegory is charged with such a multitude of overlapping schemes, ‘a pluralizing of the tree 
image’ (Donaldson 188), that many readers have complained of being unable to see the tree for the 
forest.” (52)  
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brewecheste, brawleris and chideres,” at least half of whom define themselves by their 
type of speech (B.16.42-44). The rungs of the ladder the devil places against the tree 
in order to steal its flowers are made out of lies, moreover, and the devil prevents Will 
from savouring the various types of fruit growing on the tree—equivalent to the so-
called degrees of chastity—by catching them into his basket when Piers shakes the 
tree. This separation of tree and apples thus reënacts the Fall, an interpretation 
supported by the fact that the poem procedes onward to describe the locking of the 
patriarchs in limbo thanks to their father Adam’s initial sin and then the rest of 
Christian salvation history. Here then, once again, just as in Ymaginatif’s discussion 
with Will, this fall has been brought about by improper speech.  
 Langland had every reason to believe that a good word might undo whatever 
improper speaking had brought about, of course. One of the underlying assumptions in 
Christian thinking about Adam’s fall is that God did not want the effects of that Fall to 
be permanent. If, in the monastic understanding especially, humans had been created 
to be able to replace the fallen angels who had rebelled with Lucifer during his 
prehistoric revolt, then humans have an allotted place in heaven. Jesus as the anointed 
Son of, coequal person with, and indeed Word of God conducted human life to redeem 
humanity for future heavenly glory. In essentially founding the Christian church by 
inaugurating his closest followers’ apostolic ministry, Jesus was thought to have 
passed down a new law according to which humanity—once released from fore-
ordained slavery to the devil—oncemore could attain heaven.  
 The life of Jesus presented here in passus 16 of Piers Plowman clearly sets up 
oppositions between rash judgment (based on limited knowledge) and humility; 
between betrayal and rightousness; between rumormongering and prayer. It also 
notably employs a distasteful antisemitic rhetoric of supersession, but its 
unpleasantness finds itself somewhat mitigated by the probability that the Jews 
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mentioned with such opprobrium in the episode refer to Christian clerical corruption 
in Langland’s day.452  In response to Jesus’ cures and other miracles, “Iewes iangled 
þer-ayein þat Iuggede lawes” (B.16.119). But Jesus “missays” these in a manner 
described here as “manly,” as the poem turns to recount the so-called scourging of the 
temple—in which Jesus “knokked on hem wiþ a corde, and caste adoun hir stalles / 
þat in chirche chaffared, or chaungeden any moneie” (B.16.127-29). This naturally 
provokes Jesus’ own people, here described otheringly as “þe Iewes,” to want to kill 
him; the apostle Judas is the most notorious of these, in so far as he works to hand 
over his lord to be executed, but for his hidden plotting he receives an open curse:  
 
Enuye and yuel wil arne in þe Iewes. 
Thei casten and contreueden to kulle hym whan þei myʒte; 
eche day after ooþer hir tyme þei awaiteden 
til it bifel on a friday, a litel bifore Pasqe. 
The þursday bifore, þere he made his cene, 
sitting at þe soper he seide þise wordes: 
‘I am solde þoruʒ som of yow; he shal þe tyme rewe 
that euere he his Saueour solde for siluer or ellis.’ 
Iudas iangled þerayein, ac Iesus hym tolde 
it was hymself sooþly and seide ‘tu dicis.’453  
Again, the centerpiece of the narrative is the opposition it sets between the frank, 
honest, sober speech of Jesus and the guile of those who would defeat him, and this 
contrast becomes even stronger a few lines later on: 
 
And þus was wiþ Iudas þo þat Iesus bitrayed: 
‘Aue, raby,’ quod þat Ribaud, and riʒt to hym he yede 
and kiste hym to be caught þerby and kulled of þe Iewes. 
Thanne Iesus to Iudas and to þe Iewes seide, 
‘Falsnesse I fynde in þi faire speche 
                                                 
452 This sort of typological perspective may be corroborated by lyrics by Friar William Herbert, d. 1333, 
and in the collection of John Grimestone, on which see Luria & Hoffman’s Middle English Lyrics, 
which conflate the Old Testament God with the New Testament crucified savior, inviting a shameful 
identification by these poems’ real late medieval Christian audiences with the addressed tormentors. 
453 B.16.136-45. Interestingly, this line seems to conflate two different verses and episodes of the 
Passion narrative—even with a studied ambiguity. In Matthew 26:25, when Judas asks if he himself 
will betray Jesus, Jesus replies, “Tu dixisti.” In Matthew 27:11, when Pilate asks Jesus if he is the 
“King of the Jews,” Jesus answers, “Tu dicis.” In Langland’s account, it has been rendered unclear 
whether the phrase “it was hymself sooþly” refers to Jesus being the “Saueor” (as Rex Iudæorum?) or to 
Judas being a traitor. Hence, perhaps, the Matthew 26 situation paired with the Matthew 27 response. 
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and gile in þi glad chere and galle is in þi laughyng. 
Thow shalt be myrour to many men to deceyue, 
ac to þe worldes ende þi wikkednesse shal worþe vpon þiselue: 
Necesse est vt veniant scandala; ve homini illi per quem scandalum venit. 
Thouʒ I bi reson be taken to youre iewene wille 
suffreþ myne Apostles in pays and in pees gange.’ (B.16.151-59) 
 
An account of the Passion follows, which shakes Will, and he wakes up for a time. 
Throughout all the dream’s retelling of Jesus’ life, the norm or new standard he 
encourages imbricates itself with matters of proper works and, especially, proper 
words.  
 The best statement from Jesus in this episode of what reform under a new law 
should really look like—of what might constitute the return to paradise—comes in the 
description of the scourging of the Jerusalem Temple. This building was richly 
meaningful as a symbol to medieval Christians, as Jennifer A. Harris has shown.454 
The Temple Jesus promised to rebuild was understood even by the authors of the 
Gospels to refer to Jesus’ body, itself a metaphorical way to refer to all Christians (i.e. 
“the body of Christ”) and by extension—as Harris indicates—the Christian body.455 
As a result, by putting an end to himself physically and then withdrawing from the 
world in the Ascension, Jesus’ body would be rebuilt as a presumably non-avaricious, 
non-cynical, Christian community. As Jesus goes on to conclude, “I hote you, / of 
preires and parfitnesse þis place þat ye callen: / Domus mea domus oracionis 
vocabitur” (B.16.135-35a). The episode might seem at first, therefore, only to refer to 
Jewish moneychangers and the Christian prelates who behaviorally are their heirs (as 
the description of the Jerusalem Temple as a “chirche” suggests). As a comparison of 
Piers’ treatment with the Gospel episode behind it shows, however, Langland places 
                                                 
454 On some of the medieval interpretations of the Temple in Jerusalem, see Jennifer A. Harris, “The 
Place of the Jerusalem Temple in the Reform of the Church in the Eleventh Century,” Ph.D. diss, 
University of Toronto, 2002. 
455 On the conceit here and following Jennifer A. Harris, “The Body as Temple in the High Middle 
Ages,” in Sacrifice in Religious Experience, ed. Albert I. Baumgarten (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 233-56 
is relevant. 
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more emphasis here on the actions that Jesus promotes than on those which Jesus 
discourages.  Its satiric norm or ideal more widely concerns not merely the avoidance 
of venality, then, but a particular type of discipline “of preires and of parfitnessse” that 
should replace such vice. 
 Although the general referent here or target for reform must be the Christian 
Church, Langland’s quotation of the phrase “domus oracionis” would more 
immediately have brought that house of prayer par excellence, the monastery, to mind. 
Certainly monks themselves have thought of their vocation in this way. But it is in 
Langland’s own poem that our ability to make a clear-cut distinction between the 
parish church and the monastery or canonical cathedral becomes most difficult, since 
the poem translates monastic thought out of the cloister and into “the world.” Will, in 
the famous fifth passus of the C-text, proposes to his interlocutors that he betake 
himself to the church to spend all the rest of his days there in prayer, which we can all 
agree would make of Will’s parish church a very “domus oracionis” indeed—but this 
suggestion also comes across as a somewhat desperate gambit for ensuring personal 
salvation rather than logistically a viable choice; Jesus does tell potential followers in 
the Gospels to drop everything at once to follow him, to let the dead bury the dead for 
instance, but Will’s offer does not appear motivated by zeal so much as by fear. 
Nothing so literal is Langland’s final ideal. 
 The evidence uncovered by a cursory overview of database search results for 
“domus oracionis” and variants thereof reveals another way of considering how 
Langland might have understood Jesus’ ideal re-created Temple: not just as Jesus’ 
resurrected body, nor the Christian Church built over the metaphorical foundations of 
the synagogue, nor even the literal monastic life into which men and women retire to 
pray, but the human soul itself. The Rationale divinorum officiorum of William 
Durandus (1286), which circulated among secular clergy in the fourteenth century, 
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defines the related item “church” (ecclesia) with comprehensity regarding any number 
of senses (and synonyms) of the word. It can, he says, mean a congregation of the 
faithful. It can also mean a building made from bricks and mortar, each of its elements 
however symbolizing some larger spiritual or historical aspect of the Church. In his 
discussion of this, Durandus mentions the “cloister of the soul” or interior cloister 
whose ideals are the basis for much of the inquiry in this dissertation. Again, it is an 
important passage to quote at length because it indicates a means by which non-monks 
could have encountered the idea of a “cloister of the soul” in the later Middle Ages:  
 
The cloisters, as Richard, Bishop of Cremona, testifieth, had their rise either in 
the watchings of the Levites around the tabernacle, or from the chambers of the 
priests, or from the porch of Solomon’s temple. ‘For the Lord commanded 
Moses, that he should not number the Levites with the rest of the children of 
Israel; but should set them over the tabernacle of the testimony to carry it and 
to keep it.’ (Numbers 1:47; 18:6) On account of which divine commandment, 
while the Holy Mysteries are in celebration, the clergy should in the church 
stand apart from the laity. Whence the Council of Mayence ordained that the 
part which is separated with rails from the altar should be appropriated 
altogether to the priests choral. Furthermore, as the church signifieth the 
Church Triumphant, so the cloister signifieth the celestial Paradise, where 
there will be one and the same heart in fulfilling the commands of God and 
loving Him: where all things will be possessed in common, because that of 
which one hath less, he will rejoice to see abounding in another, for ‘God shall 
be all in all’ (1 Corinthians 15:28). Therefore the regular clergy who live in the 
cloisters, and are of one mind, rising to the service of God and leaving worldly 
things, lead their lives in common. The various offices in the cloister signify 
the different mansions, and the difference of rewards in the Kingdom: for ‘In 
my Father’s House are many mansions,’ saith our Lord (John 15:2). But in a 
moral sense the cloister is the contemplative state, into which the soul betaking 
itself, is separated from the crowd of carnal thoughts, and meditateth on 
celestial things only. In this cloister there are four sides: denoting, namely, 
contempt of self, contempt of the world, love of God, love of our neighbor. 
Each side hath his own row of columns. Contempt of self hath humiliation of 
soul, mortification of the flesh, humility of speech, and the like. The base of all 
the columns is patience.  In this cloister the diversity of office-chambers is the 
diversity of virtues. The chapter-house is the secret of the heart: concerning 
this, however, we shall speak differently hereafter. The refectory is the love of 
holy meditation. The cellar, Holy Scripture. The dormitory, a clean conscience. 
The oratory, a spotless life. The garden of trees and herbs, the collection of 
virtues. The well, the dew of God’s heavenly gifts; which in this world 
mitigateth our thirst, and hereafter will quench it.456  
                                                 
456 For further adaptations of the interior cloister idea, even in the vernacular, see Christiana Whitehead, 
“Making a Cloister of the Soul.” The English translation I use for William Durandus comes from John 
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Durandus’ treatise shows that the idea of the Church was a multivalent one in the later 
Middle Ages, not only a restoration of the Temple and transhistorical community but a 
reference to these. Furthermore, as Durandus’ discussion of the church “cloister” may 
be concerned, a physical church’s disposition in its architecture and its ornaments also 
provides a guiding pattern for the Christian believer’s disposition of virtues and 
faculties of mind. The idea that the human anima might build up its own interior 
cloister is not new to William Durandus. If anything, that author’s understanding that 
the interior cloister finds patristic expression in only part of a physical church is his 
only real innovation here. As I have already noted, earlier writers such Hugo de 
Folieto, in the twelfth century, developed the analogy of the “claustrum animæ” on the 
                                                                                                                                            
Mason Neale and Benjamin Webb, edd., The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments: a 
Translation of the First Book of the Rationale Divinorum Officiorum written by William Durandus, 
sometime Bishop of Mende (London: Gibbings and Company, 1893), pp. 29-30. The Latin follows, 
taken online from Guillelmus Duranti senior, dictus Speculator: Rationale diuinorum officiorum (libri I 
- UIII), ed. A. Davril, T. M. Thibodeau, CM140 and CM140A (with B. G. Guyot). 1995-1998 (140); 
2000 (140A): “42. Claustrum, sicut ait Sicardus episcopus Cremonensis in Mitrali, ab excubiis et 
custodiis leuitarum circa tabernaculum uel ab atrio sacerdotum uel a porticu Salomonis ad templum 
sumpsit exordium. Precepit enim Dominus Moysi ne leuitas cum plebeia multitudine numeraret, sed 
constitueret eos super tabernaculum testimonii ad portandum et custodiendum. Et propter dictum 
preceptum Domini, dum diuina peraguntur misteria, clerici debent in ecclesia stare a laicis segregati. 
Vnde statuit concilium Maguntinum quod pars illa que cancellis diuiditur ab altari, psallentibus tantum 
pateat clericis. Porro secundum quod templum triumphantem designat Ecclesiam, claustrum celestem 
significat paradysum ubi erit cor unum et idem in Dei dilectione et uoluntate, ubi omnia communiter 
possidebuntur, quia que quisquis minus habebit in se in alio se gaudebit habere, quia Deus erit omnia in 
omnibus. Ideo que regulares unanimiter in claustro degentes ad seruitium Dei surgunt et secularia 
relinquentes in omnibus uitam communem ducunt. 43. Diuersitas autem officinarum et officiorum in 
claustro diuersitas est mansionum cum diuersitate premiorum in regno, quoniam: In domo patris mei 
mansiones multe sunt, dicit Dominus. Moraliter uero claustrum est anime contemplatio, ubi se recipit 
dum a turba cogitationum carnalium separatur et sola celestia meditatur. In hoc claustro sunt quatuor 
latera scilicet contemptus sui, contemptus mundi, amor proximi et amor Dei. Vnumquodque autem latus 
suum habet ordinem columpnarum; contemptus sui habet mentis humiliationem, carnis afflictionem, 
humilem sermonem et similia; basis omnium columpnarum est patientia in hoc claustro. Diuersitas 
officinarum est diuersitas uirtutum; capitulum est cordis secretum, de hoc tamen aliter dicetur in quinta 
parte sub titulo De prima; refectorium, dilectio sancte meditationis; cellarium, sacra Scriptura; 
dormitorium, munda conscientia; oratorium, uita immaculata; hortus arborum et herbarum, congeries 
uirtutum, puteus aquarum uiuentium, irrigatio donorum que hic sitim mitigant et in futuro penitus 
extinguent.” The remarks on the columns pretty clearly refer to Hugo de Folieto’s De claustro animæ, 
liber 3, chapter 2: “De quatuor lateribus claustri,” coll. 1088D-1089B and liber 3, chapter 3: “De 
quatuor ordinibus columnarum, et quod ex contemptu sui duodecim columnarum ordo procedit,” coll. 
1089C-1090C. 
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model of the monastic cloister. Still other writers spoke not of an inner cloister at all 
(even as part of a church) but instead of the domus oracionis of the human soul tout 
court.457  
 This study obviously has a vested interest in seeing the reference by 
Langland’s Jesus to an ideal temple—a domus oracionis of some sort—as an indicator 
of an ascetic ideal, and so it would be very tempting to observe that the church when 
referred to by Langland often falls short of any acceptable standard of prayerfulness 
except when being portrayed as the church of poor, penitent religious separated from 
the world. One might also choose to mention that in the Middle Ages generally 
monastic life was the one most intensely associated with not only prayers but also (as 
Langland’s Jesus also puts it) “parfitnesse.” But to stress the identification too strongly 
between Langland’s view of the Church and his conception of monastic life distorts, I 
think, the focus on Church reform that the poem’s satire here and elsewhere wishes to 
achieve. As such, it might be best to keep with a more cautious assessment of the 
“domus oracionis” passage, namely that in it Langland clearly sees Jesus’ reference to 
rebuilding the Temple as not only a prediction of the rise of the Christian faith, not 
only (in context) as an image calling for a corrupt Christian church to be reformed, but 
also a reminder that—the reform of the Church corporate being predicated on the 
reform of individuals—individuals must rebuild their own interior temples or cloisters 
into places of “preieres and parfitnesse.” As we have seen from William Durandus, 
Langland could have encountered thought on the pursuit of Christian perfection, in 
terms of the building up of an interior domus oracionis, in writings meant primarily 
for use by the secular clergy.  
 
                                                 
457 A relatively quick search of the PL database online indicates as much. 
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 But if it seems plausible to think that for Langland’s poem the monastic life 
would come closest to an ideal for living with “preires and parfitnesse,” and if it seems 
obvious that writings by monastic authors most fully theorized this life in the later 
Middle Ages, it is indisputable that the world’s closest approach to the reversal of the 
Fall that Jesus was commonly believed to have helped accomplish could be found in 
regular religious life. I do not mean here that a well-informed medieval Christian 
would have thought of regular religious like monks as somehow more redeemed by 
Christ’s Passion; medieval theology understood that as a sacrifice performed once for 
all humanity.458 But I do mean that even a well-informed medieval Christian would 
recognize in monks theoretically a heightened state of holiness deriving from their 
impatience to be quit of the secular world, their zeal to conduct the life angelic in 
Paradise while still mortal and earthbound. That Langland also knew this shows up 
most prominently from Piers Plowman’s so-called paradisus claustralis passage, 
which I have quoted above, despite the uneasy prophecy with which the passage 
appears (B.10.297-310).459 It remains now to ask how the monastery or cloister of the 
                                                 
458 In Pourquoi?, François Vandenbroucke takes great pains to indicate that the main rewards of 
monastic life are provided solely as a result of living in the baptized state, rather than thanks to some 
special ecclesiastical status such as priesthood, and that certain other aspects traditionally attributed to 
the monastic life—such as royalty or the role of prophet—follow from the sacrament of confirmation 
(78ff). That said, Vandenbroucke’s book to some extent wishes to re-tool monasticism for contemporary 
global society; especially as it draws toward its concluding chapters, its theological arguments 
increasingly verge on tendentiousness. 
459 Kathryn Kerby-Fulton observes while discussing “Langland’s formal, intellectual, and polemical 
heritage” on p. 532 of chapter 19 (“Piers Plowman”) in the Cambridge History of Medieval English 
Literature, ed. David Wallace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 513-38 at p. 
532, that “in the heat of indignation [Langland] flirts” with making his satire more vernacular and 
otherwise overt. In the same chapter, however, she points out Langland’s knowledge of monastic 
thought—a matter well attested by Bloomfield in Apocalypse, Wittig, “Inward Journey,” and by others 
as noted by Adams, “Langland’s Theology,” in the Alford Companion, pp. 87-114, esp. at 104-107 (s.v. 
“Monasticism”)—which leads her to the idea that Langland might, himself, at least once have been a 
monk. It is interesting to speculate on the circumstances that might have driven Langland from 
monastic (or fraternal) life, assuming that he ever was professed to regular religion, and in turn to 
wonder if his departure from it helped to make his satire more or less overt than it would have been 
otherwise. But these are questions that might well be impossible to answer. 
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religious was understood to be a return to paradise. In so doing, we should consider 
how speech and silence were thought to bring about that return. 
 A sermon attributed to Peter Damian supplied Langland with his base text on 
the paradisus claustralis, as R. E. Kaske showed, but the real Peter Damian deserves 
to be quoted on silence as well.460 As one of Peter’s letters (to the Empress Agnes) 
makes clear, the practice of silence works in large part to design and build a 
fortresslike temple in the human heart. 
 
[W]hen the din of human conversation ceases, through silence the 
temple of the Holy Spirit is constructed in you. [...] Indeed, the temple 
of God grew through silence, because when the human mind does not 
focus itself on outer words, the building of a spiritual edifice rises to 
the sublime summit, and rising up, the more it is lifted to the heights, 
the more it is prevented from focusing on external things, enclosed in 
the protection of silence, for, ‘The guardian of justice is silence.’ 
(Isaiah 32:17, with “custos” for the Vulg. cultus”) And Jeremiah says, 
‘It is good to wait with silence for the salvation of the Lord, it is good 
for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth. He shall sit 
solitary and be silent, because he has taken it up upon himself.’ 
(Lamentations 3:26-28) Plainly, when the solitary is silent he raises 
himself above himself, because when the human mind is everywhere 
encompassed by the cloisters of silence it is led up to the highest places 
of the air, it is carried off to God through heavenly desire, and is 
kindled in his love through the ardor of the spirit. [...]  Therefore, let the 
temple of your breast grow now through silence, let the edifice of 
spiritual virtues rise up in you as if made of celestial stones [...].461  
                                                 
460 As Kaske notes in “Paradisus Claustralis,” the text is actually by Nicholas of Clairvaux but was 
attributed “long” (and certainly by Langland’s rough contemporary Benvenuto da Imola) to “Petrus 
Ravennas.” 
461 The translation comes from Irven M. Resnick, ed. & trans., Peter Damian: Letters 121-150, The 
Fathers of the Church, Mediæval Continuation 6 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2004), letter 124, pp. 21-25, at pp. 22-24. Since in this case I am able easily enough to do so, and 
since the poetic language of the letter might otherwise induce (unfounded) readerly doubts about the 
translation, I provide the Latin from the Patrologia Latina here as well: “dum strepitus humani cessat 
alloquii, construitur in te per silentium templum Spiritus sancti. [...] Templum quippe Dei per silentium 
crescit, quia cum mens humana per exteriora se verba non fundit, in sublime fastigium spiritualis 
ædificii structura consurgit, tantoque subcrescens, in altiora sustollitur, quanto per silentii custodiam 
circumclusa, sese extrinsecus fundere prohibetur. Custos enim justitiæ silentium. Et per Jeremiam 
dicitur: ‘Bonum est præstolari cum silentio salutare Domini. Bonum est viro cum portaverit jugum ab 
adolescentia sua: sedebit solitarius, et tacebit, quia levabit se super se (Thren. III).’ Solitarius plane, 
dum tacet, se elevat super se, quia mens humana, dum intra silentii claustra undique circumcluditur, in 
superiora sublimis erigitur, ad Deum per coeleste desiderium rapitur, et in amore ejus per ardorem 
Spiritus inflammatur [...]. Templum ergo tui pectoris nunc per silentium crescat, virtutum spiritualium 
tanquam coelestium lapidum in te structura consurgat [...].”  (S. Petri Damiani S. R. E. Cardinalis 
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 The idea of a temple or cloister in the soul is hardly unique or even new to 
Peter Damian, as we’ve seen, and his letter need not have been known specifically to 
Langland; it merely stands as an exceptionally fine illustration of the concept whose 
existence this study wishes here to assert, hence my quoting from it at length. The 
silence referred to by Peter Damian’s letter is here of course the silence of 
contemplation—but not necessarily of a purely monastic, rule-imposed sort. If 
anything, it is the repose of prayer. And while the silence of prayer and the silence that 
comes from refraining from judging other seem divided very deeply, the two need not 
to be understood as emanating from entirely different thought worlds: not for 
Langland, either. In Peter Damian’s text here, the virtue provided by silence comes 
hand in hand with the virtue of being removed from other people not merely 
physically but mentally. One is removed from the care for the worldy pursuits of other 
people.  
 One of Peter Damian’s most striking scriptural quotations in the letter comes 
from the book of Lamentations, whose currency in the Middle Ages seems to have 
been limited (according to Hugh Farmer, no one knew what to do with it), at least in 
the sense that not many commentaries on the book seem to exist. Of these, as Farmer 
notes, two important commentaries—William of Malmesbury’s and the better known 
one by Paschasius Radbertus on which William of Malmesbury’s commentary was 
based—derive from, and not surprisingly then speak to, ascetic religious contexts.462  
 Of course, Lamentations did not provide the only references to silence known 
to regular religious or other medieval Christians. Scott G.  Bruce has noted for 
instance the ways in which monastic silence was part and parcel of the “angelic 
                                                                                                                                            
Epistolarum Libro Octo: Liber Septimus, ad Sæculares Principes, PL vol. 144, coll. 433-460D at VI, 
coll. 443B-445D]) See also Jennifer A. Harris, “Peter Damian and the Architecture of the Self,” in Das 
Eigene, pp. 131-57. 
462 See Hugh Farmer, “William of Malmesbury’s Commentary on Lamentations,” Studia Monastica 4.2 
(1962), pp. 283-311. 
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life.”463 Ambrose G. Wathen draws attention to how silence was legislated in the 
Benedictine Rule itself.464 P. Salmon has shown how the theology of monastic silence 
developed from ideals to reality (manifested in religious praxis and as penance) and 
draws particular attention to how silence enables a change in focus from things 
external to things internal. He is also eloquent in reminding the reader that silence was 
not a monastic practice alone, despite its being so well adopted and theorized in the 
monastic orders:  
 
Désormais avec la création des ordres mendiants, des clercs réguliers et 
à plus forte raison des congrégations modernes, qui ne sont plus 
astreints à la vie claustrale dans toute sa rigueur comme les moines, il 
n’est guère question de silence régulier, ni même de silence pénitentiel, 
et l’on parle presque uniquement du silence-recueillement, de la vertu 
de silence. Il y a d’ailleurs à cela quelque avantage, c’est que l’on 
insiste sur un aspect, et le plus important de cettre pratique. Bien qu’il 
ait, à ses origines, une grande affinité avec la vie monastique—et c’est 
dans son cadre qu’il est le plus facilement, le plus complètement 
observé, et qu’il s’épanouit le plus parfaitement—le silence n’est pas 
un privilège des moines: il est une des données de la vie chrétienne, et 
il doit avoir sa part dans l’effort personnel de tous ceux qui font 
profession de celle-ci; seulement cette part doit être plus grande dans la 
vie de ceux qui cherchent à suivre de plus près les maximes de 
l’Evangile et qui tende à une perfection plus grande.465  
 
As one might expect from an order attempting to meld eremetic and cenobitic lives, 
the Camaldolese Constitutiones Rodulphi Camaldulensis (1080, 1085) provide a 
rationale for silence and a framework in which it might be cultivated, noting that 
“silentium sine meditatione mors est, & tamquam vivi hominis sepultura,” while 
“meditatio sine silentio inefficax est, & quasi sepulti hominis exagitatio,” though 
“simul [...] spiritualiter copulata” leads with great spiritual benefit to  
                                                 
463 See “Uttering No Human Sound,” in Silence and Sign Language in Medieval Monasticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
464 See Silence: the Meaning of Silence in the Rule of St. Benedict, Cistercian Studies Series 22 
(Washington, D.C.: Consortium Press for Cistercian Publications, 1973). 
465 See “Le Silence Religieux: Pratique et Théorie,” in Mélanges Bénédictins, Publiés à l’Occasion du 
XIVe Centenaire de la Mort de Saint Benoît par les Moines de l’Abbaye de Saint-Jérôme de Rome 
(Abbaye Saint Wandrille: Éditions de Fontenelle, 1947), pp. 13-57 (quoted at pp. 37-38). 
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“contemplationis perfectio.”466 Jean Leclercq’s Otia monastica offers lexical and 
similar evidence that silence is best viewed as part of an environment supportive of 
meditation.467 It makes for no surprise, then, that Hugo de Folieto’s “cloister of the 
soul” was wonderfully distinguished by silence.468 In reality, however, earthly 
cloisters were at times full of commotion and locutio.469 
 Nor do all injunctions to silence in the Middle Ages come from this ascetic 
Christian worldview, either, and seem often to derive intsead from a sort of politically 
calculating streetwise Stoicism.470  In Piers Plowman, one finds such “political” 
expressions turned on their heads—or at least interrogated from the perspective of 
Christianity (e.g. the Catonian “sic ars deluditur arte”). Others seem more neutral 
between pagan and ascetic Christian viewpoints. What for instance are we to make of 
the French tag quoted by Reason in his rebuke to Will, that “Bele vertue est 
suffraunce”?471 But since utterances like these, too, appear in a Christian matrix, Piers 
                                                 
466 See Annales Camaldulenses Ordinis Sancti Benedicti, quibus Plura Interseruntur tum ceteras 
Italico-monasticas Res, tum Historiam Ecclesiasticam Remque Diplomaticam Illustrantia, edd. 
Johanne-Benedicto Mittarelli and Anselmo Constadoni, vol. 3: “complectens res gestas ab anno Christi 
M. LXXX. ad annum M. C. LX., ad fidem Monumentorum &Veterum Chartarum, quæ Appendicem 
constituunt” (Venice: Ære Monasterii Sancti Michælis de Muriano, 1758; repr. Westmead: Gregg 
International Publishers Limited, 1970), app. III, coll. 512-551. 
467 See Otia monastica: études sur le vocabulaire de la contemplation au Moyen Âge (Rome: Orbis 
Catholicus/Herder, 1963). 
468 Hugo de Folieto, liber 4, chapter 36: “De silentio cœlestis claustri,” De claustro animæ, PL 176, coll. 
1017-1181 at coll. 1174C-1176C. 
469 See Paul Meyvaert, “The Medieval Monastic Claustrum,” Gesta 12 (1973), pp. 53-59. 
470 Such items appear in  Cato, in other vernacular proverbs, even in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde 
with its “firste vertu is to kepen tonge” and in the Manciple’s Tale. See also the Fasciculus morum, p. 
47 in Wenzel’s edition and translation, de superbia oris” or “on pride of mouth.” Cato might be found, 
along with the Chartula [de contemptu mundi], in the medieval Auctores octo: see most conveniently 
Ronald E. Pepin, trans., An English Translation of Auctores octo: a Medieval Reader, Medieval Studies 
12 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1999). Its place in the medieval curriculum is explained in Nicholas 
Orme, chapter 3: “The Teaching of Grammar,” in Medieval Schools: from Roman Britain to 
Renaissance England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),  pp. 86-127 (esp. at p. 100ff). On the 
Chartula, see again Bultot, “La Chartula et l’Enseignement de Mépris du Monde,” cited above. For an 
even more vernacular tradition of silence in the earlier wisdom literature of medieval Germanic 
cultures, see Aaron Francis Ralby, “The Pœnitentiale Pseudo-Ecgberti and the Old English Precepts,” 
Notes & Queries n.s. 57.1 (2010), pp. 6-10.  
471 It could be proverbial, and certainly is presented as something learned at one’s mother’s knee rather 
than in university halls. 
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Plowman, in which much that is in a word ascetic is highlyhighly valued, we might 
well consider even more deeply monastic thinkers on the value of silence: not only in 
prayerful solitude (as Peter Damian seems to have described) but also in interactions 
with others.  
 Especially important for the terms of this study, one of the main virtues said to 
be upheld by such humility and obedience is also important to ordering the 
interactions between individuals in the poem: love of one’s neighbor, or Amor 
proximi. As Berlière quite clearly expresses it, before (significantly) turning his 
attention to the related virtues of humility and obedience—virtues that result in charity 
for one’s fellows— 
 
L’esprit de silence, cette ‘taciturnité’ dont S. Benoît relève l’importance 
dans un chapitre spécial de sa Règle, semblait donc à nos ancêtres la 
garantie de l’observance et le secret du progrès dans la vie intérieure. 
Le silence du Christ leur était une leçon. De l’exemple de l’Homme-
Dieu, qui s’ensevelit dans le silence du sein de Marie, Guerric d’Igny 
déduit la convenance et la fécondité du silence. C’est dans le silence 
que l’homme intérieur, comme l’Homme-Dieu dans le sein de sa Mère, 
se refait à l’image du Christ, et que se nourrissent et se développent les 
vertus chrétiennes, ces vertus que cet auteur appelle l’ossature du Christ 
dans l’homme spirituel.472  
 
This assessment also seems to work for Piers Plowman, in so far as to firmly identify 
charity (which we have seen promoted by temperate speech, even silence) with love of 
one’s neighbor.473 Will’s vision of the tree of charity opens into or precipitates a 
                                                 
472 Berlière, Ascèse, p. 128. Again, the “vertus chrétiennes” which follow, in his scheme but according 
to many medieval religious writers he mentions, are obedience, humility, and—in my opinion 
synonymous here with amor proximi—charity. 
473 Mary Carruthers adduces a line of monastic thought according to which silence in fact is directly 
related to judgment and the boldness (or parrhesia) of satire, just as the introduction to this dissertation 
has already indicated, in “On Affliction and Reading, Weeping and Argument: Chaucer’s Lachrymose 
Troilus in Context,” Representations 93 (2006), pp. 1-21. One passage from her article is worth quoting 
at length on this point: “Laughter and harsh criticism (parrhésia) are condemned by [rather early, 
patristic-era] ascetics because the attitude they can require is hard and cold [whereas to Gregory of 
Nyssa tears were “hot, moist, and restorative of deadened, scarred flesh”]. Both phenomena were 
considered ambiguous. ‘Speaking freely’—parrhésia—can be a virtue but it can also be a fault. St. 
Barsanuphius (d. ca. 540), an important figure in desert monasticism, distinguished two kinds of 
parrhésia, that from impudence (anaideiás) and that from gaiety (hilarótes). Laughter is the outer 
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reprise of Christian salvation history ending in the betrayal and death of Christ. Will 
then sees Abrahamic “Feiþ” and the patriarchs still locked in Limbo (for the 
Resurrection has not yet happened), and this sad sight prompts him to lament in terms 
similar to Haukyn’s: “‘Allas!’ I seide, ‘þat synne so longe shal lette / the myght of 
goddes mercy þat myʒte vs alle amende.” (B.16.270-271) At this point, however, 
arrives a secret messenger who announces that his name is Hope:  
 
‘I am Spes, a spie,’ quod he, ‘and spire after a Knyght 
that took me a maundement vpon þe mount of Synay 
to rule alle Reames wiþ; I bere þe writ riʒt here.’ 
‘Is it enseled?’ I seide; ‘may men see þe lettres?’ 
‘Nay,’ he seide, ‘I seke hym þat haþ þe seel to kepe, 
and þat is cros and cristendom and crist þeron to honge; 
and whan it is enseled þerwiþ I woot wel þe soþe 
That Luciferis lordshipe laste shal no lenger. 
[And þus my lettre meneþ; ye mowe knowe it al.’]474 
‘Lat se þi lettres,’ quod I, ‘we myghte þe lawe knowe.’ 
He plukkede forþ a patente, a pece of an hard roche 
wheron was writen two wordes on þis wise yglosed. 
Dilige deum & proximum tuum, 
this was the tixte, trewely; I took ful good yeme. 
The glose was gloriously writen wiþ a gilt penne: 
In hijs duobus mandatis tota lex pendet & prophete. 
‘Is here alle þi lordes lawes?’ quod I; ‘ye, leue me,’ he seide.  
(B.17.1-17) 
 
The narrative thus gives way to a progression from Abrahamic Faith to secret and 
fervent Hope, bearing a message heralding the advent of true Charity. Amor Proximi, 
to this extent, makes for a culminating focus in the vita of Piers Plowman after Will’s 
                                                                                                                                            
expression of both. But, since the ambiguity of laughter makes it easily misunderstood, Barsanuphius 
comments, it is best for a monk to avoid it altogether. But, his disciple persists, there is a kind of 
‘proper gaiety’ (prépousa hilarótes)—what about that? A monk should be master enough of his craft so 
that he can display a pleasing countenance and pleasant demeanor, all the while he is groaning 
inwardly, as a monk should. Spiritual dryness (acedia) is the great enemy of monastic discipline, and 
tears must constantly water the monk’s thoughts to prevent it. The tears can be not only spontaneous but 
also the result of willed mental exercise. They are necessary for the intellectual method of meditation.” 
(7-8) On the continuation of these spiritual exercises of willed tears into the modern period, see again 
Jean-Joseph Navatel, “La Devotion Sensible.” That work, by the way, explicitly brings up the question 
of whether spiritual individuals in premodern times were more easily given to tears since they do not 
seem quite so often on display in modernity as in medieval religious texts. 
474 The line in square brackets is omitted from many manuscripts and respelled according to Kane-
Donaldson’s base manuscript (in which it does not appear).  
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long series of interlocutors have again and again cautioned him to silence and 
humility. It tempers and counterbalances his desire to judge others in defense of Truth. 
 
Will’s Learning, Revisited  
 
 The long foregoing exposition, if it can be said to have proven anything other 
than the central importance of the virtue of Amor proximi and the primarily ascetic 
discipline of taciturnitas in order to promote such love, has shown that Will is hardly 
quick to grasp that lesson from his string of interlocutors. We could hardly allow 
ourselves to consider our analysis of the poem’s take on satiric judgment complete 
without considering possible reasons for Will’s inability to learn more quickly. 
Another question raised byWill’s hard-learned lesson also demands an answer: why, 
in the part of the poem most focused on the necessity of not condemning others, does 
Piers Plowman allow its charaters to indulge, unchastened, in its most ringing 
condemnations of all?  
 The easiest apparent solution to the problem, that Will is a typically slow-
witted “Goliardic” narrator and that the judgments and condemnations indulged in by 
his teachers but stringently forbidden from him, must be dispensed with. I claimed in 
chapter 3 that Will’s function as a vehicle for comic relief has been overestimated. 
Will’s instructors and debate partners, for their part, even at their most colorful, do not 
come across as mere ventriloquizings from an embittered poet. They seem sincere, 
their lesson seems to hold consistent throughout its development, and they seem to 
argue their point at times with dauntingly sophisicated reasoning—not just 
pronouncements propounded by fiat.  
 The very sincerity of the poem’s various speaking figures of authority and of 
the poet’s desire for his audience also to learn their lesson might better explain their 
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judgments. As Will’s poetic misadventures make clear, the issue of satiric judgment 
(indeed of any type of judgment) makes for a vexed and complicated matter at best. 
Despairing of coming to the conclusion that no answer exists, that we cannot know 
when to speak out and when to hold our mouths shut, is likewise not allowed, since 
the many pronouncements made by God in the course of holy writ indicate there to be 
some divine opinion or other about the matter. Reading Will’s uneven, unhasty 
progress from the end of the second vision almost up to the end of the poem, we 
become aware of the issues at stake in choosing to speak out, or hold our tongues 
about, perceived evils; we hear the arguments and counterarguments that can be made; 
and we as readers probably come away from the experience more fully aware of how 
to live apparent contradictory precepts. We have been told how wonderful those 
precepts are. The very dauntingness of the command to love our neighbors, 
furthermore—not merely as Will implies when rebuking to Scripture to “suffer” 
them—also prepares the mind of the poem’s last and most major theme, the absolute 
necessity and ineluctable mystery of Grace.  
 This is not to deny our ability to progress a little more quickly than Will to an 
understanding of the issue. We certainly can, and from there might draw further 
conclusions from what his teachers preach. We learn that the intentions of others, if 
unknown, might not need to be defended; we learn that an abandonment of learning 
out of frustration at its own deficiency does more harm than good. Even as the poem 
doggedly unspools its message of Amor proximi, one of the supports of the “cloister of 
the soul,” we see that it often stands in conflict with another of those supports—amor 
Dei, or love of God, manifested through Veritatis defensio.  
 Finally, the judgments we see delivered in the poem are frequently non-
destructive, non-personal, and in their care not to attack too harshly seem to 
understand that total reform, total “paradise,” is nowhere to be found—not even “in 
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cloistre or in scole.” To see why and where that leaves Langland’s satire will call for 
another argument, but we can for the present sum up and look forward to it with the 
words of Dom Jean Leclercq:  
 
Or, dans l’Église—et dans la vie donnée à Dieu, par excellence dans la 
vie claustrale—toute réalité se juge correctement par rapport à deux 
paradis, entre lesquelles elle se ‘situe’: le premier—celui de la 
Genèse—et le dernier—celui de l’éschatologie, celui qui doit venir et 
dont parle l’Apocalypse. Il répond au premier comme son antitype: les 
mêmes images s’y retrouvent, empruntées aux mêmes créatures comme 
aux symboles du monde restauré. On y trouve l’arbre de vie et le fruit 
donné au vainqueur; transposés, les parfums de la terre et ses couleurs 
servent à exprimer l’éternel bonheur de l’esprit.  
 
Lui non plus, ce paradis restauré ne désigne un lieu ni un temps, mais 
une situation religieuse de l’humanité. Le premier représentait l’état de 
l’homme avant le péché, le dernier symbolise l’état de l’homme après 
la manifestation totale de la victoire du Christ sur le péché. Entre les 
deux—interim, comme disent nos Pères—l’Église et chacun de ses 
membres sont dans un état transitoire, provisoire.475 
 
With appropriate attention to the shape moving out of that “interim” must take, 
Leclercq adds that “[t]out passera et il y aura une catastrophe finale”—but what does it 
mean to see reform solely in a distant “catastrophe”?476  Does one’s ideal become, 
necessarily, prophetic? 
                                                 
475 Jean Leclercq, “Cloître / Paradis,” pp. 141-59. 
476Leclercq, “Cloître / Paradis,” p. 142. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROPHECY AND THE PROMISE OF REDEMPTIO MUNDI: 
LANGLAND’S CIRCLE AND THE SATIRIC IDEAL 
 
 In “Le Cloître est-il un Paradis?” as well as in other writing, Jean Leclercq 
observed that when monastic writers refer to the perfect life (and they often do) their 
discourse verges into the eschatological.477 For medieval Christians more broadly, in 
fact, the intensest visions of the ideal world often verged on the prophetic. Not 
surprisingly, then, can we ascribe a strong affinity with prophecy with medieval satire; 
because monastic reflections on a perfected world rise out of a discourse that always 
takes imperfection to exist in the present and defers perfection to the future. By now, 
the reader can grant that ascetic ideology inherently encourages critical perception. It 
is not pessimistic, however, even though its optimism remains to be shown. As literary 
critics have known about satire for some time, satiric criticism cannot help but express 
an implicit ideal.  
 Contempt of self and world, love of neighbor, defense of truth: so far in this 
dissertation I’ve been focusing on these elements of monastically theorized ascetic 
ideology as phenomena broadly reflected upon throughout medieval religious writing. 
Moreover, as Pranger was quite apt to point out in his ‘Artificiality’ of Christianity, 
contempt of the world was not only written: it was also lived.478 Nevertheless, the 
ideological guidance for such life did promulgate itself textually to an extent that 
might seem amazing: the Rule of Saint Benedict was read out to newcomers to any 
monastery, and was repeated at dinner times by increments to all the cloister’s 
inhabitants;479 works de contemptu were inspired by, and themselves inspired 
ruminatio on, the Rule’s precept for each monk to “sæculi actibus se facere 
                                                 
477 See also “La Séparation du Monde dans le Monachisme au Moyen Âge” in La Séparation du Monde, 
ed. Albert Plé, Problèmes de la Religieuse d’Aujourd’hui 16 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1961),  pp. 75-94. 
478 See The ‘Artificiality’ of Christianity: Essays on the Poetics of Monasticism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). 
479 See for example chapter 58 in the Rule of St. Benedict. 
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alienum.”480 Yet equally if not more influential on the lives of monks attempting to 
keep themselves “unspotted by the world” were the works of the Church Fathers, 
prophetic reflections on the joys that would repay earthly restraint in heaven, and, 
preëminently texts both ascetic and prophetic in the Bible. The liturgical prayers of the 
mass, confession, sermons: all these spoken texts (especially the latter) provided 
instruction to monks on how to contemn the world, and these also were heavily 
influenced by the Bible. If the monasticism developed during the medieval period can 
be said to amount to a “second patristic age” (as Leclercq claims in L’Amour) then it 
also accounts for a second biblical age of sorts since the Church Fathers were 
themselves heavily indebted to the Bible.  
 I’ve previously written (in other chapters, above) of satiric discourse existing 
on a theoretical continuum with sermon and prophecy. Satire predominately points out 
problems, sermons aim to resolve them, and prophecy attends to the consequences of 
either the unchanged behavior targeted by the satire or the reform suggested by the 
sermon—but, as with most continua, all the elements can coëxist and indeed bleed 
into one another. I would like to add here that satire and prophecy bear an affinity in 
terms of what James G. Clark might call the ascèse (or lived practice) of monasticism 
as well.481 For if prophecy influenced the monk’s sense of a justification and ultimate 
vindication of his asceticism, then prophecy cannot help but influence the satiric ideal 
for any satire produced by that monk—and ascetic ideology was, as I have previously 
argued, almost inherently (if problematically) inclined to the satiric mode.  
                                                 
480 See the Rule, chapter 4, on the “instruments of good works.” The preface to Bernard’s De contemptu 
mundi is relevant here, as is the discussion of similar meditations on the heavenly Jerusalem in 
Leclercq’s Amour des Lettres: these show “contempt of the world” in a more positive light—a desire 
for the life of paradise. 
481 I use the term ascèse here on the model of Clark in The Culture of Medieval English Monasticism,  
Studies in the History of Medieval Religion 30 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2007),who employs it ostensibly 
to denote asceticism as lived practice rather than purely abstracted ideology or doctrine. 
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 One small, discrete example of how satire, sermon, and prophecy might be said 
to come together in Langland’s poem appears even as early as the B prologue, relating 
not incidentally to the friars: 
 
I fond þere Freres, alle þe foure ordres, 
prechynge þe peple for profit of þe wombe; 
glosed the gospel as hem good liked; 
for coueitise of copes construwed it as þei wolde. 
Manye of þise maistres mowe cloþen hem at likyng 
for hire moneie and hire marchaundiʒe marchen togideres. 
Siþ charite haþ ben chapman and chief to shryue lordes 
many ferlies han fallen in a fewe yeres. 
But holy chirche and hij holde bettre togidres 
the mooste meschief on Molde is mountynge vp faste. 
(B.prol.59-67) 
 
Here the discourse is roundly and even conventionally satiric, certainly, describing the 
“foure ordres” by the ostentation of their clothes. The friars and their merchandise also 
“march” together, reminiscent of Wynnere and Wastoure. The passage is also 
sermonic in so far as it outlines how the friars depart from the example of the gospel 
and may yet be reformed: they preach for gain in a way that Paul’s epistles denounce, 
and they should therefore hold faster to the precepts of Holy Church. Yet prophecy 
also coëxists here with the other types of discourse, declaring the natural wonders that 
corruption has brought about and its threat of causing “the moost mischeif on molde” 
if the reforms do not come about. The satirist’s schematizing portraits help a 
sermonizer make his point even as they enable a prophet to show the consequences—
and here, at least, sermonizer and prophet are one figure and the same.482  
                                                 
482 In the chapter on satiric hybridity that concluded Part I of the dissertation, above,  I noted some 
differences between classical and medieval satire, one being that in the latter high regard is given to 
serious theological reflection. This has a further consequence, that medieval satire is more liely to 
appropriate unto itself the mode of the prophetic. As it happens, then, we find less prophecy in classical 
satire than in medieval satire even though the modes are intertwined. Medieval satirists took greater 
advantage of the theoretical possibility of melding prophecy and satire, just as they also expanded on 
classical ideas of ambiguity and hybridity which I discussed in Part One. 
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 The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to discuss how Piers Plowman draws 
on prophetic discourse to express its own satiric ideal, an investigation that will show 
better than any of the analyses so far that Piers is not completely the product of 
monasticism.483  As it will appear, Langland’s poem references not only biblical 
prophecy but also a type of secular literary prophecy long associated with satire. 
Based on both ascetic and learnedly literary references in the poem, we can postulate a 
potential target or “circle” for the B and C versions of Piers Plowman—the subject of 
investigations by Ralph Hanna, Steven Justice, and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton already, 
among others.484  
 
Prophecy in Monasticism 
 
 The prophet, considered as a type, has always had a rather specific 
iconography, as Jean Leclercq has noted, such that an inveterate reader of Gary 
Larson’s famous “Far Side” cartoons will not gain from his reading an appreciably 
different concept of what a medieval layman might have thought about the bearers of 
prophecy.485 He—for while not essentially, the prophet always seems to be 
incidentally male—stands out from the rest of society, marked by a fullness of years, 
idiosyncratic vestments, and passion or even rage. His message is to alert society of 
what fate seems likely to befall it. One might here keep in mind the simple schematic 
differentiation between preaching, satire, and prophecy with which I opened the 
                                                 
483 That Langland departs from monasticism’s typical concerns is not a new claim, being inferrable in 
several other ways, but obviously needs to be reinforced here. 
484 On Langland’s possible circles see for example the claims of Hanna, at least for the A version, that it 
might have been written with a somewhat upper-class urban coterie in mind in Pursuing History: 
Middle English Manuscripts and their Texts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). See also both 
Kathryn Kerby-Fulton and Steven Justice, on a perhaps-similar group of intended addressees, in 
“Langlandian Reading Circles and the Civil Service in London and Dublin, 1380-1427,” New Medieval 
Literatures 1 (1997), pp. 59-83. 
485 As I indicate, Jean Leclercq makes much more cogent remarks on this topic in La Vie Parfaite. 
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chapter, namely that in satire the emphasis lies in pointing out the need for reform, 
while in preaching the emphasis lies on how one might accomplish the reform, and in 
prophecy the emphasis lies in what will happen if the necessary reforms are or are not 
carried out. The prophet’s peculiar appearance—as, unlike satirist or sermonizer, he 
almost always stands out—relates to (sc. might stem from) and informs others of the 
peculiar extra-institutional authority he has appropriated: if a satirist can criticize, and 
a sermonizer suggest solutions, a prophet can warn of or even call down divine wrath 
and punishment.486  
 The prophet’s announcement of the likely outcomes of a ruler or society’s 
decision for or against reform rarely involves, at least in the most central Christian and 
Judaic traditions most relevant here, specific dates. For whatever reason, biblical 
prophecy instead seems to focus on specific outcomes or events, especially in 
narratives of historical character recounting the mercies and punishments of the Old 
Testament deity: consider the forty days’ warning given to Nineveh by Jonah (Jonah 
3:4). The parts of the Bible that depart from historical narrative to look more expressly 
forwards, like the prophecies of Isaiah about the coming of the Messiah, describe 
events that might very happen far in the future and therefore have no set date. One 
specific date given in the New Testament—in Jesus’ “Destroy this Temple, and in 
three days I shall raise it up,” John 2:19—is the exception that proves the rule for the 
Christian Gospels.  
 The uncertainty over dates so evident in biblical prophecy accompanies a 
certain vagueness in imagery, too, thanks not to a prophet’s desire for willful 
obscurantism but instead the poetic qualities of his message. This evocative 
                                                 
486 The biblical Book of Jonah makes vivid the limitations of the prophet’s power when it comes to 
choosing whom to criticize or even to call down divine judgment, but at the same time it shows the 
respect with which prophets are held and their own temptation to see themselves as wielders of 
punishment. 
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strangeness so marked out prophecy for Late Antique and medieval readers that 
almost any poetic Scriptural text from the Bible, in the Middle Ages, seemed to call 
for interpretation as prophecy.487 When the Dantaean letter to Can Grande purports to 
read the Divina Commedia in literal, allegorical, anagogical, and typological terms it 
merely applied to a great vernacular poem the same critical lenses used for centuries 
already in interpreting the Christian scriptures, out of which half the four senses had a 
future-minded if not fully prophetic character.488  
 As the Book of Revelation shows, some of the most poetic scriptural prophecy 
for the Christian faith involved the rejuvenated world after the final triumphant 
conquest of good over evil: the redemptio mundi, or redemption of the world, the very 
name of which indicates some of that term’s importance to this dissertation. As further 
discussion later on in this chapter will show, the idea of redemptio mundi lies 
(however silently, however paradoxically) at the heart of monastic thought: both 
transhistorically and in the later Middle Ages specifically. Just as central is the 
concept’s role in the worldview of the satirist (again, viewed in the double perspective 
of both the Middle Ages and all history): although satirists, unlike preachers, do not 
make it their primary objective to suggest remedies for society, seemingly content 
merely to point out its flaws, their investment in the continuation and improvement of 
the very world that they decry stands evident from their often delicately crated, 
artfully worded critiques’ very existence. Prophecy, both despairing over the present 
order and looking forward for a new paradise, goes just one step further.489  
                                                 
487 The same of course held true for texts by Virgil, among others. 
488 i.e. the moral and anagogical senses, which display again the easy commerce between sermonic and 
prophetic modes. In addition to the famous “Letter to Can Grande,” explaining Dante’s Divina 
Commedia in terms of the four senses, the well-known medieval mnemonic verse: “Littera gesta docet, 
quod credas allegoria / moralia quod agas, quo tendas anagogia.” 
489 Bloomfield, Apocalypse, gives a brief intellectual history of the term. “The imagery of paradise in 
Christian thinking is most complex, and most of it goes back to Patristic speculation on the subject. 
Paradise, according to Father Jean Daniélou, may be: the earthly paradise of Adam and Eve; heaven, the 
place of beatitude; a place where the souls of the just await resurrection [...]; the soul; and finally the 
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 That said, a peculiarity of the medieval worldview that we need to pay 
particular attention to is that even though the Middle Ages saw paradise as lost and in 
need of restoration, it also conceived of this paradisiacal nature as not being lost 
everywhere. Indeed, one of the distressing things about the Crusade era (for medieval 
observers) was that it showed the presumably heretofore inviolate sanctity of 
Jerusalem overthrown. The legendary history of the so-called “holy rood tree” and 
related tales took as a matter of course that when Adam and Eve were originally 
expelled from paradise, the Garden of Eden did not cease to exist. Joinville writes of 
sweet-smelling bark flowing towards the Mediterranean by the river Nile, ostensibly 
carried from trees growing in the earthly paradise.490 Other medieval literature, such as 
the Parzival of Wolfram von Eschenbach (itself drawing on any number of medieval 
lapidaries like that famous one by Marbode of Rennes) describes the curative powers 
of several precious stones thought to have come from paradise, still a place on earth.491 
                                                                                                                                            
paradisus regnum, the new paradise, the new Jerusalem on earth that will be established with the 
coming of the King. In the works of Ephraem the Syrian in the fourth century, paradise is at one and the 
same time the summit, the circle, and the center of the universe. [...] One must pass through fire and 
water and be divested spiritually of one’s clothes to re-enter paradise, retracing Adam’s steps. Baptism 
[...] is the first step towards the return, just as entry into a monastic order was conceived as a new and 
second baptism.” (47-48) 
490 For a translation that while old nevertheless accords with my memory of the passage in a much more 
recent book, see Ethel Wedgwood, trans., The Memoirs of the Lord Joinville (London: John Murray, 
1906), providing Joinville’s observations of the Nile: “Before the river reaches Egypt, men who are 
practised in it cast their nets loose in the stream at nightfall, and when morning comes, they find in their 
nets such raw goods as are imported into this country; to wit, ginger, rhubarb, aloes, and cinnamon. And 
it is said, that these things are washed down from the Earthly Paradise; that the wind blows down the 
trees of Eden just as the wind in this country blows down the dry wood; and that what the merchants 
sell to us in this country, is the dry wood that falls into the river there.” (88) 
491 Leopold Pannier’s work on medieval French lapidaries of “oriental” origin (e.g. those attributed to 
Marbode and Mandeville)  and of “Christian” origin (largely anonymous) mentions emerald appearing 
“en Syce, ou flun de Paradis” (244, line 206, after Mandeville). See also the fragmented (“Christian”) 
lapidary of “Philippe,” p. 297, making a similar claim, and a remark about paradisical origin for ruby as 
well on page 295 of those fragments.  On pages 294-295 of the fragments appears a more extensive 
remark about emeralds: “Sainz Jehans nous dit en l’apocalipse qu’il vit esmeraude quarte pierre desoz 
le verai regne, et pour ce senefie ele la foi des quatre evangelistes. Et si nous dist sainz Jehans 
l’evangelistres que une meniere de bestes sont qui ont non gripon, qui gardent les esmeraudes sur le 
flun de paradis en la terre de Sirie, et iceles manieres de bestes ont quatre piés et deus eles en maniere 
d’anges, et par derriere comme lyons; et une maniere de gens sont qui ont non Arimpiles et n’ont qu’un 
œil en mi le front et vont querre les esmeraudes, et les quierent tuit armé el flun et les pranent. Et celes 
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 As we’ve also seen, the monastery (and to a lesser extent the school) was also 
viewed as a place in which paradise was being restored, for which reason monastic 
writers engaging in discussions of prophetic redemptio mundi tended to see the 
bringing about of a restored world as a matter of following even more closely the 
monastic life and its ascetic ideals. Given a typical if probably not universal 
understanding of the course of sacred history by Christian monks, the cloister was 
meant through the constant liturgical reënaction of the Divine Office (especially after 
the Cluniac reforms) and the enclosed penitential separation and austerity of its 
inhabitants to both train monks for later existence in, and also to restore to the paradise 
above, the depleted ranks of angels fallen during Satan’s prehistoric rebellion.492 The 
bios angelikos ideal in monasticism accounts, at a stroke, for the apparent 
abandonment of the world by cloistered religious and the salutary optimism of their—
otherwise—seemingly negation-freighted earthly existence.  
 Satire by monks also very clearly displays these traits enforced through 
monastic discipline, such that one can say without hesitation that both satire by monks 
and the lives of those monks themselves participate in the same prophetic ideal. In 
Bernard of Cluny’s De contemptu mundi, for instance—a poem whose very name, 
translated by Pepin’s edition as “Scorn for the World,” would seem to indicate an 
                                                                                                                                            
bestes devant nomées vont corant et volant et lor tolent a leur pooir, et moult sont angoisseuses et 
ardanz dou tolir, mes il sont armé et tolir ne lor pueent.” But if this so far seems like a description 
verifying the existence of an actual earthly paradise, what follows profoundly modifies—moralizes—
what had gone before: “La fine esmeraude nete et gentil et tresvert senefie la grant verdure de bone foi 
qui ne puet flechir, que li bon patriarche et li prophete orent si grant et si tres finement vert, por quoi il 
ont la grant gloire dou ciel. Tuit cil qui sont en ceste grant verdor, dit sains Jehans, n’ont que un œil, 
c’est a dire Jhesucrist. Li Arimpile vont querre les esmeraudes armé, si se combatent as gripons. Li 
gripon senefient les diables. Toutes icès choses doivent avoir en memoire tuit cil qui esmeraude 
portent.” Despite this moralistic conclusion, it is not difficult to see how descriptions of an earthly 
paradise (attributed to saints no less) could help to contribute to the idea of such a place’s literal 
existence by individuals such as Joinville (quoted above). See Les Lapidaires Français du Moyen Âge 
des XIIe, XIIIe et XIVe Siècles (Paris: Vieweg, 1882). 
492 On the growing centrality of the Divine Office for monks in the medieval period, see Berlière, 
Ascèse. 
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active and disdainful renouncement of all transitory things—the narrator’s torrent of 
deprecations gives way to an affectingly beautiful meditation on the heavenly 
Jerusalem. Nor were such meditations uncommon, as Jean Leclercq in L’Amour des 
Lettres et le Désir de Dieu long ago pointed out; monks seem, especially in the high 
and later Middle Ages, to have taken Jerome’s dictum that it is “better to have lived 
well than to have lived in Jerusalem” to heart. That Bernard would have found it 
appropriate to place such a vision in his De contemptu, by its own admission a poem 
that indulges in satire, deserves consideration. Monastic prophecy, purely defined as 
prophecy engaged in by the writings of monks, is thus inherently biblical and also 
inherently ascetic, its main field of inspiration application being monks and not all 
people (though certainly the salvation of all people may be entertained as a 
possibility). At the same time, satire such as one finds in Bernard of Cluny’s De 
contemptu serves as a strong reminder of how the monastic vision of a healed and 
restored world, prior to the fourteenth century, considered only superficially the 
character of redemptio and reform outside cloister and college walls. 
 
Secular Prophecy: the Evidence from Satire 
 
 Leclercq made much of the differentiation between monks and scholars, but 
the reason for his caveats is clear: no one wanted new monks or those interested in 
monastic life to confuse scholarship with ascèse, the cloister with the school. In terms 
of satire, though, the most obviously different of comparanda are not the works of the 
scholastics but rather secular satirists—particularly those writing in the vernacular. 
Because monastic thought is so little generally understood, discussions of its literature 
often assume a familiarity with secular examples. It might prove useful, though, to 
consider medieval secular satire with a presumption of already understanding 
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monastic thought so as to throw fresh light on what makes this secular poetry’s use of 
prophecy noteworthy, interesting, and innovative.  
 Dream visions are obviously important vehicles of literary prophecy, to say 
nothing of secular satire, in the later Middle Ages. For late fourteenth century England 
they are inherently important to a range of literature hard to summarize, since as L. O. 
Aranye Fradenberg has observed the era’s literary output distinguishes itself by 
making dreams an extremely common setting for narrative literary works.493 There can 
of course be no doubt that the dream setting of Piers Plowman is not simply sterile 
convention, as (perhaps best of all) the ending to the second vision makes clear. The 
second vision provides two excellent examples of prophecy by the narrator, and I 
particularly want to focus on the latter of those two since it provides good evidence 
inter alia for the prophetic significance of the poem’s dream vision frame 
 In the second vision’s conclusion, the narrator awakens from the altercation 
between the priest and Piers about the latter character’s ability to read and correctly 
make sense of Truth’s “pardon.” He then steps back, as it were, from recalling events 
as they happened to reflect on the strangeness of all that he had seen:  
 
The preest and Perkyn apposeden eiþer ooþer, 
and þoruʒ hir wordes I wook and waited aboute, 
and seiʒ þe sonne euene South sitte þat tyme, 
metelees and moneilees on Maluerne hulles. 
Musynge on þis metels a myle wey ich yede. 
Many tyme þis metels haþ maked me to studie 
of þat I seiʒ slepynge, if it so be myʒte, 
and for Piers loue þe Plowman wel pencif in herte, 
and which a pardon Piers hadde þe peple to conforte, 
and how þe preest inpugned it wiþ two propre wordes. 
Ac I haue no sauour in songewarie for I se it ofte faille. 
Caton and Canonistres counseillen vs to leue 
to sette sadnesse in Songewarie for sompnia ne cures. 
Ac for þe book bible bereþ witnesse 
                                                 
493 L. O. Aranye Fradenburg, chapter 4: “(Dis)Continuity: a History of Dreaming,” elsewhere titled 
“Dreaming in the Middle Ages: Chaucer and Freud,” in The Post-Historical Middle Ages, edd. 
Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Federico, pp. 87-116 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). I heard the 
statement in a lecture version of this essay presented by Fradenburg at Cornell. 
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how Daniel diuined þe dremes of a kyng 
that Nabugodonosor nempneþ þise clerkes— 
Daniel seide, ‘sire kyng, þi sweuene is to mene 
that vnkouþe knyʒtes shul come þi kyngdom to cleyme; 
amonges lower lordes þi lond shal be departed.’ 
As Daniel diuined in dede it fel after: 
the kyng lees his lordshipe and lasse men it hadde. 
And Ioseph mette merueillously how þe moone and þe sonne 
and þe elleuene sterres hailsed hym alle. 
Thanne Iacob iugged Iosephes sweuene: 
‘Beau fitʒ,’ quod his fader, ‘for defaute we shullen, 
I myself and my sones, seche þee for nede.’ 
It bifel as his fader seide in Pharaoes tyme 
that Ioseph was Iustice Egipte to loke; 
it bifel as his fader tolde, hise frendes þere hym souʒte. 
Al þis makeþ me on metels to þynke, 
and how þe preest preued no pardon to dowel 
and demed þat dowel Indulgences passeþ, 
biennals and triennals and Bisshopes lettres. 
Dowel at þe day of dome is digneliche vnderfongen; 
he passeþ al þe pardon of Seint Petres cherche.494 
Two main observations about prophecy stand out upon examination of the foregoing 
passage. It will strike the reader first that the narrator presents his “enigmatic dream” 
(as Macrobius might have put it) explicitly in terms of biblical narrative.495 This fact 
has not been lost to David Johnson, who finds in the scene an allusion to patristic 
writings about prophecy.496  Second, the narrator considers even the biblical dreams 
on which he draws as precedent in terms of learned medieval dream theory 
                                                 
494 B.7.144-78. Though I do not wish to raise the specter of the old authorship controversy again, I will 
make the note that the second vision’s ending as it does proves that Langland was able to make a 
narrative end with an effective and familiar sense of closure. Perhaps no scholars have seriously thought 
Langland incapable of writing other than iteratively, but paying attention to this and to other loci of 
closure in the poem helps us to keep in mind that the B/C version’s last end comes about as the result of 
the poet’s conscious choice (on which see discussion below). I suppose it possible that Langland could 
have intended to make the end of the second vision the end of the entire poem but decided not to or else 
was somehow thwarted in redesign.  
495 Medieval dream theory is very much informed by the Late Antique commentary on Cicero’s 
Somnium Scipionis by Macrobius. For the meaning of such terms as “enigmatic” and “oracular” dream, 
see William Harris Stahl, ed. Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, Records of Western Civilization 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1952; repr. 1990). 
496 See David Frame Johnson, “‘In somnium, in visionem’: the Figurative Significance of Sleep in Piers 
Plowman,” which observes that Will’s falling asleep in the poem might be understood not only 
pejoratively but also in terms of patristic thought on the positive, vaticinatory role sleep might have. It 
appears in Loyal Letters: Studies on Mediæval Alliterative Poetry & Prose, edd. L. A. J. R. Houwen and 
Alasdair A. MacDonald (Gröningen: Egbert Forsten, 1994 ), pp. 239-60. 
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(Macrobius, arguably Richard of St. Victor) and of course—that schoolboy authority 
Langland so often seems to present as a touchstone for conventional common sense—
the Distichs of Cato. This being the case, it ought therefore to be asserted that the 
dream vision is Langland’s application of “literary” prophecy, however mixed it may 
be with biblical references.497 
  Straightforward political prophecy is another type of what I’ve been calling 
literary prophecy. Piers Plowman is not the only piece of late medieval dream 
literature to ascribe political significance to the prophecy it contains. Nor is it the only 
satire to do so. In fact, of all types of writing that indulge in prophecy, satiric writing 
might lay the greatest claim to political commentary—if it does not always indulge in 
prophecy—for reasons which by now should be obvious. And it is precisely the 
political sensitivity in the satiric message that dictates the often riddling form used in a 
secular prophecy. The obscurity of enigmata provides an apparent substitute for the 
perhaps more purely poetical obscurity of the more sincerely vatic utterances by the 
inspired prophet, hiding political critique from the ears of those who cannot or should 
not understand it while validating and encouraging the solidarity in the group of those 
who should and do understand (as we shall see below).  
 Of course it is hard to say that in later medieval literature culture poetic 
prophecy—in dream form, of a riddling nature, quite possibly with political valence in 
referring to specific names and dates or other setting markers—is not Christian at all. 
Some of what I have been calling literary poetic prophecy obviously could draw 
sufficiently on pagan models (and thus needs no scriptural referents), as in the twelfth-
                                                 
497 Indeed, the tale of Daniel reminds us that even actual examples of prophecy in the Bible are 
sometimes of the “literary,” riddling sort—following various conventions to hide names and 
occasionally intended references to specific dates and individuals (as in the purported gematria in the 
Book of Revelation identifying 666 with Nero).  
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century Prophetia Merlini.498 Even medieval literary prophecy can hardly have 
escaped completely from scriptural models, nevertheless. Yet even here, Piers 
Plowman being a case in point, satiric literary prophecy looks different from biblical 
prophecy when the two coëxist. If by a degree, one type of prophecy has the present 
more “worldly” state of affairs more specifically in mind than the other does.   
 One of the purest examples of literary political prophecy in Piers Plowman 
occurs in the Prologue to the B version with the words of the “angel of heaven” who 
speaks in Latin to the king being celebrated there. To it should be added the Latin quip 
of the “Goliardeys” just following. Iconographically, the angel is reminiscent of the 
person dressed as an angel in the pageant surrounding king Richard II’s triumphal 
entry into London during coronation celebrations in 1377—and because the king is 
here being addressed by an angel then the overall picture seems quite flattering to the 
king.499 I begin my quotation a bit earlier for the sake of context:  
 
Thanne loked vp a lunatik, a leene þyng wiþalle, 
and knelynge to þe kyng clergially he seide, 
‘Crist kepe þee, sire kyng, and þi kyngryche, 
and lene þee lede þi lond so leaute þee louye, 
and for þi riʒtful rulyng be rewarded in heuene.’ 
And siþen in þe Eyr an heiʒ an Aungel of heuene 
lowed to speke in latyn, for lewed me ne koude 
Iangle ne Iugge þat Iustifie hem sholde, 
but suffren and seruen; forþi seide þe Aungel, 
‘ “Sum Rex, sum princeps”; neutrum fortasse deinceps. 
O qui iura regis christi specialia regis, 
hoc quod agas melius, iustus es, esto pius! 
Nudum ius a te vestiri vult pietate. 
Qualia vis metere, talia grana sere. 
Si ius nudatur nudo de iure metatur; 
                                                 
498 For the largely non-scriptural prophecies, such Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Prophecies of Merlin, see 
for example Jacob Hammer, “A Commentary on the Prophetia Merlini (Geoffrey of Monmouth’s 
Historia Regum Britanniæ, Book VII),” Speculum 10.1 (1935), pp. 3-30 and continued in Speculum 
15.4 (1940), pp. 409-31. It mentions other commentaries as well, such as the one attributed to Alan of 
Lille. On a wider context for the Prophecies of Merlin, see Rupert Taylor, The Political Prophecy in 
England (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911). 
499 For more, see the accounts of the triumphal entry in Richard Maidstone: Concordia (The 
Reconciliation of Richard II with London), ed. David R. Carlson with verse trans. by A. G. Rigg 
(Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications for TEAMS, 2003), app. II. 
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si seritur pietas de pietate metas.’500 
Thanne greued hym a Goliardeis, a gloton of wordes, 
and to þe Aungel an heiʒ answerde after: 
‘Dum rex a regere dicatur nonem habere 
nomen habet sine re nisi studet iura tenere.’501 
Thanne comsed al þe commune crye in vers of latyn 
to þe kynges counseil, construe whoso wolde, 
Precepta Regis sunt nobis vincula legis!’502  
(B.prol.123-145a) 
As the passage shows, the angel’s words tell another story—for they sternly warn the 
king of potential vices he might fall prey to, in a sort of subjunctive satire; they direct 
him as to how he might best go about living rightly so as not to fall into those ways, in 
a sort of admonitory sermon; and they indicate the dire consequence if he does not do 
so, fully in the manner of prophecy. Although the “lunatik” speaking in English hardly 
utters any explicit criticism at all—he sneers, but says only the kindest words—the 
angel’s Latin suggests obliquely yet straightforwardly enough that strict and 
unforgiving justice should and might alight on a king who is not merciful and wise; he 
might not be “Rex and Princeps” in the future.  
 The Goliard, “greved” (likely by these too-conciliatory utterances) repeats the 
angel’s message in a distich. In so doing, he rephrases the message at once more 
circumspectly and also more starkly, which suggests—even early in the poem—an 
implicit theory of how to judge others. The angel, as minister of heaven, can “speak 
truth to power” face-to-face (though Langland puts this message in Latin and in rather 
polite address). The Goliard, a “gloton of words,” makes for a different case. Scholars 
have generally taken the epithet merely Langland’s alliterating recognition of one 
                                                 
500 A. V. C. Schmidt’s translation, ad loc.: “(You say) ‘I am King, I am Ruler’; you  may perhaps be 
neither in future. O you who administer the sublime laws of Christ the King, in order to do better what 
you do, as you are just, be godly! Naked law requires to be clothed by you with a sense of your duty to 
God. Sow such grain as you wish to reap: if the law is nakedly administered [lit. stripped bare] by you, 
then let (judgement) be measured out (to you) according to the letter [lit. naked law]. If goodness is 
sown (by you), may you reap goodness.   
501 Schmidt : “Inasmuch as a king has his name from (the fact of) being a ruler [ultimately the word rex 
is from regere, ‘to rule’], he possesses the name (alone) without the reality unless he is zealous in 
maintaining the laws.” 
502 Schmidt: “The king’s bidding has for us the binding force of law.”  
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possible etymology for Golias and his sons. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest here 
that the poet could also have been keying the reader in to how deeply the Goliard’s 
words here might reward interpretation. On the one hand, as befits a mortal person 
speaking to someone in a position of supremely high temporal authority, the Goliard 
merely points out not that stern justice might deprive a bad king of his titles but that an 
unwillingness to rule would give him the name without the actually performed office 
(in other words, provide the nomen [...] sine re) of the ruler.  
 On the other hand, the message quite clearly suggests actual violent death. At 
least one scholar of Goliardic poetry has observed that these medieval satirists often 
played around the edges of scholastic thought by considering words in a realist as 
opposed to a nominalist sense.503 In other words, the Goliards suggested that words 
themselves held a key to and to some degree partook in the nature of those beings they 
described; nominalists would declare that names are merely names, on the other hand, 
and have as arbitrary signs or locutions no real bearing on the matters they describe.504  
Langland’s Goliard, then, does not really believe that the king can ever have a “nomen 
[...] sine re” and still misrule. On the contrary, the ruler will have the “nomen” denoted 
“sine re” in so far as the “nomen” (the noun spelled R-E-X), “sine re” (without R-E) is 
simply a mark of obliteration: X. 
 Though it may seem obvious from the quotation and the chapters in this 
dissertation which have come above, the implicit theory of satire in the passage above 
quoted suggests not only the dangers but also the importance of satire and satirists. For 
while it is obvious from the lunatic, angel, and Goliard’s circumlocutions and choice 
of Latin (in the latter two cases) that those who would provide criticism to anyone so 
powerful as a king must choose their words carefully, the reader gets the distinct 
                                                 
503 Mann, “Satiric Subject and Satiric Object.” 
504 Thus one satirist, as Mann explains in “Satiric Subject and Satiric Object,” was able to write that the 
“presbyter” takes his title by the fact that he “ter prebiberit,” or “tipples thrice.” 
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impression that—at least in the opinion of the poet—normal people have no way at all 
of speaking up for themselves; satirists (by which I mean here individuals who are 
able to send critical and admonitory messages to the king using a fine touch as well as 
verbal ingenuity) are, so far as public advocacy goes, the only game in town.  A 
relatively recent study by Fiona Somerset in the Yearbook of Langland Studies has 
made this point forcefully, since the study locates the source of the people’s jubilant 
exclamation that the “precepta regis” would be “vincula legis” to them. As it turns 
out, this line comes from a larger work in which, in context, it speaks of the 
“precepta” of God rather than any mortal monarch. Not only can the people not 
“jangle ne jugge that justifie hem sholde,” then, but the passage actually shows us 
how; the people’s attempt to use Latin only exacerbates their role—to “suffren and 
serven”—when they so address the king.505  
 We may compare the angel and Goliard’s admonitory suggestions to the king, 
which I have called (literary) political prophecy in its purest form in Piers, by virtue of 
its use of Latin and its careful wordplay and topicality, to the prophecy that ends 
passus 6 of the B-version and constitutes the narrator’s reflections on the failure of the 
“plowing of the half acre” in the second vision. I discussed the “plowing of the half 
acre” at length in chapter 4, above, but I did not at that time focus on the confusing 
prophecy that concludes the passage. There, the narrator—recounting what he has seen 
so far as Will, is warning laborers everywhere that their unwillingness to exert 
themselves save under threat of Hunger, could result in very dire consequences. That 
Piers had called down Hunger to avenge the sloth and disrespect of wastours was in a 
way merely a scare tactic alone and did not represent actual famine. The hunger that 
arrives upon the scene could be said to represent simply a lack of crops at harvest time 
                                                 
505 See Fiona Somerset, “Expanding the Langlandian Canon: Radical Latin and the Stylistics of 
Reform,” YLS 17 (2003), pp. 73-92. 
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caused by a dearth of workers, as Robert Worth Frank has indicated, though as Kaske 
has shown Hunger’s characterization matters, too.506 We can take the farewell banquet 
to Hunger as proof:  
 
Al þe pouere peple pescoddes fetten; 
benes and baken apples þei broʒte in hire lappes, 
Chibolles and Cheruelles and ripe chiries manye; 
and profrede Piers þis present to plese wiþ hunger. 
Hunger eet þis in haste and axed after moore. 
Thanne pouere folk for fere fedden hunger yerne 
grene poret and pesen; to peisen hym þei þoʒte. 
By þat it neʒed neer heruest newe corn cam to chepyng. 
Thanne was folk fayn and fedde hunger wiþ þe beste; 
wiþ good Ale as gloton taʒte þei garte hym to slepe. 
And þo nolde Wastour noʒt werche, but wandred aboute, 
ne no beggere ete breed þat benes Inne come, 
but Coket or clermatyn or of clene whete, 
ne noon halfpeny ale in none wise drynke, 
but of þe beste and þe brunneste þat brewesteres selle. 
Laborers þat haue no land to lyue on but hire handes 
deyneþ noʒt to dyne a day nyʒt olde wortes. 
May no peny ale hem paie, ne no pece of bacoun, 
but if it be fressh flessh ouþer fissh yfryed, 
and þat chaud and plus chaud for chillynge of hir mawe. 
But he be heiʒliche hyred ellis wole he chide; 
that he was werkman wroʒt warie þe tyme. 
Ayeins Catons counseil comseþ he to Iangle: 
Paupertatis onus pacienter ferre memento; 
he greueþ hym ageyn god and gruccheþ ageyn Reson, 
and þanne corseþ þe kyng and al þe counseil after 
swiche lawes to loke laborers to chaste. 
Ac whiles hunger was hir maister þer wolde noon chide 
ne stryuen ayeins þe statut, so sterneliche he loked. (B.6.292-320) 
 
The availability of food at harvest time, so suddenly arriving, fills certain workers with 
pride and causes them to demand only the finest foods for themselves, and only the 
easiest laboring conditions, as compensation for what (little) they do. 
 
                                                 
506 See Robert Worth Frank, “The ‘Hungry Gap,’ Crop Failure, and Famine: the Fourteenth-Century 
Agricultural Crisis and Piers Plowman,”  YLS 4 (1990), pp. 87-104 and R. E. Kaske, “The Character 
Hunger in Piers Plowman” in Medieval English Studies Presented to George Kane, edd. Edward 
Donald Kennedy and Joseph S. Wittig (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1988), pp. 187-97. 
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 As the narrator warns, though, this will not always be the case. Just as surely as 
winter comes to reward ants and to punish grasshoppers in the familiar fairy tale (not 
that Langland mentions any version of this tale here), so to will Hunger come 
again...and with a vengeance: 
 
Ac I warne yow werkmen, wynneþ whil ye mowe 
for hunger hiderward hasteþ hym faste. 
He shal awake þoruʒ water wastours to chaste; 
er fyue yer be fulfilled swich famyn shal aryse. 
Thoruʒ flood and foule wedres fruytes shul faille, 
and so seiþ Saturne and sente yow to warne. 
Whan ye se þe mone amys and two monkes heddes, 
and a mayde haue þe maistrie, and multiplie by eiʒte, 
thanne shal deeþ wiþdrawe and derþe be Iustice, 
and Dawe þe dykere deye for hunger 
but if god of his goodnesse graunte vs a trewe. (B.6.321-31) 
But what sort of warning does this riddling passage refer to? On the one hand, it may 
seem reasonable to assume that Langland had a very specific topical matter in mind—
that the riddle has a solution. On the other hand, however, that the prophecy itself is 
topical does not make for an open-and-shut case. Certainly it seems to be topical and 
“literary” in so far as it seems to indulge in riddling references—predominately non-
scriptural or markedly religious—to time-stamped future events. Famine shall arise “er 
fyue yer be fulfilled,” for instance.507 The signs referred to afterwards also appear to 
indicate some real year or date, given the suggestion to “multiplie by eiʒte.”  
 But the passage can also be said to touch on the conventions of biblical 
prophecy. In addition to God at the end—whose “trewe” in the form of pardon from 
Truth will be the subject of the next passus of Piers—the prophecy also seems to 
dwell on the cosmic, the ahistorical, the universal. One gets the feeling on reading it 
that the passage would be very different without the temporal markers, “er fyue yer be 
                                                 
507 Saturn is a traditional debate partner in literature from the medieval sapiential tradition, e.g. Solomon 
and Saturn, and also a deity associated with wet weather. See for example James E. Cross and Thomas 
D. Hill, edd. The Prose Solomon and Saturn and Adrian and Ritheus (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1982). 
  290   
fulfilled” and (especially) the direction to “multiplie by eiʒte.” “Marking the sun 
amiss” after all reminds us of the eschatological prophecies of Jesus recorded in the 
Gospel of Matthew about “eclipses of the sun and moon.” As for whether the “mayde 
with mastrie” and the “monkes heddes” are a number or refer instead to portents like 
an eclipse, it bears noting that the events they are said here to refer to do happen later 
in Piers (the eclipse and resurrection of passus 19) but otherwise seem more generally 
apocalyptic.  
 To recap, then, a medieval satirist might write two broadly different types of 
prophecy. Both appear intermingled in Piers. One, which I have chosen to call 
“biblical,” flourished naturally in that continuation of the patristic age that Leclercq 
has called the monastic world and has redemptio mundi as its goal; it is not date-
specific, not “coded.” The other, which I have vacillated between calling “satiric” and 
“literary,” has pagan literary exemplars and during the time this study concerns itself 
with focused its vision on the necessity of more immediate reforms (especially in the 
political sphere).508 What does it mean for Langland to draw on both types of 
prophecy? At first glance, at least, it may not mean necessarily much: as I’ve just 
written, it would be difficult for literary prophecy to differ from biblical prophecy in 
every respect, given the latter’s prominence and availability as a model; by the same 
token, purely biblical prophecy could invite the use of nonbiblical literary models as 
well.  
 Upon closer inspection, biblical and literary prophecy’s cross-pollination 
hardly seems to have been unavoidable in every case. The prophecies in “Thomas of 
Erceldoune,” though they take place in a poem obviously familiar with Christian 
cosmography, have all the specificity and enigma of the pagan literary prophecy.509 
                                                 
508 Classical satire does not contain prophecy to the same degree, as I have already pointed out. 
509 See for example the edition by Brandl, provided in the bibliography. 
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On the other hand, one finds in the prophecies of Bernard of Cluny’s De contemptu 
mundi an eschatological vision almost resistant to specific reference or date. This is 
not to say that religious prophecies cannot contain specific references or riddles, or 
that literary prophecy cannot be vague: for the former, again, see the Book of 
Revelation and its clever use of gematria. But the types tend to have distinctly 
different priorities. Scholars have been known to ascribe one or another of these sets 
of priorities to Langland, but not both.  
 The appropriate answer to the question of whether Langland’s use of prophetic 
discourse in Piers Plowman deserves special attention or not, then, must be “yes,” 
since, far from avoiding a mixture of the biblical and literary types he draws greatly on 
the conventions specific to both. His biblical prophecy is especially biblical, one might 
say, and his literary prophecy elaborate. Various examples could be adduced here to 
prove this point, but the best evidence in broad outline is that some of Langland’s 
“biblical” prophecies even go so far as to allude to, or even directly quote, prophetic 
utterances from the Bible. Langland’s literary prophecy, on the other hand, 
circumscribes itself. There are a number of places in Piers Plowman in which the 
narrator or some other character seems on the verge of making a topical, politically 
charged utterance of warning and chastisement only to restrain itself or otherwise 
occlude its message from being too openly understood.  
 Because Piers draws on biblical and literary prophecy so thoroughly, it seems 
likely that Langland wrote with an audience in mind that would have been especially 
familiar with both. The end of the second vision contains for example a meditation on 
the significance of dreams clearly allying the poem so far with the biblical prophetic 
tradition, as we’ve seen, but it also contains an example of extremely obscure and 
ostensibly topical prophetic admonition in its last lines when it mentions the return of 
Hunger and the signs that will attend that. The references to monks’ heads and eclipses 
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tempt conjecture, as I have observed, since we assume they must mean something yet 
no satisfactory solution for them has been found. Far more important, however, might 
be the lines’ appearance of meaning something: their suggestion that the person with 
the proper sort of knowledge might be able to unlock their secrets and know the date 
being referred to (if indeed that is what they mean). The passage would thus beckon a 
sense of pride in an initiate group identity—and also thwart it, much as Dame Study 
claims to tempt (yet thwart) seekers after higher knowledge with the distractions of 
(pseudo-)scientific lore. The passage here also illustrates another feature of 
Langlandian prophetic vision, in so far as one cannot always be certain of the vision’s 
referent’s being in the waking world of sublunary reality or in the poem itself.510  
 Moreover, and much more solidly literary, some prophecy in the poem seems 
to draw on or allude to satire produced in a university context and to both Goliardic 
and parodic texts.511 These imitations and allusions, while few, should be respected 
since they indicate even more about the literary taste of Langland and a possible target 
audience. These allusions have been alleged not to say much, being typical fare for 
sermons and entertaining tales. The fable of the mice attempting to bell the cat, for 
instance (whose cartoonesque frivolity clearly aims to soften the blow of the biblical 
tag quoted there only apparently in passing, “Woe to the land where a boy is king!”) 
appears in a recorded medieval English sermon contemporary with Langland and has 
the character of a traditional fable. But other seemingly similar references would not 
                                                 
510 When Langland sees pope and king in the prologue, are these the plot or a prophetic vision? And do 
the monks’ heads later refer to real famine in 14th-century England or, within the narrative only, to the 
dire setting in which the poem introduces the character Nede? 
511 Will makes an angry reference in B.13.90-92 that the gluttonous “doctor of divinity” “haþ dronken 
so depe he wolde deuyne soone / and preuen it by hir Pocalips and passion of Seint Auereys / that 
neiþer bacon ne braun, blancmanger ne mortrews, / is neiþer fisshe ne flessh, but fode for a penaunt.” 
The “Pocalips” has been seen as a reference to the Goliardic Apocalipsis Goliæ (edition listed in the 
bibliography), while the “passion of Seint Auereys” has occasioned more uncertainty. It appears 
however to be a reference to the parodic Tractatus Garsiæ (edition listed in the bibliography): see Ben 
Parsons, “An Unrecognized Reference to a Latin Satire in Langland’s Piers Plowman,” Notes & 
Queries n.s. 57.1 (2010), pp. 27-29. 
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be so universally appreciated outside a certain literate setting. Nor can we look at such 
references and claim that Langland is only borrowing a story which will appeal to a 
wide class of readers, since the references take the form of allusions that only someone 
familiar with their literary referents already could appreciate.  
 Before turning to how Langland might have encountered it, it deserves noting 
that the presence of satire one could associate with the medieval world of learning in a 
poem arguably much indebted to the monastic prophetic tradition puzzles. Again, not 
for no reason did Leclercq open L’Amour des Lettres et le Désir de Dieu by 
contrasting the monastic as opposed to the scholastic worldview and way of 
representing the world and ideas: although scholasticism and monasticism stand out as 
twin peaks of high-minded, disinterested life, especially for the Middle Ages, the 
methods and aims of “classic” Benedictine monasticism diverge sharply from those of 
even medieval schools.512 Monks could be said to draw their energy, as we have seen, 
from the practiced impracticability and leisure for associative thinking that adherence 
to their rule (and a concomitant separation from “the world” to examine more closely 
the health of their own souls) provides them. Scholastics, despite a propensity for 
abstraction, are much more concerned with practical things than monks, much as in 
modern universities mathematicians might, however incorrectly, be considered more 
engaged with the present hour than medieval historians.  
                                                 
512 On the incompatibility of monastic and scholastic thought see an extended treatment at the beginning 
of Leclercq’s Amour des Lettres. See also Leclercq’s review of C[eslas]. Spicq, Esquisse d’une Histoire 
de l’Exégèse Latine au Moyen Âge, in the Bulletin Thomiste (1942-1945), pp. 59-67, noting that the 
twelfth century especially recognized “deux exégèses, correspondant à ce qu’on pourrait désigner 
comme ‘deux moyen âges’ parrallèles”: one, monastic, was concerned with spiritual growth and the 
other, scholastic, emphasized on didactic explication (62). He also notes, following Spicq, that the 
fourteenth century saw “une sorte de rupture entre les deux exégèses, littérale et allégorique, que la 
tradition avait unies, tout en mettant l’accent sur la seconde,” plunging exegesis into an unremitting 
literalism and (as a result) “caducité” (at least on the evidence provided by Spicq’s examination of too 
few authors). Leclercq concludes that there were indeed ‘two Middle Ages,’ the second scholastic, and 
that writers of the first category—“mystique, prolongement de l’époque patristique [...] relèvent non de 
l’histoire de l’exégèse, mais de celle de la morale et de la spiritualité.” (68-69)  
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 Does this use of different types of prophecy point simply to the poem’s satiric 
hybridity, or does it point to the poem’s “circle” as well? I think the latter option must 
be the case. The presence of both types of prophecy undoubtedly speaks to the 
author’s discursive eclecticism. Reading them in situ, though, one does not get the 
sense, which would be possible, that the poet wanted to dole them both out equally.  
On the contrary, “biblical” prophecy (here associated with the monastic worldview) 
achieves far more prominence in the poem and also seems more serious.  
Appropriations of the scholastic seem at key points almost mockingly, parodically, to 
make overtures to that worldview’s adherents only to undermine them, calling their 
trademark elaboration into question. All this suggests a circle, but not a close one: one 
that Langland stood on the edge of, that could appreciate scriptural and academic 
discourse but whose taste, to Langland, may have been too academic and not scriptural 
enough. 
 
Langland’s Circle? 
 
 Scholars have long commented on the elaborate scholasticism of certain 
passages in Piers, the impression Langland gives of familiarity with the educated 
world of his day. Ralph Hanna has proposed that Langland spent part of his early 
career around the University of Oxford, a circumstance which would help to explain 
some of the poem’s more learned references.513 Moreover, scholars such as D. Vance 
Smith and Anne Middleton have noticed that the poem also contains references to the 
curriculum of study and examinations necessary for the achievement of a doctorate in 
                                                 
513 See Hanna, William Langland as well as the claims aforementioned in Pursuing History. 
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theology.514 This, too, suggests non-casual knowledge with an educated elite, whether 
Langland was firmly a member of that group or not. While the extent and exact nature 
of the poet’s learning has been subject to some debate—as witness the articles in a 
special edition of The Yearbook of Langland Studies on that very subject515—it seems 
reasonable to assume that the poem’s author was sufficiently well acquainted with 
learned circles to address them confidently, if he also stood outside those circles 
enough to pass judgment upon them.  
 Langland’s taste in riddles seems to have been of a piece with late fourteenth-
century English scholarly tastes as well, if the evidence provided by the curious figure 
of John Erghome can serve as any guide. Erghome—friar, university don, and author 
most famously now of a commentary on the so-called prophecies ascribed to John 
Bridlington (if not those prophecies as well)—appears in his writings to indulge in the 
same occultative literary tricks that one also finds in the so-called “Oxford Riddles” 
contemporary to him and, it has been plausibly argued, Patience’s riddle in Piers 
Plowman (a riddle which appears in a scene prominently featuring a “doctour of 
divinity”).516 The commentary on the prophecies of John of Bridlington in fact 
enumerates in its preface the various methods of hiding one’s message and uses these 
same techniques to veil its author’s name.517  
                                                 
514 See D. Vance Smith, chapter 7: “Principium” at “Beginning Perfection: the Theology of Inception,” 
s.vv. “Incipient Puns: the Inauguration of Dowel.” The Book of the Incipit: Beginnings in the 
Fourteenth Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), pp. 194-197. 
515 See John A. Alford, “Langland’s Learning,” YLS 9 (1995), pp. 1-7 [response by Andrew Galloway, 
pp. 10-15]. 
516 The work has long attracted scholarly attention.  Paul Meyvaert first solidly arranged the facts in 
“John Erghome and the Vaticinium Roberti Bridlington,” Speculum 41.4 (1966), 656-64; Michael J. 
Curley, among other things, observed the work’s manifest political danger in “The Cloak of Anonymity 
and ‘The Prophecy of John of Bridlington’,” ModPh 77.4 (1980); and A. G. Rigg gives further support 
for Meyvaert’s theory of authorship in “John of Bridlington’s Prophecy: a New Look,” Speculum 63.3 
(1988), pp. 596-613. On Patience’s riddle and its suitability in a context such as Erghome’s see Andrew 
Galloway, “The Rhetoric of Riddling in Late-Medieval England: the ‘Oxford’ Riddles, the Secretum 
philosophorum, and the Riddles in Piers Plowman,” Speculum 70.1 (1995), pp. 68-105. 
517 More on medieval literary obfuscation might be found in Jan M. Ziolkowski, “Theories of Obscurity 
in the Latin Tradition,” Mediævalia 19 (1996 for 1993), pp. 101-170. As Ziolkowski shows, this was 
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 That Erghome, or those like him, should indulge in riddles of the sort one finds 
in Piers Plowman is made even more interesting by the fact that he obviously also had 
an interest in the composition of literary prophecy, as the commentary to which his 
treatise on obfuscation is prepended makes very clear. Erghome’s extant list of books 
further supports this assessment, showing him to have been interested in matters not 
only obscure but positively occult as well.518 One reads Piers Plowman with the 
distinct impression that, even if some of the poem’s most cryptic statements might not 
have an easily recognizable solution, Langland could indulge in the same techniques 
himself as well as make light of them.519 Therefore, even if we can identify persons 
such as Erghome in Piers Plowman’s target audience, we should not necessarily 
consider Langland to have been one of them. He does portray himself as such a figure, 
though, to the extent that Will is a Goliard or gyrovague; given the currency of 
antifraternal polemic, he must have been aware of this.520 His curious awareness of 
                                                                                                                                            
not a phenomenon confined to the literature of the later medieval period; see also Andrew Galloway, 
“Word-Play and Political Satire: Solving the Riddle of the Text of Jezebel,” MÆ 68.2 (1999), pp.189-
208. For a more biblically grounded medieval view on occultation, see Monica Brzezinski Potkay, “The 
Parable of the Sower and Obscurity in the Prologue to Marie de France’s Lais,” Christianity and 
Literature 57.3 (2008), pp. 355-78. 
518 For more detailed information about the contents of Erghome’s book collection, see K. W. 
Humphreys, ed., The Friars’ Libraries, Corpus of British Medieval Library Catalogues (London: The 
British Library in association with the British Academy, 1990) and an earlier incarnation with 
interesting notes by M. R. James, “The Catalogue of the Library of the Augustinian Friars at York: now 
first edited from the manuscript at Trinity College, Dublin,” in Fasciculus J. W. [Ioanni Willis] Clark 
dicatus, n. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), pp. 2-96. Some sense of the context 
whereby Erghome might have collected these materials might be found in M. B. Parkes, chapter 11: 
“The Provision of Books,” in the History of the University of Oxford, edd. J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans, 
vol. 2: Late Medieval Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 407-83. See also, for friars 
specifically, K. W. Humphreys, The Book Provisions of the Mediæval Friars, 1215-1400, Safaho 
Monographs, Published by the Safaho Foundation for Promotion of Bibliographic Research, gen. ed. 
Abraham Horodisch, 2: Studies in the History of Libraries and Librianship, ed. K. W. Humphreys 1 
(Amsterdam: Erasmus  Booksellers, 1964).On the occult books, see  the assessment by E. Aubrey 
Gwynn, The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940. 
519 The fact that Langland takes care to make a critique of such writing exactly by indulging in it 
indicates that he sees its attraction. This is not a surprise, as Will’s exploration of learning near the 
beginning of the vita clearly indicates a sympathy to how one could be misled into the deceptive 
knowledge of non-clerical disciplines by pride in learning itself. 
520 Szittya, in The Antifraternal Tradition: “[Like the “notoroious Biblical wanderer” Cain], [l]iteral 
wanderers are reviled throughout hte poem as spiritual wanderers[—] especially the friars, ‘men of þis 
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Franciscan internal conflicts, too (even though he disapproves of the friars’ fall from 
their founder’s ideal), only strengthens this impression.521  
 As a friar, we may assume, John Erghome would have been as interested in 
biblical prophecy as any medieval Christian if not more so by virtue of extended 
familiarity with scripture.522 As Augustine showed in The City of God, that history 
which began in the garden of Eden and the creation (by Cain) of the first of corrupt 
human cities, and realized in Augustine’s time its apogée at Rome, would culminate at 
the end of time in the celestial city of the Heavenly Jerusalem—a location reached in 
this life only by meditation on the future and the contemplative visions of prophecy. It 
is clear that Erghome had books on the past as well, of course, suggesting an interest 
in the fate of empires and reigns as well as the future of humanity.523 As a friar, no 
doubt, Erghome would also have known the works of that mysterious Cistercian 
Joachim of Fiore, whose prophecies about world reform undertaken by new monks 
were understood by the Franciscan “spirituals” to refer to themselves.524 Joachim’s 
                                                                                                                                            
moolde þat moost wide walken’ (B.8.14), who were derogatorily called gyrovagi by their critics of the 
fourteenth century.” (251) 
521 The case for Langland’s familiarity with fraternal thought has been most enthusiastically made by 
Lawrence M. Clopper in his “Songes of Rechelesnesse”: Langland and the Franciscans, Studies in 
Medieval and Early Modern Civilization (Ann Arbor: University of Michgan Press, 1997). It is 
important to recognize when considering this book that even its author never quite fully signs on to the 
notion that Langland was or had been a friar. Nevertheless, his investigations do much to change our 
understanding of Langland’s religious and intellectual background and help to re-orient our perspective 
on his satire. 
522 In addition to Oxford, there is some evidence that Erghome at one time had a place among the 
faculty of theology at no less estimable a seat of learning than Bologna: see Gwynn, English Austin 
Friars. For a sense of the curriculum under which he would have learned, see Leonard E. Boyle, 
chapter 14: “Canon Law before 1380,” in the History of the University of Oxford, ed. J. I. Catto, vol. 1: 
The Early Oxford Schools (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 531-64. For his scholarly milieu in 
England, see M. W. Sheehan, chapter 5: “The Religious Orders, 1220-1370,” in the History of the 
University of Oxford, ed. J. I. Catto, vol. 1: The Early Oxford Schools (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 
pp. 193-224 and R. B. Dobson, “The Religious Orders, 1370-1540,” in volume 2 (cited above). 
523 cf. Middleton’s remarks in “The Audience and Public of Piers Plowman,” concerning such 
collections, and Trigg’s notes about the Thornton miscellany.. 
524 In addition to Morton Bloomfield’s remarks in Apocalypse, a very useful discussion of how Joachim 
was received by Franciscan spirituals might be found in Frédégand Callaey, L’Idéalisme Franciscain 
Spirituel au XIVe Siècle: étude sur Ubertin de Casale (Louvain: Bureau de Recueil de Travaux du 
Universite de Louvain, 1911). The most recent treatment regarding Langland seems to be Kathryn 
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work, which was so controversial in large part because it dealt with relatively recent 
history, deserves comparison with the more literary and older, yet equally topical, 
Prophecies of Merlini by Geoffrey of Monmouth. One of the manuscripts in 
Erghome’s collection, in fact—heading the list of the books of “supersticiosa” 
originally owned by him in the Austin friars’ priory at York—contains all these 
pieces. 
 Erghome’s interest in satiric poetry is even better attested than his reading of 
prophecy, appearing in a number of manuscripts catalogued at York from his 
collection and yet showing themselves to represent only an aspect in Erghome’s 
obvious concern with and interest in poetry evinced by numerous treatises on rhetoric 
and composition. Part of the reason Erghome’s concern for poetics—the choices poets 
make to bring various messages and impressions across to others—must be the friar’s 
evident general belief in the inherent, even quasi-divine, authority possessed by poets. 
Works by both Persius and Juvenal appear in books together with matters of more 
objective and codified learning, and the same obtains with the verse prophecies of 
Merlin as well as Horace.   
 Less understandable, it may be, is Erghome’s extensive collection of works of 
parody such as those found in MS 121 with its massa compoti. These works tend to 
lampoon the very upper circles of court, church, and college in which Erghome 
himself was known to move, but of course that might have accounted for some of their 
charm or interest. Erghome certainly was not afraid to possess somewhat unorthodox 
material compared to which even the most scurrilous writings of the Archpoet would 
seem slight, as his numerous works of “supersticiosa” attest. MS 379 also indicates an 
interest in polemic, containing “Nicholaus de Lira contra Iudeum de verbis Euangelii,” 
                                                                                                                                            
Kerby-Fulton, chapter 5: “Leaven of Hope: New Leadership and Joachite Apocalypticism,” in 
Reformist Apocalypticism and Piers Plowman, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 7 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 162-200. 
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“Anselmus inter christianum et gentilum,” and astonishingly “Wilhelmus de Sancto 
Amore.” Though the catalog gives only the author’s name and not his subject for the 
latter piece, it is recognizably that same body of work produced a century earlier at the 
University of Paris, declaring the friars to be the agents of Satan and harbingers (as 
false prophets) of the end of things. 
 In general, the satirical works owned by Erghome and his other works of 
prophecy and magic indicate sobriety more than frivolity. Parody takes up less shelf 
space than social criticism by the ancient poets, and the medieval poetry in Erghome’s 
collection other than parody and purely instructional matter reveals its character even 
in a list: Alan of Lille and Bernardus Silvestris seem to be favorites—at least they are 
well attested—and to them we can add Johannes de Hauvilla and Bernard of Cluny, all 
of which explore the fallen state of human nature and man’s rightful place in the 
universe while reflection on the potential perfection of his behavior and future in the 
world to come. John Bromyard’s Summa prædicantium, also in the York priory’s 
possession, notably described “world” [mundus] in terms astronomical, geological, 
and geographical as well as social and theological, and Erghome seems to have 
considered “man’s place in the world” from a similarly broad series of perspectives.  
 It would of course be a bad idea—it would lead the wrong impression—to 
consider Erghome’s manuscript holdings in poetry alone. Erghome possessed much 
that was written in prose, and many of these works are devotional ones which also 
have a clearly evident interest in matters relating to contempt of the world. Several 
copies in fact exist in the putative library of Augustine’s soliloquia, the treatise “de 
spiritu et anima” cited by Wittig as a possible background text for Langland, and the 
like: including much by Seneca, attributed to Seneca, or otherwise Stoic in outlook. 
Marbode’s work on the “contempt of the present life” shows up just as surely as his 
famous lapidary—and who is to say which work might have been the better 
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appreciated by the Austin friar?525 In addition to works one might consider of more 
scholarly or professional clerical interest like the above the collection includes a 
number of pieces which were also instructional, as exemplary texts about men who 
died before making confession, for example, make clear.526  
 The question no doubt arises in my readers’ minds, as it has in mine, the extent 
to which the presence of a given work in Erghome’s book collection really can be said 
to reflect Erghome’s own thought and reading rather than casual interest; we all, 
admittedly in an era in which books are plentiful and printing still relatively cheap, 
have texts in our possession which we have not yet had a chance to read. In the case of 
Erghome and fellow scholars or Austin friars, we may feel a bit more certain about the 
real interest book owners would have had in their texts, since books were more 
expensive at a time when time itself was for certain classes of society more amenable 
to careful reading. Yet it still challenges credulity to think of a professor or preacher 
turning to his primary texts for full and careful readings in advance of sermon or 
lecture. Not surprisingly, shortcuts existed: florilegia, the gathering of the best and 
choicest excerpts and bon mots from particularly nectarsome texts.527 A florilegium, as 
the name implies, is just a collection of passages that can be used to embellish—like 
so many flowers—another work. They need not necessarily be religious in nature. 
Nevertheless, in the Middle Ages florilegia were commonly compiled to serve as 
                                                 
525 MS 489, containing also, as Humphrey records it, “(a) Cosmographia et michrochosmus Bernardi 
Silvestris libri duo; (d) versus de contemptu presentis vite [“Marbod of Rennes: PL 171.1667; Walter 
20702”]; (l) versus de paupertate et anxi\e/tate; (m) versus de ruina Rome; (n) versus de infortunio.” 
526 MS 109, though not actually Erghome’s, contains a text “de quodam milite in peccatis suis mortuo 
qui dum vellet penitere et confitere non potuit.” 
527 For a typical statement of such gathering, see Alan of Lille’s statement on his role in compiling the 
summa Quoniam homines: “[H]orto sacre scripture circumponantur excubie ne inter herbas fructiferas 
inimicus seminet zizania, ne flores sacre scripture per malos defloratores defloreant, ne eorum 
petulantia in diversis sententias virginales defloreant. De nostris ergo nulla influere laboremus nec de 
nostro thesauro nova proponere, sed ex antiquorum patrum tractatibus antiqua elicere ut quasi ex 
diversis flosculis nostri interventu laboris mellita quedam doctrina emergat, ut non nostrum inventum 
sed totum potius furtum esse credatur. Huiusmodi tamen furtum non penam sed veniam promeretur.” 
(Glorieux, p. 120)  
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preachers’ aids, and the type of thinking (and reading) associated with them seems to 
have been developed most strongly (it could be, originally) in the monastic world.  
 Vitally, Erghome and those associated with him appear on the evidence of 
marginalia to have read the works aforementioned way consonant with Langland’s use 
of such writing: “florilegially,” in other words, drawing on short excerpted portions 
for moralistic interpretation and possibly quotation in sermons or other didactic 
works.528 Because ultimately for the purposes of this chapter I’m concerned with a 
type of reading than with any specific type of text that facilitates such reading, a 
narrow definition of the term “florilegium” is useless to me. Reading florilegia allows 
one searching for a key statement or bit of information to use to some practical end—I 
have suggested a school lesson or a sermon—to find it quickly, and then to find other 
similar statements (or at least statements by other texts on the same theme by other 
authors). Whereas a distinction collection might be organized alphabetically and might 
cover an encyclopedic range of topics (as my references to “mundus” in Bromyard 
should indicate) a classic florilegium might confine itself more narrowly either to one 
text or another—what does Bede say about a certain subject? Where is this material in 
the Historia Ecclesiastica?—or to specific conceptual ranges involving sin or the 
sacraments, for example.  
 Because they introduced readers to specific nuggets of textual statements not 
originally in dialogue about often theological material, thus inviting the reader to 
expand on their perforce excerpted statement with fuller treatment on his own, 
florilegia could be useful for devotional meditation. Jean Leclercq in fact points to 
florilegia as among the most significant gifts bequeathed to the Western heritage by 
                                                 
528 In addition to the discussion in Leclercq’s Amour des Lettres, see H.-M. Rochais, “Contribution à 
l’Histoire des Florilèges Ascétiques du Haut Moyen Âge Latin: le Liber scintillarum,” Revue 
Bénédictine 63 (1953), pp. 246-91; and Jean-Claude Schmitt, “Recueils Franciscains d’Exempla et 
Perfectionnement des Techniques Intellectuelles du XIIIe au XVe Siècle,” Bibliothèque de l’École des 
Chartes 105 (1977), pp. 5-21. 
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medieval monasticism in L’Amour des Lettres et le Désir de Dieu (q.v.) and names a 
specific type of work he calls the “florilège ascétique.” The differences betwen 
monastic and scholastic florilegia should not detain us, given that by John Erghome’s 
era both had cross-pollinated (if they ever were so conceptually distinct as Leclercq 
would seem to claim) and both existed in textual, as opposed to their originally 
memorial, form. Among the earliest certainly must be counted the Liber scintillarum 
by Defensor in the sixth century; by the late fourteenth century, Erghome could own 
his own Scintillarum poetarum (this by one Alberic of London)—recognizably in the 
same tradition, at least to go by its name. 
 How did one read satire “florilegially”? The same exegetical frames of mind 
that helped bring about the commentary tradition and the florilegium itself also 
inspired a way of reading that was, itself, florilegial. It is well known of course that 
poets from classical antiquity were taught, and thus read, in medieval schools. Given 
however the manifestly pagan and sometimes obscene or other objectionable material 
these poets works contained, simply to read them without some guidance was not 
permitted: hence the famous accessūs ad auctores which stated the ways in which a 
given classical text of obviously questionable content, like the elegies of Maximianus, 
actually “ethice subponitur.” In a world replete with the so-called spoils of the 
Egyptians (to use a favorite metaphor) in which too “all that is written is written for 
our doctrine,” texts of pagan and indeed any origin had to be approached by ginger 
respect. Hidden mines had to be avoided, hidden treasures to be found. Excerpting, 
and then interpreting the excerpt out of context as a statement on universal truths, 
amounted to rather standard practice.  
 Modern day biblical concordances attest to the persistence of florilegial 
reading even into the twenty-first century, and manipuli mark the notable lines in early 
modern editions of Chaucer: such reading is not to be considered medieval alone. Not 
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surprisingly, it is possible to detect evidence for florilegial reading (in addition to the 
reading of florilegia) in Erghome’s collection as well—and of satire, at that. The 
marginal annotations in Erghome’s copy of the Architrenius, one of the few which still 
survives today (as London, British Library MS Cotton Vespasian B.xxiii) seem to 
indicate a reader’s looking for lines or images to discuss (perhaps in a lesson) 
elsewhere.529 Even had the manuscript not existed, though, the contexts of the poem 
suggest its being read this way in so far as it consists of excisable speeches and other 
set pieces on a wide number of edifying subjects.  
 Given that I have just been claiming that sufficiently learned members of later 
medieval English society gave near-universal acknowledgment to a practice of 
florilegial reading, it will hardly come as a shock that I wish to ascribe florilegial 
reading to Langland as well. But since I intend to claim, or at least suggest, that Piers 
Plowman was written to be read florilegially, some further demonstration of how 
Langland so read his texts appears to be desirable. The most striking and relevant 
example comes from the Entheticus and is uttered by Dame Study in C.11t:  
 
Qui sapiunt nugas  & crimina lege uocantur,  
Qui recte sapiunt lex iubet ire foras. (C.11.18a) 
 
[Those who know about trifles and slanders are called in by the law; 
those who are truly wise the law commands to go away.]530 
 
In the Entheticus, a different and more topical sense hoves into view:  
 
Ebria fortunæ donis nova curia rege 
   sub puero credit, cuncta licere sibi. 
Insanire putes æque iuvenesque senesque; 
   insanit iudex officiumque suum. 
Curia nugaces solos amat, audit, honorat, 
   artes exosas aulicus omnis habet; 
artes virtuti famulantes aulicus odit, 
                                                 
529 As Humphreys records, the manuscript contains the following texts: “(a) Architrenius libri 10; (b) 
Ouidius de vetula libri 3; (c) centones Virgilii per Probam; (d)  Alanus de complanctu nature; (e) Fabule 
Ysopi; (f) Exidium Troianum; (g) Enigmata Symphosii.” This is Schmidt’s manuscript H. 
530 Pearsall’s translation from his earlier edition of the C-text, p. 194. 
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   sed famulas carnis aulicus omnis amat. 
Hos aulæ mors funambulus intulit ille, 
   qui, quod præsumit, lege tuetur avi. 
Qui sapiunt nugas et crimina, lege vocantur; 
   qui recte sapiunt, lex iubet ire foras. 
 
[Drunk with the gift of Fortune the new court under a youthful  
   king believes that all things are lawful for it.  
You would think that both young and old men are equally mad, 
   the judge is mad, and his office. 
The court loves, hears, honours only the triflers; 
   every courtier holds the arts as detested; 
the courtier hates the arts which serve virtue, 
   but every courtier loves servants of the flesh. 
That rope-dancer, who defends by the law of his grandfather 
   whatever he attempts, has introduced these morals to the court. 
Those who have a taste for trifles and crimes, are called upon by the law; 
   those who have the right taste, the law orders to go abroad.]531  
On the one hand, Langland makes only fleeting use of this poem from the Entheticus. 
On the other hand, and also befitting florilegial reading, the tag invites those who can 
recognize the source to look closer at it in somewhat wider context (even if not at all 
of the Entheticus). I have earlier said that florilegial reading invites interpretation out 
of context, but by its disconnection of statements from their original matrix in larger 
texts the opposite is also true—for those who have access to the original texts, who 
know what those texts are. When a reader possesses such knowledge in this case, he 
discovers that the poem has as its subject matter the perils of life under the reign of a 
young king. This is exactly the sort of material thought to have been blunted by the C 
revision, of course, and to find its presence “occulted” here indicates how 
referentiality such as provided by the wordplay-rich literary prophecy this chapter has 
already concerned itself with might help to sharpen the poem’s satiric edge for readers 
“in the know.”  
 In any case, up to this point in the chapter I have been referring to John 
Erghome mostly in his secular role, and for good reason. The chapter has so far been 
concerned with how Langland’s poetic prophecy—and by extension his poem’s satiric 
                                                 
531 Laarhoven, Entheticus [Maior] III.T.95, “The crazy court,” pp. 200-201. 
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ideal—speaks to secular as well as religious concerns; and for this the secular literary 
tastes and enterprises of John Erghome provide a most important context analogous, if 
not identical, to Langland’s own. This secular context lies in a learned, literate world, 
where texts and an especially scholastic verbal ingenuity were in plentiful supply.  
 Yet Erghome was also “a religious”: not only an instructor of some standing at 
he University of Oxford but also—not that, at the time, this was uncommon—a friar in 
the Order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine. As such, he would have been a member 
of a religious group whose members were sworn to perpetual and deep 
impoverishment following the example, preëminently, of St. Francis of Assisi. The 
towering mass of antifraternal polemic in the later Middle Ages, including in 
Langland’s poem, needs to be seen in this light. For although the Franciscans pledged 
themselves to poverty, the order  attracted luminous intellectuals whose gifts brought 
them handsome positions and continued to attract money from donors. Moreover, all 
this occurred in a gray area opened up between the urban world in which they 
ministered and the traditional separate monastic life.  
 
Redemptio Mundi 
 
 The ultimate question I wish to touch on regarding prophecy and the intentions 
of Piers Plowman regards how we might conceive of its “ideal,” that essential element 
lending coherence to satire by indicating what does not deserve criticism and in fact 
might even deserve emulation. The question also needs to be raised of whether or not 
we can ascribe that ideal to the members of any particular demographic. Granted that 
the poem’s literary prophecy and numerous other allusions to texts regarded from the 
high Middle Ages onward as clerical, even learned, might have been meant to speak to 
the concerns of a demographic such as Erghome’s. Can we then say that the poem’s 
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ultimate message is for the friars alone to reform themselves? If learned paraclaustral 
members of any religious orders form one main audience for the poem’s ultimate 
vision, is the vision presented to them necessarily one meant for friars or the religious 
orders alone? It would seem to me that the vision in Piers might indeed appeal to the 
four orders (such as the Franciscans or Austin friars) but need not have been solely a 
fraternal invention.  
 As a religious ideal, redemptio mundi is the necessary (although often highly 
implicit) complement to contempt of the world. As I earlier tried to indicate, it also 
forms the ideal for prophetic and indeed sermonic discourse. The necessity for a vision 
of renewal of the world might well account for the existence of Piers Plowman B and 
C, in fact. It is perfectly laudable for the poem to encourage both religious and secular 
reform. Even so, the awful paradox posed at the end of A in passus 11—that the 
world’s corruption needs to be avoided, but that entrance to the clerical estate invites a 
host of perilous responsibilities—inspires a desire not for improvement so much as for 
inertia and despair.  “Why take action when I am nonetheless destined to fail?” is a 
sober question to ask, but it is also one that the B and C texts appear to take seriously 
by delving more deeply into religious thought. The discourse of regular religious 
orders allowed for both learning and salvation, it had spread beyond the cloister, and 
already it was being applied at least tentatively to the problems of the laity’s secular 
life. Its answer to the A.11 problem was that learning could lead to perfection and 
salvation rather than ambition, inflation, and fall. One simply needed to maintain the 
proper perspective.  
 This appears to have been Langland’s position in the B version, too, though it 
rather slowly unfolds in the narrative. Certainly the problem of fallen human volition 
lamented at the end of A—of the “wikked wille”—shows up in that poem from the 
first, and again in B and C. The poem’s central conceit, of the aptly named Will 
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searching endlessly for the proper combination of learning and action that will help 
him save his immortal soul, therefore has a direct bearing on the issue of the 
redemptio to be sought by and for all society: having voiced the need for such reform 
so searingly in A, in fact, the poet almost has no choice in B and C except to address 
it. This the so-called vita that forms the new poem’s sections repeatedly tries to do, but 
nothing presenting itself as an answer to him there seems to satisfy Will enough. The 
events that transpire about him (and happen to him) continue to mystify Will; selfish 
behavior, such as displayed by Wastoure and company on the half acre, seem 
unavoidable. What prophecy there is in the poem indeed, is dark—not only at the end 
of the second vision, foretelling a return of Hunger, but also in final scenes.  
 Will’s confusion in the visio and then in the vita, it seems obvious now, is not 
necessarily Langland’s. On the contrary: the poet rather consistently, if quietly, 
advocates for the cluster of ascetic ideals forming the so-called interior cloister: 
contempt of self, contempt of the world, love of neighbor, and defense of Truth. 
Judging others in view of non-frivolous religious motivations requires abandoning 
ridicule or downplaying it, choosing to employ circumspection and more earnestly to 
desire that one’s targets (including oneself) change behavior. Not for nothing is the 
graven and gilt “patent” in  B.17.11 a resplendent statement of the so-called “Golden 
Rule,” though it takes time for Will to see what it promises.532 Will grows “wery of þe 
world” (B.18.4) after years of careless wandering, and falls asleep dreaming of the 
liturgy of Palm Sunday—whereupon the life, passion, and resurrection of Jesus that 
follows, in the ensuing narrative of passus 18, exceeds the “Golden Rule” and suffuses 
the narrative with hope.  
                                                 
532 Anima makes reference to this well beforehand in passus 15: “And Iewes lyuen in lele lawe; oure 
lord wroot it hymselue / in stoon for it stedefast was and stonde sholde euere. / Dilige deum & 
proximum is parfit Iewen lawe; / and took it Moyses to teche men til Messie coome, / and on þei leue 
and leten it þe beste.” (B.15.582-86) 
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 The poem’s atmosphere of inexorable resolution culminates in the Pentecostal 
division of the gifts of Grace in passus 19 and the founding of that large barn, Unite, 
which symbolizes the church: 
 
[...] Oon Spiritus paraclitus to Piers and to hise felawes, 
in liknesse of a lightnynge [...] lighte on hem alle 
and made hem konne and knowe alle kynne langages. 
I wondred what þat was and waggede Conscience, 
and was afered for þe light, for in fires liknesse 
Spiritus paraclitus ouerspradde hem alle. 
Thanne bigan grace to go wiþ Piers Plowman 
* * * * * * * * 
and counseillede hym and Conscience þe comune to sompne: 
‘For I wole dele today and dyuyde grace 
to alle kynne creatures þat kan hise fyue wittes, 
tresour to lyue by to hir lyues ende, 
and wepne to fighte wiþ þat wole neuere faille. 
For Antecrist and hise al þe world shul greue 
and acombre þee, Conscience, but if crist þee helpe. 
* * * * * * * * 
Diuisiones graciarum sunt, &c. 
Some wyes he yaf wit with wordes to shewe, 
to wyne wiþ truþe þat þe world askeþ, 
as prechours and preestes and Prentices of lawe: 
they lelly to lyue by labour of tonge, 
and by wit to wissen oþere as grace hem wolde teche. 
And some he kennede craft and konnynge of sighte, 
by sellynge and buggynge hir bilyue to wynne. 
And some he lered to laboure on lond and on watre 
and lyue, by þat labour, a lele lif and a trewe. 
And some he tauʒte to tile, to coke and to thecche, 
to wynne wiþ hir liflode bi loore of his techynge; 
and some to deuyne and diuide, figures to kenne; 
and some to kerue and compace, and colours to make; 
and some to se and to seye what sholde bifalle, 
boþe of wele and of woe and be ware bifore,  
as Astronomyens þoruʒ Astronomye, and Philosofres wise. 
And some to ryde and to recouere þat vnriʒtfully was wonne: 
he wissed hem wynne it ayein þoruʒ wightnesse of handes 
and fecchen it fro false men wiþ Folyules lawes. 
And some he lered to lyue in longynge to ben hennes, 
in pouerte and in pacience to preie for alle cristene. 
And alle he lered to be lele, and ech a craft loue ooþer, 
ne no boost ne debat be among hem alle. 
‘Thouʒ some be clenner þan some, ye se wel,’ quod Grace, 
‘that al craft and konnyng come of my ʒifte. 
Lokeþ þat noon lakke ooþer, but loueþ as breþeren; 
and who þat moost maistries kan be myldest of berynge.’  
(B.19.201-20, 228a-55) 
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The passage shows clearly that the dilemma of selfish laborers in the second vision, 
and the corruption Will had seen on the “fair field full of folk” in the prologue, both 
receive their recapitulation and resolution here.533 Instead of a few heart-hardened 
estates acting only according to their own immediate interest—which had confounded 
Will and dashed Piers’ hopes before this—innumerable professions authorized by the 
very will of God appear. (It does not escape my notice here that those blessed with 
“longynge to ben hennes” are mentioned last, even as the secular clergy are mentioned 
first—perhaps reluctantly adding those following the monastic ideal to a list of 
decidedly uncloistered occupations.) Piers’ half acre has been expanded, moreover, 
into the entire world.534  
 Passus 19, if it were allowed to end Piers Plowman, would probably have 
made the poem much more popular with twentieth-century readers but less popular 
with them as a satire. A realization that its narrative needed to end “on the ground,” 
with ongoing struggles towards rather than an achievement of an ideal, might 
ultimately have pushed Langland into writing the much darker passus 20, which really 
does “end” the poem. For no sooner is the division of Grace accomplished and social 
perfection respective of diversity accomplished than that Pride, the chief of all sins, 
plots an attack. Conscience directs the people into Unite, which they surround by 
means of a moat filled with saintly tears called holiness, but the battle seems lost 
before it has even started. Eschewing an elaborate psychomachia such as at the end of 
Alan’s Anticlaudianus, Langland depicts instead of a chaos of characters’ (prideful) 
claims to rule and not be ruled over.  
                                                 
533 Stephen A. Barney, in The Penn Commentary on Piers Plowman, vol. 5 (C Passūs 20-22; B Passūs 
18-20) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), notes that “[t]o think of Grace’s 
exposition here as merely a description of a redeemed social order will involve problems; at this point 
in the narrative it is an order of hope rather than achievement.” (141) 
534 J. A. Burrow, in “The Two Ploughs of Piers Plowman (B XIX 430),” N&Q 54.2 (2007), pp. 123-24, 
observes in an overlooked image a direct reference back to the “plowing of the half acre” in the second 
vision. 
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 As passus 19 ends and passus 20 begins, the poem embraces prophecy more 
fully. The narrator claims to wake up and to write just as he had dreamed, for example, 
which brings to mind the similar connections between visionary experience and 
writing in the biblical book of Revelation. Passus 20, in fact, describes the narrator’s 
vision of actual apocalyptic events, including the coming of Antichrist and the fall of 
Unite threatened by corrupt friars (guided by Envy) within. Given a putative audience 
or “circle” of friars, Langland’s narrative choices here are fantastically interesting: 
they include a great deal of criticism for the friars, after all, largely in the authoritative 
voice of his character Conscience. Conscience will not allow friars into Unite, for 
example, except on condition that they not expand their numbers too greatly or depart 
from their rule of poverty; in response, Envy sends friars to university so that their 
message that can be all the more persuasively set forth:  
 
Enuye herde þis and heet freres go to scole 
and lerne logyk and lawe and ek contemplacion, 
and preche men of Plato, and preue it by Seneca 
that alle þynges vnder heuene ouʒte to ben in comune. (B.20.273-76) 
 
In recounting this the narrator immediately adds that “he lyeþ, as I leue, þat to þe 
lewed so precheþ”—preaching Plato, not the Gospel—which narratorial aside, given 
the character who had just sent the friars into higher education, is certainly 
unnecessary and thus perhaps the sign of real opposition on Langland’s part.  
 Nor does this venture end well for the rest of society: one of the highly 
educated friars, infiltrating Unite and thereby wreaking havoc, provides the impetus 
for Conscience’s anguished pilgrimage at the very end of the poem. Yet Langland also 
shows himself susceptible to the friars’ easy arguments, beginning passus 20 with a 
waking episode in which he meets with the character “Nede.” This character, soon to 
be associated with the Antichrist (who “sprede and spede mennes nedes,” line 55) 
explains to the poet what he presents as almost divine prerogatives accordant unto a 
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situation of indigence which he, the poet, just like the friars, might legitimately 
appropriate in imitation of Christ.  
 As so often, then, Langland’s strategy is to suggest not only problems but why 
those problems exist. He shows what makes possible solutions inadequate, and he 
even identifies with the same temptations facing his putative targets. Because few 
restrictions hold against the friars and essentially anyone can join their order, 
Langland seems to suggest, the friars are given insufficient respect. “Envy,” then, is 
right to send friars to school for the prestigious study of theology and the arts. But 
with every resulting magister among the friars, their reputation and visibility increase, 
meaning that more friars come about. And since the new friars have as models only 
the most visible mentions of the orders in their mind upon joining, they would hardly 
feel content with the sort of humility practiced by Francis and Dominic. What use is 
learning, they might ask, if not to apply it for saving souls in confession? (Pure 
Benedictine thinking would as I have previously noted suggest a more private role for 
learning, but man must eat.)   
 One detects in Conscience’s anguish at the very end of the poem the same 
renunciatory exasperation that had been displayed by Piers at the end of the second 
vision—an “elynge in herte” such as Will’s shortly before his encounter with Nede, 
and a “longyng to ben hennes,” quit from the world, such as characterizes ascetics 
during passus 19’s “division of Grace.” This is well understandable, since the friars’ 
entry into Unite shows that no institution on earth can entirely avoid the entanglements 
of the world and the invert pantheon of human vices at work therein. (“Wherever you 
go,” as the saying runs, “there you are.”) But if the ending to Langland’s poem might 
seem to rear once more the vexing problem of predestination earlier debated in the 
poem, it avoids it by suggesting the power of the ascetic ideal for world renewal...an 
ideal particularly well developed among Franciscans.  
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 Though one would hardly guess it from the large bulk of antifraternal polemic 
produced during the fourteenth century, after all, friars were not completely secular; 
they cultivated a sort of contemptus mundi of their own.535 As Salvatore Nicolosi 
points out, strong currents of religious and philosophical thought dating back to 
Antiquity had made contempt of the world rather hard to avoid in the Middle Ages:  
 
Il sistema bonaventuriano sviluppa una visione ‘simbolica’ e allegorica 
dell’universo, considerando la realità come segno di quella invisibile. 
In questa concezione, in cui non è difficile scorgere l’eredità platonia e 
agostiniana, sorge il quesito su quale sia la ‘consistenza ontologica’ del 
mondo circostante. Da quando, nel famoso apologo dell’inizio del libro 
VII della Reppublica, Platone propose una sua interpretazione del 
mondo come immagine e come ombra—e quindi come segno del 
mondo autentico—la speculazione si è dibattuta tra una visione 
simbolica, mediata, ed una visione diretta, immediata, del reale. Si 
tratta di respondere alla domanda ‘quid est?’ che è la domanda sul 
senso dell’essere, riportandola alla sua radice storica, quale fu intesa 
dai Greci, cioè la domanda sul senso delle cose che ‘ci stanno davanti,’ 
che ci ‘appaiono.’ I Greci con il termine phænomeon intesero tanto ciò 
che è veduto, tanto ciò che ‘appare,’ quanto ciò che ‘sembra.’536  
 
At the same time, however, the world was a sign of God’s grandeur and to that extent 
inherently good—something Francis was alert in recognizing—and this meant that 
utter disavowal of worldly things (as aspired to by some anchorites) was also not 
acceptable:  
 
Se questo mondo è ‘orma’ e ‘segno’ di un altro mondo, che senso ha il 
nostro agire in questo mondo e per questo mondo? Il vivere in questo 
mondo deve tradursi, per il credente, in una progressiva “liberazione” 
da questo mondo, in una continua ricerca del ‘simboleggiato’ attraverso 
i simboli, in una ricerca di Colui che ha impresso la sua ‘orma’ nelle 
cose di questo mondo visibile. In una concezione allegorizzante, vivere 
in un mondo di sogni e di vestigia, no può significare altro che 
orientarsi verso la realità significata. La figura e la spiritualità di S. 
Francesco d’Assisi si presentano come una forma originale della 
spiritualità cristiana. Si tratta di un atteggiamento che, ad un 
                                                 
535 On some false dichotomies between monastic and fraternal thought, see Bertilo de Boer, “La Soi-
Disant Opposition de Saint François d’Assise à Saint Benoît,” Études Franciscains 8 (1957), pp. 181-94 
& 9 (1958), pp. 57-65.  
536 Salvatore Nicolosi, “Contemptus mundi e Redemptio mundi nella Dottrina Morale di S. 
Bonaventure,” Doctor Seraphicus 29 (1982), pp. 61-72 at 61. I have removed the paragraph breaks 
appearing every sentence or two in the text. 
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osservatore superficiale, può apparire come una delle tante forme di 
‘fuga dal mondo,’ ma in realità si tratta di una forma di amore per tutte 
le creature, che suppone una già avvenuta ‘redemptio mundi.’ 
Nell’austerità del Poverello non c’è più il ‘contemptus mundi’ degli 
anacoreti, giacché il ‘contemptus mundi’ suppone una non ancora 
superata ‘corruptio mundi.’ La povertà e l’austerita di S. Francesco di 
Assisi sono, in definitiva, molto diverse dalla ‘fuga dal mondo’ di certi 
anacoreti. La fuga dal mondo anacoretica suppone una concezione 
pessimistica dello ‘status’ di questo mondo: ‘status’ corrotto e 
corruttore. La povertà di S. Francesco attua, invece, la fuga dal mondo 
come affermazione di una libertà interiore: si scopre il volto di Dio, se 
non ci si attarda a rimirare il ‘vestigio’ impresso nelle cose visibili. Di 
questa visione del mondo, serena e rassenerante, luminosa ed 
illuminante, la testimonianza più grandiosa è forse il Cantico delle 
Creature, dove tute le creature sono contemplate in una visione gioiosa, 
perché sono ‘segno’ di Dio, delle sue opere, dei suoi precetti. E questa 
visione serena trova la sua conclusione, logica e commovente, ne iversi 
aggiunti alla fine della vita: ‘Laudato si, mi Signore, per sora nostra 
Morte corporale, da la quale nullo omo vivente po’ scampare.’ Non si 
tratta solo di serenità di fronte alla morte, ma di attesa gioiosa 
dell’abbraccio sororale a lungo sospirato, nel diuturno cammino 
percorso di orma in orma, per ritornare dall’esilio alla patria.537  
 
The fraternal ideal was then neither to flee from the world entirely, nor to embrace it 
exclusively, but to move through it—in imitation of Christ, as Nicolosi goes on to 
mention—so as to bring about its redemption and their arrival at the “more real” world 
to come.  
 Redemption of the world of course is an old ascetic, prophetic, and often satiric 
ideal as references to other works in this dissertation so far have shown. The fraternal 
ideal viewed it as accomplishable through action in the world rather than complete 
enclaustration away from it. This seems to have been Langland’s ideal as well: he is 
truly, as David Aers would write, “in the last resort [the] poet of incarnate man, of the 
existence of individual spirit in the social and material world.”538 Nevertheless, as we 
might expect from a poem naming one of its major sinners Actiua vita, the ideal of 
                                                 
537 Nicolosi, “Redemptio mundi,” pp. 62-63. 
538 Aers, “Imagination and Ideology in Piers Plowman,” Literature and History 7 (1978), pp. 2-19 at p. 
11.  
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action in Piers Plowman is not at all what contemporary Christians would consider 
“social work” today.539  
 Langland’s satiric ideal thus owes much if not all its power to asceticism, as I 
have argued, but specifically to an asceticism that can exist outside the cloister: one 
perfectly suited to, and indeed developed by, learned friars respectful of learning yet 
aware of its shortcomings or limitations. This shows that contempt of the world 
outside the cloister was not meant for contemporary religious reformers to be a 
decision made under duress, by those who could not live in a cloister or who did not 
feel called to it. Instead it was also a decision motivated by an informed theological 
(and satiric) ideal, “redemption of the world”: one just as radiant as contemptus 
mundi’s satirizing distortion (its ascetic renunciation) of worldly vanity could seem 
dark.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
539 For this question regarding the social activity allowed by an ideal of fraternal redemptio mundi, 
Gwynn’s synopsis of William Flete’s second letter to English friars, written c. 1380 and presented in 
English Austin Friars, is most interesting and strikingly relevant. William Flete, O.E.S.A., had received 
university degrees in England but at the time of his writing was living as a hermit in Italy where he had 
become a close associate of Catherine of Siena. As Gwynn recounts, “[Flete] begins by recalling the 
words of the Gospel: ‘Neither be ye called masters, for one is your Master, Christ.’ They are not to take 
pleasure in their titles nor in their dignity, but should strive to walk in Christ’s footsteps, and be thus 
perfect masters. A master is a doctor, and St. Chrysostom tells us that a doctor must be adorned with 
virtue, as it is also written in the Gospel: ‘Master, we know that Thou art truthful, and dost teach the 
way of God in truth.’ Let them therefore be more truthful than all their brethren, keeping strictly to the 
rule they profess, and seeing that others keep it also. They are both doctors and professors, and are thus 
bound by a double tie to teach as doctors and to profess their rule. They are bound to give good example 
to their brethren: especially in these latter days, when the judgement of God is at hand. A reverend 
doctor of the order had once said to Flete: ‘It is plain that God wishes to renew the face of the earth, and 
He has promised me that He will help the reform of the order.’ [...] ” (199, emphasis mine) Flete goes 
on, as Gwynn writes, to urge the O.E.S.A. to be “bound to a higher perfection, and specially to greater 
contempt of the world [...] than other friars,” to embrace solitude and contemplation, and (in a nod “to 
their favourite study of logic”) to “‘let your premisses be sound in this life, that a good conclusion may 
follow from them in your death.’”  (200, emphasis mine) 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE LAST LAUGH: LANGLANDIAN PARRHESIA IN LITERARY HISTORY 
 
 This dissertation has been focusing on William Langland’s appropriations of 
ascetic ideology for his satire and thus, rightly, has set the poet’s great contemporaries 
Geoffrey Chaucer and John Gower to the side. For the most part, I’ve simply asserted 
that Langland’s rationale for writing satire, to say nothing of his actual practice, differs 
from theirs. Now, however, it’s time to bring these star players back on stage, at least 
briefly, to help to answer a question the foregoing study has certainly raised but cannot 
(all by itself) firmly answer: what happened to the ideology of asceticism in vernacular 
literature, preëminently satire, after Langland? In the next few pages I attempt at least 
to sketch out a response by considering Chaucer, Gower, Spenser, and a small group 
of later writers in turn.  
 Langland’s understanding of the ascetic ideals making up the cloister of the 
soul was both subtle and thorough. He seems to have been interested in using the 
schematizing capabilities of satire to promote actual reform, and the reforms he 
promotes on various levels seem to match with those envisioned by earlier ascetic 
writers. The framework he employs, which he acknowledges neither as the spiritual 
cloister nor as in any way monastic, is both flexibly and creatively explored. Behavior 
that corresponds to “contempt of self” comprises his suggestions for criticism of self. 
His view of how the estates should work together leans heavily—if a little 
surprisingly—on an extraclaustral version of “contempt of the world.” His poem’s 
protracted meditations on when and how one should judge others (or remain silent) 
acknowledges an inherent tension between “love of neighbor” and “defense of Truth.” 
His ultimate prophetic ideal is no less than a “redemption of the world.”  
 Langland’s appropriations of asceticism for his satire thus make him far more 
general than earlier theorists Hugo de Folieto and Richard of St. Victor were in their 
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treatments of the same ideals but also far more specific than a host of other writers, 
extending well into the fifteenth century and beyond. These later whose expressions of 
ascetic piety were so general as to be actively boring to D. R. Howard, who in the 
following passage can barely suppress a yawn:  
 
The content of these writings on contempt of the world need not delay 
us, for they nearly all say the same things. They argue that worldly life 
is mutable and transitory, that its pleasures are vain and disappointing, 
that man is fallen, his nature corrupt, and his body infirm. They often 
depict human society as a caldron of vices and hypocrisies, and a good 
many of them end with apocalyptic passages describing the 
punishments of hell and the joys of heaven.540  
 
Nevertheless, Howard had in fact cut his scholarly teeth on vernacular “contempt of 
the world.”541 And as he taken pains in his dissertation and first book to point out, the 
great fourteenth-century Middle English poets were at least conversant in the triple 
topos of world—flesh—devil, often used as a vehicle for teaching a very basic ascetic 
piety. The same topos shows up in Piers Plowman in the “tree of Charity” episode and 
(with Concupiscentia carnis and “pride of perfect living”) in the inner dreams.  Given 
the wide circulation of ascetic discourse in both Latin and vernacular literature in the 
later Middle Ages, which the work of Rice and Constable indicates for the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, asceticism of one sort or another would have been hard for any 
of these writers to avoid. Yet assessing “the ascetic” in these writers is not an all-or-
nothing proposal. They appreciate it differently and make use of it in different ways.  
 Such divergent approaches become apparent after considering Piers 
Plowman’s second vision, in which Langland presents contempt of the world with 
vigor and even optimism. The pilgrims, lost and foundering on their way to Truth, do 
not know what they should do while their new guide plows his half acre—but Piers, 
                                                 
540 See Howard, chapter 2: “Renaissance World-Alienation,” in The Darker Vision of the Renaissance: 
Beyond the Fields of Reason, ed. R. S. Kinsman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 
64-75 at pp. 53-54) 
541 See Donald R[oy] Howard, “The Contempt of the World” and The Three Temptations. 
  317   
who had “poked” his head into the narrative just at their lowest point, is happy to let 
them know. The second vision presents contempt of the world not as an immurating 
closing-off of social ties but rather as the check to pride and spur to coöperation that 
will enable functioning estates working for the common profit. Piers’ effective ascetic 
withdrawal in the face of attacks by a condescending priest is just he opposite of the 
armed revolt certain readers of the poem would have had him lead. Langland views 
the cloister and school’s separation, albeit with noted reservations, as “heuene [on] þis 
erþe” and “ese” to the “soule.” His asceticism depends on motivations other than 
negativity. 
 
Chaucer and Gower 
 
 It could be, following a suggestion of D. R. Howard’s in The Idea of the 
Canterbury Tales, that contempt of the world in the later Middle Ages was motivated 
by a growing consciousness of the corruption of an ideal, the inability of society to 
conform to its formerly fixed, formal course. In this sense, as Howard goes on to 
speculate, Chaucer can hardly have avoided contempt of the world. It was the most 
obvious way to think satirically, was a common Christian way of seeing the world 
even outside of monasteries at this point, and might in fact still be the “seed of 
satire.”542 
                                                 
542 Howard writes: “The Troilus [gives] us a picture of an ordered social unit in a society which existed 
before the age of grace and is about to be swallowed up in the process of history; we know where it is 
headed. The Canterbury Tales gives us a picture of a disordered Christian society in a state of 
obsolescence, decline, and uncertainty; we do not know where it is headed. The Troilus shows us noble 
if inadequate ideals and a glittery actuality whose fate is sealed; The Canterbury Tales shows us ideals 
no longer followed and an evanescent actuality whose fate is unknown. Both works teach contempt of 
the world, but the Troilus teaches that lesson by fastening chiefly upon the themes of mutability and 
vanity. The Canterbury Tales fastens upon the other themes of contemptus mundi writings—upon the 
corruptness of human nature and society and the world’s decline. Both works are ambivalent about the 
vanity of human wishes, pursuits, and efforts; so were the treatises on contempt of the world. Pope 
Innocent III in his classic treatise (which Chaucer says he translated) inveighed against the vanity of 
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 Nevertheless, Chaucerian contempt is of a markedly different character from 
Langland’s: a type of, as well as an impetus to, mourning over man’s fallen state of 
imperfection. As Jean Leclercq notes in the introduction to La Vie Parfaite, the very 
word “perfection” implies that it cannot be achieved in this life. The fourteenth-
century English writers under discussion would surely all have acknowledged this, yet 
for Chaucer more than for Langland the fallen world seems to provide an impediment 
too great to challenge with any hope of winning. This leads to certain reversals when 
the renunciatory ideal of Christianity meets directly with what the world can bring: 
Howard has pointed out in his discussion of Chaucer’s style that the narrator’s 
inveighal against “old clerkes speche / in poetry” comes not “a moment” in Troilus 
and Criseyde after he “had spoken reverently of five ‘old clerks,’ the pagan poets 
Vergil, Ovid, Homer, Lucan, and Statius.”543  
 Perhaps that gesture is also an idealistically self-abnegating one, coming as it 
does from a narrator obviously in love with old books—and for whom it would be 
thus a sacrifice indeed to reject them. On the other hand, to question a bit more than 
Howard Chaucer’s ascetic sincerity, perhaps Chaucer liked showing the world’s messy 
humanity win over and over again—we enjoy reading about its conquests too much in 
his works to think that he did not enjoy writing them—and this is the reason 
confession seems almost a distraction or an afterthought as presented in the 
Canterbury Tales, at least in its fragmented form.544  
                                                                                                                                            
curiosity and learning, but when he fastened upon actualities—the corrupt judge, the avaricious lawyer, 
the lecherous priest—he implied that reform was needed. This is the seed of satire, perhaps the real 
origin of medieval satire: Bernard of Morval actually called his De contemptu mundi a satire. And the 
implication that things should be reformed is present in The Canterbury Tales—present in the minute 
actualities of its un-ideal characters and present in the author’s irony. The great ideals of the Middle 
Ages—the mutability, vanity, and corruption of the world, the decline of the world from a Golden Age, 
the need of the individual to transcend in his thoughts the mundane order, the need for charity and 
reform—all get into The Canterbury Tales.” (115-116) 
543 Howard, The Idea, p. 121, referring to that poem’s last book, line 1792. 
544 Oliver Sacks writes, in “Cupid’s Disease,” of an elderly woman whose syphilis resulted in symptoms 
so delightful that she feared to have it removed : see The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat [New 
  319   
 Chaucer claimed to have translated at least part of Innocentian De miseria (in 
the prologue to The Legend of Good Women), though if it ever existed that translation 
is probably lost.545 On the evidence, however, he appears to have gravitated to it for its 
shock factor—to have extracted about as much as its author did from his own source, 
the rather more balanced Meditationes piisimæ. Chaucer excels in the expression of 
ascetic pieties, in other words, yet falls short when it comes to promoting ascetic 
practices. Mary Carruthers has written a very fine article on the somatic and mental 
processes attendant on meditation in monastic thought, in fact, and finds the tradition 
reflected only “ambiguous[ly]” by major characters in Chaucer’s Troilus.546 We can 
conclude that Elde and holiness fear that Will might come to believe in Piers 
Plowman, Chaucer seems convinced of, himself: that time teaches better than a rule.   
 Rules of behavior and penitential habitus play a much more prominent role in 
Gower´s poetry, for which reason one might think Gower to have more sympathy for 
the ascetic practices Chaucer seems to ignore. But this is not the case. The Confessio 
Amantis has confession as its conceit, and its real subject might be right governance 
even more than amorous pursuits, but in his very act of displaying concern for how 
properly to maintain the intricacies of human relationships Gower shows his 
allegiance to that more rigid and compartmentalizing system rather than to the 
distractions that it imposes on a human’s more important relationship to God. Gower’s 
intricate Confessio concludes by dismantling itself enough to unveil its author—to 
announce, with Chaucer and Langland both, that initiation to certain insights comes 
                                                                                                                                            
York: Simon & Schuster, 1985], pp. 102-104); the doctor was professionally obligated to encourage 
treatment, regardless of whether or not that would destroy her new-found joie de vivre (fortunately, it 
simply allayed future deterioration). 
545 Here I am glad to acknowledge the study by Jennifer Wong (“Public Chaucer: Translation and the 
Uses of Prose,” Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 2002) with its helpful bibliography on the matter. 
Wrong writes on p. 227, following a suggestion of C.S. Lewis, that “the pasages which Chaucer selects 
to include in the Man of Law’s Tale seem to come not from an artist’s deliberate, meaningful selection 
rom a source, but rather from the page which Chaucer happened to have in front of him.” 
546“On Affliction and Reading, Weeping and Argument,” p. 13.  
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best through the mysteries of old age. But even here the lesson is not entirely ascetic. 
Gower recognizes that his time has come por reposer; Langland’s Elde brings him a 
thrillingly urgent call to work.  
 In writing the foregoing of Gower I am not ignorant of the Carmina de 
multiplicia viciorum pestilencia and its gestures de contemptu—just unconvinced. 
Certain features of the work strike me as fundamentally misunderstanding asceticism, 
while others seem almost painfully disingenuous to me. For the poet’s 
misunderstanding of ascetic ideology I would point line 304, “Hec qui mente capit 
gaudia raro sapit,” which Yeager translates as “Who understands this rarely enjoys 
delights.”547 The implication here seems to be that it is somehow salutary to deprive 
onself of gaudia, whereas a more truly ascetic foundation would acknowledge how 
earthly delights are not actually joys at all.548 As for how we can call Gower here 
“disingenuous,” I would point to the first poem in the work, against the Lollards, 
which seems to suggest that the truly religious person will subject himself entirely to 
the dictates of temporal and ecclesiastical authority.549  
 A book has been written on the thesis that Gower and Chaucer wanted 
consciously to define themselves against the overwhelming presence of Piers 
Plowman on their contemporary literary scene, though as a reviewer has noted its 
comparison of Chaucer and Langland is doomed never to be exact.550 We know 
“Langland” from his poem’s circulation in many manuscripts—but who, exactly, was 
                                                 
547 See John Gower: the Minor Latin Works [with In Praise of Peace, ed. Michael Livingston], ed. & 
trans. R. F. Yeager (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications for TEAMS, 2005), available online. 
548 The marginalia noted in the TEAMS edition might be a reader’s attempt to make orthodox sense of 
them. 
549 In “L’Ascèse dans les Sectes d’Origine Protestante,” Jean Séguy observes, thinking of Weber, that 
asceticism (in part because of its promotion of intense obedience to one’s abbot and one’s God rather 
than to other figures or institutions) paradoxically can be considered resistant to authority. This of 
course makes it especially worthwhile as a vantage point from which a satirist might choose to speak.    
550 Pamela Luff Troyer, rev. John M. Bowers (Antagonistic Tradition), Rocky Mountain Review 62.2 
(2008), pp. 96-98. 
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he? Isn’t “Langland” something of a pen name? And if Chaucer was not as widely 
circulated at first, except thanks to the tireless publicization efforts of his son, can we 
even so call him marginal in his own day? His narrower circle of readers would after 
all have been of higher status and more influential.  Chaucer and Gower had their 
sights on translatio imperii more than redemptio mundi, despite how pious they might 
have been.  
 
Spenser 
 
 The poet Edmund Spenser was also associated with high-ranking society, like 
Chaucer and Gower but unlike Langland, counting Elizabeth I of England as a patron 
as well as the model for his “Faerie Queene.” He shares other attributes with 
Langland, no doubt owing to the fact that he definitely had access to the text of Piers 
Plowman through Crowley’s impressions (from 1550) and Owen Rogers’ impression 
of 1561.551 He also was not even in a phantom competition with Langland to be 
“Father of English Poetry,” unlike Chaucer, and in fact lived at a moment when—
though all “moments” meld and are “in transition” from one to another—it was 
acceptable to approve of what Piers Plowman, even more than Chaucer, seemed to 
represent: Englishness, Protestantism, a rustic style.  
 Spenser’s understanding of contemptus, however, does not always appear 
markedly different from Chaucer’s. Spenser’s Daphnaïda, modeled on Chaucer’s 
Book of the Duchess, is in fact a text explicitly designed to elicit sorrow:552  
                                                 
551 For this and for some of the other information comparing Spenser to Langland in this chapter, I am 
indebted to A. C. Hamilton, “Spenser and Langland,” Studies in Philology 55.4 (1958), pp. 533-48. 
552The only major study of this phenomenon in the Renaissance of which I am aware is Douglas Trevor, 
The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
The book observes perspicaciously that Spenser seems to portray sadness in a positive light on 
numerous occasions (but not on others). In the Faerie Queene, for instance, Spenser embraces 
otherworldly tristitia as praiseworthy and Galenic “humoral” melancholy as an affliction. 
Unfortunately, Trevor seems completely unaware of the existence of contempt ideology—perhaps 
because it had been replaced by other discourse, though the discourses and discussions that Trevor cites 
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What euer man he be, whose heauie mynd 
With griefe of mournefull great mishap opprest, 
Fit matter for his cares increase would fynd: 
Let reade the rufull plaint herein exprest, 
Of one (I weene) the wofulst man aliue; 
Euen sad Alcyon, whose empierced brest, 
Sharpe sorrowe did in thousand peeces riue.  
 
But who so else in pleasure findeth sense, 
Or in this wretched life dooth take delight, 
Let him be banisht farre away from hence: 
Ne let the sacred Sisters here be hight, 
Though they of sorrowe heauilie can sing; 
For euen their heauie song would breede delight: 
But here no tunes, saue sobs and grones shall ring. 
 
In stead of them, and their sweete harmonie, 
Let those three fatall Sisters, whose sad hands 
Doe weaue the direfull threads of destinie, 
And in their wrath breake off the vitall bands, 
Approach hereto: and let the dreadfull Queene 
Of darknes deepe come from the Stygian Strands, 
And grisly Ghosts to heare this dolefull teene. (1-21)553 
The work’s despairing hero who longs for death, Alcyon, seems not to die so much as 
to disappearing, and in so doing he draws faintly but firmly on the same tradition of 
the Old Man in Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale, itself echoing the pagan Late Antique 
“elegies of Maximianus.” This Stoic image had a place in the medieval ascetic 
imagination, but it served not for emulation so much as for a warning.554  
 To his credit, however, Spenser realized that asceticism meant more than 
lugubrious thoughts about death. Book One of the Faerie Queene shows his broader 
understanding especially clearly, particularly in its narration of the Redcrosse knight’s 
meeting with the character “Despayre” and that meeting’s aftermath. Despayre’s 
                                                                                                                                            
as providing the background to Spenser’s representations do not entirely satisfy me. I am unpersuaded, 
for instance, that Despayre is bad because he only represents an overflow of dark humors or that 
Contemplation only represents tristitia. The medieval ideological framework I have attempted to 
suggest behind Langland’s poem also operates here, to a degree, and so it would have been worth 
Trevor’s while to suggest that intellectual heritage for the framework that he draws on. 
553 Elizabeth Fowler of the University of Virginia gave a paper at the International Spenser Society 
Conference in Toronto, in which she compared the form of Spenser’s Daphnaïda, rich with anaphora, 
to a multi-sided funeral monument expressing different aspects of mourning. 
554 See George Lyman Kittredge, “Chaucer and Maximianus,” American Journal of Philology 9 (1888), 
pp. 84-85.  
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arguments in Spenser are perfectly analogous to wanhope’s threats in Langland: a 
mash-up of Despayre’s words with Haukyn’s desolation at the end of B.14 would not 
be jarring in content, I suspect, but only in style.555 The treatments the Redcrosse 
knight undergoes at the house of holiness are also in keeping with those urged on 
Haukyn by his interlocutors.556 That they lead out of despair and into the vision of a 
heavenly Jerusalem greater than city seats of earthly power, as the knight encounters 
Contemplation, embraces the prophetic ideal of asceticism as Gower’s Carmina did 
not.  
 Comparisons between Langland and Spenser run more deeply still, extending 
further than just one or two episodes in the tale of the Redcrosse knight. Spenser’s 
entire Faerie Queene has an edificatory purpose, the “Letter to Raleigh” explains, with 
each of the six books devoted to one of twelve supposedly Aristotelian “moral 
virtues”: holiness, temperance, chastity, friendship, justice, and courtesy.557 Langland 
likely also influenced Spenser’s sense of satire as well. Behind the letter’s assertion 
that the Faerie Queene would be “a continual allegory, or dark conceit,” as A. C. 
Hamilton has noted, likely lie Crowley’s words describing Piers—the only other 
model Spenser would have had for such a text.558 Moreover, Hamilton observes that 
references to Piers in Spenser’s satiric verse tend to promote an ideal of separation 
from the world.  
 
                                                 
555 For corroboration see Harold Skulsky, “Spenser’s Despair Episode and the Theology of Doubt,” 
Modern Philology 78.3 (1981), pp. 227-42 at 229-30 on what Langland would surely have identified as 
the perils of the active life. 
556 The “Castle of Caro” in Piers Plowman also seems, manifestly, to have inspired Spenser’s Castle of 
Alma in the Faerie Queene.   
557 See W. F. DeMoss, “Spenser’s Twelve Moral Virtues ‘According to Aristotle,’” Modern Philology 
16.1 (1918), pp. 23-38 and 16.5 (1918), pp. 245-270. 
558 Crowley: “The sence [is] somewhat darcke [...] but not so harde, but that it may be vnderstande of 
suche as will not sticke to breake the shelle of the nutte for the kernelles sake.” (qtd. by Hamilton, 
“Spenser and Langland,” p. 535) 
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William Goddard and the English Epigrammatists 
 
 I would like to close this brief overview with some attention to another 
research subject I have explored, one William Goddard and similar poets very early in 
the seventeenth century, in so far as these might hold the key to the fate of 
Langlandian asceticism and satire in the early modern period. They provide the very 
interesting means by which Chaucer’s scurrility was sanctioned by classical precedent, 
increasing the license for satiric parrhesia—not without debate—while at the same 
time fatally compromising its seriousness through overreliance on humor.  
 I first became acquainted with William Goddard while examing a copy of the 
1602 edition by Thomas Speght of Chaucer’s collected works—a book which, its 
purchaser noted, had been owned by the “well known Elizabethan poet and satirist 
Willyam Goddard.”559 Goddard had heavily annotated Chaucer’s Romaunt of the Rose 
and nothing else, he claimed, which was not true. But Adams also claimed that “[o]n 
the blank reverse of the portrait of Chaucer Goddard has inscribed a commendatory 
poem, and signed it boldly with his full name”—and this was true.  As a further proof 
of his authorship, one not provided by the text in Adams’ note, Goddard had even 
changed the poem in the midst of writing:  
 
If thou yll-rellishe Chaucer for his rime 
Consider when he liu’d, the age, and tyme 
And then thou’t saie old Geffr’ye neatlie writt 
And showes both elloquence and curious witt 
       No age did ere afford a merryer straine vaine, 
      Yet (diu’d into) a deepe and sollid vaine straine 
 
It was fitting that Goddard made his ownership known by means of a signed epigram, 
moreover, because he was one of a group of poet-pamphleteers dedicated to increasing 
                                                 
559 Joseph Quincy Adams, Jr., “Willyam Goddard,” correspondence item, MLN  32.3 (1917), p. 187. 
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the spread of their mostly lighthearted verse, a group Thomas Warton called the 
“epigrammatists.”560  
 The English epigrammatists—Goddard and his compatriots—helped to provide 
an important corrective in the nascent business of Chaucer criticism, which had by 
Speght’s 1602 edition made Chaucer far more patrician and removed from coarse 
human concerns than the evidence would seem (to us) to warrant. Speght wrote in  the 
front-matter to his edition that  
 
it were a labor worth commendation, if some scholler, that hath skil and 
leisure, would confer Chaucer with those learned Authors, both in 
Greek and Latin, from whom he hath drawn many excellent things [...] 
which would so grace this auncient Poet, that whereas diuers haue 
thought him vnlearned, and his writings meere trifles, it should appeare, 
that besides the knowledge of sundrie tongues, he was a man of great 
reading, & deep judgement[.]”561 
                                                 
560 Thomas Warton, in The History of English Poetry, from the Close of the Eleventh to the 
Commencement of the Eighteenth Century, to Which are Prefixed Three Dissertations: of the Origin of 
Romantic Fiction in Europe, on the Introduction of Learning into England, [and] on the ‘Gesta 
Romanorum’ in four volumes (London: Thomas Tegg, 1824), writes at length in praise of Bishop Hall 
and John Marston, the self-proclaimed first and second satirists of the English language, who inspired 
what he calls “an innumerable crop of SATIRISTS, and a set of writings, differing but little more than in 
name, and now properly belonging to the same species, EPIGRAMMATISTS.” (Among these, Warton 
happens to cite William Goddard and a closely related writer, Samuel Rowlands: see the bibliography 
for title and publication information about some of Goddard’s works and two works of Rowlands to 
which I allude.) Hall and Marston apparently borrowed from Juvenal and Persius for their writings, to 
which the epigrammatists certainly added Martial and other poets of a similar vein: Warton’s history 
tells us that Martial’s epigrams were first rendered into English by Timothy Kendall in 1577, who titled 
his collection Flovvres of Epigrammes (out of Sundrie the Most Singular Authors Selected, as well 
aucient as late writers: pleasant and profitable to the expert readers of quicke capacitie, &c.). 
Kendall’s book contains epigrams by “Martial, Pictorius, Borbonius, Politian, Bruno, Textor, Ausonius, 
the Greek anthology, Beza, Sir Thomas More, Henry Stephens, Haddon, Parkhurst, and others,” not to 
mention Kendall (upon whose contributions Warton frowns). “But by much the greater part,” Warton 
assures us, “is from Martial.”   
561 Thomas Speght, letter “To the Readers” in The Workes of Our Ancient and learned English Poet, 
Geffrey Chaucer, newly Printed, ed. Thomas Speght (London: Adam Islip, 1602). Speght had Francis 
Thynne, son of the earlier Chaucer compiler William Thynne, in mind, who apparently “wished to 
make a Coment in our tongue, as the Italians have for Dante, Petrarke, and other of their poets.” In this 
connection it’s interesting to note that a poem of similar length to Goddard’s epigram by one Nicolas 
Watson, hand-written behind an engraving in F.J. Furnivall’s former copy, makes these very 
associations: “Parnassus Topp, pure streame of Hellicon, / Grave Lawreat, and thou English Horace, he 
/ (Pearle of Olimp:) whom Muses since each one / So dearely priz’d, yt they strove whose shouldst be / 
But now thou art gone to him that first thee made, / To walke with him in the Elizean shade, / And yet 
th’art heare, where Poetts are thy Paiges / And thou art Tutor to surviveing Ages. Nico. Wał.” Such 
testimonia have been collected in volume one of Caroline Frances Eleanor Spurgeon’s monumental 
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The epigrammatists’ response to such assessments seems to have hinged upon the fact 
that Martial was a more-or-less classical poet, too, and that Chaucer fit better in that 
tradition than in the pure, Appollonian firmament into which he had been set. 
Goddard’s point that criticism of human nature could be accomplished through humor 
was merely the flip-side of the classical understanding that humor could leaven 
criticism of human nature. Just as his “wife, widow, and maid” in A Satyricall 
Dialogue built upon Chaucer’s Wife of Bath, Goddard’s absurd character of Diogenes, 
in the same work, merely built on absurdities inherent in the original figure.562 If 
humor and outspoken criticism were allowed in such figures as Chaucer, Martial, and 
Seneca, why should they face censorship like the 1599 “bishops’ ban”—a ban on 
satire itself?563  
 It might have looked good for Langland’s literary fortunes, in terms of 
asceticism and satire, if early seventeenth-century epigrammatists were defending the 
“broad”ness—the parrhesia—of their verse by appealing to the well-acknowledged 
high-minded purpose of outspoken classical writers and their oft-crowned English 
heir. As it happened, however, the opposite scenario obtained. Goddard’s annotations 
show that despite his hand-written epigram’s professed admiration for how Chaucer 
mixed humor with seriousness, he mainly noted passages presenting one element or 
the other. The portions of the Wife of Bath’s monologues that he highlights have just 
                                                                                                                                            
Five Hundred Years of Chaucer Criticism and Allusion, 1357-1900, 7 vols. (London: K. Paul, Trench, 
Trübner, & Co. for the Chaucer Society and H. Frowde for Oxford University Press, 1914-1925), 
rightly praised as a key source collection for understanding the 14th-century poet’s critical afterlife. 
562 On the real human being behind the strange figure Goddard and his compatriots would concoct, see 
Luis E. Navia, Diogenes of Sinope: the Man in the Tub, Contributions in Philosophy 67 (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1998. 
563 On this background, see R. A. McCabe, “Elizabethan Satire and the Bishops’ Ban of 1599,” 
Yearbook of English Studies 11 (1981), pp. 188-94. As he notes, “[t]he terms of the ban [...] show quite 
clearly that its primary target, despite the inclusion of one undoubtedly obscene work, Thomas 
Cutwood’s Caltha Poetarum, was neighter eroticism nor lewdness but satire itself.” (189) The ban has 
been published in The Stationers’ Registers, Register C, fols 361a, 361b. On the connection between 
satirists and pamphleteers see also Andrew McRae, Literature, Satire, and the Early Stuart State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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about as much edifying substance as Goddard’s own version of the same, while 
Goddard’s chosen excepts from the Plowman’s Tale there abscribed to Chaucer (but 
really written by a third-rate and possibly Lollard Langlandian) exhibit real pathos and 
simply are not funny.564  
 Goddard was unable to mix his humor and his seriousness, after all, not having 
found the two mixed in Chaucer’s “workes” (or not noticing when they were). His 
poems show all too clearly that he decided to prioritize humor in his writings, as did 
his contemporaries, in order to maximize sales and to weaken the case for 
censorship.565 To this decision, I suspect, we owe the place of humor in the satire of 
even the contemporary era, where it holds a prominence greater than it had even in 
Horace, Persius, Juvenal, and Martial’s day. Will, searcher after Dowel, becomes a 
shadow in the purportedly stoic figure of Diogenes of A Satyricall Dialogue; the 
character of Death, in Samuel Rowlands’ Look to It! for, Ile Stabbe Ye, will prompt no 
meditation on the grave.  
 By the eighteenth century, when as Howard implicitly notes the popularity of 
works de contemptu had begun to wane, Langland would still be viewed as a satirist—
and in the vein of  classical poets rather than English writers, which would surely have 
been some consolation. An eighteenth-century inscription in one manuscript of Piers 
Plowman refers to the poem as “an auntient English Poem, very Satyrical” and 
observes that one “learned Dr Hickes sometime Dean of Norwich” called it “Egregius 
                                                 
564 This has been a cursory overview; in time to come, I aspire to publish an essay fully devoted to 
William Goddard and the epigrammatists’ Chaucer. 
565 As McCabe notes in “Elizabethan Satire and the Bishops’ Ban,” “verse satire [...] was clearly one of 
the most popular forms of the day, and the epigram, its sister genre, shared in this new popularity—all 
of which might have been quite harmless were it not becoming increasingly obvious that the 
enthusiastic response of the reading public was prompted by an awareness that the new writers were 
beginning to realize the full potentials of their medium as a vehicle for social complaint.” (191) Humor 
was vital for the survival of such works. 
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Satyranum Liber, in a good Sense.” 566 Even so, his apparently outspoken plowman 
dominated the conversation; and the extent to which the rest of his poem made use of 
satire had begun to dry into several small pools, where I think he had intended a lake. 
This is certainly an injustice at the hands of posterity—and one which I hope this 
dissertation might in some small way help to redress. Such injustices, however—
forming the very subject of Langland’s satire, and fading by the light of its ideal—are 
what the poem best knows how to bear. 
                                                 
566 See London, British Library Additional MS 35157. Nor was this view an eighteenth-century 
invention, as the inscription’s quotations from Crowley convey. Middleton writes in her introduction to 
the Alford Companion (“The Critical Heritage”)  that Puttenham—rough contemporary to Crowley— 
in 1589 referred to “ ‘that nameless’ who wrote it as ‘a malcontent of that time’ and [placed] him in the 
tradition of the Latin satirists ‘Lucilius, Iuuvenall and Persius’ as one who ‘intended to taxe the 
common abuses and vice of the people in rough and bitter speaches.’ ” (9) 
 329 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Texts of Piers Plowman 
 
 
Kane, George, ed. Piers Plowman, the A Version: Will’s Visions of Piers Plowman 
and Do-Well: an Edition in the Form of Trinity College Cambridge MS R.3.14, 
Corrected from Other Manuscripts, with Variant Readings. rev. ed. London: 
Athlone Press, 1988. 
 
Kane, George and E. Talbot Donaldson, edd. Piers Plowman, the B Version: Will’s 
Visions of Piers Plowman, Do-Well, Do-Better, and Do-Best: an Edition in the 
Form of Trinity College Cambridge MS B.15.17, Corrected and Restored from 
the Known Evidence, with Variant Readings. rev. ed. London: Athlone Press, 
1988. 
 
Pearsall, Derek. William Langland: Piers Plowman: the C-text. Exeter: Exeter 
University Press, 1978 repr. 2003. 
 
Pearsall, Derek. Piers Plowman: a New Annotated Edition of the C-text. Exeter: Exeter 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Russell, George and George Kane, edd. Piers Plowman, the C Version: Will’s Visions 
of Piers Plowman, Do-Well, Do-Better, and Do-Best: an Edition in the Form 
of Huntingdon Library MS HM 143, Corrected and Restored from the Known 
Evidence, with Variant Readings. London: Athlone Press, 1997. 
 
Schmidt, A. V. C., ed. The Vision of Piers Plowman: a Critical Edition of the B-text 
based on Trinity College Cambridge MS B.15.17. 2nd ed. Everyman. London: 
J.M. Dent, 1995. 
 
 
Other Primary Texts 
 
 
Accessūs ad auctores. | Huygens, R. B. C., ed. Accessūs ad Auctores: édition critique. 
Brussels: Latomus, 1954. 
 
Accounts of Richard II’s Triumphal Entry into London. | In Richard Maidstone: 
Concordia (The Reconciliation of Richard II with London), ed. David R. 
Carlson with verse trans. by A. G. Rigg, app. II. Kalamazoo: Medieval 
Institute Publications for TEAMS, 2003. Available online. 
 
Alan of Lille, Summa de Arte Prædicatoria. | Summa Magistri Alani Doctoris 
Universalis de Arte Prædicatoria. PL 210, coll. 111-198A; Gillian R. Evans, 
trans. Alan of Lille: the Art of Preaching. Cistercian Studies Series 23. 
Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1981. 
 
Alan of Lille. Summa “Quoniam homines.” | Glorieux, P., ed., “La somme Quoniam 
homines d’Alain de Lille,”Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du 
Moyen Âge 20 (1953): 113-364. 
 
  330   
Alcuin. Letter to the Monks of Lindisfarne. | Bullough, Donald A., trans. In Beowulf: a 
Verse Translation, trans. Seamus Heaney and ed. Daniel Donoghue, p. 91 et 
seq. Norton Critical Editions. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001. 
 
Anselm. Meditations. | Ward, Benedicta, ed. & trans. The Prayers and Meditations of 
Saint Anselm. Baltimore: Penguin,1973. 
 
Apocalipsis Goliæ. | Strecker, K. Die Apokalypse des Golias. Texte zur 
Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters 5. Rome: W. Regenberg,1928; trans. F. X. 
Newman in The Literature of Medieval England, ed. D. W. Robertson, Jr., pp. 
253-61. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 
 
Johannes de Hauvilla. Architrenius. | Schmidt, Paul Gerhard. Johannes de Hauvilla: 
Architrenius: mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 
1974; Winthrop Wetherbee, trans. Johannes de Hauvilla: Architrenius. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Arundel, Thomas. Constitutions of 1408. | Zieman, Katherine, transcr. from Fœdera, 
conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliæ 
et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates 
(1101-1654), ed Thomas Rymer. London: 1704-35. Available online. 
 
Auctores octo. | Pepin, Ronald E., ed. & trans. An English Translation of Auctores 
octo: a Medieval Reader. Mediæval Studies 12. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 
1999. 
 
Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. | Robertson, D. W., trans. Saint Augustine: on 
Christian Doctrine.  New York: MacMillan, 1958; repr. Prentice-Hall, 1997. 
 
B. Rodulphi (Prioris IV.) Camaldulensis. Constitutiones (1080, 1085). | In Annales 
Camaldulenses Ordinis Sancti Benedicti, quibus Plura Interseruntur tum 
ceteras Italico-monasticas Res, tum Historiam Ecclesiasticam Remque 
Diplomaticam Illustrantia, edd. Johanne-Benedicto Mittarelli and Anselmo 
Constadoni, vol. 3 (“complectens res gestas ab anno Christi M. LXXX. ad 
annum M. C. LX., ad fidem Monumentorum & Veterum Chartarum, quæ 
Appendicem constituunt”), app. III, coll. 512-551. Venice: Ære Monasterii 
Sancti Michælis de Muriano, 1758; repr. Westmead: Gregg International 
Publishers Limited, 1970. 
 
Benedictine Rule. | McCann, Justin, ed. & trans. The Rule of Saint Benedict in Latin 
and English. Westminster: Newman Press, 1952. 
 
Bernard of Cluny. De contemptu mundi. | Hoskier, H. C., ed. De Contemptv Mvndi: a 
Bitter Satirical Poem of 3000 Lines upon the Morals of the XIIth Century by 
Bernard of Morval, Monk of Cluny (fl. 1150): Re-edited, with Introduction and 
Copious Variants from all the Known MSS. London: Quaritch, 1929. 
 
Bernard of Cluny. De contemptu mundi. | Pepin, Ronald E. Scorn for the World: 
Bernard of Cluny’s De contemptu mundi. Medieval Texts and Studies 8. East 
Lansing: Colleagues Press, 1991. 
 
Bishops’ Ban. | The Stationers’ Registers, Register C, fols 361a, 361b. 
  331   
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. De consolatione Philosophiæ. | Stewart, H. F., 
E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester, edd. and trans. Boethius: Theological Tractates 
and The Consolation of Philosophy. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1973. 
 
Burckhardt, Jacob. | Middlemore, S. G. C., trans. The Civilization of the Renaissance 
in Italy. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Row, 1958. 
 
Chaucer Life-Records. | Crow, Martin M. and Clair C. Olson, edd. (after John M. 
Manly and Edith Rickert), Chaucer Life-Records. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1966. 
 
Chaucer. Works. | The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson. 3rd ed. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1987. 
 
Citizens United case. | Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 
[United States Reports] 50 (2010) 
 
De adhærendo Deo. | Jodl von Kastl? (fl. c. 1410). Chapter 15: “Contemptus sui, 
qualiter causetur in homine, et quam utilis sit?” De adhærendo Deo. Print 
publication information unknown, transcr. Èulogos IntraText®, 2007. 
Available online. 
 
Dialogus de Mundi Contemptu, vel Amore. | Bultot, Robert, ed. Dialogus de Mundi 
Contemptu, vel Amore, attribué à Conrad d’Hirsau, [avec] Extraits de 
l’Allocutio ad Deum et du De veritatis inquisitione: textes inédits. Analecta 
Mediævalia Namurcensia 19. Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1966. 
 
Ecclesiastical Satires. | Dean, James McMurrin. Six Ecclesiastical Satires. Kalamazoo: 
Medieval Institute Publications for TEAMS, 1991. 
 
Edmund Spenser. Works. | The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, edd. J.C. Smith 
and Ernest de Sélincourt. 1-vol. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924. 
[cited by line number] 
 
Fasciculus morum. | Wenzel, Siegfried, ed. & trans. Fasciculus Morum: a Fourteenth-
Century Preacher’s Handbook. London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1989. 
 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf. Poetria nova. | In Les Arts Poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe Siècles: 
recherches et documents sur la technique littéraire du moyen âge. 
Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, IVe Section, Sciences Historiques 
et Philologiques 238. Paris: Éditions Champion, 1924; trans. Margaret F. 
Nims, Geoffrey of Vinsauf: Poetria nova. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediæval Studies, 1967. 
 
Goddard, William. A Mastif Whelp, with other ruff-Island-lik Currs fetcht from among 
the Antipedes, which bite and barke at the fantasticall humorists and abusers 
of the time.. . Imprinted at the Antipedes, and are to be sould where they are to 
be bought. 1598/9. [STC (2nd ed.) / 11929]. 
  332   
Goddard, William. A Neaste of VVasps, latelie found out and discouered in the L[o]w 
Countreys, yealding as sweete hony as some of our English bees. At Dort. 
Printed in the Low-countreyes. 1615. [STC (2nd ed.) / 11929]. 
 
Goddard, William. A Satyricall Dialogue, or a sharplye invectiue conference between 
Allexander the Great and that truelye woman-hater Diogynes. Imprinted in the 
Lowcountryes for all such gentlewomen as are not altogeather Idle nor yet 
well. OCVPYED. [?at Dort?] 1615. [STC (2nd ed.) / 11930]. 
 
Goliardic Verse. | Adcock, Fleur, ed. & trans. Hugh Primas and the Archpoet. 
Cambridge Medieval Classics 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994. 
 
Goliardic Verse. | Waddell, Helen, trans. The Wandering Scholars. London: 
Constable, 1927. 
 
Goliardic Verse. | Whicher, George Frisbie, trans. The Goliard Poets: Medieval Latin 
Songs and Satires. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949. 
 
Gratian. Decretum. |  Decretvm Gratiani emendatvm, et notationibvs illvstratvm, vnà 
cvm glossis Gregorii XIII. Pont. Max. iussu editum; et nunc recens cum 
additionibus [...] Augustini Caruitæ [...].Venetiis: [s.n.], 1600. 
 
Gratian. Decretum. | Concordantia discordantium canonum, ed. Emil Albert 
Friedberg. Corpus Iuris Canonici 1. Leipzig: 1879. 
 
Henri d’Andeli. Bataille des set ars. | Paetow, Louis Jean, ed. & trans, The Battle of 
the Seven Arts: a French Poem by Henri d’Andeli, Trouvère of the Thirteenth 
Century. Memoirs of the University of California 4.1. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1914. 
 
Henri d’Andeli. Poems. | Corbellari, Alain, ed. Les Dits d’Henri d’Andeli. Paris: 
Honoré Champion, 2003. 
 
Henry of Huntingdon. Works. | Henry of Huntingdon: Historia Anglorum, ed. & trans. 
Diana E. Greenway. Oxford Medieval Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996. 
 
Horace. | Fairclough, H. Rushton, trans. Horace: Satires, Epistles, and Ars poetica. 
Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929. 
 
Hugh of St. Victor. Didascalicon. | Didascalicon: a Medieval Guide to the Arts, ed. & 
trans. Jerome Taylor. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. 
 
Hugo de Folieto. De claustro animæ. PL 176, coll. 1017-1181. 
 
John Bromyard. Summa prædicantium. | Svmma prædicantivm omnibvs Dominici 
gregis pastoribvs divini verbi præconibvs animarvm fidelivm ministris & 
sacrarum literarum cultoribus longè vtilissima ac pernecessaria [...].  
Antverpiæ: ex officina Hieronymi Verdvssi, M.DC.XIV [1614]. 
 
 
  333   
John Gower. Carmen super Multiplici Viciorum Pestilencia. | Yeager, R. F., trans. 
John Gower: the Minor Latin Works [with In Praise of Peace, ed. Michael 
Livingston], ed. & trans. R. F. Yeager. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute 
Publications for TEAMS, 2005. Available online. 
 
John of Salisbury. Entheticus. | Laarhoven, Jan van, ed. & trans. John of Salisbury’s 
Entheticus Maior and Minor. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des 
Mittelalters 17. 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1987. 
 
Joinville. | Wedgwood, Ethel, trans. The Memoirs of the Lord Joinville. London: John 
Murray, 1906. 
 
Juvenal. and Persius | Braund, Susanna Morton, ed. & trans. Juvenal and Persius. 
Loeb Classical Library 91. London: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
 
Kendall, Timothy. Flovvers of Epigrams, out of sundrie the moste singular authors 
selected, as well auncient as late writers: Pleasant and profitable to the expert 
readers of quicke capacitie.. . Imprinted at London in Poules Churche-yarde, 
at the signe of the Brasen Serpent, by Ihon Shepperd. 1577. [STC (2nd ed.) / 
14927]. A reprint of Kendall’s Flovvres appears as Publications of the Spenser 
Society 15. Manchester: Charles Simms for The Spenser Society, 1874. 
 
Langland. Piers Plowman. | London, British Library Additional MS 35157.  
 
Lapidaries. | Pannier, Léopold. Les Lapidaires Français du Moyen Âge des XIIe, XIIIe 
et XIVe Siècles. Paris: Vieweg, 1882. 
 
Libellus de diuersus ordinibus. | Constable, Giles and Bernard S. Smith, edd. & trans. 
Libellus de Diversis Ordinibus et Professionibus qui sunt in Æcclesia. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2003. 
 
Liber de Spiritu et Anima. PL vol. 40, coll. 779-832. 
 
Life of Christina of Markyate. | Talbot, C. H., ed. & trans., The Life of Christina of 
Markyate, a Twelfth-Century Recluse. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. 
 
Macrobius. Commentary on The Dream of Scipio.| Stahl, William Harris, ed. & trans. 
Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, by Macrobius. Records of Western 
Civilization. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952; repr. 1990. 
 
Middle English Lyrics. | Luria, Maxwell, and Richard Lester Hoffman, edd. Middle 
English Lyrics. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974. 
 
Mum and the Sothsegger and Richard the Redeless. | Dean, James McMurrin. Richard 
the Redeless and Mum and the Sothsegger. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute 
Publications for TEAMS, 2000. 
 
Old English Miscellany. | Morris, Richard, ed. Old English Miscellany: containing a 
bestiary, Kentish sermons, proverbs of Alfred, religious poems of the thirteenth 
century from manuscripts in the British Museum, Bodleian Library, Jesus 
College Library, etc. EETS o.s. 49. London: N. Trübner for the Early English 
Text Society, 1872; repr. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1997.  
  334   
Parodies. | Lehmann, Paul, ed. Die Parodie im Mittelalter: mit 24 ausgewählten 
parodistischen Texten. rev. ed. Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1963. 
 
Peter Damian. Letters. | Resnick, Irven M., ed. & trans. Peter Damian: Letters 121-
150. The Fathers of the Church, Mediæval Continuation 6. Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2004. 
 
Peter Damian. Letters. | S. Petri Damiani S. R. E. Cardinalis Epistolarum Libro Octo: 
Liber Septimus, ad Sæculares Principes. PL vol. 144, coll. 433-460D. 
 
Political Songs. | Coss, Peter R., ed. Thomas Wright’s Political Songs of England from 
the Reign of John to that of Edward II. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. 
 
Pope Gregory I. Cura pastoralis. | Davis, Henry, trans. Gregory the Great: Pastoral 
Care. Ancient Christian Writers 11. Westminster:  Newman Press, 1950. 
 
Pope Innocent III (as cardinal Lothario dei Segni). De miseria humanæ condicionis. | 
Howard, Donald R., ed. and Mary Dietz, trans., On the Misery of the Human 
Condition. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,1969. 
 
Pricke of Conscience. | Morris, Richard, ed. The Pricke of Conscience (Stimulus 
conscientiæ): a Northumbrian Poem [...]. Berlin: A. Asher & Co. for the 
Philological Society, 1863. 
 
Pseudo-Bernardus Clarævallensis (Pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux). Meditationes 
piisimæ de cognitione humanæ conditionis. PL 184, coll. 485A-508B. 
 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite via  John Scotus Eriugena. Excerpts from 
Expositiones in Ierarchiam cœlestem Iohannis Scoti Eriugenæ. | Rorem, Paul, 
ed. and trans. Eriugena’s Commentary on the Dionysian Celestial Hierarchy. 
Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediæval Studies, 2005. 
 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. De Mystica Theologia. | Harrington, L. Michael. A 
Thirteenth-Century Textbook of Mystical Theology at the University of Paris: 
the Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite in Eriugena’s Latin 
Translation, with the Scholia translated by Anastasius the Librarian and 
Excerpts from Eriugena’s Periphyseon. Dallas Medieval Texts and  
Translations 4. Leuven: Peeters, 2004. 
 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. De Mystica Theologia. | McEvoy, James, ed. & 
trans. Mystical Theology: the Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary 
of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia. Dallas Medieval Texts and 
Translations 3. Leuven: Peeters, 2003. 
 
Richard of St. Victor. De eruditione hominis interioris. PL 196, coll. 1229-1366A. 
 
Richard of St. Victor. De exterminatione mali et promotione boni. PL 196, coll. 
1073C-1088A. 
 
  335   
Rowlands, Samuel. Look to it: for, Ile Stabbe ye. Imprinted at London by E. Allde for 
W. Ferbrand, and George Loftes, and are to be solde in Popeshead Allie. 1604. 
[STC (2nd ed.) / 21398]. 
 
Rowlands, Samuel. The Letting of Hvmours Blood in the Head-Vaine, with a new 
Morisco, daunced by seauen Satyres, vpon the bottome of Diogines Tubbe. At 
London, printed for W. White for W. F. 1600. [STC (2nd ed.) / 21393.5]. 
 
Seneca. Apocolocyntosis. | Ball, Allan Perley, ed. and trans. The Satire of Seneca on 
the Apotheosis of Claudius, Commonly Called the ΑΠΟΚΟΛΟΚΥΝΤΩΣΙΣ: a 
Study. Columbia University Studies in Classical Philology. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1902. 
 
Simon of Gaunt [de Gandavo]. Sermon Preached at Oxford on Ash Wedneday, 11 
February 1293. | In Oxford Theology and Theologians c. AD 1280-1502, edd. 
Franz Pelster and Andrew George Little, pp. 205-15. Oxford Historical Society 
96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934. 
 
Sir Frederic Madden. Diaries. | The Diaries of Sir Frederic Madden, MSS Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, Engl. Hist. c. 140-182. London: World Microfilms 
Productions in association with the Bodleian Library, 1973. Microfilm. 
 
Sir Frederic Madden. Diaries. | Rogers, T. D., ed., Sir Frederic Madden at Cambridge: 
extracts from Madden’s diaries 1831, 1838, 1841-2, 1846, 1859 and 1863. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Bibliographical Society, 1980. 
 
Solomon and Saturn. | Cross, James E. and Thomas D. Hill, edd. The Prose Solomon 
and Saturn and Adrian and Ritheus. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1982. 
 
Speculum stultorum. | Mozley, J. H., trans. “Nigel Longchamp,” Speculum stultorum: 
a Mirror for Fools: the Book of Burnel the Ass. South Bend: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1963. 
 
Speculum stultorum. | Nigel of Longchamps. Speculum stultorum, edd. John H. 
Mozley and Robert R. Raymo. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960. 
 
Speght, Thomas, ed. The Workes Of Ovr Ancient and learned English Poet, Geffrey 
Chavcer, newly Printed. [...]  London: Adam Islip, 1602. 
 
Statutes of the Realm. | Pickering, Danby, ed. & trans. The Statutes at Large, from the 
Fifteenth Year of King Edward III to the Thirteenth Year of King Henry IV 
inclusive. vol. 2 (15 Edw. 3 to 13 Hen. 4). Cambridge: Joseph Bentham, 1762. 
 
Thesaurus Proverbiorum Medii Ævi: Lexicon der Sprichwörter des romanisch-
germanischen Mittelalters, edd. Samuel Singer et al. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997. 
Thomas Brinton. Sermon 41 (1374). | The Sermons of Thomas Brinton, Bishop of 
Rochester, ed. Sister Mary Aquinas Devlin. 2 vols. Camden Society, 3rd 
Series, 85-86. London: Camden Society, 1954. 
 
Thomas of Chobham. Sermo XIX. | In Sermones, ed. F. Morenzoni. CM 82A. 1993. 
CLCLT database online. 
  336   
Thomas of Erceldoune. | Brandl, Alois, ed. Thomas of Erceldoune. Sammlung 
Englischer Denkmäler in Kritischen Ausgaben 2. Berlin: Weidmannsche 
Buchhandlung, 1880. 
 
Tractatus Garsiæ de Albino et Rufino. | Thomson, Rodney M., ed. and trans. Tractatus 
Garsiæ, or the Translation of the Relics of SS. Gold and Silver.  Leiden: Brill, 
1973. 
 
Trigg, Stephanie, ed. Wynnere and Wastoure. | Trigg, Stephanie, ed. Wynnere and 
Wastoure. EETS 297. Oxford: Oxford  University Press, 1990. 
Walter Map. Dissuasio Valerii ad Rufinum. | Hanna, Ralph and Traugott Lawler, edd., 
Jankyn’s Book of Wikked Wyves, vol. 1 (“The Primary Texts”), pp. 121-148. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997. 
 
Walter of Châtillon. Satiric Poetry. | Levine, Robert, trans. Satirical Poems of Walter 
of Châtillon, after the editions of K. Strecker (q.v.). Available online. 
 
Walter of Châtillon. Satiric Poetry. | Strecker, Karl, ed. Die Lieder Walters von 
Châtillon in der Handschrift 351 von St. Omer. orig. Die Gedichte Walters von 
Châtillon, vol. 1. Berlin: Weidmann, 1925; repr. 1964. 
 
Walter of Châtillon. Satiric Poetry. | Strecker, Karl, ed. Moralisch-satirische Gedichte 
Walters von Châtillon: aus deutschen, englischen, französischen, und 
italienischen Handschriften. orig. Die Lieder Walters von Châtillon, vol. 2 (vel 
suppl.). Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1929. 
 
Warton, Thomas. The History of English Poetry, from the Close of the Eleventh to the 
Commencement of the Eighteenth Century [...].  4 vols. London: Thomas Tegg, 
1824. 
 
Wells, H.G. “The Island of Doctor Moreau.” Seven Famous Novels by H.G. Wells, pp. 
69-157. New York: Garden City Publishing, 1934. 
 
William Durandus. Rationale divinorum officiorum. | In Guillelmus Duranti senior, 
dictus Speculator: Rationale diuinorum officiorum (libri I - UIII), ed. A. 
Davril, T. M. Thibodeau, CM140 and CM140A (with B. G. Guyot). 1995-1998 
(140); 2000 (140A). CLCLT database online. 
 
William Durandus. Rationale divinorum officiorum. | Neale, John Mason and 
Benjamin Webb, edd. The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments: a 
Translation of the First Book of the Rationale Divinorum Officiorum written 
by William Durandus, sometime Bishop of Mende. London: Gibbings and 
Company, 1893. 
 
Wynnere and Wastoure. | Ginsberg, Warren, ed. Wynnere and Wastoure and The 
Parlement of the Thre Ages. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications for 
TEAMS, 1992. 
 
 
 
 
 
  337   
Secondary Sources 
 
 
Abrams, M. H., ed. A Glossary of Literary Terms, with Geoffrey Galt Harpham. 9th 
ed. Boston: Wadsworth Cengage, 2009. 
 
Ackerman, Robert W. and Gretchen Ackerman, edd. Sir Frederic Madden: a 
Biographical Sketch and Bibliography. New York: Garland, 1979. 
 
Adams, Joseph Quincy[, Jr.]. “Willyam Goddard.” Correspondence. Modern 
Language Notes 32.3 (1917): 187. 
 
Adams, Robert. Chapter 3: “Langland’s Theology.” In A Companion to Piers 
Plowman, ed. John A. Alford, pp. 87-114. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988. 
 
Aers, David. “Imagination and Ideology in Piers Plowman.” Literature and History 7 
(1978): 2-19. 
 
Alberi, Mary. “‘The Better Paths of Wisdom’: Alcuin’s Monastic ‘True Philosophy’ 
and the Worldly Court.” Speculum 76.4 (2001): 896-910. 
 
Alford, John A. “Haukyn’s Coat: Some Observations on Piers Plowman B.XIV.22-
27.” MÆ 43 (1974): 133-38. 
 
Alford, John A. “The Role of the Quotations in Piers Plowman.” Speculum 52 (1977): 
80-99. 
 
Alford, John A. Review of John Norton-Smith, William Langland. Speculum 61.1 
(1986): 192-195. 
 
Alford, John A., Chapter 1: “The Design of the Poem.” A Companion to Piers 
Plowman, pp. 29-64. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 
 
Alford, John A. Piers Plowman: a Guide to the Quotations. Medieval & Renaissance 
Texts & Studies 77. Binghamton: SUNY Binghamton, 1992. 
 
Alford, John A. “Langland’s Learning.” YLS 9 (1995): 1-7 [response by Andrew 
Galloway, pp.10-15]. 
 
Astell, Ann W. Chapter 2: “‘Full of Enigmas’: John Ball’s Letters and Piers 
Plowman.” Political Allegory in Late Medieval England, pp. 44-72. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999. 
 
Balint, Bridget. Chapter 3: “Situating the Self.” Ordering Chaos: the Self and the 
Cosmos in Twelfth-Century Latin Prosimetrum, pp. 77-105. Leiden: Brill, 
2009. 
 
Barney, Stephen A. Chapter 4: “Allegorical Visions.” In A Companion to Piers 
Plowman, ed. John A. Alford, pp. 117-33. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988. 
 
  338   
Barney, Stephen A. The Penn Commentary on Piers Plowman. Vol. 5: C Passūs 20-
22; B Passūs 18-20. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
 
Bartlett, Robert. England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 1075-1225. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
Bayless, Martha. Parody in the Middle Ages: the Latin Tradition. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996. 
 
Bennett, Nicholas. “Pastors and Masters: the Beneficed Clergy of North-East 
Lincolnshire, 1290-1340.” In The Foundations of Medieval English 
Ecclesiastical History: Studies Presented to David Smith, edd. Philippa 
Hoskin, Christopher Brooke, and Barrie Dobson, pp. 40-62. Studies in the 
History of Medieval Religion 27. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2005. 
 
Berlière, Ursmer. L’Ascèse Bénédictine au Moyen Âge. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 
1927. 
 
Bestul, Thomas H. Satire and Allegory in Wynnere and Wastoure. Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1974. 
 
Bloomfield, Morton W. Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth-Century Apocalypse. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962. 
 
Bloomfield, Morton W.  “The Gloomy Chaucer.” In Veins of Humor, ed. Harry Levin, 
pp. 57-68. Harvard English Studies 3. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1972. 
 
Borges, Jorge Luis. “Kafka and his Precursors,” trans. J. E. Irby. Labyrinths: Selected 
Stories and Other Writings, aug. ed., pp.199-201. New York: New Directions, 
1964. 
 
Bowers, John M. Chaucer and Langland: the Antagonistic Tradition. South Bend: 
University of Notre Dame, 2007. 
 
Boyle, Leonard E. “The Oculus Sacerdotis and Some Other Works of William of 
Pagula.” Pastoral Care, Clerical Education, and Canon Law, 1200-1400, item 
IV, pp. 81-110. London: Variorum Reprints, 1981. 
 
Boyle, Leonard E. Chapter 14: “Canon Law before 1380.” In History of the University 
of Oxford, ed. J. I. Catto, pp. 531-64. vol. 1: The Early Oxford Schools. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
 
Boyle, Leonard E. “The Fourth Lateran Council and Manuals of Popular Theology.” 
In The Popular Literature of Medieval England, ed. Thomas Heffernan, pp. 
30-43. Tennessee Studies in Literature 28. Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1985. 
 
Braund, Susanna Morton. “Libertas or Licentia? Freedom and Criticism in Roman 
Satire.” In Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, edd. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph 
Mark Rosen, pp. 409-28. Mnemosyne 254. Leiden: Brill, 2004. 
 
  339   
Brent, J. Justin. “From Address to Debate: Generic Considerations in the Debate 
between Soul and Body.” Comitatus 32 (2001): 1–18. 
 
Brewer, Charlotte. Editing Piers Plowman: the Evolution of the Text. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Bruce, Scott. G. “Uttering No Human Sound.” Silence and Sign Language in Medieval 
Monasticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Buckley, Christopher. No Way to Treat a First Lady. New York: Random House, 
2002. 
 
Bultot, Robert. Christianisme et Valeurs Humaines: A (La Doctrine du Mépris du 
Monde, en Occident, de S. Ambroise à Innocent III): Tome IV (le XIe siècle): 
vol. 1 (Pierre Damien), a.k.a. 4.1. Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1963. 
 
Bultot, Robert. Christianisme et Valeurs Humaines: A (La Doctrine du Mépris du 
Monde, en Occident, de S. Ambroise à Innocent III): Tome IV (le XIe siècle): 
vol. 2 (Jean de Fécamp, Hermann Contract, Roger de Caen, Anselme de 
Canterbury), a.k.a. 4.2. Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1964. 
 
Bultot, Robert. “Méthode et Conditionnement: Réponse à propos de S. Pierre 
Damien.” Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique 40 (1964): 481-492Bultot, Robert. 
“Anthropologie et Spiritualité: à propos du contemptus mundi dans l’école de 
Saint-Victor.” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 51 (1967): 
3-38. 
 
Bultot, Robert. “La Chartula et l’Enseignement de Mépris du Monde dans les Écoles 
et les Universités Médiévales.” Studi Medievali, ser. 3, 8:2 (1967): 787-834. 
 
Bultot, Robert. “Les Philosophes du Paganisme, Docteurs et Exemples de Contemptus 
Mundi pour la Morale Médiévale.” Studia Gratiana XIX: Mélanges G. 
Fransen, vol. 1. (1976): 103-22. 
 
Bultot, Robert. “Le Conflit entre l’Aspiration au Bonheur et l’Idéologie du 
Contemptus Mundi.” In L’Idée de Bonheur au Moyen Âge: actes du colloque 
d’Amiens de mars 1984, ed. Danielle Buschinger, pp. 87-96. Göppingen: 
Kümmerle, 1990. 
 
Bultot, Robert. “Aux Sources du Divorce entre l’Église et le Monde Moderne: la 
doctrine du mépris du monde.” In Rêves de Chrétienté, Réalités du Monde: 
imaginaires Catholiques, edd. Laurence van Ypersele and Anne-Dolorès 
Marcelis, pp. 17-58. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2001. 
 
Burrow, J. A. “The Action of Langland’s Second Vision,” Essays in Criticism 15 
(1965): 247-68; repr. in Style and Symbolism in Piers Plowman: a Modern 
Critical Anthology, ed. Robert J. Blanch, pp. 209-27. Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1969. 
 
Burrow, J. A. Chapter 6: “The Audience of Piers Plowman.” Essays on Medieval 
Literature, pp. 102-16. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
 
  340   
Burrow, J. A. “The Two Ploughs of Piers Plowman (B XIX 430).” N&Q 54.2 (2007): 
123-24. 
 
Bynum, Caroline Walker. “Docere verbo et exemplo”: an Aspect of Twelfth-Century 
Spirituality. Harvard Theological Studies 31. Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979. 
 
Callaey, Frédégand. L’Idéalisme Franciscain Spirituel au XIVe Siècle: étude sur 
Ubertin de Casale. Louvain: Bureau de Recueil de Travaux du Universite de 
Louvain, 1911. 
 
Cargill, Oscar. “The Date of the A-text of Piers Ploughman,” PMLA 47 (1932): 354-
62. 
 
Carruthers, Mary. “On Affliction and Reading, Weeping and Argument: Chaucer’s 
Lachrymose Troilus in Context.” Representations 93 (2006): 1-21. 
 
Catto, J. I. Chapter 5: “Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford, 1356-1430.” In History of 
the University of Oxford, edd. J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans, pp. 175-261. vol. 2: 
Late Medieval Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
 
Cecchetti, Igino. “‘Tibi silentium laus.’” Miscellanea Liturgica in Honorem L. 
Cuniberti Mohlberg, vol. 2, pp. 521-70. Rome: Edizioni Liturgiche, 1949. 
 
Chadwick, Henry. “The Ascetic Ideal in the History of the Church.” In Monks, 
Hermits, and the Ascetic Tradition, ed. W. J. Sheils. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1985. 
 
Chambers, A. B. “‘I was but an inverted tree’: Notes toward the History of an Idea,” 
Studies in the Renaissance 8 (1961): 291-99. 
 
Chesterton, G. K. Chapter 5: “The Flag of the World.” Orthodoxy, pp. 119-47. New 
York: John Lane, 1908.  
 
Chevallier, Louis and Henri Rondet. “L’Idée de Vanité dans l’Œuvre de Saint 
Augustin.” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 3.3 (1957): 221-34. 
 
Clark, Elizabeth A. “Dissuading from Marriage: Jerome and the Asceticization of 
Satire.” In Satiric Advice on Women and Marriage: from Plautus to Chaucer, 
ed. Warren S. Smith, pp. 154-81. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2005. 
 
Clark, James G., ed. The Culture of Medieval English Monasticism. Studies in the 
History of Medieval Religion 30. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2007. 
 
Clopper, Lawrence M. “Songes of Rechelesnesse”: Langland and the Franciscans. 
Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Civilization. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michgan Press, 1997. 
 
Coing, Helmut. “English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law.” 
Law Quarterly Review 71 (1955): 223-41.  
 
Cole, Andrew. “William Langland’s Lollardy.” YLS 17 (2003): 25-54. 
  341   
Colish, Marcia L. Chapter 3: “The Satirists.” The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the 
Middle Ages, vol. 1, pp. 159-224. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1990. 
 
Constable, Giles. “The Popularity of Twelfth-Century Spiritual Writers in the Late 
Middle Ages.” In Renaissance: Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, edd. Anthony 
Molio and John A. Tedeschi, pp. 5-28. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1971. 
 
Constable, Giles. “Monachisme et Pélerinage au Moyen Âge,” repr. in Religious Life 
and Thought (11th-12th Centuries), item III, pp. 1-27. London: Variorum, 
1979. 
 
Craun, Edwin D.  “‘Ʒe by Peter and by Poul!’: Lewte and the Practice of Fraternal 
Correction.” YLS 15 (2001): 15-25 [responses by David C. Fowler and 
Lawrence M. Clopper on pp. 26-29 and 30-32 respectively]. 
 
Craun, Edwin D. Ethics and Power in Medieval English Reformist Writing. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
 
Crislip, Andrew. “The Sin of Sloth or the Illness of the Demons? The Demon of 
Acedia in Early Christian Monasticism.” Harvard Theological Review 98.2 
(2005):143-69. 
 
Curley, Michael J. “The Cloak of Anonymity and ‘The Prophecy of John of 
Bridlington.’” Modern Philology 77.4 (1980): 361-69. 
 
Daley, Suzanne. “Storm Kills 62 in France, Switzerland and Germany.” The New York 
Times (Dec. 27, 1999). 
 
Daley, Suzanne. “An Ill Wind Gives Versailles the Push it Needs.” The New York 
Times (Jan. 20, 2000). 
 
Daniélou, Jean. Platonisme et Théologie Mystique: essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de 
Saint Grégoire de Nysse. Paris: Éditions Montaigne,1944. 
 
de Bazelaire, Louis. “Connaissance de Soi.” Dictionnaire de Spiritualité Ascétique et 
Mystique, Doctrine et Histoire, ed. Marcel Viller, coll. 1511-43. Vol. 11. Paris: 
Beauchesne et Fils, 1948. 
 
de Boer, Bertilo, “La Soi-Disant Opposition de Saint François d’Assise à Saint 
Benoît.” Études Franciscains 8 (1957): 181-94 & 9 (1958): 57-65. 
 
Delatte, Paul. Commentaire sur la Règle de Saint Benoît. rev. ed. Solesmes: Abbaye 
de Saint Pierre de Solesmes, 1969. 
 
Delumeau, Jean. Sin and Fear: the Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture, 13th to 
18th Centuries, trans. Eric Nicholson. New York: St. Martin’s, 1990[; orig. Le 
Peché et La Peur]. Paris: Fayard, 1983. 
 
DeMoss, W. F. “Spenser’s Twelve Moral Virtues ‘According to Aristotle.’” Modern 
Philology 16.1 (1918): 23-38 and 16.5 (1918): 245-270. 
 
  342   
Derrida, Jacques. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” 
In The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: the Structuralist 
Controversy, edd. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, pp. 247-65. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.  
 
Dobson, R. B. Chapter 13: “The Religious Orders, 1370-1540.” In History of the 
University of Oxford, edd. J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans, pp. 539-79. vol. 2: Late 
Medieval Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
 
Donaldson, E. Talbot. Introduction. In Piers Plowman (William Langland): a Norton 
Critical Edition, trans. Donaldson, edd. Elizabeth A. Robertson and Stephen H. 
A. Shepherd. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006.  
 
Eliason, Eric Jon. “‘Vanitas vanitatum’: Piers Plowman, Ecclesiastes, and Contempt 
of the World.”  Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1989. 
 
Elliott, Thomas J. “Middle English Complaints against the Times: to Contemn the 
World or to Reform it?” Annuale Medievale 14 (1973): 22-34. 
 
Endres, Joseph Anton. Honorius Augustodunensis: Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
Geistigen Lebens im 12. Jahrhundert. Münich: Jos. Kösel’schen, 1906. 
 
Evans, T. A. R. Chapter 12: “The Number, Origins, and Careers of Scholars” In 
History of the University of Oxford, edd. J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans, pp. 485-
538. vol. 2: Late Medieval Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
 
Farmer, Hugh. “William of Malmesbury’s Commentary on Lamentations.” Studia 
Monastica 4.2 (1962): 283-311. 
 
Farrell, Thomas. “Hybrid Discourse in the General Prologue Portraits.” Studies in the 
Age of Chaucer 30 (2008): 39-93. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2001. 
 
Fradenburg, L. O. Aranye. Chapter 4: “(Dis)Continuity: a History of Dreaming.” 
[elsewhere titled “Dreaming in the Middle Ages: Chaucer and Freud.”] In The 
Post-Historical Middle Ages, edd. Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Federico, pp. 87-
116. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
Frank, Karl Suso. ΑΓΓΕΛΙΚΟΣ ΒΙΟΣ: Begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum 
“engelgleichen Leben” im frühen Mönchtum. Münster: Aschendorffsche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964. 
 
Frank, Robert Worth. “The Pardon Scene in Piers Plowman.” Speculum 26.2 (1951): 
317-31. 
 
Frank, Robert Worth. “The ‘Hungry Gap,’ Crop Failure, and Famine: the Fourteenth-
Century Agricultural Crisis and Piers Plowman.”  YLS 4 (1990): 87-104.  
  343   
Franzen, Christine. The Tremulous Hand of Worcester: a study of Old English in the 
thirteenth century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
Freccero, John. Chapter 2: “The Firm Foot on a Journey Without a Guide.” Dante: the 
Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff, pp. 29-54. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Freccero, John. Chapter 6: “The Neutral Angels.” Dante: the Poetics of Conversion, 
ed. Rachel Jacoff, pp. 110-18. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 
 
Freeman, Edward Augustus. The History of the Norman Conquest: its Causes and its 
Results. 6 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1873-1879. 
 
Galloway, Andrew. “The Rhetoric of Riddling in Late-Medieval England: the 
‘Oxford’ Riddles, the Secretum philosophorum, and the Riddles in Piers 
Plowman.” Speculum 70.1 (1995): 68-105. 
 
Galloway, Andrew. “Chaucer’s Former Age and the Anthropology of Craft.” ELH 63 
(1996): 535-53. 
 
Galloway, Andrew. “Word-Play and Political Satire: Solving the Riddle of the Text of 
Jezebel.” MÆ 68.2 (1999): 189-208. 
 
Gardner, Elizabeth J. Chapter 5: “The English Nobility and Monastic Education, c. 
1100-1500.” In The Cloister and the World: Essays in Medieval History in 
Honour of Barbara Harvey, edd. John Blair and Brian Golding, pp. 80-94. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. Chapter 5: “Ideology and Consciousness.” Central Problems in 
Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis, pp. 
165-97. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 
 
Gillespie, Vincent. Chapter 6: “[The Study of Classical Authors] from the Twelfth 
Century to c. 1450.” In The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 2 
(“The Middle Ages”), edd. Alastair Minnis and Ian Johnson, pp. 145-235. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 (first paperback ed., 2009). 
 
Godden, Malcolm. “Plowmen and Hermits in Langland’s Piers Plowman.” RES n.s. 
35.138 (1984): 129-63. 
 
Gollancz, Sir Israel. “The Middle Ages in the Lineage of English Poetry.” Printed 
Lecture. London: Harrap & Co., 1920. 
 
Gough, Alfred B[radly]. “Who was Spenser’s Bon Font?” MLR 12.2 (1917):140-145. 
 
Gradon, Pamela. “Langland and the Ideology of Dissent.” Proceedings of the British 
Academy 66 (1982 for 1980): 179-205. 
 
Gwynn, E. Aubrey. The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1940. 
 
  344   
Habinek, Thomas. “Satire as Aristocratic Play.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Roman Satire, ed. Kirk Freudenberg, pp. 177-91. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Hamilton, A. C. “Spenser and Langland.” Studies in Philology 55.4 (1958): 533-48. 
 
Hammer, Jacob. “A Commentary on the Prophetia Merlini (Geoffrey of Monmouth’s 
Historia Regum Britanniæ, Book VII). Speculum 10.1 (1935): 3-30 and 
continued in Speculum 15.4 (1940), pp. 409-31. 
 
Hanna, Ralph. William Langland. Authors of the Middle Ages/English Writers of the 
Late Middle Ages 3. Aldershot: Variorum, 1993 
 
Hanna, Ralph. Pursuing History: Middle English Manuscripts and their Texts. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. 
 
Hanna, Ralph. “Will’s Work.” In Written Work: Langland, Labor, and Authorship, 
edd. Steven Justice and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, pp. 23-66. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997 
 
Hanna, Ralph, Tony Hunt, R. G. Keightley, Alastair Minnis, and Nigel F. Palmer. 
Chapter 14: “Latin Commentary Tradition and Vernacular Literature.” In The 
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 2 (“The Middle Ages”), edd. 
Alastair Minnis and Ian Johnson, pp. 363-421. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005 (first paperback ed., 2009). 
 
Hanna, Ralph. Review of Wendy Scase, Literature and Complaint in England, 1272-
1553. RES n.s. 59.238 (2008): 137-38. 
 
Harris, Jennifer A. “The Body as Temple in the High Middle Ages.” In Sacrifice in 
Religious Experience, ed. Albert I. Baumgarten, pp. 233-56. Leiden: Brill, 
2002. 
 
Harris, Jennifer A. “The Place of the Jerusalem Temple in the Reform of the Church in 
the Eleventh Century,” Ph.D. diss, University of Toronto, 2002. 
 
Harris, Jennifer. “Peter Damian and the Architecture of the Self.” In Das Eigene und 
das Ganze: zum Individuellen im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum, ed. Gert 
Melville, pp. 131-57. Vita regularis (Ordnungen und Deutungen religiosen 
Lebens im Mittelalter) 16, gen. edd. Gert Melville and Jörg Oberste. Münster: 
Lit, 2002. 
 
Harrison, Martin Leigh. “Cluniac Promotion of Pilgrimage.” The Encylopedia of 
Medieval Pilgrimage, edd. Larissa J. Taylor et al., pp. 111-12. Leiden: Brill, 
2010. 
 
Harrison, Martin Leigh. “Palmer.” The Encyclopedia of Medieval Pilgrimage, edd. 
Larissa J. Taylor et al., pp. 480-483. Leiden: Brill, 2010. 
 
Hart, Thomas Elwood. “Medieval Structuralism: ‘Dulcarnoun’ and the Five-Book 
Design of Chaucer’s Troilus.” The Chaucer Review 16.2 (1981): 129-170.     
 
  345   
Heist, William W. The Fifteen Signs before Doomsday. East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 1952. 
 
Hill, Thomas D. “Parody and Theme in the Middle English ‘Land of Cockaygne.’” 
N&Q  220 (1975): 55-59. 
 
Hill, Thomas D. “The Unchanging Hero: a Stoic Maxim in The Wanderer and its 
Contexts.” Studies in Philology 101.3 (2004): 233-49. 
 
Hodges, Laura Fulkerson. Chaucer and Clothing: Clerical and Academic Costume in 
the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales. Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 
2005. 
 
Hooley, Daniel M. Roman Satire. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. 
 
Howard, Donald R. “The Contempt of the World: a Study in the Ideology of Latin 
Christendom with Emphasis on Fourteenth-Century English Literature.” Ph.D. 
diss, University of Florida, 1954. 
 
Howard, Donald R. Chapter 2: “Renaissance World-Alienation.” In The Darker Vision 
of the Renaissance: Beyond the Fields of Reason, ed. R. S. Kinsman, pp. 64-
75. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. 
 
Howard, Donald R. The Idea of the Canterbury Tales. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976. 
 
Howard, Donald R. The Three Temptations: Medieval Man in Search of the World. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. 
 
Humphreys, K. W. The Book Provisions of the Mediæval Friars, 1215-1400. Safaho 
Monographs, Published by the Safaho Foundation for Promotion of 
Bibliographic Research, gen. ed. Abraham Horodisch 2: Studies in the History 
of Libraries and Librianship, ed. K. W. Humphreys 1. Amsterdam: Erasmus  
Booksellers, 1964. [400 copies printed.] 
 
Humphreys, K. W. The Friars’ Libraries. Corpus of British Medieval Library 
Catalogues. London: The British Library in association with the British 
Academy, 1990. 
 
Hyams, Paul R. “What did Henry III of England Think in Bed (and in French) about 
Kingship and Anger?” In Anger’s Past: the Social Uses of an Emotion in the 
Middle Ages, ed Barbara Rosenwein, pp. 92-124. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998. 
 
Hyams, Paul R. Rancor & Reconciliation in Medieval England. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Resnick, I. M. “Risus Monasticus: Laughter and Medieval Monastic Culture,” Revue 
Bénédictine 97 (1987): 90-100. 
 
  346   
Isen, Alice M. and Gregory Andrade Diamond. “Affect and Automaticity.” In 
Unintended Thought, edd. James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh. New York: 
Guilford, 1989. 
 
Jacques Le Goff, “Le Rire dans les Règles Monastiques du Haut Moyen Âge,” in Haut 
Moyen Âge: Culture, Education, et Société: études offerts à Pierre Riché, edd. 
Claude Lepelley et al., pp. 92-103. Nanterre: Éditions Publidix and La 
Garenne-Colombes: Éditions Européenes Erasme, 1990. 
 
Jaeger, C. Stephen. “Cathedral Schools and Humanist Learning, 950-1150.” repr. in 
Scholars and Courtiers: Intellectuals and Society in the Medieval West, item I, 
pp. 568-616. Variorum Collected Studies Series CS 753. Burlington: Ashgate, 
2002. 
 
Jaeger, C. Stephen. “Humanism and Ethics at the School of St. Victor in the Early 
Twelfth Century.” repr. in Scholars and Courtiers: Intellectuals and Society in 
the Medieval West, item III, pp. 51-79.Variorum Collected Studies Series, CS 
753. Burlington: Ashgate, 2002. 
 
James, M. R. “The Catalogue of the Library of the Augustinian Friars at York: now 
first edited from the manuscript at Trinity College, Dublin.” In Fasciculus J. 
W. [Ioanni Willis] Clark dicatus, n. ed. 2-96. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1909. 
 
Jehl, Rainer. “Acedia and Burnout Syndrome: from an Occupational Vice of the Early 
Monks to a Psychological Concept in Secularized Professional Life.” In In the 
Garden of Evil: the Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages, ed. Richard 
Newhauser, pp. 455-76. Papers in Mediæval Studies 18. Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediæval Studies, 2005. 
 
Jirsa, Curtis Roberts-Holt. “Piers Plowman and the Invention of the Lyric in the 
Middle Ages.” Ph.D. diss, Cornell University, 2008. 
 
Johnson, David Frame. “‘In somnium, in visionem’: the Figurative Significance of 
Sleep in Piers Plowman,” in Loyal Letters: Studies on Mediæval Alliterative 
Poetry & Prose, edd. L. A. J. R. Houwen and Alasdair A. MacDonald, pp. 
239-60. Gröningen: Egbert Forsten, 1994. 
 
Justice, Steven. “The Genres of Piers Plowman.” Viator 19 (1988): 291-306. 
 
Kane, George. Piers Plowman: the Evidence for Authorship. London: Athlone Press, 
1965. 
 
Kaske, R. E. “Langland and the Paradisus Claustralis.” MLN  82.7 (1957): 481-83. 
 
Kaske, R. E. “Piers Plowman and Local Iconography.” Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes 31 (1968): 159-69. 
 
Kaske, R. E. “Holy Church’s Speech and the Structure of Piers Plowman.” In Chaucer 
and Middle English Studies in Honour of Rossell Hope Robbins, ed. Beryl 
Rowland, pp. 320-27. London: Allen & Unwin, 1974. 
 
  347   
Kaske, R. E. “The Character Hunger in Piers Plowman.” In Medieval English Studies 
Presented to George Kane, edd. Edward Donald Kennedy and Joseph S. 
Wittig, pp. 187-97. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1988. 
 
Kaulbach, Ernest N. Imaginative Prophecy in Piers Plowman. Cambridge: D. S.  
Brewer, 1993. 
 
Keane, Catherine. “Introduction: Satiric Intersections: Theory, Practice, and Literary 
History.” Classical and Modern Literature 22.2 (2002): 1-5. 
 
Keane, Catherine. “Satiric Memories: Autobiography and the Construction of Genre.” 
The Classical Journal 97.3 (2002): 215-31. 
 
Keane, Catherine. “The Critical Contexts of Satiric Discourse.” Classical and Modern 
Literature 22.2 (2002): 7-31. 
 
Kelen, Sarah. Langland’s Early Modern Identities. The New Middle Ages. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
 
Kerby-Fulton, Kathryn. Chapter 5: “Leaven of Hope: New Leadership and Joachite 
Apocalypticism.” Reformist Apocalypticism and Piers Plowman, pp. 162-200. 
Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 7. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
 
Kerby-Fulton, Kathryn and Steven Justice. “Langlandian Reading Circles and the 
Civil Service in London and Dublin, 1380-1427.” New Medieval Literatures 1 
(1997): 59-83. 
 
Kerby-Fulton, Kathryn. Chapter 19: “Piers Plowman.” In The Cambridge History of 
Medieval English Literature, ed. David Wallace, pp. 513-38. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Kernan, Alvin B. “Aggression and Satire: Art Considered as a Form of Biological 
Aggression.” In Literary Theory and Structure: Essays in Honor of William K. 
Wimsatt, edd. Frank Brady, John Palmer, and Martin Price, pp. 115-29. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. 
 
Kittredge, George Lyman. “Chaucer and Maximianus.” American Journal of 
Philology 9 (1888): 84-85. 
 
Knight, Charles. The Literature of Satire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
 
Knight, S. T. “Satire in Piers Plowman.” In Piers Plowman: Critical Approaches, ed. 
S. S. Hussey, 279-309. London: Methuen, 1969. 
 
Knowles, David. From Pachomius to Ignatius: a Study in the Constitutional History of 
the Religious Orders. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. 
 
Knuuttila, Simo. Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2004 (rev. Alan Perreiah, forthcoming in Transcendent Philosophy, 
through personal correspondence).  
  348   
Kramer, Susan R. and Caroline Walker Bynum. “Revisiting the Twelfth-Century 
Individual: the Inner Self and the Christian Community.” In Das Eigene und 
das Ganze: zum Individuellen im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum, edd. Gert 
Melville and Markus Schürer, pp. 57-85. Vita regularis (Ordnungen und 
Deutungen religiosen Lebens im Mittelalter) 16, gen. edd. Gert Melville and 
Jörg Oberste. Münster: Lit, 2002. 
 
Kruger, Steven F. “Mirrors and the Trajectory of Vision in Piers Plowman.” Speculum 
66.1 (1991): 74-95. 
 
Laemers, Jeroen W. J. “Claustrum Animæ: the Community as Example for Interior 
Reform.”  In Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century, edd. István Pieter 
Bejczy and Richard Newhauser. Leiden: Brill, 2005. 
 
Law, Vivien. “Why Write a Verse Grammar?” Journal of Medieval Latin 9 (1999): 
46-76. 
 
Lawler, Traugott. “The Secular Clergy (again): a Brief Rejoinder to Míċeál Vaughan’s 
Response.” Forum. YLS 17 (2003): 203-07. 
 
Lazzari, Francesco. “Le ‘Mépris du Monde’ chez Saint Bernard.” In Le Mépris du 
Monde, special ed. of the Revue d’Ascétique et Mystique 40 (1964): 185-96, 
repr. in Le Mépris du Monde: la notion de mépris du monde dans la tradition 
spirituelle occidentale, by M. de Certeau, L. Cognet, J. Daniélou, R. Grégoire, 
J.-C. Guy, F. Lazzari, J. Leclercq, P. Mesnard, M. Mollat, and P. Vallin. Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 1965. 
 
Lazzari, Francesco. “S. Pierre Damien et le Contemptus Mundi: à propos d’un livre 
récent.” Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique 40 (1964): 185-96. 
 
Leclercq, Jean. Review of C[eslas]. Spicq, Esquisse d’une Histoire de l’Exégèse 
Latine au Moyen Âge. Bulletin Thomiste (1942-1945): 59-67. 
 
Leclercq, Jean. La Vie Parfaite: points de vue sur l’essence de l’état religieux. 
Turnhout: Brepols, 1948. 
 
Leclercq, Jean. L’Amour des Lettres et le Désir de Dieu: initiation aux auteurs 
monastiques du moyen âge.  Paris. Éditions du Cerf, 1957; Misrahi, Catherine, 
trans. The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: a Study of Monastic 
Culture. 3rd ed. New York: Fordham University Press, 1982 
 
Leclercq, Jean. “Le Cloître est-il un Paradis?” In Le Message des Moines à Notre 
Temps, edd. Fumasoni Biondi et al., pp. 141-59. Paris: Fayard, 1958. 
 
Leclercq, Jean. “La Séparation du Monde dans le Monachisme au Moyen Âge.” In La 
Séparation du Monde, ed. Albert Plé, pp. 75-94. Problèmes de la Religieuse 
d’Aujourd’hui 16. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1961. 
 
Leclercq, Jean. Otia monastica: études sur le vocabulaire de la contemplation au 
Moyen Âge. Rome: Orbis Catholicus/Herder, 1963. 
 
  349   
LeFebvre, Charles. “Évangélique (Dénonciation).”Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique, 
vol. 5, coll. 557-69. 
 
Leicester, H. Marshall. The Disenchanted Self: Representing the Subject in the 
Canterbury Tales. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 
 
Lehrer, Jonah. “Depression’s Upside.” The New York Times Magazine (February 28, 
2010): 38-[44?]. Available online. 
 
Lerner, Robert E. “The Black Death and Western European Eschatological 
Mentalities.” American Historical Review 86.3 (1981): 533-52. 
 
Lewis, Robert E. and Angus McIntosh, A Descriptive Guide to the Manuscripts of 
Prick of Conscience. MÆ Monographs, n.s. 12. Oxford: Society for the Study 
of Mediæval Languages and Literature, 1982. 
 
Leyser, Conrad. Authority and Asceticism from Augustine to Gregory the Great. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. 
 
Lynn, Thérèse Ballet. Recherches sur l’Ambiguité et la Satire au Moyen Âge. Paris: 
Nizet, 1977.  
 
Maddicott, J. R. “Poems of Social Protest in Early Fourteenth-Century England.” 
England in the Fourteenth Century: Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton 
Symposium, ed. W. M.Ormrod, pp. 130-44. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1986. 
 
Madoff, Ray D. “Dog Eat your Taxes?” Op-Ed. The New York Times (July 9, 2008). 
Available online. 
 
Mann, Jill. Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire: the Literature of Social Classes and 
the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973. 
 
Mann, Jill. “‘Luditur Illusor’: the Cartoon World of the Ysengrimus.” Neophilologus 
61.4 (1977): 495-509. 
 
Mann, Jill. “Satiric Subject and Satiric Object in Goliardic Literature.” 
Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 15 (1980): 63-86. 
 
Mann, Jill. “The Power of the Alphabet: a Reassessment of the Relation between the 
A and B Versions of Piers Plowman.” YLS 8 (1994). 21-50. 
 
Mansfield, Mary C. The Humiliation of Sinners: Public Penance in Thirteenth-
Century France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 
 
Mason, Wyatt. “My Satirical Self.” The New York Times Magazine (September 17, 
2006): 72-77. Available online. 
 
McCabe, R. A. “Elizabethan Satire and the Bishops’ Ban of 1599.” Yearbook of 
English Studies 11 (1981): 188-94. 
 
  350   
McRae, Andrew. Literature, Satire, and the Early Stuart State. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Menache, Sophia and Jeannine Horowitz. L’Humour en Chaire: le rire dans l’Église 
médiévale. Paris: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1994. 
 
Meyvaert, Paul. “John Erghome and the Vaticinium Roberti Bridlington.” Speculum 
41.4 (1966): 656-64. 
 
Meyvaert, Paul. “The Medieval Monastic Claustrum.” Gesta 12 (1973): 53-59. 
 
Middleton, Anne. “Narration and the Invention of Experience: Episodic Form in Piers 
Plowman.” In The Wisdom of Poetry: Essays in Early English Literature in 
Honor of Morton W. Bloomfield, edd. Larry D. Benson and Siegfried Wenzel, 
pp. 91-122. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan 
University, 1982. 
 
Middleton, Anne. “The Audience and Public of Piers Plowman.” In Middle English 
Poetry and its Literary Background: Seven Essays, ed. David Lawton, pp. 101-
23. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1982. 
 
Middleton, Anne. Introduction: “The Critical Heritage.” In A Companion to Piers 
Plowman, ed. John A. Alford, pp. 1-25. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988. 
 
Middleton, Anne. “William Langland’s Kynde Name: Authorial Signature and Social 
Identity in Late Fourteenth-Century England.” In Literary Practice and Social 
Change in Britain, 1380-1530, ed. Lee Patterson, pp. 15-82. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990. 
 
Middleton, Anne. “Acts of Vagrancy: the C-Version ‘Autobiography’ and the Statute 
of 1388.” In Written Work: Langland, Labor, and Authorship, edd. Steven 
Justice and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, pp. 208-317. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1997. 
 
Milis, Ludo. Angelic Monks and Earthly Men: Monasticism and its Meaning to 
Medieval Society. Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999. 
 
Milis, Ludo. “Monks, Canons, and the City: a Barren Relationship?” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 32 (2002): 667-88. 
 
Miller, Paul Scott. “The Mediæval Literary Theory of Satire and its Relevance to the 
Works of Gower, Langland, and Chaucer.” Ph.D. diss., Queen’s University of 
Belfast, 1982. 
 
Moskin, Julia. “Late Blight Fungus Threatens Tomato Crop.” The New York Times 
(July 17, 2009). Available online. 
 
Muehlberger, Ellen. “Ambivalence about the Angelic Life: the Promise and Perils of 
an Early Christian Discourse of Asceticism.” Journal of Early Christian 
Studies 16.4 (2008): 447-78. 
 
  351   
Mühlethaler, J.-C. “Les Masques du Clerc pour Parler aux Puissants: fonctions du 
narrateur dans la satire et la littérature ‘engagée’ aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles.” Le 
Moyen Âge: revue d’histoire et de philologie 96 (1990): 265-86. 
 
Mulhern, J.C. “ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ in Aristotle.” In Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, edd. 
Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Mark Rosen, pp. 312-39. Mnemosyne 254. Leiden: 
Brill, 2004. 
 
Murray, Alexander. Chapter 4: “Philosophy.” Suicide in the Middle Ages. vol. 2: The 
Curse on Self-Murder, pp. 122-51. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
Murray, Alexander. Chapter 11: “The Sin of Despair.” Suicide in the Middle Ages. 
vol. 2: The Curse on Self-Murder, pp. 369-95. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998. 
 
Nagy, Piroska. Le Don des Larmes: un instrument spirituel en quête d’institution (Ve-
XIIIe siècle). Paris: Albin Michel, 2000. 
 
Nagy, Piroska. “Individualité et Larmes Monastiques: une Expérience de Soi ou de 
Dieu?” In Das Eigene und das Ganze: zum Individuellen im mittelalterlichen 
Religiosentum, edd. Gert Melville and Markus Schürer, pp. 107-29. Vita 
regularis (Ordnungen und Deutungen religiosen Lebens im Mittelalter) 16. 
Münster: Lit, 2002. 
 
Nault, Jean-Charles, trans. Christina Strafaci. “Acedia: Enemy of Spiritual Joy.” 
Communio 31 (2004): 236-59. 
 
Navatel, Jean-Joseph. “La Dévotion Sensible, les Larmes, et les Exercices de Saint 
Ignace.” Collection de la Bibliothèque des Exercices de Saint Ignace 64 
(1920): 3-19. 
 
Navia, Luis E. Diogenes of Sinope: the Man in the Tub. Contributions in Philosophy 
67. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998. 
 
Nicolosi, Salvatore. “Contemptus mundi” e “Redemptio mundi” nella Dottrina Morale 
di S. Bonaventure. Doctor Seraphicus 29 (1982): 61-72. 
 
Norton-Smith, John. William Langland. Leiden: Brill, 1983.   
 
Orme,  Nicholas. Chapter 3: “The Teaching of Grammar,” pp. 86-127. Medieval 
Schools: from Roman Britain to Renaissance England (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006). 
 
Owst, G. R. Preaching in Medieval England. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1926. 
 
Parkes, M. B. Chapter 11: “The Provision of Books.” In History of the University of 
Oxford, edd. J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans, pp. 407-83. vol. 2: Late Medieval 
Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
 
Parsons, Ben. “An Unrecognized Reference to a Latin Satire in Langland’s Piers 
Plowman.” N&Q n.s. 57.1 (2010): 27-29. 
  352   
Paxson, James J. “Piers Plowman: the Copula(tion)s of Figures in Medieval 
Allegory.” In The Erotics of Rhetorical Copulas, Archaic to Early Modern, 
special issue of the Rhetoric Society Quarterly [29.3] (1999): 21-29.  
 
Pearsall, Derek. “Langland and Lollardy: from B to C.” YLS 17 (2003): 7-23. 
 
Pepin, Ronald E. “Juvenal X: a Paradigm for Medieval Contemptus Mundi Poems.” 
Latomus 49 (1990): 473-478. 
 
Perrin, Curtis Maxwell. “Excursus A: Will as Fool.” “Langland’s Comic Vision,” pp. 
263-77. Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2005. 
 
Peter, John Desmond. Complaint and Satire in Early English Literature. Oxford: 
Carendon Press, 1956. 
 
Potkay, Monica Brzezinski. “The Parable of the Sower and Obscurity in the Prologue 
to Marie de France’s Lais.” Christianity and Literature 57.3 (2008): 355-78. 
 
Pranger, M. B. The ‘Artificiality’ of Christianity: Essays on the Poetics of 
Monasticism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
 
Ralby, Aaron Francis. “The Pœnitentiale Pseudo-Ecgberti and the Old English 
Precepts.”   N&Q n.s. 57.1 (2010): 6-10. 
 
Reynolds, Suzanne. Medieval Reading: Grammar, Rhetoric, and the Classical Text. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Rhodes, Gillian. Superportraits: Caricatures and Recognition. Hove: Psychology 
Press, 1997. 
 
Rice, Nicole. Lay Piety and Religious Discipline in Middle English Literature. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Rigg, A.G. “John of Bridlington’s Prophecy: a New Look.” Speculum 63.3 (1988): 
596-613. 
 
Rochais, H.-M. “Contribution à l’Histoire des Florilèges Ascétiques du Haut Moyen 
Âge Latin: le Liber scintillarum.” Revue Bénédictine 63 (1953): 246-91. 
 
Rosenbloom, Stephanie. “Names that Match Form a Bond on the Internet.” The New 
York Times, April 12, 2008. Available online. 
 
Rosenwein, Barbara. “Worrying about Emotions in History.” American Historical 
Review 107 (2002): 821-45. 
 
Rosenwein, Barbara. Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006. 
 
Sacks, Oliver. “Cupid’s Disease.” The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat, pp. 102-
104. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985. 
 
  353   
Salmon, P. (Abbé de St.-Jérôme). “Le Silence Religieux: pratique et théorie.” 
Mélanges Bénédictins, Publiés à l’Occasion du XIVe Centenaire de la Mort de 
Saint Benoît par les Moines de l’Abbaye de Saint-Jérôme de Rome, pp. 13-57. 
Abbaye Saint Wandrille: Éditions de Fontenelle (1947). 
 
Salter, Elizabeth, as Elizabeth Zeeman. “Piers Plowman and the Pilgrimage to Truth,” 
Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association n.s. 11 (1958): 1-
16, repr. in Style and Symbolism in Piers Plowman, ed. Robert J. Blanch, pp. 
117-31. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969. 
 
Scanlon, Larry. “The King’s Two Voices: Narrative and Power in Hoccleve’s 
Regement of Princes.” In Literary Practice and Social Change in Britain, 
1380-1530, ed. Lee Patterson, pp. 216-47. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990. 
 
Scase, Wendy. Piers Plowman and the New Anticlericalism. Cambridge Studies in 
Medieval Literature 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
 
Scase, Wendy. “Satire.” In The Encylopedia of Medieval Literature, edd. Robert 
Thomas Lambdin and Laura Cooner Lambdin, p. 665-66. Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2000. 
 
Scase, Wendy. Literature and Complaint in England, 1272-1553. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
 
Schlegel, Catherine M. Satire and the Threat of Speech: Horace’s Satires, Book 1. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. 
 
Schmidt, A.V.C. “The Inner Dreams in Piers Plowman.” MÆ 55.1 (1986): 24-40. 
 
Schmidt, Paul Gerhard. “The Quotation in Goliardic Poetry: the Feast of Fools and the 
Goliardic Strophe cum auctoritate.” In Latin poetry and the Classical 
Tradition: Essays in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, edd. Peter Godman 
and Oswyn Murray, pp. 39-55. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990. 
 
Schmitt, Jean-Claude. “Recueils Franciscains d’Exempla et Perfectionnement des 
Techniques Intellectuelles du XIIIe au XVe Siècle.” Bibliothèque de l’École 
des Chartes 105 (1977): 5-21. 
 
Schmitz, Gerhard. “ ‘...quod rident homines, plorandum est’: Der ‘Unwert’ des 
Lachens in monastich geprägten Vortestellungen der Spätantike und des frühen 
Mittelalters.” In Stadtverfassung—Verfassungsstaat—Pressepolitik: Festschrift 
für Eberhard Naujoks zum 65. Geburtstag, edd. Quarthal and Setzler, pp. 3-15. 
Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1980. 
 
Séguy, Jean. “L’Ascèse dans les Sectes d’Origine Protestante.” Archives de Sociologie 
des Religions 9.18 (1964): 55-70. 
 
Sheehan, M.W. Chapter 5: “The Religious Orders, 1220-1370.” In History of the 
University of Oxford, ed. J. I. Catto, pp. 193-224. vol. 1: The Early Oxford 
Schools. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
  354   
Simpson, James. “From Reason to Affective Knowledge: Modes of Thought and 
Poetic Form in Piers Plowman.” MÆ 55.1 (1986):1-23. 
 
Simpson, James. “The Constraints of Satire in Piers Plowman and Mum and the 
Sothsegger. In Langland, the Mystics, and the Medieval English Religious 
Tradition, edd. Helen Phillips and S. S. Hussey, pp. 11-30. Cambridge: D. S. 
Brewer, 1990. 
 
Skulsky, Harold. “Spenser’s Despair Episode and the Theology of Doubt.” Modern 
Philology 78.3 (1981): 227-42. 
 
Smith, D. Vance. “Principium” [Chapter 7]: “Beginning Perfection: the Theology of 
Inception,” s.vv. “Incipient Puns: the Inauguration of Dowel.” The Book of the 
Incipit: Beginnings in the Fourteenth Century, pp. 194-197. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001. 
 
Solomon, Andrew. Chapter 8: “History.” The Noonday Demon: an Atlas of 
Depression. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.  
 
Somerset, Fiona. “Expanding the Langlandian Canon: Radical Latin and the Stylistics 
of Reform.” YLS 17 (2003): 73-92. 
 
Spencer, H. L. Chapter 10: “Sermon Literature.” In A Companion to Middle English 
Prose, ed. A. S. G. Edwards, pp. 151-74. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2004. 
 
Spurgeon, Caroline Frances Eleanor, ed. Five Hundred Years of Chaucer Criticism 
and Allusion, 1357-1900. 7 vols. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co. for 
the Chaucer Society and H. Frowde for Oxford University Press, 1914-1925. 
 
Stirman, Shannon Wiltsey and Pennebaker, James W. “Word Use in the Poetry of 
Suicidal and Nonsuicidal Poets.” Psychosomatic Medicine 63 (2001): 517-522. 
 
Stock, Brian. “The Self and Literary Experience in Late Antiquity and the Middle 
Ages.” New Literary History 25.4 (1994): 839-52. 
 
Szittya, Penn R. The Antifraternal Tradition in Middle English Literature. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986. 
 
Taylor, Rupert. The Political Prophecy in England. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1911. 
 
Thacker, Alan. “Monks, Preaching, and Pastoral Care in Early Anglo-Saxon England.” 
In Pastoral Care before the Parish, edd. John Blair and Richard Sharpe, pp. 
137-70. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992. 
 
Thomson, Rodney M. “The Origins of Latin Satire in Twelfth Century Europe.” 
Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 13 (1978): 73-83. 
 
Thomson, Rodney. “What is the Entheticus?” In The World of John of Salisbury, ed. 
Michael Wilks, pp. 287-301. Studies in Church History Subsidia 3. Blackwell 
for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1994. 
 
  355   
Trevor, Douglas. The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Troyer, Pamela Luff. Review of John M. Bowers, Chaucer and Langland: the 
Antagonistic Tradition. Rocky Mountain Review 62.2 (2008): 96-98. 
 
Tucker, Samuel Marion. Verse Satire in England before the Renaissance. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1908. 
 
Van Engen, John. “The Future of Medieval Church History.” Church History 71.3 
(2002): 492-522. 
 
Van Luchene, Stephen Robert. Chapter 5: “Frankenstein.” “Essays in Gothic Fiction: 
from Horace Walpole to Mary Shelley,” pp. 149-221. Ph.D. diss., University 
of Notre Dame, 1973. 
 
van ‘t Spijker, Ineke. “Peter Damian and the Homo Interior: Life as a Work of Art.” 
Latin Culture in the Eleventh Century: Proceedings of the Third International 
Conference on Medieval Latin Studies, edd. Michael W. Herren, Christopher 
James McDonough, and Ross Gilbert Arthur, pp. 464-75. Publications of the 
Journal of Medieval Latin 5, vol. 2. Turnhout: Brepols, 1998. 
 
van ‘t Spijker, Ineke. Chapter 4: “Richard of St. Victor: Exegesis and the Inner Man.” 
Fictions of the Inner Life: Religious Literature and the Formation of the Self in 
the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, pp. 129-84. Turnhout: Brepols, 2004. 
 
Vandenbroucke, François. Moines: Pourquoi? théologie critique du monachisme. 
Gembloux: Duculot, 1967. 
 
Warren, Ann K. Anchorites and their Patrons in Medieval England. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985. 
 
Wathen, Ambrose G. Silence: the Meaning of Silence in the Rule of St. Benedict. 
Cistercian Studies Series 22. Washington, D.C.: Consortium Press for 
Cistercian Publications, 1973. 
 
Watson, Nicholas. “Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval England: 
Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel’s 
Constitutions of 1409.” Speculum 70 (1995): 822-64. 
 
Wenzel, Siegfried. The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. 
 
Wenzel, Siegfried. Chapter 6: “Sermons.” In A Companion to Piers Plowman, ed. 
John A. Alford, pp. 155-72. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 
 
Wetherbee, Winthrop. “Goliardic Verse.” In The New Princeton Encyclopedia of 
Poetry and Poetics, edd. Alex Preminger, T. V. F. Brogan, et al., n. pag. 
(online access). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Available online. 
 
White, Hugh. “Langland’s Ymaginatif, Kynde, and the Benjamin major.” MÆ 55 
(1986): 241-48. 
  356   
 
Whitehead, Christiana. “Making a Cloister of the Soul in Medieval Religious 
Treatises,” MÆ  67 (1998): 1-29. 
 
Wiesen, David S. St. Jerome as a Satirist: a Study in Christian Latin Thought and 
Letters. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964. 
 
Wittig, Joseph S. “Piers Plowman B, Passūs IX-XII: Elements in the Design of the 
Inward Journey.” Ph.D. diss, Cornell University, 1969; Traditio 28 (1972): 
211-280. 
 
Wittig, Joseph S. William Langland Revisited. New York: Twayne, 1997. 
 
Witke, Charles. Chapter 9: “Walter of Châtillon: Apologies for Stability.” Latin 
Satire: the Structure of Persuasion, pp. 233-66. Leiden: Brill, 1970.  
 
Wong, Jennifer. “Public Chaucer: Translation and the Uses of Prose,” Ph.D. diss., 
Washington University, 2002. 
 
Wright, Thomas. The Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth 
Century. London: Longman & Co., 1872. 
 
Wycislo, William E. Seneca’s Epistolary Responsum: the De Ira as Parody. Studien 
zur klassichen Philologie 124, gen. ed. Michael von Albrecht.  Berlin: Peter 
Lang, 2001. 
 
Yeager, R. F. John Gower’s Poetic: the Search for a New Arion. Publications of the 
John Gower Society 2. Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 1990. 
 
Yunck, John A. The Lineage of Lady Meed: the Development of Mediæval Venality 
Satire. Publications in Mediæval Studies 17. South Bend: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1963. 
 
Yunck, John A. Chapter 5: “Satire.” In A Companion to Piers Plowman, ed. John A. 
Alford, pp. 135-54. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 
 
Zeeman, Nicolette. “The Condition of Kynde.” In Medieval Literature and Historical 
Inquiry: Essays in Honor of Derek Pearsall, ed. David Aers, pp. 1-30. 
Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 2000. 
 
Ziolkowski, Jan M. “The Humour of Logic and the Logic of Humour in the Twelfth-
Century Renaissance.” Journal of Medieval Latin 3 (1993): 1-26. 
 
Ziolkowski, Jan M. “Theories of Obscurity in the Latin Tradition.” Mediævalia 19 
(1996 for 1993): 101-170. 
 
Ziolkowski, Jan M. “Satire.” In Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. 14 
(“Supplement”), ed. William Chester Jordan, pp. 554-57. New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 2004. 
 
